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PREFACE
The final consolidated report of the programme "co-ordinated studies in view of the future round of
multilateral trade negotiations in the agriculture and food sector" is the last deliverable of a project
which started in March 1998.
At that moment, the common view was that both the commitments agreed upon in 1994, within the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), and the next round of multilateral tade
negotiations, scheduled to start by the end of year 1999, would be likely to impose further constraints
on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and require additional adjustments in Common Market
Organisations (CMOs). This is in that context that this programme started with the aim of co-
ordinating a task force working on the preparation of the coming round of multilateral negotiations
under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The main purpose of the project was to provide a set of studies, in connection with policymakers,
involving a comprehensive economic analysis of the main issues of the next round of multilateral
negotiations, as well as their consequences for the future of the CAP, and quantitative assessments of
the likely effects of WTO proposals on the European Union (EU) agriculhre.
Such a purpose gave the project a somewhat specific status. On the one hand, it was clear since the
beginning that the proposed analyses would be policy-oriented and that the task force involved would
work closely with EU decision makers. To this regard, one very positive aspect of the project is that it
has benefited, during its overall lifetime, of the sustained following and support from the DG
Agriculture. On the other hand, as a FAIR programme, the project should not be limited to market and
policy expert evaluation but also include genuine research work. It was therefore for all partners a
challenge to develop analyical tools, based on economic theory, which outcomes would be directly
useful for EU trade negotiators and decision makers.
The financing by the European Commission has allowed us to design a set of tools and to carry out
work for making them relevant to analyse the main issues of multilateral negotiations, their
consequences in terms of CAP reforms and the effects of various policy options for EU agriculture.
Provided tools are different in nature. They include databases, synthetic indicators, theoretical models
and applied simulation models. The financing by the European Commission also made it possible to
co-ordinate our efforts in using these tools for providing policymakers with sound economic and
policy-oriented analyses, with a view to support trade negotiations and assist planning in the EU
agricultural and food sector.
This consolidated report presents methodologies used, models developed and main findings per
research task.
Finally, as co-ordinator of the project, I want to thank the European Commission for financing this
research. I hope that the outcome is meeting the expectations and that our results are useful for EU
trade negotiators and policymakers. I also want to express my gratitude to DG Agriculture for the help
and support we benefited all along the project's life. I am particularly indebted to Marina
Mastrostefano for her constant following. Her involvement and her active contribution to our meetings
as well as to our work have constituted an invaluable support for the co-ordinator in leading this
project through to a successful conclusion. Moreover her kindness and her sustained encouragement
were a great help for the co-ordinator in doubtful moments.
Lastly, I would like to thank involved partners. The good finalisation of this project relies on their
excellent scientific contributions. I greatly thank all researchers and assistants that have participated to
this project for the sizeable and high-quality work they have carried out.
INTRODUCTION
The background to the FAIRS-CT97-3481 programme
The FAIR5-CT97-3481programme started on the beginning of 1998. At that time, the consequences
of the basic provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (JRAA) for the European
Union (tIE) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were well documented in the literature (e.g.,
Josling and Tangermann, L992; Guyomard and Mahé, 1993; Helmar et al., 1994; Guyomard et al.,
1996; Swinbank, 1996; Tangermann,1996). And all existing studies agreed that the major consûaint
the AAUR would impose on EU agriculture would lie in the export commitments. The commitments
to reduce domestic support would impose no adjustment needs on the CAP because of the
accommodating heatment of AMS (Aggregate Measure of Support) reductions, in particular the
exclusion of 1992 CAP reform compensatory payments from AMS computation. In the same way,
tariffication of border measures and the new access provisions in the form of current access and
minimum access tariff quotas would marginally improve the price competitiveness of imports into the
EU over the six-year implementation period.
The common view however was that, although the immediate quantitative effects of the URAA on EU
agriculture would likely to be modest, its significance should not be underestimated. In fact,
"recognising that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and
protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process", Article 20 of the Agreement
includes a commitment to engage in a new round of multilateral agricultural negotiations before the
end of 1999. Thus, the placement of agriculture on the agenda of multilateral negotiations and the
definition of a negotiation framework in the form of three main areas, i.e., internal support, market
access and export competition, are two features of major significance of the URAA (Vanzetti, L996\.
Then, at the beginning of 1998, it was expected that the next round of V/orld Trade Organisation
(!VTO) talks (the so-called Millenium Round) would use again the negotiation framework of the
Uruguay Round and that the proponents of reform (particularly the United States and the Caims
group) would push for further commitments in terms of intemal support reduction, market access
improvement and export subsidy cut. In addition, by announcing that all the support provided to
farmers under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 would qualiff for the so-
called "green" box, the United States (US) had indicated their willingness to challenge the exemption
of a large share of EU farm support from reduction commitment (the so-called "blue box" issue). On
the other hand, the mandate given to the US Trade Representative by the Agriculture and Food
Consultative Committee suggested that EU intemal regulations relative to competition, norms, quality
standards, etc would likely to be challenged in the Millenium Round.
From the EU perspective, it was expected that not only the URAA commitments would probably
require a significant adjustment ofEuropean agriculture around the year 2000, but the next round of
WTO negotiations would be likely to impose further constraints on the CAP, and require larger
changes in Common Market Organisations (European Commission, 1997; FAPRI, 1998; USDA,
1998; OECD,1999).
The objectives of the FAIRS-CT9 7-3 48 1 programme
In that context, the aim of the FAIR5-CT97-348I programme was to co-ordinate a task force working
on the preparation of the Millenium Round. The purpose of the prograrnme was to provide a set of
studies, in connection with policymakers, involving:
- comprehensive economic analyses of the main issues of the next round of multilateral negotiations;
- databases and indicators on trade and tariffs for the EU as well as other major trading countries;
- assessments of the world market environment and prices as well as of the forecasted effects of WTO
reform proposals;
- quantitative assessments of the economic impact of WTO proposals on EU agriculture, including
simulations on reforms of Common Market Organisations (CMOs) which could be necessary to
comply with these proposals;
- assessments of the effects of proposed "regulatory reforms" on the EU agro-food industry, with
special attention paid to the trade effects of food standards and food labelling.
More specifically, the following operational objectives have been retained:
1. Assess the ctrrent intemational trade environment, which will form the basis of the next round of
multilateral negotiations.
2. Develop effective measures of trade restrictions, encompassing domestic support as well as tariffs
and non-tariff measures such as food safety and quality standards, and develop effective measures of
decoupled domestic support.
3. Evaluate the impact of hade reforms on world markets and, in turn, the implications for European
agriculture and the food processing industries.
4. Assess the degree to which food safety and quality standards act as impedance to hade and the
implications of regulatory reforms on trade flows.
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5. Define an appropriate classification of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) which assesses the degree to
which such measures impede trade and/or actually address market failures, which can be applied to
assess the impact of regulatory reforms.
6. Overall, to provide a comprehensive analysis of policy reforms and trade in agriculture and food
products within the European Union to support future hade negotiations and aid planning in the
agricultural and food sectors.
Presentation of tasles and subtasks
In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the research has been organised into three tasks,
further divided into subtasks to facilitate effective management. For each task or subtask, a co-
ordinator has been appointed who was responsible for the methodology, co-ordination and final
analysis (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Tasks, subtasks and co-ordinators
r Task l: Analysis of the international trade environment for agricultural and food products
- Subtask l. I : Development of a database on tade (co-ordinator: partner 2, INRA-ESR Grignon)
-Subtaskl.2: Constructing indicators of hade restriction, measures of protection and support, and assessing the
consequences of choosing a particular indicator (co-ordinator: Partner 1, INRA-ESR Rennes)
- Subtask 1.3: Assessing the development of the world market environment and world market prices using a revised
and updated version of the TRADE model (co-ordinator: partner 3, University of Bonn)
o Task 2: Quantitative assessments of the economic impact of policy reforms on agriculture and the food sector in
the European Union
- Subtask 2.1: Arable crops (co-ordinator: partner I,II\IRA-ESR Rennes)
- Subtask 2.2: Dany (co-ordinator: partner 5, University of Wageningen)
- Subtask 2.3: Beef (co-ordinator: partner l,INRA-ESR Rennes)
- Subtask 2.4: W ine (co-ordinator: partner2, INRA-ESR Grignon)
o Task 3: Effect of proposed agreements in the area of regulatory reform on the EU agro-food industry
(co-ordinator: partner 4, University of Reading)
- Stage l: Survey of regulatory requirements
- Stage 2: Interviews
- Stage 3: Postal survey
- Stage 4: Estimation of market effects
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Additional hackground elements durtng the coarse of the FAIRS-CT97-3481 programme
Since the beginning of 1998, two main features have marked the background to the FAIR5-CT97-
3481 programme. First of all, in March 1999, the EU adopted a CAP reform package (Agenda 2000).
This reform basically extents the 1992 reform and inhoduces more decoupling in the system of
compensatory payments to COP (cereals, oilseeds and protein crops) producers. The Agenda 2000
reform was largely motivated by EU export commitments under the AAUR and the expectation that
these commitments would be strengthened in the Millenium Round (Desquilbet et al., 1999).
However, smoothing the EU East enlargement process and easing CAP budget pressures were also
important concerns supporting the Agenda 2000 reform.
Secondly, in December 1999, the Seattle ministerial conference marked the opening of the Millenium
Round. The first phase of multilateral negotiations (which ended in March 2001) has consisted of
countries submitting proposals containing their starting position for the negotiations. Hence, since the
early 2000, 125 WTO member govemments have submitted 45 proposals from which it is possible to
deduce the issues that are likely to be the major focus of the second phase of negotiations.
The synthesis of the overall received proposals provided by the WTO Secretariat (W'TO, 2001)
globally confirms the main issues that were expected at the beginning of the FAIR5-CT97'3481
programme. On the market access side, further tariff reductions should be negotiated, but how the
reductions will be handled is still undecided and appears as a major negotiating area. It is widely
recognised that the Uruguay Round (UR) calculated equivalent tariffs were very often too high to
allow real opportunity for imports. Hence, the discussion is likely to focus on various ways to define
and apply reduction rates, for market protection to be effectively reduced. I Regarding tariff-rate
quotas (TRQO there are several proposals for either replacing them with low tariffs or increasing their
size, but at the moment the discussion almost turns on quota administration. Many countries advocate
for increased scrutiny of methods used for giving exporters access to quotas. They add that it should
be clarified which methods are legal or illegal under WTO rules. On the export competition side, as
expected further reductions in export subsidies should be negotiated. Currently, some countries
propose the total elimination of export subsidies while others are prepared to negotiate further
progressive reductions. Finally, on the domestic support side, the received proposals deal with the
three "boxes". As expected further reduction of "amber box" measures should be negotiated. As in the
case of tariffs, how this additional reduction will be applied seems to be a major concern in
discussions. To this regard, some countries advocate that ceilings should be set for specific products
rather than having overall aggregated ceilings. Proposals dealing with the "green box" are of three
t Th. US for example proposes that the negotiations to reduce tariffs starts with applied tariffs instead of
generally higher corresponding bound tariffs.
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types. Unsurprisingly, some countries push for increased scrutiny of measures currently included,
arguing that some of them, in certain circumstances, could have an influence on production and prices.
Others think that the "green box" should not be changed because it is already satisfactory. The last
ones argue for a broadening of the "green box" to cover additional types of measures. Finally, as
expected, some countries want the "blue box" to be scrapped because it involves payments that are
only partly decoupled from production. Obviously, some other countries oppose scrapping it
completely and maintain that the "blue box" is an important tool for supporting and reforming
agriculture, and for achieving certain "non-trade" objectives.
The synthesis of proposals by the WTO Secretariat points out a certain number of other issues. These
were also expected issues at the beginning of the FAIR5-CT97-348I programme. However, we paid
lower attention to them when developing this programme. This is the case of, mainly, the extension of
the export subsidy discipline to all forms of subsidies (including the effect of state trading enterprises,
food aid and export credits) as well as "non-trade" concerns and multifunctionality.
All these additional background elements, which punctuated the programme's life, did not make us to
depart from the original plan. However, they contributed, in the finalisation stage, to bend the work
undertaken for integrating them into our analyses. Thus, as far as the Agenda 2000 reform is
concerned, we decided when defining the reference runs of all developed models, that they should
include this CAP change. It results that, within both subtask 1.3 and task 2, the analyses carried out
with, respectively, the world hade (the so-called WATSIM) model and the EU sectoral models for
arable crops, dairy and beef start with an examination of the impacts of the Agenda 2000 reform
package in each ofthese EU sectors.
Secondly, the proposals submitted by countries to the WTO oriented our work in mainly two areas. On
the one hand, they helped us to speciff the policy scenarios to be simulated with the various models.
Hence, within subtask 1.3, we retained, as a stylised liberalisation scenario, a policy scenario
replicating the main provisions of the URAA, which in view of the submitted proposals appears as a
possible outcome of the Millenium Round. Furthermore, as submitted proposals confirm that the
decoupling issue will be a major focus of the Millenium Round, this issue being of key importance for
the future of the CAP, we decided to integrate the decoupling dimension in most of our simulated
scenarios. Therefore, still within task 1.3, all simulated scenarios that were originally designed
assuming coupled CAP direct payments have been supplemented by alternative scenarios assuming a
greater degree of decoupling of these payments. In the same vein, within task 2, some policy scenarios
have been defined in order to shed some light on the degree of decoupling of the Agenda 2000 CAP
direct payment systems. On the other hand, following the growing debate around multifunctionality in
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'WTO submitted proposals, we oriented our last work undertaken on decoupling within subtask 1.2
towards this issue.
Outline of the report
In chapter l, methodologies used for the different subtasks are described. Chapter 2 refers to subtask
l.l and deals with the database on tariffs and frade. The modalities adopted to construct this database
as well as its content are first described. Then, a thorough assessment of the implementation of the
Uruguay Round market access discipline is provided. Chapter 3 refers to subtask 1.2 and focuses on
market protection indicators. Using the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) and the Mercantilist Trade
Restrictiveness Index (MTRI), a comparison of EU and US tariff structures before and after the
URAA implementation is proposed. This allows to assess and compare the improvement in market
access that was permitted in both countries by the Uruguay Round commitments on tariffs. In
addition, the effects of the actual URAA commitments are compared to altemative schemes of tariff
reductions such as the "Swiss formula" and the uniform tariff reduction. This makes it possible to
assess and compare the impact of the uneven allocation of tariff cuts across commodities implemented
by the EU and the US under the URAA. Chapter 4 also refers to subtask 1.2 and is concerned with the
decoupling issue. The first part of the analysis gives an overview of the main advantages and limits of
decoupling. The second part deals with the "green box" decoupling criteria as defined in Annex 2 of
the URAA. Two theoretical models are developed in order to compare the degree of decoupling of
various internal income support instruments, and in so doing to examine whether the corresponding
"green box" decoupling criteria are well-designed. Using an extended version of one of the above-
mentioned theoretical models, the last part of the analysis addresses the question of the relative merits
of naditional income support instruments as regards to the promotion of multifunctionality. Chapter 5
refers to subtask 1.3 and reports the analyses carried out with the WATSM (World Agricultural Trade
SlMulation) model. Firstly, a detailed description of the model is provided. Secondly, the reference
run of the model is presented and analysed, emphasising the tikely developments of the world market
environment, as the background to the Millenium Round. Thirdly, the results of a stylised
liberalisation scenario, as a fictitious outcome of the Millenium Round, are described and discussed.
Chapters 2 and 5 contribute to the first objective of the programme (assess the current international
hade environment which will form the basis of the next round of multilateral negotiations). Chapters 3
and 4 are devoted to the second objective of the programme (develop effective indicators of trade
restrictions and develop effective measures of decoupled domestic support). The third objective of the
programme (evaluate the impact of trade reforms on world markets and their implications for
European agriculture and the food processing industries) is dealt with in the last part of chapter 5 and
in the following chapters 6 to 10.
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Chapter 6 refers to subtask 2.I and, reports the analysis carried out with the EU sectoral model for
arable crops. Chapters 7 and 8 both refer to subtask 2.2. Chapter 7 is concerned with the model of the
EU's dairy and beef producing sector and related policy simulations. While chapter 8 concenfiates on
the model of the EU's milk processing sector and related performed simulations. Chapter 9 refers to
subtask 2.3 and focuses on the analysis carried out with the EU sectoral model for beef. Finally,
chapter 10 refers to subtask 2.4 and addresses the question of the welfare effects of an Appellation of
Origin using a software depicting a regional market regulated through an Appellation of Origin. hr all
these chapters, the model developed is presented first. Then, the reference run of the model is
described and the obtained results are discussed. Finally, alternative simulations performed with the
model are proposed and results are analysed. In chapters 6 to 9, altemative simulations corresponds to
policy change scenarios, while in chapter 10 they involve changes in some characteristics of the
regional market considered.
Chapters 1l and 12 both refer to task 3. The assessment of the impact of technical measures (or
standards) on EU agricultural and food exports to the United-States is the subject of chapter 11. The
chapter starts with an analysis and a review of literature centred on the definition and the classification
of technical measures, the impact of such measures on hade, the available methods for quantifring this
impact and the existing studies devoted to estimate this impact in the context of trade in agricultural
and food products. Then, the impact of US technical measures on EU agricultural and food exports to
the US is assessed combining various methods. Chapter 12 focuses on the economics of non-tariff
barriers. It proposes several analytical frameworks allowing to analyse the welfare effects of domestic
food quality and safety regulations and to examine their ability to address market failures. A particular
attention is paid to market failures resulting from risk and imperfect information.
Chapter 11 contributes to the fourth objective of the programme (assess the degree to which food
safety and quality standards hinder trade, and the implications of regulatory reform on trade flows).
Chapter 12 relates to the fifth objective of the programme (define an appropriate classification of non-
tariff barriers that assesses the degree to which such measures impede trade and/or actually address
market failures).
The overall report contibute to the sixth objective of the programme (to provide a comprehensive
analysis of domestic policies and hade reforms in agriculture and food products in the EU, with a view
to support future trade negotiations and to assist planning in the agricultural and food sector).
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1 - MATERIAL A}ID METHODS
As indicated in the infroduction, the research was divided into three tasks, further divided into eleven
subtasks (or stages, as far as task 3 is concerned). In this report, results ofthese eleven subtasks are
reported in chapters 2 to 12. However for purpose of rationalising the presentation, one chapter does
not necessarily correspond to one subtask, even if this is most often the case. In fact, when one subtask
conbibutes to several objectives or, at reverse, when several subtasks contribute to the same objective,
results are presented according to the objectives rather than according to the subtask they refer to. As
there is an obvious relationship between material and methods used and pursued objectives, applied
methodologies for this project are described following the framework of chapters 2 to 12.
It is important to emphasise that in next sections, material and methods used are described without
going into too much details since further descriptions are provided in each of chapters 2to 12.
1.1. The database on tariffs, tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) and trade (chapter 2)
Subtask 1.1 consists in the development of a database on tariffs and trade. The database has been
consfucted with the principle of matching all the relevant information to each counûry's official
schedule on bound tariffs, as submitted under the URAA.
As a result, the developed database is organised on the basis of the 8-digit Harmonised System (HS)
classification, for chapters 01, 02, 03 to 24 (that is, all food products with the exception of fisheries
products), and for selected items of chapters 29,31,35,38, 40,41,50,51 and52 (that is, non-food
agricultural products, such as skins for leather, etc). This introduced a lot of difficulty for gathering the
relevant information, since the list of commodities include some 2800 items.
The database has been constructed for a set of countries, namely Australia, Brazil, Canada, the EU,
Japan, Korea, Norway and the US. Datasets have been ôompleted in a satisfactory way for Canada, the
EU and the US. For other countries, datasets remained flawed because of problems in the
correspondence between the various sources of information. It was decided then, together with the
Commissionrs representatives, to focus on the Canada, the EU and the US, and to provide less
sophisticated data for other counties.
Hence, for Canada, the EU and the US, the constructed datasets include, in addition to the schedules
on base (1995) and bound tariffs (2000), import values, import quantities, unit values of imports
(under and out of the Most Favoured Nation status) and applied tariffs, for each year since 1995.
Moreover, as during the project's life the Commission's representatives highlighted the fact that the
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tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) are an important issue in the WTO negotiations, TRQ information have been
added to countries' datasets.
For the EU, data sources are mainly COMEXT for import values and quantities, and both the TARIC
and the UNCTAD's TRAINS databases for applied tariffs. Furthermore, obtained applied tariffs were
checked against the applied tariffs published in the Official Joumal of the European Communities. For
the US, hade and tariff data come mainly from the USITC (US International Trade Commission)
database, while for Canada most of the data are extracted from the Statistics Canada database. Finally,
for all three countries, the main sources for information on TRQS are the IIRAA schedules as well as
notifications that were obtained from the WTO Secretariat.
1.2. Market access indicators (chapter 3)
The part of subtask 1.2 devoted to market access is aimed at constructing indicators of frade restriction
and, on the basis of these indicators, assessing and comparing the improvement in market access that
was permitted in the UE and other countries by the IJRAA.
This part of subtask 1.2 has been ca:ried out by first conducting a thorough review of literature on
available methods to measure market protection. Relying on this review, the approach proposed by
Anderson and Neary, which develops theoretically consistent measures in terms of a given criterion of
equivalence among trade barriers, has been retained. More specifically, two indicators have been
retained : i) the TRI (Trade Restrictiveness Index), which corresponds to the uniform tariff equivalent
in terms of welfare (Anderson and Neary, 1994) and ii) the MTRI (Mercantilistic Trade
Restrictiveness Index), representing the uniform tariff equivalent in terms of imports (Anderson and
Neary, 1999), and which might be more relevant regarding trade negotiations.
The second step corresponds to the empirical implementation of the TRI and the MTRI in order to
assess and compare the change in market access in the EU and other countries due to the URAA.
Because the empirical estimation of indicators such as the TRI and the MTRI is very demanding in
terms of data and parameter requirement, it was decided to focus on the EU and the US.
The analysis involves three stages. Firstly, the rates of change of the UE and US TRI and MTRI
between 1995 and 2000 are computed using the base and bound tariffs of both countries as submitted
under the LTRAA. This first stage allows to assess and to compare how much liberalisation was
achieved in both countries by the end of the implementation period of the URAA, compared to the
initial situation. Secondly, the rates of change of the EU and US TRI and MTRI between 1995 and
2000 are computed using two other schemes of tariff reduction: the "Swiss formula" and the uniform
tariff reduction. In the case of the "Swiss formula", the resulting changes in the TRI and MTRI reflect
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the impact of tariff reduction commitments that would have focused more on reducing tariff dispersion
than the actual LIRAA tariff cuts. For the uniform tariff reduction, the resulting changes in the TRI and
MTRI measure the impact of tariff reduction commitments that would have focused more on reducing
tariff average than the actual URAA commitments. Hence, this second stage allows to assess and to
compare the impact of the uneven allocation of tariff cuts across commodities implemented by the EU
and the US under the URAA. Thirdly, the levels of the EU and US MTRI are computed for the years
1995 and 2000, using the same three schemes of tariff reduction than within the second stage. This
third stage adds information on the EU and US tariff structures at the beginning and at the end of the
URAA implementation period.
Prices, base and bound tariffs and import quantities required for computing the EU and US TRI and
MTRI were extracted from the database on tariffs and trade developed within subtask 1.1. Regarding
tariffs, for some commodities the EU and US schedules include a combination of ad-valorem and
specific tariffs, with sometimes thresholds on one or both tariff components. Therefore, specific
components were converted into ad-valorem equivalents by using the average 1995-1998 unit value of
imports (or exports when imports were not available, or a unit value of the most similar commodity as
a proxy when there was no trade in any of the four years). When tariff lines mentioned a threshold, the
highest possible tariffs were considered.
Data on total expenditures were taken from the GTAP (Global Trade Project Analysis) database
(version 4,Mc Dougall et al., 1998).
EU and US import elasticities were estimated econometrically. The estimation of these parameters
raises a lot of problems, so that simpliffing assumptions had to be adopted. First of all required data
for a sufficiently long period were available only at the level of the so-called SITC classification (from
the OECD's NEXT database), which is more aggregated than the 8-digit HS level. Hence, import
elasticities were estimated for the commodity aggregates of the SITC classification. Consequently the
single elasticity estimate of each aggregate was atfibuted to all 8-digit level commodities composing
the conesponding aggregate. Secondly, due to the very large number of considered commodities, the
specification of import demand functions as well as the estimation procedure had to be simplified.
Thus, import demand functions were specified in double log form, with the domestic own price (unit
value) of imports deflated by the domestic consumer price index and the domestic real income as the
only explanatory variables. In other words, cross price effects were not taken into account, which is
clearly a limitation of the study. Finally, import demand functions were estimated over the period
1,973-1996 using the OLS method.
Due to these adopted simplifuing assumptions, the estimated elasticities for any particular commodity
can obviously only be considered as very crude estimates. Hence a sensivity analysis has been
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conducted in order to check how responsive are the TRI and MTRI estimates to the magnitudes of
import demand elasticities.
1.3. The decoupling issue (chapter 4)
The part of subtask 1.2 devoted to intemal support is aimed at contributing to the debate on the
decoupling of intemal support instruments and the related WTO "green box" definition.
The analysis starts with a thorough review of literature on decoupling. Based on the general theory of
welfare economics, the theoretical foundations of the principle of decoupling are reviewed. Then, the
main limits of this principle when applied to domestic agricultural sectors and policies are discussed.
These limits mainly relate to practical concems and efficiency concerns. On the practical side, the
different mechanisms through which internal support policy instruments affect production and trade
are reviewed. From the economic efficiency point of view, the question is raised of the efficiency of
highly decoupled policy instruments when concerned domestic economies are far removed from the
theoretical first-best economies and when objectives assigned to agricultural policies are not confined
to supporting agricultural incomes. This last point directly refers to the question of the
multifunctionality of agriculture.
The second step of the analysis addresses the issue of the measurement of the degree of decoupling of
internal support policy instruments and of the consistency of the "green box" decoupling criteria as
defined in Annex 2 of the URAA. The analysis is focused on income support policy instruments and
on coffesponding "green box" decoupling criteria (i.e., point 6 of Annex 2). This part of the analysis is
carried out by developing two different theoretical frameworks allowing to determine the effects on
domestic production and trade of various income support policy instruments.
The first model is directed at emphasising the key role of production technologies and factor mobility
assumptions as regards to the effects on domestic production (i.e., the degree of decoupling) of
alternative income support policy instuments. The proposed model, inspired from Hertel (1989),
considers two mono-product agriculttnal sectors, each using an aggregate variable input whose price is
exogenous, a specific factor and a factor whose price is endogenous. Both sectors are competing for
this last factor which is alternatively considered as homogeneous and perfectly mobile or
heterogeneous and so imperfectly mobile between sectors. Comparative static results allow to show
how the effects of policy instruments on domestic production are sensitive to adopted assumptions on
production technologies and factor mobility. They are also used to check whether specific decoupling
criteria of point 6 of Annex 2 of the t RAA are well-designed.
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The second model has as its aim to examine the effects of various income support policy instruments
on domestic production and trade when both the nurnber of farmers and the price of land are
endogenous. The proposed model, inspired from both Hughes (1980) and Leathers (1992), considers
one mono-product agricultural sector and consists in three equilibrium equations: the equilibrium
condition in the output market, the equilibrium condition in the land market and the entry/exit
condition. Comparative static results allow to compare the degree of decoupling of altemative policy
instruments.
Finally, the third step of the analysis extents the second step by taking into account the multifunctional
dimension of agriculture. More specifically, the second model is extended for allowing to examine the
effects of income support policy instruments not only on domestic production and trade (i.e., their
distortion effects) but also on indicators (such as farmers' profit, the number of farmers or yields)
relating to various objectives that may be assigned to agricultural policies. In that case, comparative
static results are derived on a constant cosVsupport basis, which allows it to classiff instruments
according to their relative ability to achieve each policy objective while minimising induced trade
distortion effects.
1.4. Assessing the world market environment: The \ilATSIM model (chapter 5)
Subtask 1.3 is aimed at assessing the international frade environment, which will form the basis of the
Millenium Round, and the impacts of trade reforms on world agricultural markets and trade.
This subtask has been carried out using a revised version of the WATSM (World Agricultural Trade
SlMulation) model. WATSIM is a partial equilibrium, multi-region and multi-commodity simulation
model of the world agricultural markets and trade. The current version covers 10 countries and
regional aggregates accounting for the whole world. For each region, 29 commodities are included,
covering 4 cereals, starchy products, sugar, pulses, 4 oilseeds, 4 vegetable oils, 4 oil cakes, 4 meats,
eggs, milk and 3 dairy products. The model is a comparative static framework. Starting from the 1997
base year situation, it is solved for a given set of target years, with no information given on the path of
adjustment between base and target years. Most parameters used to describe supply and demand
behaviours are not estimated but borrowed from other models or literature. All parameters are subject
to careful calibration to meet microeconomic theory.
The initial version of the model has been revised with respect to two main areas. On the one hand its
original net trade representation has been changed to now consider endogenously gross imports and
gross exports on a same market. On the other hand, and based on the gross hade approach, the model's
representation of tariff barriers and export subsidies has been improved. In addition, tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs), that have become particularly relevant since the IIRAA, are now explicitly modelled.
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The implementation of the gross trade approach within the WATSIM model has been conducted in
two stages. Firstly, the former WATSM database has been updated and adapted to the new gross trade
structure of the model. The new WATSIM database consists now in two subsets: the former non-
spatial database and the spatial database. The non-spatial database brings together data from various
sources on production, demand, frade and prices of agricultural commodities, macroeconomic and
sectoral data as well as policy data. It includes long time series, covering the period 1961-1997 (with
some series extending up to 1999), available at the single country level for some 110 agricultural
commodities. Programming routines have been developed, that allow to easily and quickly check for
data consistency as well as aggregate data according to the model's regional and commodity structure.
Available time series are extracted mainly from the FAOSTAT (FAO of the United Nations) and PSD
(Production, Supply and Distribution, USDA) databases, the World Development Indicators (World
Bank's database), the World Population Prospects (United Nations) and the Producer and Consumer
Support Estimates (OECD).
The spatial database has been developed by adding bilateral trade flows and prices between the
model's regions to the non-spatial database. The spatial database includes time series covering the
period 1988-1997, available at the model's regional and commodity aggregate levels. Required
bilateral trade flows are extracted mainly from the COMTRADE database (United Nations Statistics
Division). A major task in the construction of the spatial database was to ensure consistency within
this database and compared with the non-spatial database. The experience shows that the "double
reporting" in bilateral trade flows statistics (i.e., importer quotation and exporter quotation) does not
necessarily yields in mutual confirmation. In addition, in our specific case, the added gross imports
and exports data (issued from the COMTRADE database) did not necessarily match the resulting net
trade data of the non-spatial database (issued from mainly the FAOSTAT and PSD databases).
Therefore, in order to ensure data consistency, the V/ATSIM spatial database has been constructed
using an entropy-based approach, namely the cross-entropy approach (Golan et al., 1996).
The second stage consisted in the re-designing of the WATSIM model in order to incorporate gross
trade representation. Based on the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969), import demand
functions and export supply functions have been specified for each geographical zone and each
commodity. Such functions closely rely on elasticities of, respectively, substitution and
hansformation. Due to data restrictions and resources limitations, these parameters have been
"guesstimated". So, sensivity analyses aimed at investigating the impact of the adopted levels of these
elasticities on the model outcome were carried out.
Since the new version of the WATSIM model represents explicitly gross imports and gross exports, it
became possible to improve the modelling of trade policy instruments such as import tariff barriers,
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TRQs and export subsidies. In very general terms, for each country and commodity, domestic
"incentive prices" and import prices are linked to the corresponding world price through linear price
transmission functions. Specific and ad-valorem tariffs are represented by simple linear elements in
transmission functions from world to domestic import prices. Flexible levies are also explicitly
modelled. They lead to non-differentiable price transmission functions. Thus, the exact relationship is
smoothly approximated in order to allow for solubility. Just like import tariffs, export subsidies are
specified as an element of price hansmission functions on the export side. They can either be
represented by a linear element or reflect a minimum domestic export price. In this last case, flexible
export subsidies are modelled in a way similar to flexible levies on the import side. In addition, limits
on subsidised exports are explicitly taken into account. For that purpose, two endogenous adjustment
options are introduced in the model solution: in the case of a minimum export price, the model forces
administrated stock purchases to adjust for subsidised exports do not exceed the corresponding limit;
in the case of a constant export subsidy, the model forces the per-unit export subsidy to adjust for
subsidised exports meet the bound. Lastly, TRQs are represented through two-tiered tariff lines:
preferential tariffs for within quota imports and MFN (Most Favoured Nation) tariffs for over quota
imports. The effective tariff (i.e., real protection) is then determined andogenously. It is at the
preferential tariff level as long as the quota is unfilled, at the MFN tariff level when over quota
imports occur and between both tariffs when the quota is just binding. This effective tariff function is
non-differentiable and is approximated through smooth sigmoid functions.
1.5. MECOP: A model of the EU's producing sector of cereals, oilseeds and protein crops
(chapter 6)
The main objective of subtask 2.1 is to develop a sectoral model of arable crops for the EU in order to
provide quantitative assessments of the impacts of reform proposals of the Common Market
Organisation (CMO) for arable crops.
Subtask 2.1 has been carried out by developing a model of the EU's producing sector of cereals,
oilseeds and protein crops (the so-called MECOP model) and then using this model for simulating
alternative policy scenarios.
The MECOP (Maximum Enhopy for Cereals, Oilseeds and Protein crops) model is cented on EU
supply of cereals, oilseeds and protein crops (COP). A special feature of the model is that it considers
explicitly the main policy instruments currently in force in the CMO for arable crops (i.e., price
support, area payment system, set-aside requirement). A second distinctive feature of MECOP is that
behavioural parameters are calibrated using the Generalised Maximum Entropy (GME) approach.
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The MECOP model describes the supply behaviour of a representative COP producer. The
specification of the model relies on duality theory in the presence of allocatable quasi-fixed factors. A
multi-output restricted profit function where total land is fixed but allocatable to the various crops is
defined. Then, via the envelope theorem, one obtains crop supply, variable input demand and land
allocation functions. Using crop supply and land allocation functions, it is thus possible to derive
yields per hectare functions. As the profit function incorporates the main policy instruments of the
CMO for arable crops, these instruments are arguments of crop supply, variable input demand, land
allocation and yields functions.
Hence, MECOP corresponds to a system of crop supply, variable input demand and land allocation
equations. The functional form retained for the profit function to speciff these equations is the
normalised quadratic function. Behavioural parameters involved in these equations are calibrated
using the GME approach (Golan et al., 1996). Data used for the calibration process (i.e., output
quantities, cultivated areas devoted to each crop, total cultivated and idle areas, output and variable
input prices and area payments) are time series covering the period 1973-1997, taken from the
Eurostat CRONOS database and from the French joint-trade organisation ONIC (Office
Interprofessionnel des céréales).
MECOP has been implemented at the national level for 6 EU Member States: Denmark, Francen
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Ten crops have been retained: 6 cereals (soft wheat,
barley, maize, durum wheat, oat and rye), 3 oilseeds (rape, sunflower and soya) and one protein crop
(fîeld peas). As the 6 above mentioned Member States are the main EU COP producing countries,
MECOP nearly covers the overall EU15 supply for the retained crops.
1.6. A model of the EU's dairy and beef producing sector (chapter 7)
The main objective of subtask 2.2 isto develop a sectoral model of milk and dairy products for the EU
in order to provide quantitative assessments of the impacts of reform proposals of the Common
Market Organisation for milk and milk products.
Subtask 2.2has been carried out by developing two models, which have then been used for simulating
alternative policy scenarios. Both models depict the whole EU milk and dairy sector, but the first one
is more specifically centred on the milk producing segment while the second one pays particular
attention to the dairy processing segment. In addition, a supporting study aimed at estimating quota
rent levels in the French dairy sector provided some empirical evidence for the calibration of initial
quota rents in both models.
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This section deals with the first model: the model of the EU's dairy and beef producing sector. The
methodology used for the supporting study (reported in the appendix to chapter 7) is also briefly
described.
The EU's dairy and beef producing sector depicts the supply behaviour of a represenktive dairy
producer. However, an aggregate demand for milk is added. This allows the model to cover both the
supply side and the demand side of the dairy sector, and almost to make the market price of milk
endogenous following certain policy changes such as a quota removal for example.
A special feature of the model, on the supply side, is that dairy and beef production are fully integrated
in the model, both as regards to the underlying decision making model and in specifoing the
constraints and rade-offs between the two types of production. The specification of the model relies
on duality theory in the presence of output constraints. A resficted profit function where the milk
output is fixed is defined. Then, Hotelling's lemma yields beef and veal output supply and variable
input demand functions. Using the conditional shadow price functions, one can derive the equations
for the optimal level of each of the quasi-fixed factors (i.e., grazing and forage area, suckler cow stock
number and dairy cow stock number). It is assumed that quasi-fixed factors need more than one period
to adjust to their optimal levels and that they adjust according to a partial adjustment mechanism. In a
similar way, the conditional shadow price function for the rationed milk output yields the shadow milk
supply equation. As the milk supply response depends on the quantities of quasi-fixed factors, it is
possible to define different "levels" of supply response, from the short-term (no adjustment of quasi-
fixed factors) to the long-term (all quasifixed factors adjusted to their optimal levels).
The functional form retained for the profit function to speciff all these equations is the normalised
quadratic function. Behavioural parameters involved in these equations are estimated econometrically.
A mixed-estimation procedure was applied, which allows sample and non-sample information to be
combined. The non-sample information consists of the usual (non-stochastic) theoretical consffaints
and other forms of prior information. Other prior information reflect prior ideas regarding specific
model coefficients, based on previous research (rnput and output price elasticities for example), or
agronomic characteristics (feed conversion characteristics, milk yields per cow for example). Unlike
the theoretical restrictions, which are assumed to hold exactly, the prior parameter values are imposed
in the form of stochastic relationships to reflect a priori uncertainty about the validity of these values.
Estimation was done separately for the 15 Member States of the EU. Data used for the estimation
process are time series covering the period 1973-1995, taken from the SPEL database, and from the
Official Journal of the European Communities as far as policy variables are concemed. The aggregate
milk demand equation was not estimated but instead calibrated using an extraneous estimate of the
demand elasticity. The shadow milk supply function cannot be estimated econometrically. The milk
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output supply function is based on the expression for the shadow price of milk, which is derived by
algebraic means from the profit function. Hence, this derivation gives those parameters of the milk
supply function that describe the responsiveness of milk supply to changes in milk price, other prices
and quasi-fixed factors. Therefore, only the "position" of the milk supply function was calibrated. This
has been done using exogenous information about quota rents and structural features of the milk
producing sector in each EU Member State. This exogenous information were both derived from the
Eurostat FADN database and taken from existing studies.
Finally, the model of the EU's dairy and beef producing sector allows for analysing a wide range of
policies targeting the milk sector: supply control (changes in the levels or removal of milk quotas);
direct payment systems (payment per head for different types of animal, payment per ton of quota,
payment per hectare); price support (for milk and for cereals through the adjustment of the price of
feed).
1.7. Aspatial equilibrium model of the EU's dairy industry (chapter 8)
The model of the EU's dairy industry is a spatial equilibrium model of a vertical multi-market sector.
Hence, the EU dairy sector is modelled as a vertical structure involving milk supply, milk processing
into final dairy products and final demand for dairy products. The processing technology is modelled
as a Leontieff allocation mechanism of milk components (milk fat and protein) among final dairy
products. From this allocation mechanism, one can derive the raw milk derived demand function and
the dairy product supply functions of the processing industry. The raw milk supply function and the
dairy product final demand functions are specified as stylised functions relying on constant own-price
elasticities.
Equilibrium is determined using the general framework of a competitive resource allocation problem
involving various geographical regions and assuming hansport costs for trading from one region to the
other. Hence, the spatial structure of the model results from the assumption that hade across regions
imply transport costs that differ according to the origin and the destination of trade flows. This
competitive market equilibrium framework extends the interregional model proposed by Samuelson
(1952) and Takayama and Judge (1971). Chavas et al. (1998) have shown that this extended version of
the initial interregional model generates a competitive resource allocation equilibrium. Bouamra-
Mechemache et al. (2001) show how this framework may be modified in order to incorporate the EU
dairy policy so as to represent distorted competitive market equilibria under alternative policy
scenanos
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Thus, the model of the EU's dairy industry is a comparative static model which, from the base year to
the target year and conditionally to relevant policy instruments, solves instantaneously for regional
shadow prices of implicit milk components, milk and dairy product prices, production, consumption
and hade.
The empirical application of the model considers raw milk and 10 final dairy products: butter,
skimmed milk powder, condensed milk, fluid milk, fresh products, casein, hard and semi-hard cheese,
processed cheese and other cheese. The EU is divided into 9 regions: Belgium-Luxembourg,
Denmark, France, Germany-Austria, Italy-Greece, Netherlands, Spain-Portugal, Sweden-Finland and
United Kingdom-keland. An exogenous "Rest of the Worldu is also added in order to make world
prices endogenous and be able to depict the EU trade policy instuments. The structure of the model
allows to represent explicitly the main policy instruments currently in force in the CMO for milk and
milk products: milk quotas, intervention prices (butter and skimmed milk powder), ceiling quantities
for public intervention, consumption subsidies (butter and skimmed milk powder), production
subsidies (casein), export refunds, import tariffs and quotas.
The model is calibrated on 1995 quantity and price data. All parameters and initial quota rents are
derived from the existing literature.
1.8. A model of the EUrs beef producing sector (chapter 9)
The main objective of subtask 2.3 is to develop an EU sectoral model for beef in order to provide
quantitative assessments of the impacts of reform proposals of the Common Market Organisation for
beefand veal.
This subtask has been carried out by developing national supply models for the main EU beef
producing Member States, and then using these models for simulating alternative policy scenarios.
A generic national analytical model has been developed first. The main feature of this generic
framework is that it takes into account simultaneously the demographic structure and the biological
relationships that drive bovine production, as well as the impacts of economic and policy variables on
these dynamic demographic linla.
Three subsets of inter-related biological and behavioural relationships are defined. The first one
focuses on calves, the second one on female animals aged one year and over and the third one on male
animals aged one year and over. In each subset, each animal in the herd at the beginning of a period
may be either bred, slaughtered or exported during the period. Arbitration among alternative decisions
applies to sub-categories of animals (such as heifers, suckler cows and dairy cows for female animals
and bulls and steers for male animals) and generate for each sub-category various variable rates such
19
as the calf crop rate, replacement rates and slaughtering rates. Finally, based on the slaughtered
quantities of each category of animals and the corresponding average slaughtering weights, the net
production of beef and veal meat is determined.
Variable calf crop, replacement and slaughtering rates are key variables of the model since they reflect
the dynamic links between all variables of interest. In the same \ryay, average slaughtering weights are
of key importance since they depict the linkage between the demographic adjustments of considered
herds and meat supply. Therefore, a particular attention has been paid to the specification of these
variables. Variable rates and average slaughtering weights are assumed to be dependent on economic
and policy variables. However, as they must also enforce biological constraints, they are specified as
logistic functions of explanatory variables. Such a specification allows for setting upper limits, fixed
according to empirical observation and common knowledge, for the levels of the considered rates.
The main policy instruments currently in force in the CMO for beef and veal (i.e., intervention price
and headage payments for the various categories of animals) are introduced as explanatory variables in
variable rates and average slaughtering weight equations. Therefore, the model is able to capture the
effects of changes in all these instruments on bovine production and beef and veal meat supply.
This generic analytical model has then been applied to 4 EU Member States: France, Germany, Italy
and United Kingdom. These 4 Member States account for nearly two third of the EU 15 beef and veal
production. All parameters of the national models (except biological upper limits) have been estimated
using traditional econometric techniques applied to annual aggregate time series data covering the
period lg73-lgg9. Data used were taken mainly from the Eurostat CRONOS database and from the
Official Journal of the European Communities as far as policy variables are concerned.
1.9. A software for depicting the regional market of an Appetlation of Origin (chapter 10)
Subtask 2.4 is aimed at developing an EU sectoral model for wine in order to provide quantitative
assessments of the impacts of reform proposals of the Common Market Organisation for wine.
Due to the great heterogeneity in vineyard specificity as well as in production and oenologic practices,
that underlies the extensive differentiation of wines produced all over the EU 15, constructing a proper
integrated sectoral model for the EU wine sector is a highly, if possible, difficult task.
On the other hand, one of the main feature of the new CMO for wine (implemented on the beginning
of year 2000) lies in the shift frnm a price support policy to a quality support policy. This reorientation
of support towards the improvement of vineyard and wine quality is associated with the strengthening
of systems of supply regulation implemented at the regional level. Such a decentralised regulation
increases the role of producers' unions and "interprofessions" in managing the structure of vineyards,
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regulating yields and adjusting wine quality. Hence, the new orientation of the CMO for wine
implicitly gives a prominent role to the system of Appellations of Origins, which is the most
widespread example of a regional supply regulation system managed by an "interprofession".
The status of Appellations of Origins constitutes precisely an issue widely discussed within the WTO
negotiations. Hence, the status of Appellations of Origins could be an important stumbling block
between the WTO multilateral negotiations and the new orientation of the CMO for wine. Actually,
the non-recognition of Appellations of Origins from the WTO point of view would seriously challenge
the new orientation of the CMO for wine.
In that respect, it has been decided, instead of developing an EU sectoral model for wine in order to
assess the impacts of changes in the CMO for wine, to focus the analysis of subtask 2.4 on the
economics of Appellations of Origins. Our objective is to examine the welfare effects of the
implementation of such a regional supply organisation, based on a barrier to entry for producers
outside the appellation, allowing inside producers to regulate yields and to adjust wine quality. kr
doing so, we intend to contribute to justifu on economic grounds the implementation of regional
supply organisations such as Appellations of Origins.
For that purpose, the analysis starts with some theoretical work (Giraud-Héraud et al., 1998; Amaud,
Giraud-Héraud and Mathurin, 1999; Arnaud et al., 1999) aimed at developing a general analytical
framework formalising the functioning of an Appellation of Origin. This fîrst stage allows to show that
this kind of supply organisation is similar to a problem of decentralised supply regulation. More
specifically, the barrier to entry imposed to producers outside the appellation allows inside actors (i.e.,
the "interprofession") to behave as a "local monopoly" maximising its intertemporal profit. Then, by
comparing the "local monopoly" situation to the perfectly competitive situation, it is possible to
highlight the welfare effects of the implementation of such a decentralised supply regulation regime.
Thus, it is shown that the possibility for the "local monopoly" to stock wine in order to achieve a given
level of quality (i.e., to manage strategically a so-called qualitative reserve) decreases the total wine
quantity supplied but improves the average quality of wine proposed to consumers, with respect to the
perfectly competitive situation. This results in an increase in the market price of wine. These
adjustments relative to the perfectly competitive situation are welfare increasing for producers and
welfare decreasing or increasing for consumers, depending on the sfucture of their preferences with
respect to wine quality. Consequently, the overall welfare effect may be positive or negative.
The second stage of the analysis of subtask 2.4 is directed at developing a regional software for
empirically assessing the above described welfare effects of the implementation of an Appellation of
Origin and, in doing so, emphasising the key parameters and assumptions as regards to the sign and
magnitude of these effects. The main features of the proposed model are the following.
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On the supply side, the uncertainty on quantity and quality of the yearly output supply, that
characterises wine production, is taken into account. The "interprofession" disposes of a fixed
vineyard area and of an upper-bounded stocking capacity. The stocking capacity is used as a
qualitative reserve aimed at managing the quality of wine to be sold on the market. It is assumed that
the "interprofession" knows perfectly the random distribution of yields and of the quality level. Each
year, the "interprofession" has to decide the share of available supply to be kept in stock (and
consequently the share to be sold on the market), provided the state (in terms of quantity and quality)
of the qualitative reserve. This yearly arbihation is directed at maximising the expected intertemporal
profit of the "interprofession".
On the demand side, a vertical product differentiation model, inspired from Musa and Rosen (1978), is
adopted in order to take account of the heterogeneity in consumers' tastes. In addition, the potential
competition exerted by wines produced outside the considered region is considered within the
modelling of demand.
Thus, the software solves an optimal command problem where the series of the states of the qualitative
reserve is a Markov process.
The empirical application of the software requires data (on the supply side and on the demand side)
referring to a specific vineyard. Such data are exfremely diffrcult to obtain. Hence, it has been decided
to apply the software on two differentiated stylised vineyards: a Northern and a Southern vineyard.
Data and parameters underlying these stylised vineyards have been calibrated on the basis of available
empirical observation and common knowledge.
1.10. Assessment of the impact of food quality and safety standards on EU-US trade in
agricultural and food products (chapter 11)
This part of task 3 is aimed at assessing the impact of current food quality and safety standards on EU-
US trade in agricultural and food products. More specifically, we focus on the impact of US food
quality and safety standards on EU agricultural and food exports to the US.
This part of task 3 has been carried out by first completing a thorough review of literature on technical
measures. This literature review successively addresses the questions ofthe classification oftechnical
measures, their effects on trade and the available methods for measuring these trade effects. Finally,
existing studies that have attempted to measure the effects of technical measures in the context of trade
in agricultural and food products are reviewed.
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Relying on the literature review, it has been decided to retain the classification of technical measures
proposed by Roberts et al (1999) in the remainder of the analysis, dedicated to the assessment of the
impact of US standards on EU agricultural and food exports to the US.
The literature review suggests that there are four basic approaches commonly used to evaluate the
trade impact of technical measures: frequency/inventory-based measures; price-comparison measures
(or tariff equivalent estimates); compliance-cost measures; quantity-type measures. The impact of US
standards on EU agricultural and food exports to the US has been assessed combining the first three
approaches. In addition, an analysis of US detentions of EU agricultural and food exports has also
been carried out.
Frequency/inventory based measures attempt to estimate the number of technical measures applied by
a country, by type across product categories. These measures typically make use of inventories of non-
tariff measures, including technical measures, which detail the number and type of measures by tariff
line. This approach has been applied to the US and the EU in order to identify differences in both
countries' food safety and quality standards. First, a detailed inventory database of food safety and
quality standards in the US and the EU has been constructed. The database consists of 825
governmental regulations and standards laying down requirements (534 for the US and 29L for the
EU) identified from an undertaken review of official publications (the Code of Federal Regulation in
the case of the US and the Official Journal of the European Communities in the case of the EU). Based
on this database, a comparison of the number and types of measures applied, as well as concerned
categories of products, in both countries has been carried out. Secondly, the UNCTAD database on
Trade Control Measures has been used in order to evaluate the frequency of technical measures by
tariffline in the US and the EU.
Price-comparison measures attempt to quantifu the price effect of technical measures. Technical
measures alter relative prices between world and national markets. Hence, by comparing the domestic
price of a product, which imports are subject to a technical measure, to some reference world price
(inclusive of hansport costs and any tariff applied by the considered country), provides some
indication on the net effect of the technical measure. This price wedge is termed a tariff equivalent
because under conditions of perfect competition, an ad-valorem tariff at the same rate would create the
same wedge between the domestic and the reference world prices. A tariff-rate equivalent computed
through this approach can thus be interpreted as the tariff rate that would restrict tade to the same
level as the corresponding technical measure. The price-comparison method has been empirically
implemented for some products exported by the EU to the US. A number of product case studies were
undertaken. However, the majority of these were not successful, reflecting the inherent problems with
the price wedge approach. A successful example was nevertheless obtained and is presented in this
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report as an illustration. It concerns the estimation of the tariff-rate equivalent of hygiene requirements
for poultry meat in the US. The case study refers to US imports from the EU and relates to high value
poultry meat as typically exported by the EU to the US. The tariff-rate equivalent is obtained by
comparing the US wholesale price for poultry meat to a calculated EU CIF export price to the US.
Data used are quarterly time series covering the period 1996-2000 taken from USDA-ERS as far as the
US wholesale price and the transport and insurance costs are concerned and from Eurostat for the EU
wholesale price.
Compliance-cost measures attempt to estimate directly the additional costs that are imposed on an
exporter for complying with the requirements induced by a technical measure applied by an importing
country. Hence, the compliance-cost approach involves identification of the specific changes and
procedures that businesses are required to undertake to comply with the considered technical measure.
The process which suppliers follow in order to comply with technical requirements typically consists
of two stages: adaptation of the production processes and/or the final product to facilitate compliance
with the specified standard; production and supply of the product complying with the specified
standard and compliance with conformity assessment procedures (Henson, 1997). Stage one is
associated with non-recurring costs (i.e., one-off expenditure required to achieve initial compliance
with the standard, such as investment in new capital for example) whilst stage two is associated with
recurring costs (i.e., more perrnanent production and other supply costs required to supply the product
that is in compliance and to demonstrate compliance has been achieved, such as product testing
requirements for example).
The compliance-cost approach has been implemented in order to assess the problems and the
associated costs for EU exporters to comply with the technical requirements for agriculttral and food
products in force in the US. For that purpose, a survey was undertaken of EU exporters of agricultural
and food products. A questionnaire was defined involving three distinct parts. The first part aimed to
identifu the main characteristics of the exporting firm. The second part aimed to assess the importance
of technical requirements relative to other factors influencing agricultural and food exports to the US.
The third part aimed to assess the costs of compliance and associated problems incurred by EU firms
to export to the US. In this third part, questions were asked separately about four main stages of the
compliance process: prior approval of production facilities; product reformulation and/or change in
production, packaging and labelling; impact on production costs; border procedures.
A sample of 1800 exporters of agricultural and food products were selected from across 6 Member
States (naurely, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ncthcrlands and Unitcd Kingdom). An cquol
number of exporters (i.e., 300) was selected from each Member State. The survey was undertaken
during the period April to July 2000. A response rate of l8% was achieved.
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Finally, an analysis of US detentions of EU agricultural and food exports has also been carried out.
The objective of this last phase was to complement previous analysis in identiffing those products for
which problems are actually experienced by EU exporters due to US technical measures. The US Food
and Drugs Administration (FDA) publishes data on border detention of products for which it is
responsible. These data provide some indication of the problems experienced by EU exporters, both in
terms of those product categories most subject to detention and the reason for detention. Hence, a
database of US border detentions of EU agricultural and food exports observed from 1997 to 1999 was
constucted on the basis of the FDA published data. Then, an analysis of US detentions according
three criteria: concerned Member States, concerned product categories and reasons for detention was
completed.
1.11. Non-tariff barriers and market failures: Risk and informational aspects (chapter 12)
This part of task 3 focuses on the economics of non-tariff barriers. It aims at developing an analytical
framework allowing to analyse the welfare effects of domestic food quality and safety regulations and
to examine their ability to address market failures.
Indeed, the legitimacy of public intervention, and in particular of border protection, can be found in
the alleviation of market failures. Regarding food quality and safety regulations targeted market
failures most of the time pertain to imperfect information (this includes risk but also uncertainty of
consumers about the quality of the product). Hence, integrating this consideration in the regular
framework of normative economics appears as a necessary building block in the effort to classiff non-
tariff barriers (NIBs) according to the degree to which they actually address market failures and/or
impede hade.
The methodology that was used for this part of task 3 relies on three fields of the economic theory
literature. The first one is the literature in Intemational Economics, which tackles the issue of non-
tariff barriers (NIBs) albeit in specific ways, i.e., mainly as quantitative restrictions (quotas, voluntary
export restrictions) and minimum quality standards. The second one is the literature in Industrial
Organisation, which gives a central role to market failures resulting from imperfect competition and
imperfect information. The third one is the literature in Public Economics and welfare analysis, which
investigates the effectiveness of regulations in the sense that they should protect consumers and
alleviate market failures while minimising overall welfare loss. Law was also used in the part of the
work devoted to the analysis of the US system of food safety regulation.
The general idea that is supported in this part of task 3 is that the beneficial effects of trade
liberalisation may be attenuated by spontaneous market inefficiencies. The logical consequence is that
when it can be shown that a domestic regulation successfully addresses these market inefficiencies,
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even though it might result in restricting trade flows, the international community should acknowledge
that there is a form of legitimacy which should be reflected in trade agreements.
Hence, combining elements of the three above-mentioned fields of literahre, several analyical
frameworks were developed in order to, first, illustrate how hade liberalisation may result in
spontaneous or increased market inefficiencies. There are numerous possible cases where trade
liberalisation may induce market failures. Two of them, that are particularly relevant in the context of
food quality and safety standards, were retained: the presence of sanitary and phytosanitary risk and
imperfect information on the quality of products.
The first three developed models build on the literature on both trade in a context where consumers
face imperfect information on the quality/safety of the product and on quality/safety revelation and
quality/safety effort (Akerlot 1970; Shapiro, 1983; Donnenfeld et al., 1985; Donnenfeld, 1986;
Grossman and Shapiro, 1988; Falvey, 1989; Daughety and Reinganum, 1995 and 1997). All three
models consider that production, consumption and trade take place over two periods and assume
imperfect competition on the supply side. In all three models, two qualities of the single considered
product are distinguished: a high quality (or safe product) and a low quality (or unsafe product). On
the demand side, the first two models consider a single consumer who purchases either zero or one
unit of the product and whose willingness to pay is zero for the low quality or unsafe product and
positive for the high quality or safe product. The third model considers a group of consumers and
adopts the usual vertical differentiation framework proposed by Musa and Rosen (1978).
The first developed model investigates the welfare impact of trade liberalisation between two
countries experiencing different levels of sanitary risk and production cost, the consumers being
unable to detect the origin of the product sold on the market. The second developed model relies on a
similar framework but put special emphasis on the impact of trade liberalisation on the behaviour of
sellers in terms of testing and signalling the quality of their product. In this case, both countries exhibit
equal levels of sanitary risk and production cost, but differ in their ability to confrol product's safety.
The third model explores the economic mechanisms affecting product safety when consumers face
different information structures. Three cases are considered: the search good situation; the experience
good situation (as defined by Nelson, 1970); the credence good situation (Darby and Karny, 1973).
The fourth developed model is specifically designed for addressing the EU-US hormone-treated beef
dispute. It corresponds to a particular case of the previous third model considering only one period,
assnming perfect competition on the supply side and where thc considered product is a credence good.
This fourth model is used for investigating the welfare effects of opening the domestic market (i.e., the
EU market where hormone-free beef is perceived as of higher quality) to foreign products (i.e., US
hormone-treated beef) that are perceived as lower quality goods.
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In a second stage, these four theoretical models are used to explore the effectiveness ofdifferent types
of public regulation aiming at increasing consumer protection and circumventing market failures. A
particular attention is paid to labels.
The second part of the analysis further examines some issues related to labelling policies. Indeed,
there are several ways to implement a label and this second stage of the analysis aims to further
examine the effectiveness of various labelling strategies. More specifically, three main questions are
addressed: when should a regulator promote public labelling and when should labelling be a
mandatory or a voluntary progranrme? How should public labelling be financed? Under which
conditions a label "does contain" is more effective than a label "does not contain"? Lessons are drawn
from developed analytical frameworks similar to the ones of the third or fourth model previously
described, but complemented in order to take into account various types of labels and the associated
labelling costs.
The third part of the analysis proposes an assessment of the US sanitary and phytosanitary legislation,
from the point of view of the V/TO rules. A special emphasis is paid to the so-called Delaney clause.
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2 . TIIE DATABASE ON TARIFFS, TARIFF,-RATE QUOTAS (TRQs) AI\D TRADE
Jean-Christophe Bureau
Parhrer 2: INRA-ESR, Grignon
2.1. Introduction
The objective of this part of the project was to develop a comprehensive database on tariffs and
imports which would make it possible to monitor the effect of past Uruguay Round (UR) market
access commitments as well as future proposals for tade liberalisation.
The purpose of the trade database was twofold. First, the aim was to provide the basic material to other
sections of the project, in particular the one dealing with market protection indicators (chapter 3) and
the one centred on the hade model (chapter 5). The construction of market protection indicators
requires precise estimates of the tariff commitments decided upon in the Uruguay Round Agreement
on Agriculture (URAA) as well as corresponding detailed data on imports. The world hade simulation
model also relies on precise quantification of the tade barriers (i.e., UR tariff and tariff-rate quota
commitments but also applied tariffs, which are often lower than bound tariffs) which requires
aggregating the many tariff lines into an average tariff that represents the hade obstacle faced by
exporters.
Second, the hade database in itself was believed to be useful to the Commission's policy makers
during the current Millenium Round. Indeed, many aspects of 1WTO negotiations in the field of market
access are very technical, and crucial aspects are most often "in the details". For example, the product
classification that was used to define UR tariff commitments is of particular importance because the
way tariffs are defined and reduced can lead counhies to find a way around the spirit, and even the
discipline of the agreement. 2 It is presently extremely difficult to assess how the various WTO
countries have fulfilled their UR tariff commitments, since the WTO has not provided detailed figures
on applied tariffs that matched the bound tariffs. The difficulty is that no comprehensive data is
available on these issues, and that, unless challenged by a third country, a counùry that does not fulfil
its commitments has no particular sanction to face.
' Details and technical aspects of the tariff schedules have proved important in recent years. For example,
imports of gluten flew into the United States in 1998 in spite of countervailing duties because of a loophole in
the definition of products at the 8 digit level of the trade classification.
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Because of these technical aspects, which will prove important during the Millenium Round, the fade
database was constructed with the principle of matching all the relevant information to each country's
official schedule on bound tariffs, as submitted to the WTO. This has resulted in a database organised
on the basis of the 8-digit Harmonised System (HS) classification. This introduced difficulties for
gathering the relevant information, since the list of commodities includes some 2800 items. It is
however a sine qua non-condition for being able to assess how the various countries have fulfilled
their WTO commitments. Hence, unlike most other efforts, such as those of Agriculture Canada, US
Department of Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organisation for example, which attempt to
aggregate the official V/TO tariff commitments, the emphasis was put on working at a very detailed
level of the classification, so that no information would be lost.
This chapter is organised as follows. The content of the database on tariffs and trade is described first.
Then the modalities adopted and the main sources used for constructing this database are presented.
Thirdly, the dataset on tariff-rate quotas that was developed independently from the database on tariffs
and trade is briefly described. Finally, a thorough assessment of the implementation of market access
discipline of the Uruguay Round is provided. Some lessons for the Millenium Round are drawn in the
concluding section.
2.2.The content of the database on tariffs and trade
The database is organised on the basis of the 8-digit HS classification for chapters 01, 02, 03 to 24
(i.e., all food products with the exception of fisheries products) and for selected items of chapters 29,
31, 35, 38,40,41, 50, 5I,52 (i.e., non food agricultural products, such as skins for leather, etc). It
matches, for each country, the following information for each year since 1995 (unless otherwise
specified):
1. The schedules on base (1995) and bound (2000) tariffs.
2. Import values, in national currency.
3. Import quantities.
4. Import quantities in secondary units (i.e., pieces, heads, dozen,hectolitres, etc and not kilos).
5. Unit values of imports under the Most Favoured Nation (MFI'D status.
6. Unit values of imports non MFN.
7. Applied tariffs MFl.l.
8. Average applied tariffs non MFN.
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9. Tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) information
10. Fulfilment of TRQs (for the EU only)
1 1. Import elasticities (for 3 countries only: EU, US, Canada)
The database on tariffs and fade was constructed for a set of countries. While datasets were completed
in a satisfactory way for the EU, the US and Canada, the datasets for other countries remained flawed
because of problems in the correspondence between the various sources of information. It was thus
decided to focus on the EU, the US and Canada, and to provide less sophisticated data for the other
countries (namely, Australia, Brazil, Japan, Korea and Norway).
One may underline that the database on tariffs and trade developed under this project has been used as
part of the contribution of the EU Commission to the co-operative Agricultural Market Access
Database (AMAD) project. This co-operative effort, involving the EU Commission, the Organisation
of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Economic Research Service (ERS) of the
US Department of agriculture (USDA), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (I-INCTAD) and Agriculture Canada, aims to put
together data on agricultural tariffs, tariff-rate quotas and trade gathered by the various institutions.
This effort has led to the constitution of a large database that is now available online (www.amad.org).
2.3. Modalities adopted and sources used for constructing the database
2.3.1. Modalities and conventions adopted
Because the database is oriented towards a real-time use in trade negotiations, the UR schedules of
official tariff commitments were the starting point. A major difficulty was found in the revision of the
official classification used in the WTO negotiations. Under the URAA, countries' base and bound
tariffs are notified on the basis of the 1992 version of the Harmonised System. Since then, the WTO
has asked member countries to submit a revised version of their tariff commitments in the new HS-
1996 classification. When the database was being constructed, these revised tariff commitments were
not available for many countries.
In many counhies, some tariffs are specified in values per kilo, liter, or head of animal, i.e., as
"specific" tariffs. This is particularly the case in the EU, the US and Japan, but the problem does exist
in many other countries. One cannot perform any aggegation, computation and economic analysis on
the basis of such tariffs. Therefore, they were converted into ad-valorem equivalents. Such a
conversion requires import price data, available at the same level of disaggregation, which is a major
obstacle. For the present casen the following conversion rules were adopted:
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- the average 1995-98 unit values of imports were used as import price data;
- when these import unit values were not available, they were approximated by corresponding export
unit values;
- for those commodities that were not traded in any of the four years, the average unit value of imports
of the most similar commodity was used as a proxy;
- for those tariff lines combining an ad-valorem and a specific tariff with a threshold mentioned (i.e., a
minimum or a maximum tariff), for which either the ad-valorem component or the specific component
is binding, the highest possible tariff was considered.
It is important to note that there is no solution that is fully satisfactory for converting specific tariffs
into ad-valorem equivalents. One will always have to use a local approximation that is not necessarily
robust to changes in tariffs. The AMAD group and the USDA have adopted different conventions
from ours. Particularly, they convert HS-8-digit specific tariffs by using more aggregated price data.
From our point of view, such a procedure introduces artificial tariff peaks in computed ad-valorem
tariff equivalents (see Gibson et aI,2001).
2.3,2. Sources used
2.3.2.1. The European Union
For the EU 15, the UR schedule (WTO submission, HS96-8-digit), that covers 1764 tariff lines,
determines the list of commodities included in the database. Practitioners call this list the "Geneva
list".
Import quantities and values come from COMEXT. As the Eurostat COMEXT database is based on
the NC-8-digit classification, this latter was matched manually to the HS96-8-digit classifïcation. It is
noteworthy that both classifications differ significantly and that this raised a lot of problems for
matching tariff data to trade data. Note that the matching between the "Geneva list" and COMEXT
resulted in non correspondence ofthe codes for roughly 15% ofthe tarifflines.
Data on applied tariffs come from various sources. In the EU, roughly 53% of imports (in value) are
imported under preferential agreements, at a tariff that is most of the time much lower than the WTO
(i.e., MFN) tariff. Tariffs under preferential agreements were extracted from the TARIC (NC-12-digit)
database. Information on applied tariffs was also extracted from the UNCTAD's TRAINS database (at
8-digit level) and was checked against the applied tariffs published in the Official Joumal of the
European Communities. Although there were some discrepancies between the various sources, it was
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possible to match the data with the 8-digit level data on import flows and to convert specific tariffs in
ad-valorem equivalents. 3
2.3.2.2. The United States
In the case of the United States, the UR schedule was also the starting point. The limitation here is that
by the time the project was completed, the official schedule in the HS96 classification was still not
notified to the WTO. Therefore, the starting point was the initial HS92 based schedule that showed
some discrepancies with the HS96 data on trade flows.
Import quantities and values come from the US International Trade Commission (USITC).
Unlike the EU schedule, the US schedule includes in-quota tariffs. In order to make things
comparable, a separate dataset was constructed for the US only with the Most Favoured Nation tariffs.
That is, the US tariff dataset covers 1377 tariff lines.
2.3.2.3, Canada and other countries
For Canada, starting from the UR schedule, the other used data source is the Statistics Canada
database on tade.
For other countries, the information gathered was more partial. Still starting from UR schedules, other
data sources include the United Nation's COMTRADE and TRAINS database (both at the 6-digit
level). However, the data were quite poor and in most cases the product codes of the trade data did not
match the product codes of the tariff data, in spite of the so-called "harmonised" system.
2.4.The dataset on tariff-rate quotas
Following a request from the Commission's representatives, highlighting the fact that tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs) were an important issue in the WTO negotiations, an extensive dataset gathering together
available information on TRQs was completed. This dataset covers the 35 countries that have notified
tariff-rate quotas to the WTO. The main source was the WTO schedules and notifications that were
obtained from the IWTO Secretariat.
kr the meantime, the AMAD group started and extensive collection of data on tariff-rate quotas.
Hence, the dataset on tariff-rate quotas developed under this project was made available to the AMAD
group and is now included in the AMAD database.
' There is no import data available at a more detailed level because of confidentiality of information, since it
would be possible to tack the individual importer.
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In addition, one may underline that, during the project's life, an assessment of the implementation of
UR tariff-rate quotas in various countries has been carried out by the International Agricultr'ral Trade
Research Consortium. Following a request from the Commission's representatives, researchers
involved in this section of the project provided the database for the study and wrote the EU section in
the report (Bureau and Tangermann, 2000). This work allowed for feeding the dataset on tariff-rate
quotas with information on fulfilment of TRQs for the EU.
2.5. A thorough assessment of the implementation of market access discipline of the Uruguay
Round
The database on tariffs and trade has made it possible to compare the structure of protection chosen by
the EU to that retained by other WTO countries. Because the data spans from 1995 to 2000 (data on
import flows span from 1994 to 1998 for most countries), it also gave the possibility for a thorough
assessment of the implementation of market access discipline of the Uruguay Round.
2.5.1. Technical arrangements made it possible to minimise the constraints that resulted from UR
market access commitments
As a first evaluation of the market access provisions of the URAA, various studies had pointed out
that, in spite of the highly significant potential benefîts in the long term, the impact during the 1995-
2000 implementation period would be low (IATRC, 1994 and 1997; Josling, 1998; OECD, 1995;
Tangermann, lggl and 1996). It is commonly admitted that almost all WTO member countries have
acted to minimise the constraints of market access commitments, using a combination of factors such
aso:
- The over-estimation of the tariff equivalents at the time of the conversion of quantitative restrictions
on imports into bound tariffs (this phenomenon denominated "dirty" tariffication has led to an unused
protection identified as the "water" in the tarif|.
- The presence of very high tariff peaks which completely prevent imports for certain products, in
spite of average rates of protection relatively low when they are calculated on the whole of the agro-
food products.
- The setting of very low thresholds to the special safeguard clause, which are used to grant
supplements of protection in relatively normal market situations.
o These factors are discussed in details in the FAIR5 -CT97-3481document: Véganzones, Bureau and Hofstetter
(1eee).
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- The lack of transparency of some tariff structures, which allows statistical manipulations that make it
possible to dissimulate the failure to decrease particular tariffs or to reallocate particular products
under more protected headings, with the favour of a change in the nomenclatures.
- The strategic repartition of tariff reductions between tariff headings, so as to reduce as little as
possible the protection on sensitive products, and to achieve the average reduction objective by large
tariff cuts on products of marginal importance or initially very little protected (this phenomenon is
called the "dilution" of tariff reductions).
- Questionable methods of calculation of the level of the tarifÊrate quotas.
- The restriction of access to tariff-rate quotas sometimes to a predetermined list of countries, in spite
of the spirit of the Agreement which supposes an allocation according to the clause of the most
favoured nation.
- Restrictive methods for allocating import licenses that result in underutilised quotas, which therefore
show low fill rates.
These provisions legally do not constitute violations of the Agreement insofar as they in general
respect the commitments entered into in the official Lists (which have legal value), even when those
did not correspond to what was envisaged by the Modalities. Thus, even with a careful examination of
the schedules ofthe various countries, the researchers involved in this section ofthe project did not
observe infringements at the rules of the WTO.
Many points were however raised which show that countries used significant degrees of freedom when
complying to the rules initially laid down in the WTO Modalities. One can quote:
- The compatibility of the allocation of tarifÊrate quotas under minimum access with preferential
agreements such as NAFTA. As an example, preferential duties under NAFTA seem lower than the
corresponding in-quotas tariffs in Canada. This could result in making it easier to import from the
United States than from other countries, which should normally access the Canadian market under the
minimal access provisions.
- The maintenance of tariff peaks which keep isolating the Canadian dairy sector and turn tariff-rate
quotas into simple quantitative restrictions (normally eliminated during the Uruguay Round).
- Pigmeat imports regulations in Japan, which de facto maintain a variable levy.
- Taxes levied by the Japanese state import monopolies, which add to tariffs and result in a lack of
transparency (more generally, the complexity of the whole of commitments makes it extemely
difficult to perform a decent evaluation of the implementation of the Uruguay Round provisions).
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- Minimal reductions in tariffs for processed products (initially more protected) in Australia, which
suggest that there is a significant amount of tariff escalation.
- Implementation of tariff schemes at an excessively detailed level of the statistical classification (up
to 11 digit) in Korea that makes it possible to minimise the scope of the Uruguay Round commitments.
- The persistence of non tariffied commodities in Israel that makes an exception to the general rules of
the WTO.
Without being challengeable under the WTO (since the schedules are the legally binding
commitments), these provisions are questionable and appear to be in opposition with the spirit of the
initial rules of the WTO.
Hence, the assessment of the implementation of the URAA that was made here using the database on
tariffs and trade and the dataset on TRQs sheds a different light on the compliance to the spirit of the
Agreement across countries. From the point of view of the setting of the tariff-rate quotasn of the
management and allocation of import licenses, of the transparency of the notifications to the WTO, the
European Union has a better record than most countries of the sample. The European Union is one of
the few counfies, with Morocco and Argentina, which has not used (or very little) a sûategic
allocation of tariff reductions across the tariff lines covered by the Agreement. In most countries, one
observes large cuts in those tariffs set on products of minor importance in terms of consumption. This
made it possible to achieve the 36%o average goal of reduction with limited reductions of tariffs set on
most sensitive products.
The database on tariffs and tade shows no visible increase in flows of imports over the period of
implementation of the URAA that seems to have resulted from the Agreement. The fact is that it was
possible to work only on a very limited number of years corresponding to a period where the
implementation of the Agreement was not completed (the most recent statistics that were used were
for the year 1998). It seems, however, that the average 360Â deuease in tariffs was a not very active
binding during most of the 1995-2000 period. In most countries, the main result of the Agreement in
terms of market access was the minimal I5%o cut in tariff that was implemented on the bulk of
products in large demand.
The improvements of the access to agricultural and food markets, which took place, are undoubtedly
more due to the tariff-rate quotas than to the decrease in bound tariffs. It is noteworthy, for example,
that observed growth of some import flows takes place under tariff-rate quotas that resulted from
minimal access provisions (milk and margarine in Canada; dairy products and rice in Japan; cheeses
and other dairy products as well as chocolate in the United States). Nevertheless, the European Union
is seldom in the situation of being a serious competitor of exporters like the Cairns group or the United
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States in supplying of these quotas. The reasons are multiple: in certain cases that is due to the lack of
competitiveness of the European products (corn, butter); in other cases to the geographical proximity
between the import and the export markets (Asian markets are closer to the United States or
Australia); in other cases, this is caused by the existence of preferential agreements, NAFTA in
particular, or the ability of the US administration to obtain a preferential teatment from state trading
enterprises (in Japan, Korea or Israel).
2.5.2.Implementation and management of TRQs
A particular attention was paid to the way the EU has opened tariff-rate quotas after the Uruguay
Round. t The URAA minimum access commitments were made through the use of tariff-rate import
quotas, with a lower tariff (in-quota tariff) for imports within the quota, and a higher tariff rate (out-of-
quota tariff) for imports exceeding the quota. A total of 35 countries including all OECD member
countries (exceptTurkey) have scheduled 1370 tariff-rate quotas.
TRQs were put in place to deal with the fact that tariffication of existing quantitative restictions
would have shut off all trade in many cases. All countries were expected to allow access to their
domestic markets for imports equivalent to at least 3 percent of domestic consumption in the 1986-
1988 base period. This proportion was to rise to 5 percent by the year 2000 (developed countries).
These provisions refer to "minimum access". When traditional imports did not represent a sufficient
percentage of domestic consumption, TRQs were applied so as to meet URAA minimum access
commitments. In addition, the URAA agreed that pre-existing market access had to be preserved. That
is, access conditions for historically established import quantities would be maintained by a provision
referred to as "current access". Hence, for a number of products, countries opened up TRQs in order to
meet the obligations of current access.
No specific provisions were approved in the URAA regarding the administration of TRQs, although
relevant WTO rules were to apply. In practice, the complexity of the tariff sfucture in the presence of
TRQs results in a certain lack of fansparency. In the tariff schedules, it is often difficult to identifu the
duties that particular imports will face, given that there are two tariffs, a quota and several specific
situations like over-quota imports, quota under-fill and preferential quotas and tariffs. TRQs were
defined so as to respect current access, or to ensure minimum access to the domestic market for
imports. In practice, TRQs under current access can be restricted to traditional importers. TRQs under
minimum access should be opened to would be exporters on the MFN basis. However most countries
have not notified which quota is under which regime.
5 This paragraph builds on the document prepared for the IATRC report on tariff-rate quotas: Bureau and
Tangermann (2000).
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In terms of administering TRQs, WTO member countries use a host of different methods. Countries
have basically two ways of allocating their TRQs: the first one is global, the second one is country-
specific. Global allocation applies on imports regardless of country of origin, all countries being free
to compete. Under the country-specific allocation, the importing country grants one part of the TRQ to
an exporting country. In this case, WTO rules require that all substantial suppliers (defined as
countries with a market share of over 10 percent, see par.7 of Article XXVIII:I) have to receive a
share. Licenses are often used as a means of administering TRQs, and can be assigned to importing or
exporting firms (or to both such that an importing fîrm needs to present both an import and an export
license to import authorities). Allocation can follow different forms, from "first-come first served" and
licenses on demand to auctioning, lottery, etc. These different methods of administering TRQs may
lead to different inefficiencies and inequities. In addition, other conditions placed on TRQ
administration like quota limits per firm also have the potential to generate inefficiencies.
In most countries, TRQs have mainly been used to maintain traditional import flows but have not led
to a large increase in trade. This can be explained by several factors:
- tjRAA commitments were based on the Modalities established by the WTO, which were not
incorporated as part of the IJRRA. What countries actually agreed upon was what they respectively
submitted in their schedules, whether or not it reflected the application of the Modalities. As a result,
the Modalities discipline was not always followed in practice, and the operation of TRQs was left to
individual countries' discretion. For example, some countries calculated their TRQs in a way that do
not always correspond to 3 percent of domestic consumption. This also made it possible to minimise
market access increases for more politically sensitive commodities.
- TRQs were often set for products characterised by tariff peaks, so the out-of-quota tariffs remain
prohibitive.
- Commitments as well as management of TRQs lack transparency in many countries. This creates
grey areas that allow some countries to get around some of the URAA disciplines. One example is the
latitude given to (or taken by) countries either to use different (and sometimes inconsistent) statistical
classifications or to define products at a level of very fine detail, restricting access to quotas for
particular products from specific origins.
- TRQs under minimum access are not always allocated on a Most Favoured Nation (MFf| basis as
was specified in the Modalities. Countries have used existing freedom to fill not only current access
but also, sometimes, minimum access TRQs with imports under preferential agreements. In such
cases, one or a few countries are allowed access to the TRQ concemed and can take advantage of the
new trade opportunities. Where this is the case, it considerably limits the scope of the current
functioning of the IJRAA in terms of trade liberalisation. In some cases, quotas are allocated to
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countries that are unlikely to be able to export the relevant commodity. In other cases, tariffs under
preferential agreements are lower than the in-quota MFN tariffs so those minimum access quotas are,
defacto, filled with preferential imports from particular countries.
- Even though countries are obligated to open their markets to imports at particular tariffs within the
TRQs specified in their schedules, they are not required to import quantities corresponding to the
TRQs. Market conditions may preclude a 100 percent quota fill rate. In some cases, only a small share
of the TRQ quantities is actually imported because of the manner in which TRQs are administered.
This translates into a low fill rate for such quotas.
The EU created a large number (87) of TRQs after the Uruguay Round. Unlike those of nearly all
other countries, quotas in the EU's schedule are clearly categorised as minimum access or current
access TRQs, providing transparency in this regard. Roughly two-fifths of the EU's TRQs come under
current access. They usually provide continued access, on a bilateral basis, for exporters who in the
past enjoyed preferential access to the EU or who had low or zero tat''ff access to EU markets for
products under voluntary restraint agreements. As far as quantities are concerned, the EU's current
access quotas tend to be much larger than those created under minimum access.
In establishing the TRQS, it appears that the EU has generally not deviated from fundamental rules in
the Modalities. As in many other countries, there was a bit of "dirty quotification" in the EU, both in
terms of product specification and calculation of minimum access quantities based on domestic
consumption.
kr the EU, the relationship between in-quota tariffs and out-of-quota tariffs differs greatly between
current and minimum access. Under current access, in-quota tariffs as percentages of above-quota
tariffs vary widely across products, because the individual TRQs reflect their historical origins and,
hence, the (usually) low levels of protection that the EU had historically agreed upon with the
exporting countries concemed. For most minimum access TRQs, on the other hand, the EU has set in-
quota tariffs at a universal percentage (32 percent) of out-of-quota tariffs, and has not distinguished
between less and more sensitive products. For both current and minimum access quotas, in-quota
tariffs remained constant during the URAA implementation period, so that over time they have risen
relative to the declining out-of-quota tariffs.
In administering license allocation under the TRQs, the EU has not been particularly inventive, either
in using approaches that make it difficult to import the products concerned or in devising innovative
approaches or methods, such as auctioning, that are economically more convincing than the other,
more frequently used, approaches.
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Fill rates for TRQs in the EU have been reasonably high and have increased over time. It is interesting
to note that some of the larger current access quotas have exhibited relatively low fill rates, more so
than have minimum access quotas. This was particularly so with current access quotas for feedstuffs
that in the past was used as cereal substitutes in the EU. With the significant cut in EU cereal support
prices, it is no surprise that import demand for these feedstuffs has declined noticeably. As far as we
can see, no case has been identified in which the EU has deliberately used quota management
procedures to make access to its markets more cumbersome than expected under a TRQ regime.
Overall, it appears that the EU has played a reasonably fair game as far as TRQs are concerned.
Concerns do remain, though, as to the exact articulation of the Europe Agreement and the quotas
under minimum access. The EU has indicated in its schedule that imports under the (preferential)
Europe Agreement could be counted against certain quotas. Even though this provision is used when
preferential tariffs under the Europe Agreement and in-quota (NmI) tariffs are similar, other countries
fear that this could result in Cenhal and Eastern European countries taking greater advantage of the
EU increase in market access under the minimum access provisions.
2.6. Conclusion: Lessons for the Millenium Round
Even if there is not or few infringements to the rules of the WTO as far as market access provisions of
the URAA are concemed, lessons for the Millenium Round can be drawn from the many deviations to
the spirit of the Agreement which were observed. The European Union over-estimated the tariff
equivalents during the "tariffication process" and set relatively lenient thresholds for the triggering of
the safeguard clause. However, the EU did not use much the various mechanisms making it possible to
minimise the scope of the Agreement, compared to its trading partners. In the next round, it is likely
that it would be in the interest of the European Union to:
- Base future commitments on a further reduction of tariffs and an increase in minimal access using
the Uruguay Round benchmarks, rather than defining new reference values and periods. Because of
the changes in the EU consumption of grains experienced since 1995, and because of the fall in the
cereal intervention price, the definition of new commitments on minimal access would result in large
grain imports.
- Tighten the consfaints so that tariffs be reduced in a more uniform way. This would make it possible
to avoid the stategic allocation of the bulk of higher reductions towards the least sensitive products.
Indeed, in the Uruguay Round, these degrees of freedom were used in a larger extent by other
counfiçs than the European Union.
- Promote reduction in tariff peaks. This would create difficulties in some sectors such as the beef and
veal, and would require a reform of the corresponding Common Market Organisations. Nevertheless,
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it looks like the only way to open third countries'markets to European products such as wines and
spirits, which still face prohibitive tariffs, in particular on Asian markets.
- Press for more transparency in the schedules and in the tariff reduction procedure, to make sure that
the possibilities of manipulating classifications and statistical series will be limited. This could bring
the EU representatives to defend the idea that WTO commitments on tariffs should be specified at the
6-digit level of the United Nations Harmonised System of classification (the only level for which there
is a true international harmonisation. Beyond the 6-digit level, the codes are no longer harmonised
across countries). The countries which least opened their market are those which could exploit the
flexibility of engagements with 8, 9 or 10 digits.
- Strengthen the disciplines on the methods of management of tariff-rate quotas. There too, restrictive
procedures were used by other countries in a larger extent than in the EU. The European Union could
gain in particular with the prohibition of the management of these quotas by public monopolies,
sensitive to political interference and discretionary import authorisations.
With regard to the sfategic interest for Europe "to push" for a decrease in tariffs or, on the confuary, to
an increase in tariff-rate quotas, it is quite difficult to answer. Large decreases in tariffs in the EU
would require a substantial reform of some Common Market Organisations where producers are still
well insulated from world prices. An increase in the level of current tariff-rate quotas would lead to
limited benefits for European exporters. These quotas seldom relate to products where Europe has a
real comparative advantage. In the future, the European Union could even less benefit from these
quotas because of the foreseeable end of export refunds. Moreover, an increase in the level of tariff-
rate quotas would not mean necessarily more opened markets, insofar as third countries seldom fill
their quotas at 100%. Nevertheless, the most promising markets for the European exporters (Asia)
remain protected by extremely high customs duties. It is not likely that a cut in these tariffs, that would
necessarily remain limited, would allow a significant improvement in the access to these markets,
unless measures of crest lowering of the tariff peaks are taken. The extension of tariff-rate quotas
undoubtedly remains the only realistic prospect to penekate these short-term markets. It will then be
necessary to give a very detailed attention to the mode of calculation of these quotas, and to the related
methods of management so that TRQs are actually opened with the some products on which Europe
can be competitive. Statistical methods of calculation of minimum access should ensure the opening of
quotas on processed products, on which the European Union seems to have a capacity of stronger
export. It is indeed on these products that one observes significant progressions ofEuropean exports
since 1994.
4t
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3 . MARKET ACCESS II\DICATORS
Assessment and comparison of tariff structures chosen by the European Union and the United
States under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
Jean-Christophe Bureau and Luca Salvatici
Partner 2: INRA-ESR, Grignon
Partner 6: university of Rome "La sapienza", Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica
3.1. Introduction
The general objective of this part of the project was to construct indicators of hade restriction and, on
the basis of these indicators, to assess and compare the improvement in market access that was
permitted in the UE and other countries by the URAA.
The proposed analysis focuses on tariff commitments under the URAA and on the EU and the US. It
aims at measuring how much liberalisation UR tariff commitments allowed to achieve in both the EU
and the US by the end of the implementation period, compared to the initial situation.
The analysis retains the TRI (Trade Restrictiveness Index) and the MTRI (Mercantilistic Trade
Restrictiveness Index), proposed by Anderson and Neary Q994 and L999), as indicators of trade
restriction. Both indicators are empirically implemented for the EU and the US. The empirical analysis
involves three stages. Firstly, the rates of change of the EU and US TRI and the MTRI between 1995
and 2000 are computed using the base and bound tariffs of both countries as submitted under the
URAA. This first stage allows for assessing and comparing the extent of the improvement in market
access that was permitted in both countries by the IJRAA. Secondly, the rates of change of the EU and
the US TRI and MTRI are computed using two alternative schemes of tariff reduction: the "Swiss
formula" and the uniform tariff reduction. This second stage allows for assessing and comparing the
impact of the uneven allocation of tariff cuts across commodities implemented by the EU and the US
under the URAA. Thirdly, the levels of the EU and the US MTRI are computed for the years 1995 and
2000. This third stage adds information on the EU and the US tariff structures at the beginning and at
the end of the URAA implementation period.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, the various families of measures of tade
restrictiveness are reviewed, emphasising the pros and cons of the different existing types of measures.
Section 3 is dedicated to the empirical implementation of the TRI and the MTRI. In section 4 results
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obtained for each of the previously described three stages of the empirical analysis are successively
presented and discussed. Section 5 concludes and draws some policy recommendations.
3.2. Available measures of trade restrictiveness: A review
First of all, let's speci$ that to narrow the discussion, only production and consumption distortions are
considered in our review. That is, we exclude the possibility of gains or losses due to changes in the
terms of trade or in the scale of firms emphasised by the recent theories of imperfect competition and
trade (see, Krugnan, 1979). Secondly, policy instruments that are referred in the course of the analysis
are principally import barriers, in particular tariffs.
One may distinguish two main families of measures of hade restrictiveness: incidence measures and
outcome-based measures (Pritchett, 1996). In order to understand the crucial difference between the
two approaches is important to keep in mind two points. Firstly, the two questions "how much
protection is given" and "how much distortion is induced as a result" are distinct. Secondly, the effects
of tade policy are the result of the interaction between the level of protection and the structural
features of the economy.
3.2. 1. Incidence measures
Incidence measures are based on the direct observation of the policy instruments. They provide an ex
ante mea$xe, since they ignore any second-round effects of the policies on the market (economy)
under examination. In a sense, they attempt to measure the level of protection without considering the
rate at which the level of protection is hanslated into market (economy) specific trade distortions. The
level (or dispersion) of tariffs and the frequency of the various types of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are
typical examples of incidence measures.
Apparently, the mere count of NTBs, such as in Olechowski (1987), can be considered only suggestive
of the severity of the distortions and is unreliable for cross-country and intertemporal comparisons of
the level ofprotection. The height oftariffs, on the other hand, is less prone to subjective evaluations
than the "counting" of NTBs. Nevertheless, as we will see, even in this case it is difficult to define an
unambiguous aggregation procedure.
The distinction between the two metrics mentioned above 
- 
protection and distortion-, as a matter of
fact, would not matter if they gave the same results, that is if the restrictiveness of trade policy could
unambiguously be measured by the height of the tariff. When tariffs apply to more than one good,
there is something intuitive about the idea that the effects of protection must be related to the mean of
the tariff schedule. For example, the URAA requires each member country to reduce the simple
average tanff by 36%.
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However, it is clear that the same (average) height of the tariff can have very different impacts
according to the number of imported goods it is applied to. The easiest solution, and the one often
adopted in practice, is to aggregate tariffs by weighting them by the imports (valued at border prices)
of each good. This approach immediately runs into difficulties if there is a positive correlation
between import demand elasticities and tariff levels. If this is the case, high tariffs receive a low
weight whereas low tariffs receive a high weight.
Another measure of hade restrictiveness is the coefficient of variation of tariffs. This is based on the
intuition that a greater dispersion of the tariff structure implies larger distortions. For reasonable
parameter values, however, it can be shown that this is a no more satisfactory measure than the hade-
weighted average tariff (Anderson, 1995). More generally, all purely statistical measures (i.e., tariff
moments) have serious drawbacks on a theoretical ground.
A diagram (Figure 3.1) can be used to provide a graphical illustration of the possible inconsistencies
arising from tariff moment measures. Following Neary (1995), let us assume that in a small open
economy there are 3 goods: good 0, the untaxed numeraire, and goods 1 and 2, which are net
substitutes and taded subject to ad-valorem tariffs (respectively, t, and t ).
Figure 3.1.. Inconsistent measures of a tariff reform
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If we assume that for each value of t1 and t2 there is a unique second best optimal value of the other
tariff we can draw the iso-welfare contour U. The iso-welfare loci (U0, Ul) have always a negative
\
\
I
o
t2
xr
45
slopeo so that second best "perverse" results are excluded. Welfare increases moving towards the
origin.
The curves labelled M(t) illustrate the loci of tariff factors along which the import-weighted average
remains constant. Their shape depends on the substitution properties of the economy, and they are
necessarily downward sloping in this case.
V(t) are iso-variance contours. Since the partial derivative of the variance with respect to tariff factor i
is equal to:
dv(t)/dti: 2(ti - M(t))/n (1)
the contour's slope is equal to
dt/dt2 = -(tz - M(t))(tt - M(t)) Q)
In this case the partial derivatives must have opposite signs, hence the slope is positive. The variance
increases with distance from the uniform tariff locus (UTL).
The index 0 and t indicates the effects of a tariff reform from A to B. Points A and B lie on two
different iso-welfare contours and the reform is welfare-increasing, since Ul>Uo. If we used the mean
tariff index, we would register a rise in protection, since point B is on an higher locus (M(t)t>M(t)0).
On the other hand, the coefficient of variation would show a reduction of dispersion (lower variance -
V(t)l-, higher mean). However, it should be noticed that area AFE represents a set of (possible) tariff
reforms, which are welfare improving, but lead to higher coefficient of variations (lower mean, higher
variance).
3. 2. 2. Outcom e-b as ed measures
Outcome-based measures assess the deviation of the actual outcome from what the outcome would
have been without the trade barriers. These instruments provide an ex post measure, since they take
into account (at least some of) the effects of trade policies. This means that the economic effects
provide the weights used in the process of aggregation across markets or across policy instruments.
One commonly distinguishes two types of outcome-based measures: those based on trade intensity and
those based on the equivalence among trade barriers.
3.2.2.1. Trade intensity measures
Trade intensity measures are based on a structural model of trade, and then investigate how trade
barriers affect trade flows. The basic measure of openness is the trade intensity ratio: exports plus
imports divided by GNP (Leamer, 1988).
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In order to attribute to hade barriers any differences among countries in the level and pattern of trade,
it is necessary to control for differences in terms of resources, tastes and natural barriers. Leamer
(1988), for example, specified an Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek model of trade flows, and used the
differences between the predicted and the actual trade intensity ratios as an indicator of the level of
openness.
The measures developed within this approach differ according to the set of variables, the functional
form and the model chosen in constructing the counterfactual of what would have happened under an
alternative policy (for example, free hade). As it can be expected, the results obtained are very
sensitive to the choices made for the estimation of the trade equations.
With this approach, trade data are used as circumstantial evidence of barriers. This means that data on
hade barriers do not appear explicitly, and the restrictiveness is evaluated by the residuals in the
estimated trade equations. Since the interpretation of the statistical and economic significance of these
residuals is not obvious (Harrigan, 1991; Feenstra, 1995), a better approach might be to include
measures of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the equation, and to measure their restrictiveness in terms
of their contribution to the determination of trade. However, there is a simultaneity problem, since
high tariffs are often infroduced in those industries with high imports. There are examples of studies
that explicitly recognise the endogeneity of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, modelling these within a
political economy framework (Trefler, 1993). Nonetheless, the data problems and the model
consfruction diffi culties remain formidable.
3.2.2.2. Measures based on the equivalence among trade barriers
The starting point for this second type of outcome measures is the acknowledgement that the idea of a
"trade distortion" cannot be considered a simple, undifferentiated concept. It includes different
elements that can be captured by different indicators. As a matter of fact, there is a long tadition in the
analysis of border policies to convert various protectionist instruments and particularly non-tariff
barriers into tariff equivalents. For example, the equivalence between tariffs and import quotas has
attacted a large body of research which shows that "full equivalence" (that is, equivalence in terms of
all relevant economic effects) is almost never valid, since it requires very stringent assumptions
(Bhagwati, 1965).
Although there is not a conceptual framework where all possible impacts are taken into account, it is
possible and indeed useful to consfuct consistent measures defined in terms of a single type of effect.
As soon as we think about the problem of finding a single number capable of summarising a set of
policies applied in different markets, it is necessary to specifu the type of information we want to
summarise. This means that in the process of aggregation we want certain basic information
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maintained or, put in a different way, that the final single number is equivalent to the original multiple
data in terms of the information we are interested in.
According to Anderson and Neary (1996), a general definition of a policy index is as follows:
depending on a pre-determined reference concept, any aggregate measure is a function mapping from
a vector ofindependent variables - defined according to the policy coverage - into a scalar aggregate.
Consequently, the elements that define a theoretically consistent policy index of frade restrictiveness
include the following:
- the policy coverage (e.g., tariffs, import quotas, border and domestic policies, etc);
- the reference point for the "equivalent-impact" we are interested in (e.g., iso-welfare measures, iso-
income measures, etc);
- the scalar aggtegate, that is the policy instrument into which are translated the policy measures
covered (e.g., tariff equivalent measures, subsidy equivalent measures, quota equivalent measures,
etc).
The greatest advantage of this class of measures is that they are theoretically consistent, since the
equivalence among policy instruments is determined according to a fundamental economic structure.
Secondly, it can be pointed out that they are unequivocal, because their definition is predetermined.
Compare these fixed definition indicators with the incidence measures. Such measures are defined by
the formulas or techniques embodied in their generationn but the interpretation is questionable and it is
not easy to say exactly what information is conveyed. The notion of a theoretically consistent indicator
is to prevent any problems of interpretation, although there could be many problems in terms of
practical implementation. Consequently, this approach changes the terms of the professional debate.
The discussion is over the practical feasibility or how best to calculate the indicator, whereas the
interpretation and the properties of the indicator are predetermined by its definition (Josling, 1990).
Finally, in terms of use of indicators in hade negotiations, we have already seen that commitments
under the GATT were traditionally expressed in terms of a simple incidence measure like the average
tariff. A major obstacle to the political use of outcome measures in place of incidence measures is that
while the latter reflect only a change in policy, the former reflect both a change in policy and a change
in exogenous market conditions (e.g., world prices, exchange rates, structural parameters, etc). Thus,
govemments are reluctant to commit themselves to attaining or maintaining a negotiated level of an
indicator that is only partly under each country's control. Nonetheless, theoretically sound measures
can be very useful in order to assess the impact of different types of commitments and to evaluate the
implications resulting from the choice of alternative tariff reduction formulas.
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kr this part of the project we retained outcome-based measures as indicators of hade restriction
because these are theoretically consistent measures. More specifically, we retained two different types
of measures based on the equivalence among trade barriers: the TRI (Trade Restrictiveness index, i.e.,
the uniform tariff equivalent in terms of welfare, Anderson and Neary, 1994) and the MTRI
(Mercantilistic Trade Restrictiveness Index, i.e., the uniform tariff equivalent in terms of imports,
Anderson and Neary, 1999).
3.2.3.The TRI and the MTRI
3.2.3.1. The TN
Let the index i denote goods i : (1,...,N) that are sold at the international price vectorp*= (p,*,...,p**)
and at the domestic price vector p : (pr...,p"). The vector z includes all the variables assumed
exogenous, such as the world prices ("small country assumption") or the fixed endowment of factors
of production. It should be noticed that assuming 
-like we do in the following- a small economy with
perfect competition and constant returns to scale does not allow for terms of trade gains due to the
trade policies. In other terms, we focus on the deadweight loss from distorting production and
consumption decisions, ignoring possible gains from improving the terms of trade, or from shifting
profits between countries due to changes in the scale of firms (Feenstra, 1995).
A representative agent represents the ffade behaviour of the economy. Distributive issues are ignored
and protective purposes are set exogenously by the government, which returns its net revenues from
trade policy to the agent. It makes no essential difference whether imports are for final consumption or
intermediate input use, nor does it matter whether export as well as import frade policies are
considered.
The optimal behaviour of the representative agent can be expressed through the hade expenditure
function, E(p, U,z),and is obtained as the difference between the consumer's expenditure function,
e(p, U), and the gross domestic product function, R(p, z). Making use of the properties of duality, we
know that:
- the derivatives of the consumer's expenditure function with respect to prices equal the levels of
consumption;
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- the derivatives of the gross domestic product function with respect to prices are the economy's
general equilibrium net supply functions6;
- the trade expenditure function is homogeneous of degree one in prices and its derivatives with
respect to prices are the compensated import demand functions, I,(p, U, z),which are homogeneous of
degree zero in prices.
Given this structure of supply and demand, the other element of the model is provided by the external
budget constraint. The constraint is expressed through the balance of trade function, B(p, U, z),that
summarises the three possible sources of funds for procuring imports: earnings from exports, earnings
from the distortion of trade, G, and international transfers. Assuming that the latter are equal to zero
and that tariffs (vector l) are the only trade policies, we get:
B(.)=G-8(1=6 (3)
Total differantiating the extemal budget constraint (3) using the small country assumption (dp = dt)
implies:
BdU*Brdo=O (4)
The first term(Bud\ is the change in net trade expenditures at constant prices that could take place,
for example, as a consequence of a gift from abroad. The second term (Brdr) is the marginal cost of
tariffs, which is positive if tariff increases are inefficient. This is quite an intuitive assumption, but it
should not be taken for granted, even if we have ruled out possible gains due to imperfect competition
or due to terms of trade changes. In case of partial liberalisation, as a matter of fact, cross price effects
can make the marginal cost negative.
The TRI is a uniform tariff equivalent, iso-welfare measure. In terms of policy coverage, for the sake
of simplicity, the following presentation deals only with tariffs. Although the inclusion of import
quotas inhoduces some analyical complications (for example in terms of how the quota rent is shared
between the importing and exporting country, Anderson and Neary, 1992), both price and quantity
import restrictive policies can be included in the TRI, as well as domestic policies (Anderson,
Bannister and Neary, 1995).
6 Accordingly, each derivative can be equal either to the supply function or to minus the input derived demand
function if the good is an intermediate input. Treating imports and domestically produced goods as imperfect
substitutes (i.e., the "Armington assumption") and considering only final consumption, the derivatives of the
gross product function with respect to prices of tariff constrained goods would be equal to zero.
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The TRl(denoted Â ) is defined as the uniform scaling factor (or uniform price deflator) that, when
applied to period 1 prices, permits the representative consumer to attain his initial level of vttlily u0
while holding the balance of hade constant at its original (period 0) level:
LÇt',uo,z):b,t aG' / L,,uo,z)=of (s)
If new tariffs are equal to zero, (I/A - 1) is the uniform tariff which is equivalent in efficiency to the
original ûade policy. More generally, l/A is the scalar factor of proportionality by which period 1
prices would have to be adjusted to ensure balanced tade when utility is at period 0 level. Notice that
this is not the same as raising tariffs by a uniform proportionate rate (except when we deal with a full
liberalisation).
Since À deflates period I prices and quantities to attain period 0 utility, it is a compensating variation
type of measure. The purpose of any compensating variation index number of border policies is to
consistently map some alternative setting of tariffs and quotas into a uniform tariff and quota setting
which supports the base level of utility. Under certain conditions that will be discussed later, the TRI
provides a consistent measure that is monotonically related to efficiency for all comparisons of
possible alternative border policy settings.
Although the TRI focuses on a crucial dimension for economic analysis, namely the impact on
domestic welfare, it is important to notice that the concept of "trade restrictiveness" assumed in the
definition of the TRI is a very precise (and limited) one. It is related, but nonetheless very different
from the one that could be considered, for example, in the context of trade negotiations. In that case,
the hade volume displacement due to a certain set of policies may very well be more relevant to cross-
country comparisons than the effects on domestic welfare.
Figure 3.2 provides a graphical example of the differences in terms of trade volumes resulting from
altemative definitions of trade resbictiveness (Salvatici et al., 1999). V/e consider a partially
decoupled set of policies that includes a tariff and a production quota fixed exactly at the same level of
production which would have occurred under free trade.
kr the quantity space of a two-good economy Ot, y), A is the production bundle and FI is the
consumption bundle under free hade. As a consequence of the infroduction of the tariff-cum-quota set
of policies, the consumption bundle shifts from FT to TQ, while the production quota y2^ does not
allow the production bundle to change. On the other hand, if we replace the tariff-cum-quota with a
tariff equivalent in terms of welfare (that is, the type of counterfactual experiment used in the
construction of the TRI), the economy will produce at D and consume at TE. Clearly, in the latter case
5l
both imports (TE-C < fQ-B) and exports (D-C < A-B) are lower than under the tariff-cum-quota case,
although the economy is on the same indifference curve UI.
Figure 3.2. Comparison between different tariff equivalents
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It is possible to draw the tariff-equivalent in terms of the volume of hade for the tariff-cum-quota set
of policies, obtaining the point E and M where,by construction, M-H = TQ-B and H-E = B-A (in this
case, however, the level of welfare achieved by the two policies is different, with U2>UI).
3.2.i.2. The MTN
A trade restrictiveness index which employs a reference point different from welfare is the MTRI,
since it operationalises the idea of finding a uniform tariff which yields the same hade volume as the
original tariff structure. The definition of the MTRI shares the same basic assumptions of the TRI:
single representative agent, small country, perfect competition, and constant refurns to scale. The
MTRI relies on the idea of evaluating trade policy using trade volume as the reference standard. As a
matter of fact, the MTRI is equal to the uniform price deflator (p ) which, when applied to the new set
of distorted prices, p/, yields the same trade volume (at world prices) as in the initial equilibrium
Q,û,
p(e' ,Mo ,B')= h , M(p' / 1t, p*,Bo)= Mo = Mbo , p*,Bo)l
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(6)
The scalar import volume function M is defined as:
MQt, p+,8)=\
i=l
IÏ (7)
where,lu denotes the uncompensated (Marshallian) import demand function. Ifpl equals its free trade
valuespl (I/tt - /,) is the uniform tariff (t ) which yields the same volume (at world prices) of tariff
restricted imports as the initial vector of (non uniform) tariffs. Accordingly, the MTRI uniform tariff
r would lead to the same volume of imports (at world prices) as the one resulting from the uneven
tariff structure denoted by the N dimensional tariff vector t whose elements are t;. That is:
f, p: rylp - (t * r)r']= f, o: rrlp - (t * r,)a']
ip
(8)
i=l t=l
The MTRI can be computed by solving equation (8) for r
The MTRI derived from (8) provides a measure of hade restrictiveness relative to a free hade
reference. If we want focus on the change in the tariff structure, from the initial equilibrium
corresponding to the price vectorp0 = p'(t + to) and the new (still distorted) equilibrium
corresponding to the price vector p' = p' (t+lt), rather than free tade, we define the "uniform tariff
surcharge" vwhich, when applied to the prices in the new equilibrium,p/, yields the same volume (at
world prices) of tariff restricted imports as the old equilibrim lvf (Anderson and Neary,1,999).
Formally:
v:ufu+v)p',Bo]= Mo =M(po,Bo ) (e)
While the levels of TRI and MTRI are most interesting for policy analysis, comparing their levels is
very demanding in terms of data. In the two first stages of the following empirical analysis, then, we
follow a "local approach" estimating changes in Â and p resulting from the different patterns of tariff
reductions (Bureau, Fulponi and Salvatici, 2000).
3.2.3.3. Rates of change in the TN and MTN
Looking at the definitions of the TRI and MTRI in implicit form provided in equations (5) and (6), it
appears that proportional changes in the indices can be expressed as weighted averages of the
proportional changes in domestic prices, that is:
t ,À = Io,p, (10)
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where the point above a variable denotes a proportional change. 7 Obviously, the weights o, in
equation (10) will be different for each index. For the TRI, the weights turn out to be the share of
marginal deadweight loss due to each tariff, and these depend on the partial derivatives of the balance
of trade function with respect to prices, that is:
6T"
AB
PiôP,
,(ri=, ABuo,o t (11)
Clearly, the marginal cost of tariffs is positive if tariff increases have a negative effect on welfare.
In the case of the MTRI, proportional price changes are weighted by their marginal volume shares:
or'' =!^n,r(E#r,) (r2)
The rates of changes in TRI and MTRI can be interpreted as follows. Assume that between period 0
and period 1, all tariffs are reduced, though not all by the same percentage. lWe move from a protected
structure where pi > p;,Vi to a less protected structure where pi >- pi, pi,Vi. In order to
compensate for the change in the tariff structure, it is necessary to impose a uniform tariff, which
would raise prices to the point that would restore welfare or the volume of imports to their initial
levels (that is, before the change in the tariff structure). The introduction of the uniform tariff
surcharge implies that Â or p must be less than 1. This means that the reduction in trade distortions
and market protection is signalled by a reduction in the TRI and MTRI, respectively. 
8
7 Totally differentiating equation (5) for a given reference level of vtili} uo gives the effect on the TRI of
changes inthe period I distortions, zirr'ttp-Bo'pttl=0 twhich canbe readily converted to an expression in terms
of proportional changes. Starting from equation (6), an expression for the proportional rate of change of the
MTRI canbe easily derived along the same lines.
8 
Formally, using the Implicit Function Theorem, the following can be shown to hold:
dL 
__æ/ai
ùi ældL
âp 
_ 
_&t lùi
ùi âd lâp
Since the numerator and denominator of these expressions are of opposite signs, Â and p decrease as tariff
reductions reduce the difference between domestic and world prices'
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3.3. Empirical implementation of the TRI and the MTRI
In the empirical analysis, only the level of the MTRI is computed, while the rates of change in both
indices are estimated.
3.3.1. Empirical implementation of the MTRI in absolute terms
For the calculation of the MTRI in absolute terms, we model the consumer's preferences through a
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function. Although this fi.rnctional form imposes
rather restrictive separability assumptions, it is widely used in CGE models (Hertel etal, L997).
'We 
assume that the overall basket of goods can be partitioned into ./ aggregates denoted;=7,..."/ and
that the utility function of the representative consumer is separable on this partition. Hence, it can be
written as a sum of .I functions $, :
u(*)=IO,(r,('r)
j
(1 3)
That is, the overall utility function U is built up from lower level sub-utility functions ui.. Each vector
.ry contains N7 elements. We assume that ui is a CES function in x7. We use the popular Armington
(1969) assumption that imports are imperfect substitutes of domestic goods. 'We partition the
consumption vector;; within the7fr group into an aggregated domestic good denoted with a suffix d
and N7-l traded goods denoted with an index i. Hence:
u, (*) =(u rG ry' * I r, 0, )', )
I
Pj
Denoting o, = ;L the elasticity of substitution within the 7û group, the expenditure devoted to. t_pi
each aggregateT is:
i:1,.,,Ni
l-oj
(14)
(1 s)t,(1r,r)= go,bo,)'-"' * IFu b,)'-"' uj
The parameters B, can be calibrated to the initial values of the expenditure shares in the base data,
when all domestic prices are set to 1. After deriving the indirect utility function by inverting equation
(15), the demand functions of each of the i=,1,.., Ny-1 imported goods can be found by Roy's identity:
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-aj
xu =Fu êt (16)
(18)
(1e)
Fo,bo,)''"' * Igu (pu),-"'
Denoting Pithe price index that corresponds to the denominator of the right-hand side, the import
volume function for theT'fr agglegate,valued at world prices' is:
*0,,,=Zo;o,(fi)",, i=1,..., Ni-l (17)
When the initial total expenditure ef (expenditures on both domestic and imports ini) is used in the
expression (17), we obtain the demand function at the initial level of imports. Since the import volume
fgnction is homothetic, defining a uniform tariff equivalent requires selecting an untaxed good as a
reference. n As in Bach and Martin (2001), we solve the problem by taking the domestic good as a
numeraire.
The MTRI uniform tariff equivalent r; for each aggregate j is found by setting the value of the import
volume function with the uniform tariff equivalent equal to the initial value of imports (evaluated at
world prices):
P; )
w.û)
aj
I.p,9,
"', 
=lnuti
where I!, are the volume of imports in the initial period (i.e., 1995 or 2000 in our numerical
applications), and Pf is the price index:
-aj
P; 901( Po1)'-"' +IBrb;[ + t-)'-"i
The uniform tariff equivalent for each aggregate commodityj is found using an optimisation routine in
GAMS@ package (Brooke et al, 1998), solving for r; in equations (18) and (19).
n Mor" generally, Neary (1998) shows how the failure to select a reference untaxed good leads to misleading
results in the theory of tade policy.
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The indicators rr are by themselves relevant for the analysis of trade policy. In addition, the t, can
be used as aggregate tariffs in any trade model with a commodity aggregation and an import demand
structure which is consistent with our assumptions.ro However, rather than using a full CGE model, we
can readily compute an overall MTRI r that corresponds to the uniform tariff that would keep the
overall (i.e., on all j=I,..,N sectors) import volume equal to the initial value. This can be obtained by
modifying equation (18) as follows:
\oi( poi )'-"' +IPrb;(1+ r))""r
Pu +T
p; +
-al 6l
-6j
jt
Jt
(20)
(2t)
ZZ,p,9o e]=llruti'
Jt
Jt
In the same vein, the overall MTRI uniform tariff factor surcharge can be obtained solving for p in
equation (21) below:
aj
(orr or )'-o' +Iprb;(r * p)'-"l\rie, el =lln.rl,
3.3.2. Empirtcal implementation of the rates of change in the TRI and the MTM
Calculation of the percentage change in the TRI and the MTRI requires a number of simplifuing
assumptions, given the detailed tariff schedules on which the calculations are based.
3.3.2.1. Empirical implementation of the rates of change in the TN
The derivative of the balance of trade function with rèspect to domestic prices can be expressed as a
function of the (compensated) import elasticity matrix, whose elements are ej.,=ôlnli /ôlnp,.
Assuming that this matrix is diagonal, we obtain:
ôB / ôp, - -( P' - Pi ) ,,u1 (22)pr
l0 Bach and Martin (2001) discuss the different tariffaggregators that should be used in different components of
a CGE model.
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The assumption that the matrix of import elasticities is diagonal is a heroic one, required by the
impossibility of estimating a full 1500 by 1500 matrix when working at the level of detail
corresponding to the URAA tariff commitments (roughly 1500 tariff lines for the agricultural and food
sector). By assuming a diagonal matrix we ignore cross-effects. This is clearly a limitation of the
study, because we ignore the possibility of "second best results" such as the case where a piecemeal
reform decreases welfare because of substitutions between imported goods (see Hatta, 1977).
However, the econometric problems are so formidable that similar simplifuing assumptions have also
been adopted in other partial equilibrium applications of the TRI (Anderson et al., 1995; Fulponi,
1996, even though the latter study uses a few cross price elasticities available in the literature). Using
the import elasticities, the change in the TRI can be written as:
t'=2Ji'38?,-b,=f7 Z:=,p jaB / ôp . Ei Zi=,r o, - n, )r ,e',
(p
-p )r
This is the expression used in the actual calculations. Since we focus on the change in the tariff
structure between the beginning and the end of implementation period of the URAA (1995 and 2000),
the change in the TRI is calculated as follows: rr
(23)
(24)
i=l
(p?' 
- 
pi )I?'e! ( p?*-p?')Àro*r,t, =I
Zi=,r o',' - pr )I,l'e'r P?'
Finally, it was necessary to make assumptions about the parameter values in the year 2000. We
assume linear demand functions, thus the slopes remain constant over the period, while an alternative
assumption is used in the sensitivity analysis (reported in the appendix).
3.3.2.2. Empirical implementation of the rates of change in the MTM
According to equation (10), the proportional rate of change of the MTRI is equal to
pôpAMÈ=I
l=l
(2s)
The change in the MTRI is calculated as a function of the uncompensated import demand elasticities
ei, that is:
rr The fural estimates of TRI and MTRI rates of change presented in Table 3.2 are geometric averages of 1995
and 2000 weighted changes betweenpet andp2N0'
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Zi=,au , r ao,
r,=\ffffib,
I Pi (p?* -Il'"ùi pi')p 9952000 / (26)Zi=,r,r1'uï Pi'
Again, we assume that the slopes of the demand functions remain constant over the period.
3,3.3, Data and parameters
Price and quantity data required for computing the MTRI in absolute terms and the rates of change in
the TRI and the MTRI for the EU and the US were exhacted from the database on tariffs and hade (cf.
chapter 2).
The computation of the MTRI in absolute terms requires data on total expenditures. These data were
taken from the GTAP (Global Trade Project Analysis) version 4 dataset (McDougall et al., 1998). We
therefore adopted the commodity GTAP classification as a basis for computing the levels of the EU
andUS MTRI.
GTAP provides a comprehensive dataset that is widely used in applied analysis, and researchers might
be interested in tariff aggregates that match the GTAP classification for simulation purposes.
Moreover, the conversion tables from detailed tariff structures (HS-8-digit) to the GTAP sectors are
fully available, which makes it possible to aggregate the very detailed list of tariffs of the URAA
schedules into a restricted number of products that correspond to the GTAP system of classification.
Finally, the dataset provides the information that is necessary for distinguishing between expenditure
spent on domestic products and on imports for the various aggregates. It also provides elasticities of
substitution o, thatmatch the list of aggregates.
The original GTAP dataset distinguishes J:20 agricultural and food aggregate products. In order to
include non food other commodities listed in the URAA schedules (mainly agricultural goods listed in
chapters 25 to 53 of the HS classification) we defined an extra aggregate, which does not exist in the
original GTAP classification (see Table 3.1). We ignored one GTAP sector (raw milk), because there
is no trade for the corresponding commodity. Overall, we aggregated 1764 tariff lines in the EU and
1377 lornîf tnes in the US, at the 8-digit level of the HS classification up to 20 aggregate products
described in Table 3.1. It is noteworthy that the number of tariff lines in each commodity aggregate is
very uneven. Table 3.1 shows, for example, that there are only three tariff lines in the aggregate
"paddy rice", while the aggregate "fruits and vegetable" tariff includes 183 tariff lines listed in the EU
schedule.
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Number of tariff lines EU Number of tariff lines USGTAP
Classification
Commodities (raw milk, GTAP
code 20, is excluded because of
absence oftrade)
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
l2
t9
20
2t
22
23
24
25
26
3
3
l3
183
3l
4
lll
l4
73
9
77
199
t12
121
2
10
s80
87
3
3
t2
186
t6
2
'1
ll6
t2
50
t7
34
6t
70
il8
3
t5
489
84
130 79other
Paddy rice
Wheat
Cereal grains
Vegetables, fruits, nuts
Oilseeds
Sugar cane, sugar beet
Plant based fibers
Other crops
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses
Other animal products
Raw wool, cocoons and hair
Meat cattle, sheep, goats, horses
Other meat products
Vegetable oils and fats
Dairyproducts
Processed rice
Sugar
Other food products
Beverages and tobacco
Non-food items (goods listed in
IIRAA, beyond chapter HS 24)
Table 3.1. GTAP agricultural commodities and HS-8 tariff lines
Source: Bureau and Salvatici (2001
EU and US import elasticities were estimated econometrically. The estimation of these parameters
presents a number of problems. Lack of sufficiently long time series data at the level of disaggregation
of the tariff schedules (that is the 8-digit level) did not permit the use of rigorous estimation
procedures (the EU, for example, adopted the Nomenclature Combinée, a local version of the
Harmonised System, only in 1987). Import data for a sufficiently long period were available only at
the more aggregated levels in the so-called SITC classification; these data (from the OECD's NEXT
dataset) were used in the estimation of the elasticities. Consequently, a single import price elasticity is
used for the several commodities that compose the aggregates at the 4-digit level.
In addition, because of the large number of commodities, estimation procedures were simplified.
Import demand was assumed to depend only on own price and income. Import demand functions were
estimated over the period 1973-1996 in double log form by OLS, using data on import quantities,
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domestic unit values deflated by the consumer price index (CPD, and real domestic income. This
specification yields the Marshallian import demand elasticities that were used in the MTRI's rates of
change calculation (equation (26)). These can only be considered approximations to the (compensated)
elasticities that should be used in the calculation of the TRI's rates of change (equation (25)). The
uncompensated elasticities for food commodities however, should not differ greatly from the
compensated ones as the income effects at the 4-digit level are likely to be quite small.
In general, given the method of estimation and data limitations, the elasticities for any particular
commodity can only be considered as very crude estimates. Therefore, a sensivity analysis were
carried out in order for checking how responsive are the TRI and MTRI estimates to the magnitudes of
import demand elasticities. Results of this sensivity analysis are reported in the appendix.
3.4. Empirical results for the EU and the US
3.4.1. Three alternative tariff reduction schemes
The TRI and the MTRI are used to assess the impacts of the URAA tariff reduction commitments for
the UE and the US. However, since we also want to assess the relative effects of reducing the tariff
average and the tariff dispersion, we consider two other tariff reduction schemes in addition to the
actual UR scheme implemented by both countries. The three simulated scenarios are called "Uruguay
Round", "Swiss formula" and "Uniform tariff reduction".
All three scenarios start from the same tariff structure. In other words, the initial vector of domestic
prices p,:' is the same for all scenarios. It is obtained by multiplying each world p."ice pi (i.e., the
average CIF unit value of imports over the period 1994-1996) by the corresponding ad-valorem base
tariff retained by the EU and the US for the year !995 in their respective UR schedules. tt However,
the three scenarios rely on different final vectors of domestic prices pf* . These may be summarised
as follows:
- In the "Uruguay Round" scenario, the final vector of domestic prices p,3* is the one that results
from the implementation of the actual LrR tariff reduction provisions. It is obtained by multiplying
each world pice pi by the corresponding ad-valorem bound tariff consolidated by the EU and the US
for the year 2000 in their respective UR schedules. As we previously explained, the resulting tariff
struchre reflects the obligation of a 36% non-weighted average reduction, but with no constaints
placed on the mix of reductions to achieve the overall average, except that each tariff line must be
12 EU and US average CIF import unit values as well as base and bound tariffs are extacted from the database
on tariffs and tade described in chapter 2.
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reduced by at least 15%. Therefore, in the "Uruguay Round" scenario, the TRI and MTRI measure the
actual impact of the URAA in terms of, respectively, welfare and volume of trade.
- In the "Swiss formula" scenario, the final vector of domestic prices p,3* i. the one that would have
resulted from the implementation of a tariff reduction scheme where higher tariffs would have been
subject to larger cuts. It is obtained by multiplying each world price pi by the corresponding ad-
valorem tariff with t,2m calculated according to the following expressiorr (with r,lt5 the corresponding
initial base tariff):
tl* =ct:"s (c+t:nt ) (27)
The parameter C was chosen to obtain the same non-weighted average reduction of 36%. in tariffs as
specified in the URAA. This led in practice to choosing C:34 for the EU and C=12 for the US. This
approach, known as the "Swiss formula", was used in the Tolcyo Round for manufactured goods. 
13 In
the "Swiss formula" scenario, the TRI and MTRI reflect the impact of commitments that would have
focused more on reducing tariff dispersion than the actual URAA tariff cuts.
- In the "Uniform tariff reduction" scenario, the final vector of domestic prices p,3* is the one that
would have resulted from the implementation of a uniform 360Â taiff reduction for all tariff lines. It is
obtained by multiplying each world price p,l by the corresponding ad-valorem tariff with tfm equal
to the 36o/oreduced base tariff. This reduction scheme obviously results in the same average reduction
as specified under the IIRAA, but it does not permit countries to allocate the adjustment across
commodities. In the uUniform tariff reduction" scenario, the TRI and the MTRI measure the impact of
reducing the mean tariff without changing the tariff dispersion. ra
3.4,2. Impact of the Uruguay Round and counterfactual scenartos: Analysis in terms of TRI and
MTRI rates of change
Table 3.2 presents the estimated rates of change in the TRI and the MTRI resulting from the
implementation of the three scenarios (each scenario making it possible to achieve a 360Â average
t' In ttre Tokyo Round, one parameter, C=16, was used for all countries. We did not retain this option since we
want to isolate the effect oi reducing tariff dispersion. Hence, we calibrated C so that the "Swiss formula"
scenario results in the same average reduction than both other scenarios.
to On may underline that in all three scenarios, world prices are assumed to be constant' As a result, the
measure foôuses on changes in tariffs ceteris paribu.s, and is not aflected by exogenous price variations.
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aggregate tariff reduction). The larger the decrease in the TRI, the more distortions affecting welfare
were reduced. The larger the decrease in the MTRI, the more domestic market access increased. 15
Table 3.2 also reports traditional measures of tariff reductions using weighted and non-weighted
averages, for each of the three scenarios. The comparison of the TRI and MTRI with a widely used
indicator, the Trade-Weighted Tariff (TWT) average reduction (defined by equation (28) below)
makes it possible to assess whether the latter provides a good approximation to the theoretically
consistent indices. We also compare the TRI and MTRI to the Trade-Weighted Tariff Factor (TWTF)
average reduction (defined by equation (29) below).
p;Ii' ftl* -t?')
=Ë (p?*-p?') (28)TWT2w /t995 
- T zi=,r;r;'
p:ri'
95 Zi=,p,tl' P?' - P't i=l
TTiAFT*,roo, =zj=l Zi=,p,tl'
pil:' (T,'* 
-T,n')
=T p; ri' ( pl* - pi' ) (2e)
T,tt zi=,,, Ittt p?'
Note that, unlike the TWTF change, the TWT change given in equation (28) is not a function of
proportional changes in domestic prices. It is therefore fundamentally different from the MTRI and
TRI expressions (24) and (26).
t' In tlre rest of the text, we simply refer to the indicators for simplicity, it being understood that they refer to
their percentage change.
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Table 3.2. Estimated tariff reduction indices under the three scenarios (percentage changes)
I'RUGUAY ROT]NI)
Non-weighted average tariff reduction
Non-weighted average tariff factor reduction
Trade-weighted tariff reduction (TrtrT)
Trade-weighted tariff factor reduction (TIVTF)
TRI
MTRI
US
-36.6
-2.6
-24.8
-0.9
-2.7
-1.0
EU
-38.3
-6.6
-33.9
-4.5
-12.4
-5.7
SWISS F'ORMT]LA
Non-weighted average tariff reduction
Non-weighted average tariff factor reduction
Trade-weighted tariff reduction (TrWT)
Trade-weighted tariff factor reduction (TV/TF)
TRI
MTRI
-36.2
-5.4
-13.8
-1.1
-4.4
-1.1
-37.9
-10.5
-24.6
-8.4
-25.5
-10.6
TJNIFORM TARIFF REDUCTION
Non-weighted average tariff reduction
Non-wcightcd avcrage toriff foctor reduction
Trade-weighted tariff reduction (TV/T)
Trade-weighted tariff factor reduction (TWTF)
TRI
MTRI
-36.0
-3.3
-36.0
-1.0
-3.8
-1.0
-36.0
-7.1
-36.0
-5.0
-16.6
-6.3
Source: Bureau, Fulponi and Salvatici (2000)
Results reported in Table 3.2may be synthesised in seven main points:
i) Under the "Uruguay Round" scenario, the non-weighted tariff reduction exceeds the trade-weighted
one for both the EU and the US. This suggests that under the URAA, both countries implemented
larger reductions for those goods that had smaller import flows. The same is true for tariff factor
changes.
ii) The TRI and MTRI estimated under the "Uruguay Round" scenario indicate that the UR tariff
provisions resulted in an increase in both domestic welfare and market access in the EU and the US
(remember, however, that we ignored possible import substitutions that could have resulted in a
decrease in welfare).
iii) The percentage changes in TR[, MTRI and TWTF obtained by the EU are much larger in absolute
terms than those of the US. V/e can explain this by noting that the initial tariff structure of the EU has
a larger mean and greater variance and these characteristics should imply higher initial values for both
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the TRI and MTRI. This is confirmed, at least for the MTRI, by the results presented thereafter in
Tables 3.3,3.4 and 3.5.
iv) Under the "Swiss formula", the fact that the non-weighted average tariff and tariff factor reductions
exceed the fade-weighted ones is not surprising, since in this case, the largest reductions are applied
to the highest tariffs, which are often those applied to the smallest import flows. Though the difference
between the two averages is much larger in the US case, it should be recalled that the formulas used in
the calculations are different (the parameter C differs).
v) The comparison of the rates of change in the TRI obtained under the "Swiss formula" and the
"Uruguay Round" scenarios suggests that both the US and the EU would have reaped larger benefits in
terms of welfare using the Swiss formula reduction scheme rather than the tariff reduction scheme
actually used in the URAA.
vi) The rates of change in the MTRI resulting from both scenarios indicate that in the EU, market
access improvement would also have been greater under the Swiss formula reduction scheme
compared to the actual URAA situation. kr the case of the US, there is less difference between the
MTRI rates of change obtained under both scenarios than in the EU. This suggests that, compared to
the URAA commitments, additional reductions in tariff dispersion would have had little impact on
market access in the US.
vii) Comparing the "Uniform tariff reduction" and the "Uruguay Round" scenarios, it is possible to
assess how the EU and the US used their "degrees of freedom" in allocating tariff reduction
commitments across commodities and how this "sfrategic allocation" affects both welfare and market
access. Table 3.2 shows that the URAA has increased access to the market in a way that is very
comparable to what would have resulted from a uniform tariff reduction. This means that both the EU
and the US have not allocated tariff cuts in a very "strategic" way. The results also confirm the finding
that the "dilution" of tariff reduction effect was limited in the EU, as it could have expected since most
tariffs were cut by 36% and no tariff was reduced by less than20%o.In welfare terms (TRI results), the
uniform tariff reduction scheme is not as effective as the Swiss formula scheme. Nonetheless, it leads
to a larger increase in welfare than the actual UR commitments. This is explained by the fact that with
a uniform reduction we obtain a tariff structure with both a lower mean and dispersion than under the
URAA (Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below). These results show that the uneven allocation of the tariff
reductions limited the welfare gains that could have been obtained from the Agreement. The
difference between the TRI estimates in the URAA and uniform tariff reduction cases measures the
magnitude of the welfare costs of the "strategic" allocation of the tariff reductions. This outcome could
also be interpreted as a willingness to protect the more politically sensitive sectors.
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3.4,3.Impact of the Uruguay Round and counterfactual scenarîos: Analysis în tetms of changes in
MTRI levels
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide a set ofaggregated statistics that allow for characterising the tariffstructure
in, respectively, the EU and the US prior to implementation of the URAA (i.e., for the year 1995) and
at the end of the implementation period of the Agreement (i.e., for the year 2000, under the "Uruguay
Round scenario"). This set includes the computed MTRI levels (or MTRI uniform tariff equivalents
t ), the non-weighted and trade-weighted average tariffs and the standard deviations of tariffs.
Table 3.5 reports the computed EU and US M-TRI levels for each aggregate of the GTAP
classification. MTRI levels are calculated for the year 1995 and for the year 2000 under the three
considered scenarios.
Table 3.3. EU aggregate statistics for the years 1995 and 2000
**weighted by 1995 import values
Source: Bureau and Salvatici (2000).
Tabte 3.4. US aggregate statistics for the years 1995 and 2000
**weighted by 1995 import values
Source: Bureau and Salvatici (2000)
Tariff structures (ad-valorem
equivalent, in percentage)
Non-weighted
avetage tariff (%)
Trade-weighted
average tariff (%)
Standard
deviation
MTRI level (%)
1995 (base rates) 26.7 25.5 38.6 32.4
2000'Uruguay Round" 17.9 17.8** 26.8 25.6
2000 "Swiss formula" 1t I 8.4** 7.8 13.4
2000 "Uniform tariff reduction il t7.l 16.3** 24.7 24.7
Tariff structures (ad-valorem
equivalent, in percentage)
Non-weighted
average tariff (%)
Trade-weighted
average tariff (%)
Standard
deviation
MTRI level (%)
1995 (base rates) 9.7 3.3 18.3 3.5
2000 "Uruguay Round" 7.1 2.2** 15.5 2.4
2000 "Swiss formula" 3.5 1.7** 3.5 t.9
2000 "Uniform tariff reduction" 6.2 2.1** tt.7 2.4
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Table 3.5. Computed MTRI uniform tariff equivalents in 1995 and in 2000 under the 3 scenarios
Note: All indices compare the actual or a counterfactual tariffstructure with free tade.
Source: Bureau and Salvatici (2001).
First of all, the comparison of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 makes it possible to point out the four following
points:
i) The initial tariff structure of the EU has a larger mean and greater variance than the one of the US.
In 1995, the non-weighted average tariff is 26.7% in the EU and 9.7oÂ in the US, while the
corresponding standard deviations are, respectively, 38.6 and 18.3. This results in a substantially
higher initial MTRI value in the EU compared to the US (32.4% and3.5o/o, respectively). In other
words, the initial level of hade restrictiveness is much higher in the EU than in the US. This explains
the larger percentage changes in TRI, MTRI and TWTF obtained by the EU relative to the US,
reported in Table 3.2.
Non-
weighted
average tariff
urtggs (%)
Trade-
weighted
average tariff
in l99s (%)
MTRI level
u;-1995 (%\
MTRI level
in 2000 (%)
"Uruguay
Round"
MTRI level
in2000 (%)
"Swiss
formulatt
MTRI level
in 2000 (%)
"Uniform
tariff
reduction"
Commodities EU US EU US EU US EU US EU US EU US
Paddy rice
rWheat
Cereal grains
Vegetables, fruits, nuts
Oilseeds
Sugar cane, sugar beet
Plant based fibres
Other crops
Cattle, sheep, goat, horse
Other animal products
Raw wool, cocoons, hair
Meat (cattle, sheep, goat, horse)
Other meat products
Vegetable oils and fats
Dairy products
Processed rice
Sugar
Other food products
Beverages and tobacco
Non-food items
58.6
57.8
45.6
r6.8
0
40.3
0
7.5
30.2
4,9
0.1
62.r
35.1
14,5
72.0
99.2
39.2
28.0
r 5.8
8.6
3.0
4.9
1.1
6.9
23.6
2.9
lt.l
3.7
2.1
l.l
3.5
7.0
4.8
4.5
26.5
7.8
26.0
I1.8
7.2
3.0
80.5
114.0
84.4
57.5
0
t4.2
0
7.8
36.2
2.2
0
94.0
24.7
5.7
69.7
t26.4
63.9
t9.7
28.2
3.6
t.7
4.5
0.8
4.2
4.0
3.7
2.8
1.7
0.1
0.3
5.4
l.l
1.9
3.1
8.1
3.4
13.9
5.6
2.3
2.1
80.8
114.0
89.8
68.9
0
14.8
0
8.0
5 1.5
2.6
0
t03.2
26.4
6.8
76.4
t27.6
67.5
23.7
36.7
3.7
1.7
4.5
0.8
4.5
6.6
3.7
2.9
1.8
0.1
0.3
5.4
1.1
2.0
3.1
tt.4
3.4
t5.2
6.0
2.4
2.1
51.9
73.0
59.9
58.1
0
t2.0
0
3.4
38.9
1.9
0
70.5
t7.5
5.3
53.0
82.3
55.3
18.7
25.4
1.4
1.1
2.9
0.5
3.0
5.5
2.3
1.9
1.2
0.1
0.2
3.5
0.7
1.3
2.1
9.0
2.2
10.4
4.0
1.6
t.4
23.9
26.2
24.1
21.5
0
9.5
0
6.0
18.8
1.8
0
24.9
13.6
4.2
23.0
26.9
21.9
12.6
t6.4
3.0
1.5
3.3
0.7
2.3
2.1
2.8
1.9
1.0
0.1
0.2
3.6
0.8
t.4
2.1
3.0
2.6
5.5
3.0
1.8
1.4
52.0
73.0
60.7
51.6
0
9.8
0
5.3
39.4
1.9
0
70.7
17.9
4.9
52.t
82.3
45.2
17.t
27.0
2.4
1.1
2.9
0.5
3.0
5.5
2.3
1.9
1.2
0.1
0.2
3.5
0.7
1.3
2.t
9.0
2.2
10.4
4.0
T,6
1.4
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ii) The comparison of the MTRI levels in the base period and in the year 2000 under the "Uruguay
Round" scenario confirms that the UR tariff provisions increased market access in both the EU and the
US. One may underline that under the "Uruguay Round" scenario, the mean and the standard deviation
of tariffs decrease in both countries as well. These results are the consequence of the commitment to
reduce each tariffby at least 15%.
iii) The "Swiss formula" scenario generates a tariff structure with a lower mean and a smaller standard
deviation than the "Uruguay Round" scenario in both countries. Hence, it is not surprising that also the
EU and US MTRI levels decrease more following the implementation of the Swiss formula reduction
scheme rather than the UR actual one. In the US however there is less difference between the MTRI
values than in the EU. This result confirms that market access improvement would have been greater
under a Swiss formula reduction scheme than under the actual IJRAA case in the EU. In the case of
the US however, the adoption of a tariff reduction scheme, such as the Swiss formula, that would have
focused more on reducing tariff dispersion than the actual URAA tariff cuts would have had little
impact on market access.
iv) The "Uniform tariff reduction" scenario also generates a taiff structure with a lower mean and a
smaller standard deviation than the "Uruguay Round" scenario. Nevertheless, the decrease in the levels
of these statistics relative to the "Uruguay Round" scenario induced by the "Uniform tariff reduction"
is relatively low (almost as compared with the one observed with the "Swiss formula" scenario). As a
result, the "Uniform tariff reduction" scenario leads to a very limited decrease in the MTRI levels
compared to the "Uruguay Round" scenario in both the EU and the US. This result confirms that the
EU and the US have not allocated UR tariff cuts in a very "strategic" way, so that in both countries the
IJRAA has increased access to the market in a way that is very comparable to what would have
resulted from a uniform tariffreduction.
Secondly, dealing with Table 3.5 makes it possible to analyse the trade impact of the actual UR tariff
provisions as well as of the tariff cutting shategies of both the EU and the US at a more desaggregated
level. The four following points deserve to be emphasised:
i) Table 3.5 shows that it is not surprising that, in the initial situation, the aggregated non-weighted
average tariff and the aggregated MTRI level are lower in the US than in the EU (9.7% vs 26.7Yo and
3.5oÂ vs 32.4o/o, respectively) since one may observe lower US non-weighted average tariffs and
MTRI levels relative to the EU's ones in nearly all sectors. ru The only exceptions correspond to three
t6 The non-*eighted average tariffs that are presented here differ significantly form those computed by Gibson
et al (2001), even though *i ure the same initial tadff d ata, i.e,, the WTO schedules. The main difference lies in
the cànvention for converting specific tariffs into ad-valorem equivalents. We use a 4 year average of unit values
of either imports or exportslwhen imports are small or inexistent) at the 8-digit level, while Gibson et al use
world pricei at a moie aggregated livel. We believe that with our convention' we minimise the risk of
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product categories (oilseeds, fibres and wool) which face zero tariffs in the EU. tt The gap between the
EU and the US non-weighted average tariffs and MTRI levels is particularly wide in the grain
(including rice), meat, dairy and sugar (cane and beet) sectors.
ii) Table 3.5 confirms that the actual UR tariff provisions increased market access in both the EU and
the US. Indeed, the "Uruguay Round" scenario induces a decrease in the EU and the US MTRI levels,
with respect to the initial situation, in each of the 20 considered sectors. Once again, this illustates the
consequence of the commitment to reduce each tariff line by at least 15%.
iii) The comparison of EU and US MTRI levels obtained under the "Uruguay Round" scenario and the
"Swiss formula" scenario confirms the result previously mentioned among which the market access
improvement would have been gteater under the Swiss formula reduction scheme compared to the
URAA case in both countries, but to a much larger extent in the EU than in the US. Table 3.5 however
allows to further highlight the trade-off between the tariff dispersion and the tariff level. If the Swiss
formula had been applied, the Uruguay Round would have led to considerable increase in market
access as measured by the MTRI in the EU. More specifically, the Swiss formula implementation
would have led to dramatic decrease in fade restrictions in EU highly protected sectors such as grains
(including rice), ruminant live animals and meat, dairy and sugar. The US market would also have
been more opened at the aggregate level, but there are quite a few instances (mainly dairy and sugar,
sugar, meat) where the Swiss formula does perform better than the actual URAA, while this is nearly
always the case for the EU. Such results suggest that by using the Swiss formula the EU could have
achieved the same market access improvement (or welfare gain) as the one achieved through the
LIRAA, with an average tariff reduction of less than 36To. However, this would have required cutting
more dramatically the highest tariffs. This might of course have been difficult, since some tariffs are
particularly sensitive from a political standpoint, especially when a significant reduction of the border
protection would require a drastic reform of the corresponding Common Market Organisation.
iv) The comparison of EU and US MTRI levels obtained under the "Uruguay Round" scenario and the
"Uniform tariff reduction" scenario also confirms the result already mentioned among which the
"dilution" of tariff cuts has had overall a limited impact on market access in both the EU and the US.
However, if we compare, in Table 3.5, the ranking of sectors according to the initial MTRI levels with
constucting artificial tariff peaks, which is often the case when one converts specific tariffs into ad-valorem
using reference prices for more aggregated commodities. It is also worth recalling that the US schedule includes
specific tariff lines for in-quotas tariffs (in the case of commodities subject to a tariff-rate quotas). These tariff
lines were excluded from our analysis.
tt Tablr 3.5 shows that three product categories in the EU face zero tariffs while all aggregate tariffs in the US
face a shictly positive average tariff. However, this mainly reflects the particular structure of the GTAP
classification. Overall, the original 1995 EU tariff schedule included 245 lines with zero tariffs, while the US
schedule included 303 lines with zero tariffs. If we focus only on those items with non-zero tariffs, the average
non-weighted base tariff was 12.7o/o in the US and3l.4% in the EU.
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the ranking resulting after the IJRAA implementation, there is evidence of a more "strategic"
allocation of tariff cuts by the EU. Table 3.5 shows that there is only one change in the US (wheat
trading place with vegetables, fruits and nuts), while there are quite a few changes in the EU, where
vegetables, fruits and nuts, sugar, other food products, vegetable oils and fats and other animal
products gain positions, while paddy rice, dairy, other meat products, other crops and non-food items
move down in the ranking.
Finally, if we want to check the consistency of the numerical results with those presented in Table 3.2,
we need to turn the MTRl-uniform tariff surcharges as indicated in equation (9). The results for the
aggregate agricultural and food products are presented in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6. MTRl-uniform tariff surcharges (absolute values)
European Union United States
Uruguay Swiss Uniform Uruguay Swiss Uniform
5.4 16.8 6.2 1.0 1.3 1.0
Note: All tariff indices compare the initial (1995) tariffstructure with the new (2000) ones.
Source: Bureau and Salvatici (2001).
Given the differences in the methodological approaches followed for the computation of the tariff
surcharge and of the MTRI rate of change, the results are surprisingly similar. Only in the case of the
Swiss Formula, the difference is substantial, especially in the case of the EU. This is the scenario that
implies the largest change in tariffs: in such a case, then, the higher substitutability implied by the CES
functional form leads to a higher impact.rs
3.5. Conclusion: Discussion and policy recommendations
3.5.1. How reliable are the a-theoretic indicators?
From the results in Table 3.2, it is obvious that any attempt to measure the impact of trade
liberalisation through synthetic indicators should use changes in tariff factors. Changes in the level of
tariffs do not correctly reflect the impact of trade reforms on the economy. For example, if one focuses
only on the tade-weighted tariff reduction, one would conclude that the Swiss formula would be less
effective than actual Uruguay Round commitments, while the theoretically consistent indicators show
the opposite both in terms of trade and welfare. On the contrary, the average tariff factor reductions
provide a consistent ranking of the different tariff reduction schemes. This is not surprising, since the
18 It should be recalled that Bureau, Fulponi and Salvatici (2000) assume linear import demand functions and a
diagonal matrix of import elasticities.
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TRI and the MTRI changes are also weighted averages of tariff factors. Focusing on tariff factors
allows us to account for the obvious fact that a 50Yo reduction in a 2%o tariff rate does not reduce
protection as much as reducing a 40%o tariff by 50 % (Finger and Schuknecht, 1999). rn A similar
percentage tariff reduction can have very different impacts on market access and welfare between
countries with a different initial tariff structure.
An interesting observation is that the difference between the TRI and the TWTF (Trade-Weighted
Tariff Factor) reductions is considerable in Table 3.2. Comparing expressions (24) and (29), the
weights of the TRI include the factors (pi-pi*), which magnifr the effect of the uneven tariff
structure. In the TWTF, the reductions in high initial tariffs have weights that are smaller than in the
TRI. That is, the TWTF under-estimates the welfare change effect that is related to the variance of the
tariff structure (Anderson, 1995, shows how the welfare change due to a tariff shift is related both to
the mean and to the variance of the tariff structure).
On the other hand, results reported in Table 3.2 show that the change in the TWTF is able to mimic the
change in the MTRI. This suggests that the TWTF is a decent indicator of the trade impact of a tariff
reduction, at least under our assumptions. This can be explained looking at equations Q6) and (29)
which show that the MTRI rate of change corresponds to the TWTF reduction if the uncompensated
import demand elasticities are equal across commodities (i.e., ei = e^ ,Vj ).
The empirical finding in Table 3.2, arc confirmed by Table 3.5 which shows significant differences
between the MTRI uniform tariffs (or levels) and the non-weighted average tariffs, while the values
for the trade-weighted average tariffs are often quite close to those given by the MTRI uniform tariffs.
This empirical finding converges with those of Anderson and Neary (1999) and Bach and Martin
(2001) who show that the hade-weighted average tariff is a linear approximation to the tariff
aggregator based on the expenditure function. In other terms, the trade-weighted average tariff plays
the same role as the Laspeyres price index in consumer theory, providing a fixed-weight
approximation that underestimates the "fue" height of tariffs because it neglects substitution induced
by tariffchanges.
This empirical finding can be explored a bit further in the particular case of a CES aggregator
function, where the fuade-weighted average tariff corresponds to constant expendifure shares. Constant
shares correspond to the special case of a Cobb-Douglas sub-utility function, where oj:l.In such a
case, it can be shown that in the base equilibrium (that is, with all domestic prices equal to 1), the
rn Both reductions would be equal to 50% nterms of tariff changes, while computing the tariff factor changes
we would obtain less than lTo when a 2Yo rate is cut in half, and more than l4Yo when a 40Yo rate is cut in half.
7L
MTRI uniform tariff coincides with the trade-weighted average tariff (Bureau and Salvatici, 2001).
This proposition clarifies the linkage between our MTRI estimates, using a CES aggregator function,
and the hade-weighted index. Since the values of the o, in the GTAP dataset rank between 2.2 and
3.8, it is not surprising that the MTRI for the aggegate level is sometimes close to the value of the
hade-weighted average tariff.
However, the MTRI uniform tariff is more likely to be higher than the trade-weighted average tariff
the more elastic is the demand for tariff-constrained imports. On the basis of empirical calculations
with a CGE model, Anderson and Neary (1999) are able to confirm this basic insight. Our empirical
use of the MTRI in order to construct sectoral tariff aggregates leads to similar conclusions. 
2o In the
specific case of a CES aggregator function, it can be shown that the MTRI uniform tariff exceeds the
hade-weighted index, when the elasticity of substitution of the CES aggregator function is greater than
1 (Bureau and Salvatici,2001).
Looking at Tables 3.1 and 3.5, it is also obvious that the MTRI uniform tariff and the trade-weighted
index give very similar results when the number of tariff lines in the aggregate is very small, or when
there is little dispersion in tariffs within an aggregate. For the aggregates with a large number of
products, the gap between the two indices can be very large. In the dairy sector (which aggregates 121
tariff lines in the EU and 118 in the US), for example, the trade-weighted average tariff underestimates
the trade restrictiveness (as measured by the MTRI uniform tariff) of the pre-URAA tariff stucture by
299o in the US and by 9Yo in the EU. This is also the case in the cattle sector and in the beverages
sector in the EU (underestimation of 29o/o and 23oÂ, respectively), and in the oilseed sector in the US
(underestimation of 40%). Overall, in the EU, for six aggregate products out of twenty, the hade-
weighted average underestimates the MTRI uniform tariff by more than 10o%.
kr briei the trade-weighted average tariff can be a satisfactory approximation of more theoretically
consistent indicators of market access only under very specific conditions, and for specific values of
the substitution elasticities. In more general cases, when the aggregate includes a large number of
heterogeneous tariff lines and when the substitution elasticities differ from unity, the trade-weighted
average is a poor indicator ofthe restrictiveness ofthe tariff structure.
Finally, the difference that we observe between the MTRI uniform tariff and the non-weighted average
tariff suggests that CGE or tade models that rely on aggregate tariffs constructed as simple averages,
2o More precisely, Anderson and Neary proved the following proposition: "The MTRI uniform tariff exceeds the
hade-weighted average tariff if: (i) the compensated arc elasticity of demand for the composite tariffed good
exceeds one; (ii) the composite tariffed good is normal; and (iii) the hade expenditure function is implicitly
separable in tariffed and other goods." (Anderson and Neary, 1999).
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use poor estimates of the actual tariff structure. This bias is likely to affect a large number of studies,
since it is common practice to construct aggregate tariffs as simple averages of the detailed tariffs
applied by custom officers, who sometimes work at a level of details corresponding to the HS10 or
HSl2-digit level (case of the European Union). Constructing the aggregate tariffs used in CGE or
trade models as trade-weighted averages is obviously more satisfactory. However when one
aggregates a large number of goods with a large tariff dispersion into a single commodity, this method
also results in significant bias, most of the time an underestimation of the aggregate tariff, as measured
by the MTRI uniform tariff.
3.5. 2. Policy implications
The results presented in this chapter should be used with some caution in policy analysis.
The TRI and the MTRI are the correct way to measure the economic consequences of tariff barriers,
under a certain number of restrictive assumptions. These assumptions allowed us to measure the
impact of various tariff reduction schemes on economic effîciency and on the volume of imports for
the EU and the US, but they should be kept in mind when interpreting the results, since they may not
hold in reality. This is obviously the case for the small country assumption. The theoretical
assumptions underlying the consfuction of the hade balance functions (single utility-maximising
consumer, competitive markets) are often made, but are nonetheless restrictive. In the computation of
the rates of change, we ignored the substitutions and complementarities that may exist between
imports; while in order to be able to compute the MTRI level we needed to assume a specific
functional form for import demand.
On the empirical side, figures used for the year 2000 do not give a proper image of hade
restrictiveness of agricultural trade policy in the US and the EU. The main reason is that, for the
purpose of comparison between scenarios, the world prices were kept the same as in the initial (1995)
situation. In addition, we did not account for policy changes, particularly in the EU, like the fall in the
intervention price for grains that has an effect on the level of tariffs (the entry price capped to 155% of
the intervention price). Moreover, the actual protection of EU agriculture is clearly overestimated
since we focused on the MFN tariffs. That is, we ignored preferential tariffs that account for roughly
50% of the value of EU imports. Imports under regional agreements face very small tariffs in general,
and in-quota tariffs are roughly around one third of the corresponding MFN tariffs in the EU (see
Bureau and Tangermann, 2000). Finally, as already mentioned, given the method of estimation and
data limitations, import elasticities used in our empirical application can only be considered as very
crude estimates. On this point however, the sensivity analysis that was carried out indicates that
alternative assumptions on the elasticity values do not significantly modifu the outcomes (cf.
appendix).
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Nevertheless, the results make it possible to refine the analysis of the impact of the Uruguay Round on
market access.
First, while the relative change results suggested that the Uruguay Round had led to a larger increase
in market access in the EU than in the US, relative to the pre-Uruguay Round situation, the
computation of the absolute level of the MTRI uniform tariffs shows that access to the EU market is
still far more restricted than the US one, at least for countries that do not benefit from a preferential
treatment. This is the case for all GTAP commodities aggregate (except plant base fùres). The
difference in market access level is particularly large for grains and meat, but is still significant for
those commodities that are protected by relatively high tariffs in the US, such as dairy products and
sugar
Computing the absolute level of the MTRI uniform tariffs leads to reconsider dramatically the image
of the relative rates of protection of the EU and US agricultural sector. Indeed, on a non-r'I/eighted
basis, the overall average tariff on agricultural and food products was26.70/o in the EU and9.7Yo inthe
US in 1995, while the trade-weighted average tariff was respectively 25.5% in the EU and 3.3% in the
US. On the other hand, the MTRI uniform tariffs measure a degree of trade restrictiveness of 32.4%o
for thc EU and 3.5%o for the US. That is, the difference between the MTRI uniform tariff and the non-
weighted average tariff is much larger in relative terms (and of opposite sign) in the case of the US
than in the case of the EU. This suggests that the high tariffs in the US apply on a restricted set of very
particular goods, most of them being imported in small quantities. In point of fact, very high tariffs are
concentrated on specific types of processed food (peanuts, preparations with meat or processed
vegetables). High tariffs are also set on dairy products, but the bulk of imports, namely hopical
products and live animals that accounts for large import values faces almost zero tariffs. By contrast,
most of the commodities imported in large quantities in the EU face significant tariffs, at least under
MFN treatment.
Secondly, our results suggest that the strategy of tariff reductions implemented in both the US and the
EU, with a selective differentiation of tariff cuts across commodities, limited the welfare gains that
could have been reaped by the Agreement. However, this shategic allocation of tariff cuts has not
significantly prevented market access improvements. The comparison of the MTRI in the "Uruguay
Round" and "Uniform tariff reduction" scenarios shows that the uneven allocation of tariff cuts had a
limited effect in the EU. Thus, the market access effects of the UR provisions are not very different
from those resulting from a uniform 36% reduction in tariffs. This suggests that partner countries have
not suffered liom this uneven allocation. 'l'he limited impact of the uneven allocations of tariff cuts, as
measured by the MTRI, might be explained by the fact that the EU did not use its degrees of freedom
for allocating tariff cuts in a very strategic way. All EU tariff reductions were at least 20Yo, and 665
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tariff lines (i.e., roughly half of the total number of tariff lines) experienced a 36%o decrease. This is in
contrast to most other countries that appear to have applied only a 15% reduction to their most
sensitive products and that display a greater variance in their tariffrate cuts.
The US schedule shows more variability in cuts across tariff lines. However, a comparison of the
reductions in the MTRI across all the three considered scenarios, each hovering around 1 per cent,
suggest that the "strategic" allocation of tariff cuts in the US has not had a major influence on market
access either. The explanation lies in the initially low tariffs for most commodities. With initial low
levels of protection, the US choice of a particular tariff cutting formula does not make much difference
to the results. The choice of any specific tariff cutting procedure matters less here than in countries
where the tariff structure is initially more distorting. In this respect, one might expect that the United
States is unlikely to resist adopting one formula rather than another in the next round of negotiations.
This also means that third country exporters to the US market would also not gain much from any
particular option. The EU tariff structure suggests that the choice of a particular tariff cutting formula
makes a greater difference to the EU than to the US, and may be more of a contentious issue if market
access is a major objective.
Thirdly, the use of the TRVMTRI concepts also sheds light on the relative importance of reducing the
average tariff and tariff dispersion. The TRI changes under counterfactual scenarios leading to a lower
coefficient of dispersion of tariffs suggest that the EU and US would have experienced larger welfare
gains if such tariff reduction schemes had been retained rather than the one resulting from the actual
UR commitments. 2r Results for the MTRI in the EU also show that market access would be increased
significantly if most protected commodities were subject to larger tariff cuts. In the next round of
negotiations, proposals for tariff cutting schemes that set an identical tariff on large groups of
commodities ("tariff bands"), or proposals for binding tariffs at a 4 or 6-digit level of the classification
would confibute to reduce dispersion. They deserve more attention in the Millenium Round.
Finally, one may acknowledge that it is difficult to envisage the actual use of the TRI and/or MTRI in
order to express tariff reduction commitments in future rounds of negotiations. These indices are too
demanding in terms of data requirement, and their complexity makes them less appealing to policy
makers than simple trade-weighted averages. Even if the theoretically sound indices are not explicitly
used to express commitments, they can provide a benchmark for evaluating more readily computable
tariff indices. In this respect, our results show that the trade-weighted average tariff factor reduction
2l The welfare gains depend on substitutions between commodities that we ignored in this study. Note however
that the sign of the overall effect of the substitution is ambiguous. Accounting for substitutions could show either
smaller welfare gains or show even larger gains when dispersion is reduced depending on the goods that are
complements and substitutes, and the magnitude of the tariffs to which they are subject.
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could be a proxy for assessing market access improvements (although it would clearly under-estimate
the welfare impact). It is clear, however, that commitments expressed in average tariffs (rather than
tarifffactors) are less meaningful, when one focuses on market access improvement.
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APPENDIX
Sensivity analysis
As the TRI and MTRI use elasticities as weights in the aggregation procedures, it is necessary to ask
to what extent these parameters may affect our MTRVTRI estimates. Previous work on the TRI and
percentage change in the TRI indicates that altemative assumptions on the elasticity values did not
significantly modifr the outcomes (Anderson and Neary, 1994; Fulponi, 1996). Nonetheless, we
undertook a limited number of sensitivity tests to examine the possible effects of different elasticity
values on the measurement of TRI/MTRI changes. Elasticities were drawn at random from a uniform
distribution for each commodity. The parameters of the distibution were set at the minimum and
maximum levels obtained from estimations, i.e.,l-0.2,-2.5]. 22 For both the US and the EU, 100 draws
of each elasticity were done and the changes in MTRVTRI calculated. The results of the experiments
are shown in Table 3.7. Avenge values and standard deviations of the 100 experiments for each
indicator are presented.
Table 3.7. Sensitivity tests of the computed TRI and MTRI rates of change to import demand
elasticities (Mean values and standard deviations of TRI and MTRI rates of change in percentage,
based on 100 estimates with elasticities drawn from a uniform distibution)
Source: Bureau, Fulponi and Salvatici (2000).
Compared to the results of Table 3.2, we find that average values differ by about 15-20 per cent
compared to the "base" calculations in almost all cases, except for the EU-MTRI were the average
values are about 35 per cent lower. The rankings of the altemative tarifÊcutting formulas are
22 In tlte normal case, the income effect reinforces the substitution effect, so that in absolute value the own-price
Marshallian elasticity could provide an upper bound for the sensitivity analysis. Due to the poor data availability
at the level of the commodity detail appearing in the schedules, the upper bound of the interval used in the
sensitivity analysis was set at a slightly higher level than the average maximum estimated Marshallian
elasticities.
European Union United States
Uruguay Swiss Uniform Uruguay Swiss Uniform
TRI-constant
slope
-t2.40
(-0.3e)
-26.61
(-2.41)
-17.39
(-0.82)
-2.23
(-0.r2)
4.90
(-0.44)
4.39
(-0.34)
TRI-constant
elasticity
-t2.21
(-0.37)
-23.80
(-2.13)
-16.42
(-0.84)
-2.2t
(-0.12)
4.67
(-0.4r)
4,31
(-0.33)
MTRI 4.29
(-0.28)
-7.79
(-1.02)
-4.73
(-0.45)
-0.91
(-0.06)
-1.1 I
(-0.10)
-0.94
(-0.06)
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preserved for all indicators. Overall, we find that the percentage changes in the indices are not
significantly affected by the values of elasticities. 23
In terms of sensitivity to the import demand functional form, we computed an alternative form of the
TRI rate of change. Rather than assuming a linear demand function, we assumed an hyperbolic import
demand, so that the elasticities were constant between 1995 and 2000, rather than slopes. Table3.7
confirms that the results are not fundamentally affected by the choice of a particular functional form. 
2a
As far as the MTRI uniform tariff computation is concerned, since our results are based on
unsophisticated estimates of substitution elasticities (the ones taken out of the GTAP dataset), it is
necessary to ask to what extent these parameters may affect the computed MTRI levels. In Table 3.8
we compute the overall MTRI uniform tariff equivalents making different assumptions about the
values of the substitution elasticities. The elasticities are assumed to range from one third to three
times the original values.
Table 3.8. Sensitivity of MTRI uniform tariff estimates to alternative assumptions on the values
of the elasticities of substitution
Source: Bureau and (2001).
The comparison with Tables 3.3 and 3.4 shows that even though the ranking among different scenarios
remains the same for the various elasticity assumptions, the MTRI is obviously quite sensitive to the
assumed degree of substitution between products. Since the large values of the index are more
sensitive to the assumption on substitution, the results are more affected by changes in o, in the EU
than in the US, where the agricultural sector is less protected.
23 Although our rcsults confirm that thc TRI is robust to changoe in the elasticities, there is some evidence that
the index is far more sensitive to changes in model specification (O'Rourke, 1997).
tn In tttr case of the MTRI, we assume that only the slope of the demand functions remains constant over the
period, since the other assumption (import demand elasticities remain constant) would lead to the same weights
in computing the 1995 and 2000 values for the MTRI.
United StatesEuropean Union
Swiss UniformBase UruguayUruguay Swiss UniformBase
2.1. 1.8 2.116.6 3.126.0 t7.4 9.303'r o J
2.53.6 2.6 2.029.0 14.9 28.01.3,t o J 36.5
2.3 3.135.4 4.3 3.136.5 17.32't oJ 45.5
4.9 3.2 5.018.9 4s.5 6.259.8 47.03* ol
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4 . MEAST]RES OF'INTERNAL SUPPORT
The decoupling issue
Alexandre Gohin, Hervé Guyomard and Chantal Le Mouël
Parbrer 1: INRA-ESR, Rennes
4.1. Introduction
In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), internal support measures which are
considered as decoupled are eligible for the so-called "green box" and accordingly excluded from the
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) calculation, so from the commitments to reduce domestic
support. As a result of the Blair House compromise between the European Union (EU) and the United
States (US), the 1992 CAP compensatory payments and the 1990 FACT Act deficiency payments,
although not decoupled in the sense of the green box definition, fell in the so-called "blue box" and
accordingly were not included in the AMS.
The Seattle ministerial conference held at the very beginning of December 1999 marked the opening
of the new round (the so-called Millenium Round) of multilateral hade negotiations under the World
Trade Organisation (WtO). From the US perspective, the blue box exemption is now redundant since
the Production Flexibility Conhact (PFC) payments of the US 1996 FAIR Act may be considered as a
green box measure. The Agenda 2000 CAP reform adopted in March 1999 basically extends the 1992
reform and introduces more decoupling in the system of compensatory payments to COP (cereals,
oilseeds and protein crops) producers. However, the new regime of compensatory payments adopted
for arable crops, beef and milk producers does clearly not comply with the requirements (as defined in
Annex 2 of the URAA) for being included in the green box (see e.g., Guyomard et al., 1999;
Swinbank, 1999).
Hence, during the Millenium Round, it is likely that the blue box issue will be put on the table and the
privileged status of the CAP compensatory payments challenged. Furthermore, it is also likely that the
Caims Group and the US will push for increased scrutiny of policy measures currently included in the
green box and so exempted from international discipline.
The proposals, containing the starting positions of member countries for the negotiations, submitted to
the WTO during the first phase of the Millenium Round, confirm these expectations (WTO, 2001).
Regarding the green box, unsurprisingly, some countries push for increased scrutiny of measures
currently included, arguing that some of them, in certain circumstances, could have an influence on
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production and prices. Others think that the green box should not be changed because it is already
satisfactory. The last ones argue for a broadening of the green box to cover additional types of
measures. Finally, as expected, some countries want the blue box to be scrapped because it involves
payments that are only partly decoupled from production. While other countries oppose scrapping it
completely and maintain that the blue box is an important tool for supporting and reforming
agriculture and for achieving certain "non-trade" objectives.
To this regard, the multifunctionality issue appears as a rising concern within member counfies
proposals and their respective position regarding the way to deal with this issue directly relates to their
positions relative to the green box issue. More specifically, although there is still considerable
confusion within WTO member countries about what is really meant by the term multifunctionality,
all countries agree that agricultural production provides food and non-food outputs. Some non-food
outputs are not valued by market transactions and hence can be under produced relative to what
society may desire. Multifunctionality proponents claim then that production-linked payments are
necessary to obtain socially desired non-food benefits because of jointness relationships between
agricultural production and non-food benefits. They argue that countries should have more flexibility
in the domestic policy design relative to what is currently provided by the provisions of the URAA.
Hencc, nrultifunctionality proponents belong to thc group of countries supporting the broadening of
the green box. On the other hand, multifunctionality opponents argue that the green box provides
sufficient flexibility to address non-food benefits, i.e., non-trade concerns, with the least distortions on
hade. For these countries, mainly the US and the Cairns Group, multifunctionality is not a sufficient
basis for continuing to pursue production-linked policies, i.e., fade distorting policies according to the
[IRAA classification of support policies. In their view, non-food benefits are better addressed through
specific instruments directly linked to public goods and/or positive externalities. 2s
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to the debate on decoupling and multifunctionality issues,
in relation with the current URAA green box definition. More specifically, two main questions are
addressed.
First, are the decoupling criteria of the green box well-designed? We focus on the green box specific
criteria for decoupled income support as defined in point 6 of Annex 2 of the LJRAA. Our purpose is
to examine whether these criteria do ensure i) that a domestic income support policy instrument
complying with these criteria is decoupled, that is has actually "no effect, or at most minimal, trade
distortion effects or effects on production"; ii) that a domestic income support policy instrument which
" Fot 
" 
more complete discussion on this opposition, see Lankoski and Miettinen (2000). See also Paarlberg et
al. (2000).
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does not comply with one or more of these criteria is less decoupled than an instrument in full
compliance with all criteria.
Second, what are the relative merits of various faditional income support policy instruments as
regards to the promotion of multifunctionality? Our purpose is to classiff alternative income support
policy instruments according to their ability in achieving traditional goals of agricultural policies and
to their induced fade distortion effects.
We address both these questions by developing two different analytical frameworks allowing to
analyse the effects of policy instuments on production and trade. The first model puts emphasis on the
key role of factor mobility assumptions as regards to the effects of alternative income support policy
instruments on production (i.e., their degree of decoupling).The main feature of this model lies in the
fact that it involves two agricultural sectors competing for land, which is considered as a fixed but
allocatable factor, and which is alternatively assumed to be homogeneous and perfectly mobile or
heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile between sectors.
The second model puts emphasis on the key role of adjustments in the number of farmers and on the
land market as regards to the effects of altemative income support policy instuments on production
and fade. The main features of this second model are: an endogenous price of land and an entry/exit
condition that makes the number of farmers endogenous.
Both models are used to deal with the first above-mentioned question relating to the decoupling and
the green box criteria issues. The second question dealing with the multifunctionality issue is
addressed using the second model, where target variables relating to traditional goals of agricultural
policies are defined and considered within the comparative static analysis.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section I provides a thorough review of literature on decoupling.
Section 2 relies on the first above-described theoretical'framework. It aims to examine the consistency
of the specific decoupling criteria of point 6 of Annex 2 of the URAA, putting emphasis on the key
role of factor mobility assumptions. In section 3, the second above-described theoretical model is used
to analyse the production and tade effects of altemative income support instruments that comply more
or less with the specific criteria of point 6 of Annex 2. It aims to show that, when the impact of
instruments on both the price of land and the number of farmers is taken into account, policy
instruments that do not comply with some of these criteria may nevertheless have minimal bade
distortion effects, and/or even lower tade distortion effects than instruments in better compliance with
these criteria. Section 4 deals with the multifunctionality issue and aims to analyse the relative merits
of naditional income support policy instruments as regards to the promotion of multifunctionality.
Using the model of section 3, the analysis of the effects of instruments on an equal cost/support basis
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allows to classifu these instruments according to their ability to achieve various goals traditionally
assigned to agricultural policies, and according to their induced frade distortion effects.
4.2. Decoupling agricultural income support: Economic issues
From an economic point of view, the principle of decoupling internal support measures directly relates
to the three basic theorems of the general theory of welfare economics:
i) In a first-best economy where no distortion does exist, free market forces lead to an efficient
allocation of resources, so that a Pareto (or first-best or social) optimum is achieved within the
economy. This first theorem originated the free market and trade recommendations that international
organisations such as OECD (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and development) strongly
advocate. It is also at the basis of the world trade liberalisation process the 'WTO has been promoting
for several decades.
It is well-admitted however that free market forces may result in a domestic income distribution,
which is "unfair". As, in virtually all economies, social equity is a major concern for governments,
these latter may desire to modiff the domestic income distribution once the free market equilibrium is
established. It is shown in that case that the first-best optimum resulting from the free market forces
may be preserved, though the domestic income distribution is changed, provided that this change is
achieved through lump-sum transfers. By definition, lump-sum transfers allow to redistribute income
between economic groups in order to achieve a socially desired distribution, without affecting
previously obtained market equilibria. Hence, a lump-sum transfer, which is by definition the typical
example of a fully decoupled instrument, is the most efficient instrument for addressing this
distributional problem.
ii) kr a second best economy, where distortions do actually exist, free market forces may lead to a
resource allocation, which is not socially efficient. In that case, the private optimum deviates from the
social one and policy intervention is required in order to restore the social optimum within the
economy. This second theorem constitutes the main justification for policy intervention in domestic
sectors or economres.
iii) When policy intervention is required to correct one distortion in order to restore the social
optimum within the economy, the most efficient instrument is the one, which directly addresses the
source of the distortion. This third argument, from which the targeting rule is derived, is the most
specifically related to the principle of decoupling.26
tu Th" targeting rule stipulates that the best response to distortions is to use as much instruments as existing
distortions to bé conectàd, each of these instuments tackling the consequences of the corresponding distortion
in the most direct way possible (Bhagwati,l97l)'
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The increasing importance devoted to the notion of decoupling in the current debate regarding future
agricultural policy design2T clearly follows from the application of the three above basic theorems of
the general theory of welfare economics to domestic agricultural sectors. More specifically, if the main
objective of agricultural policies is to ensure a fair level of income to farmers relative to other
domestic economic groups, then the most efficient instrument is a lump-sum transfer from the latter to
the former, i.e., a transfer as decoupled as possible from agricultural production and market
conditions.
The objective of this section is, on the basis of existing literature, to shed some light on the main limits
of this notion of decoupling, issued from the theory of welfare economics, when it is applied to
domestic agricultural sectors and policies. These limits mainly rely on practical concerns and on
efficiency concerns. On the practical side, it is now well-recognised that, in practice, and at least as far
as agricultural production is concerned, fully decoupled policy instruments do not exist since it is
virtually impossible to break the link between income support to farmers and their production
decisions. This is a key issue as regards to the definition of decoupling as well as to the measurement
of the degree of decoupling of various policy instruments. On the other hand, the economic efficiency
of lump-sum transfers totally relies on the first-best economy assumption. Such an assumption does
clearly not correspond to the reality of agricultural markets, and more generally of contemporary
economies. Thus, one may raise the question of the validity of the efficiency argument as a
justification for decoupling agricultural income support instruments when concemed domestic
economies remain far removed from the theoretic first-best economy. In the same vein, the economic
efficiency of lump-sum transfers is ensured only for distibutional purpose. If supporting farmers
income is a major objective of agricultural policies, particularly in developed countries, one may not
be unaware of the many other objectives (such as environment goods provision, landscape
preservation, rural employment and development, food quality, etc), which are usually assigned to
agricultural policies. Hence, lump-sum hansfers or, more generally, highly decoupled policy
instruments are not necessarily the most efficient measures for achieving these other objectives. This
point is closely related to the multifunctionality issue.
4.2.1. The fficienqt argumentfor decoupling agrtcuhural income support: A graphical illustration
Figure 4.1 below depicts the domestic market of an agricultural product. Curves denoted O and D
figure respectively the domestic supply and demand of this product. Without loss of generality, we
27 As well as during the Uruguay Round negotiations, which finally gave aconcrete expression to this notion of
decoupling through the definition of the "green box" measures included in the URAA. The green box measures
are those measures, which result in no, or at most, minimal tade distortion effects or effects on production (pointI in Annex 2 of the URAA). Hence, because they are considered as decoupled from production and market
conditions, they are exempted from reduction commitment.
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assume that the considered country is a small country so that the world price of the product p' is fixed
and exogenous on the home market.
In the free trade situation, the domestic market equilibrium price equals the world market price p*.
Hence, the domestic supply corresponds to o* ,the domestic demand to D' , while the excess supply
o' 
- 
D' is exported on the world market. Thus, at free trade equilibrium, domestic consumers' surplus
is area abp' andsurplus of domestic producers corresponds to area p*cd .Let suppose now that such a
surplus distribution is considered as unfair for domestic producers within the home country. Then,
policy intervention is required in order to increase domestic producers' surplus. Obviously, many
policy instruments, from the most coupled (such as a guaranteed market price) to the most decoupled
(such as a lump-sum transfer to producers) may be used for achieving this increase in domestic
producers'surplus. In the following, we show that, in our adopted simplified framework, increasingly
decoupled instruments are increasingly efficient in transferring surplus to producers, in the sense that
for a given amount of transfer they induce a decreasing welfare cost for the home country.
Figure 4.1. The market and welfare effects of three different producersr income support instruments:
the guaranteed market price, the production subsidy and the production quota-subsidy
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4.2.1.1. The guaranteed market price: Coupling and induced market distortions
Let suppose that in order to increase the domestic producers' surplus, the home government chooses
the guaranteed market price policy instrument at level pr on Figure 4.1. In that case, the new
domestic market pnce pr is higher than the world market pnce p'. Therefore, the domestic supply
increases from o' to o, while the domestic demand decreases from D' to Du, resulting in an
increase in the home excess supply from o'-D* to Or-Dr. A variable export subsidy is then
needed for the price competitiveness of the domestic product to be restored, and the home excess
supply to be exported on the world market.
Thus, Figure 4.1 clearly shows that the guaranteed market price instrument may be considered as fully
coupled to production and market conditions since it affects simultaneously supply, demand and so
hade quantities, while insulating the home market from world market signals.2s
Following the guaranteed market price implementation, the surplus of domestic producers increases
from area p'cd to area precl, thanks to a hansfer from domestic consumers who now pay a higher
price for the product and from domestic taxpayers who bear the export subsidy expenditures. Then, the
domestic consumers' surplus decreases from area abp' to area ajp* while the cost of export subsidies
for taxpayers is represented by area jefg. One easily verifies that the surplus gain for producers is
lower than the sum of the consumers' surplus loss and the export subsidy budget expenditures. In other
word, following the guaranteed market price implementation a share of the induced transfer from both
consumers and taxpayers to producers is lost for the overall home country. This net welfare loss is
measured on Figure 4.1 by areas jbg and cef . Both areas correspond to the welfare cost of the two
distortions (one on the supply side and one on the demand side) generated by the guaranteed market
price policy.
4.2.1.2. The production subsidy: Coupled to production only and less market distorting
On Figure 4.1, the production subsidy shifting the domestic producer price from p' to ps allows to
ensure home producers the same level of surplus than the previous guaranteed market price. The main
difference between both instruments is that with the production subsidy, the domestic market price
remains at the world price level p'. It results that the production subsidy instrument does not affect
tt Ooe *uy underline that the domestic market can remain sensitive to world market signals if the export subsidy
is fixed, i.e., if the guaranteed market price is ensured through a fixed production subsidy and a Iixed
consumption tax, both implemented at the same level.
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the home consumption of the product relative to the free trade situation. In addition, the excess supply
(i.e., O, 
- 
D' ) may now be exported without the aid of an export subsidy.
Thus, Figure 4.1 shows that, in our simplified framework, the production subsidy may be considered
as less coupled than the guaranteed market price. In fact, both instruments induce the same effect on
the domestic supply quantity, but the production subsidy leaves the demand quantity unchanged
relative to the free tade situation. Therefore, the total effect on trade is lower with the production
subsidy than with the guaranteed market price. In addition, the production subsidy does not entirely
insulate the home market from world market signals since domestic demand and, in turn, trade remain
sensitive to world market price fluctuations. 2e
Finally, the production subsidy leaves the domestic consumers' surplus unchanged with respect to the
free 1,ade situation (i.e., area abp'). Domestic producers benefit from the same surplus level than in
the previous guaranteed market price regime (i.e., area pred ). While budget expenditures for the
production subsidy, as measured by area pr"Tp', are bome by taxpayers. Then, Figure 4.1 shows that
with the production subsidy instrument the surplus transfer to domestic producers is entirely bome by
domestic taxPaYers.
V/ith respect to the free trade situation, the production subsidy induces a net welfare loss equals to area
cef . Tl.is loss corresponds to the welfare cost of the distortion induced by the production subsidy on
the supply side. Therefore, the production subsidy is less distorting than the guaranteed market price
since it induces no distortion on the demand side. Hence, the production subsidy is more efficient than
the guaranteed market price in transferring surplus to domestic producers since for the same amount of
hansfer, it implies a lower welfare loss for the home country.
One may emphasise that the previous analysis of the impact of both the guaranteed market price and
the production subsidy legitimates the two basic criteria adopted in the URAA definition of the
"green-box" measures. Firstly, it has been shown that the production subsidy induces no distortion on
the demand side. Then, this result legitimates the basic criteria (ii) of point I in Annex 2 of the URAA:
"the support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded government programme...not
involving transfers from consumers". Secondly, we have shown that the production subsidy and the
guaranteed market price both generate a domestic distortion on the supply side because they provide
producers a price support leading them to increase their supply quantity. This second result legitimates
2n Oo.. again, it can be noted that the domestic supply may also remain sensitive to the world market signals if
the production subsidy is fixed.
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the first basic criteria (i) of point 1 in Annex 2 of the URAA: "the support in question shall not have
the effect ofproviding price support to producers".
4.2.1.3. The production quota-subsidy: A decoupled instrument?
Starting from the previous production subsidy situation, one sees on Figure 4.1 that consfaining
domestic producers to continue to produce o' instead of expanding their production level to O"
would prevent the distortion on the supply side to be generated. One way to break the link between the
price support provided to domestic producers by the production subsidy and the output supply level
would be to implement a production quota, fixed at level O'. In that case, however, the production
subsidy should be increased with respect to the previous situation, in order to ensure domestic
producers the same level of surplus.
On Figure 4.1, when the domestic production is fixed at O' through a production quota, the unit
production subsidy P ga - p' implies a level of producers' surplus (i.e., area psaicd) equal to the one
previously obtained with the guaranteed market price or with the unit production subsidy
Pr-P'(i.e., area prect). On the other hand, with the production quota-subsidy instrument, the
domestic market price still remains at the world market price level p*. Hence, the domestic demand is
still unchanged at its free hade level D', while the excess supply O' 
- 
D' may be exported without
any export subsidy.
Therefore, it is clear from Figure 4.1 that such a production quota-subsidy instument may be
considered as decoupled since it does not affect the product market equilibrium relative to its free
hade situation. It results that the production quota-subsidy instrument allows to fransfer surplus to
domestic producers without generating any distortion. In fact, the production quota prevents the output
supply to expand due to the production subsidy incentive, so that no distortion is created on the supply
side. Finally, one sees that the production quota-subsidy is efficient in transferring surplus to
producers since it allows to ensure them a certain level of surplus without creating any distortion, i.e.,
with no welfare cost for the home counùry.
One may emphasise that, at least at the sectoral level, when the quota is fixed at the free tade output
quantity level, the production quota-subsidy instrument is very similar to a fixed lump-sum transfer.
Starting from the free trade situation, the production quota-subsidy may be assimilated to a fixed unit
payment psa- p applied to a fixed eligible output quantity O' corresponding to a historical volume
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of production. ,0. In other wordso such a production quota-subsidy allows to duplicate the effects of a
lump-sum hansfer policy, the subsidy acting to hansfer surplus to producers without generating a
distortion on the demand side, while the quota fixed at the free trade output level ensures that no
distortion results on the supply side.
However, it is important to note here that the production quota-subsidy instrument, such as represented
on Figure 4.1, is decoupled and efficient only in our simplified framework, i.e., in a short-term, static,
and mono-product partial equilibrium with no risk.
It is very easy to see on Figrne 4.1 that the production quota-subsidy instrument turns to be less
efficient and less decoupled than previously when the analysis becomes dynamic. Let suppose for
example that the world price of the product decreases from p* to p'*. Then, the free trade output
quantity decreases to O'*. Consequently, if both the production quota and the production subsidy
remain applied at the same levels than previously (i.e., O' and prg- p' , respectively), then they now
generate a distortion on the supply side, resulting in a welfare loss for the home country. 
3r
Hence, at this stage, two main ideas are in order. Firstly, the production quota-subsidy instrument may
be considered as decoupled and efficient for transferring surplus to producers ifand only ifthe quota
level is continuously adjusted to the changes in the free trade output quantity resulting from the
changes in the corresponding world price. Obviously, this implies the unit production subsidy to be
adjusted too in order to still ensure domestic producers the same final level of surplus.
Secondly, and more importantly, this suggests that criteria adopted in the definition of decoupled
income support instruments (point 6 of Annex 2 of the LJRAA) as part of the URAA definition of the
"green-box" measures do not actually ensure that these income support instruments are no production
and frade distorting. More precisely, criteria (ii), (iii) and (iv) in point 6 stipulate that for income
support to be considered as decoupled, "the amount of such payments in any given year shall not be
related to, or based on (ii) the type or volume of production, (iii) the prices, domestic or international
and (iv) the factors of production employed, in any year after the base period. The previous production
quota-subsidy instument clearly conforms to these criteria. In fact, as already mentioned, the fixed
unit subsidy prg-p' may be considered as a unit payment calculated on historical domestic and
world market prices observed during a given base period, while the quota level O' may be analysed as
30 Such a historical volume of production may be the supply quantity observed during a given base period or
may be calculated as the produit of a historical yield and a historical volume of a production factor employed
lsuch as a land base area or a livestock base number for example), observed during the same given base period'
" It ir i*pli"itly assumed here that the production quota-subsidy instrument remains constraining following the
worldprice decrease, i.e., p"+Çt*- p'), p' .
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a fixed eligible output quantity corresponding to a historical sectoral volume of production observed
on the same given base period. Then, although the production quota-subsidy instrument conforms to
the criteria (ii), (iii), and (iv) of point 6, the previous analysis clearly shows that such an income
support policy is however production and trade distorting when world market price fluctuations are
taken into account. Furthermore, the previous analysis suggests that contrary to the requirements of
criteria (ii), (iii) and (iv), the production quota-subsidy instument would remain no production and
hade distorting (i.e., decoupled) in a dynamic framework only if the quota level, i.e., the base period
volume of production (or the base period yield and/or volume of factor employed) is continuously
adjusted to the world market conditions observed "in any year after the base period". In the same way,
it is easily shown on Figure 4.t that when the level of the quota is adjusted to the new free trade output
quantity O'* , an increase in the unit production subsidy in order to still ensure domestic producers the
same final level of surplus does not induce any distortion on the domestic market. Hence such an
adjustment of the unit production subsidy in response to the current decrease in the world market
price, though in conhadiction with criteria (iii) of point 6 is actually not market and trade distorting.
4.2.1.4. Thetixed lump-sum payment: efJicient and "decoupled'i2
Let suppose now that to ensure domestic producers the same level of surplus than in the previous
cases, the home government adopts a system of fixed lump-sum payments based on historical criteria.
Thus, on Figure 4.1, the total amount of payments given to producers corresponds to area pæi"p'.
This amount may be defined as a fixed unit payment psa p', applied to a base volume of production
o' , or equivalently to the product of a base yield and a base volume of a given production factor (this
latter varying according to the chosen eligibility criteria for the fixed lump-sum payment).
Hence, in our simplified framework, the fixed lump-sum payment instrument may clearly be
considered as decoupled since it does not affect the product market equilibrium relative to its free
trade situation. Moreover, like the production quota-subsidy, the fixed lump-sum payment is efficient
in hansferring surplus to producers since it allows to ensure them a certain level of surplus without
creating any distortion, i.e., with no welfare cost for the home country.
The main difference between the fixed lump-sum payment and the production quota-subsidy is that the
former remains efficient and decoupled even when shifting from a static to a dynamic framework. It is
easily shown on Figure 4.1 that when the world market price decreases from p' à p", the home
output supply decreases from O' to O'', which corresponds to the new efficient allocation of
32 Guillemets here mean that although the following analysis suggests that the fixed lump-sum payment is a fully
decoupled income support instument, such a result heavily depends on our simplified static, mono-product
partial equilibrium framework with no risk. This framework does not take into account many factors contributing
to reduce the degree of decoupling of the fixed lump-sumpayment instument (cf. paragraph4.2.2).
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resogrces on the supply side. It can be noted here that if the total amount of payments remains
unchanged, the domestic producers benefit from the same transfer of surplus than previously but their
final level of total surplus is reduced (ftom p*icd to (p" +(p* - p')\"d). However,like in the case
of the production quota-subsidy, the final level of producers' surplus can be maintained thanks to an
increase in the total amount of payments without generating any distortion on the home market
(though, once again, such an adjustment in the total amount of payments to producers contradicts
criteria (ii), (ii| and/or (iv) of point 6 of Annex 2). 33
Finally, the graphical analysis of this section confirms the theoretical result among which in a first-
best situation, decoupling agricultural income support from production and market conditions
constitutes the most efficient way to transfer income to domestic agricultural producers. In our
simplified framework, the fixed lump-sum payment instrument based on historical criteria appears as a
fully decoupled and effrcient policy. In addition to the efficiency argument, the fixed lump-sum
payment exhibits other advantages that cannot be illustated through Figure 4.1. Firstly, when it is
fixed, the lump-sum payment does not depend on domestic and world market conditions so that the
total budget cost of such an income support policy is easy to foresee and monitor. This is obviously
not the case with the guaranteed market price as well as with the production subsidy. Secondly, by
clearly defining the criteria of eligibility for payments, a fixed lump-sum payment policy allows to
better determine which economic group is the target of the income transfer. Hence, a fixed lump-sum
payment may be easily targeted on domestic agricultural producers while it is well-admitted that
income support provided through more coupled instruments spreads upstream and downsheam from
agricultural producers, and partly benefits to both the domestic agricultural input and food processing
sectors. Moreover, while income support may be easily targeted on specific groups of agricultural
producers (such as "small" producers or producers located in less favoured areas) through a
conveniently design fixed lump-sum payment system, it is nearly impossible to select the beneficiaries
of the support provided through a guaranteed market price or a production subsidy. Therefore, it is
easier to achieve a fairer income distribution across domestic agricultural producers through a fixed
lump-sum payment system than through more coupled instruments.
One may underline however that the real situation of agricultural markets is far more complex than the
one illustrated on Figure 4.1. Even if the fixed lump-sum instrument appears as fully decoupled on this
figure, it has actually, in practice, effects on the risk perception of producers, on their individual
decision to stay in or to leave the agricultural sector, on markets of variable inputs and primary factors,
on markets of other agricultural outputs (all agricultural input and output markets being strongly
33 It ir interesting to note that the fixed lump-sum payment system based on historical criteria considered here
results, in our simplified framework, in the same effects on the product market equilibrium than a Production
Entitlement Guarantee (PEG) system fixed at level O' .
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intenelated) , etc.34 In fact, all these effects potentially induce shifts in domestic supply and demand
curves which are not taken into account in Figure 4.1. Obviously, when these indirect effects on
domestic supply and demand, through shifts in the corresponding curves, are taken into account, the
fixed lump-sum payment instrument appears as less decoupled than in the previous analysis. Of
course, this conclusion applies to all other policy instruments.
4.2.2. rn practice, income support policy instruments are neverfully decoupled
The previous analysis suggests that the fixed lump-sum payment based on historical criteria is fully
decoupled. In particular, it is shown that such an instrument has no effects on the domestic producers'
decisions. However, this result is conditioned by the simplified framework used, which strongly relies
on rather resfictive assumptions. Hence, in this paragraph, we analyse more specifically the links
between farmers' income and their production decisions when some of these restictive hypotheses are
relaxed' We show how even predetermined and fixed lump-sum payments do change producers'
decisions so that they are not practically fully decoupled. In addition, the following analysis
constitutes a first step as regards to the problem of measuring the degree of decoupling of income
support policy instruments since it emphasises the main directions where further research, and
particularly further quantitative assessments, are needed in order to address this question.
4.2.2.1' The fixed lump-sum payment and the individual decision to stop producing: The "cross-
subsidisation" efect
When production is required in order to perceive a fixed lump-sum payment, then this policy
instrument may affect the output supply of less efficient agricultural producers by providing them an
incentive to stay in the home agricultural sector and continue to produce. This mechanism, which is
called the "cross-subsidisation" effect, is illushated on Figure 4.2.The curves CTM and Cm denote
respectively the total average cost and the total marginal cost of a specific mono-product farm.
When the domestic producer price equals P0, then the considered farmer produces the quantity e0
for an induced profit corresponding to area abcd. If the producer price decreases to pl, then the
considered producer suffers from a negative profit whatever level of production he chooses. In
particular, the output level @1 results in a negative profit measured by area efgh onFigure 4.2. In this
case, the producer will decide to stop producing and to leave the agricultural sector.
s Obviously, these effects are different according to the definition ofthe historical criteria retained to calculate
the fixed lump-sum payment (the basis of the payment, the definition 
-at the individual farm level, at the
national level or at other geographical zone levels- of the base eligible output volume, or the base yield and input
quantity volume, the requirement to produce or not in order to benefit from the payment, etc).
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Let suppose that, still facing the price level P1 , the considered producer now perceives a fixed lump-
sum payment based on historical criteria, i.e., in particular, which amount does not depend on the
volume of output currently produced. If this producer is not required to produce in order to benefit
from this payment, then he will stay in the agricultural sector for remaining eligible to the lump-sum
payment but will continue to produce nothing. When, at reverse, production is required in order to
perceive the fixed lump-sum payment, two cases may occur. If the amount of the payment remains
lower than the loss induced by the production activity at level Ql (i.e., atea efgh on Figure 4.2), then
the producer will decide to leave the agricultural sector. At reverse, if the amount of the payment is
greater than the loss resulting from producing the quantity Ql , then the lump-sum payment will act as
an incentive for the farmer to stay in the agricultural sector still producing output level 2t. Indeed, in
that case his induced profit is positive and equal to the amount of the perceived payment less the loss
resulting from the production activity. In such a case, there is "cross-subsidisation" since the fixed
lump-sum payment and the related eligibility conditions lead the agricultural producer to continue to
produce a positive quantity of output whereas regarding market conditions he is inefficient. Therefore,
in the absence of the lump-sum payment he would have decided to stop producing and to leave the
agriculttnal sector.
Finally it is interesting to note that the above result legitimates criteria (v) of point 6 of Annex 2 of the
URAA, which stipulates that for income support to be considered as decoupled, "no production shall
be required in order to receive such payments".
Figure 4.2. The f ' cro ss-subsidisation rr effect
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4.2.2.2. Thefixed lump-sum payment and labour decisions of agricultural households
Fixed lump-sum payments may induce a change in production decisions through their indirect effects
on labour decisions (derived demand of family and hired labours on farm, supply of family labour on
and off farm) of agricultural households.
Let's take the case of an agricultural single household, simultaneously producer and consumer, using a
production technology with fixed capital and land factors and variable labour factor. As a producer,
this household chooses his output supply (i.e., what and how much to produce) and the corresponding
derived demand of variable inputs. As a consumer, the considered household chooses his final demand
of goods and his labour supply. Hence, as fixed lump-sum payments increase the household's income,
they affect both his output choices and his output level decisions through an income effect on his
labour decisions. Fixed lump-sum payments affect the household's derived demand of family and hired
labour on farm as well as his family labour supply on and off farm (Benjamin and Guyomard, 1998).
Such a mechanism is illusffated on Figure 4.3 in the simplified case where the considered single
household does not supply his own family labour off farm.
tr'igure 4.3. An illustration of the effects of a fixed lump-sum payment (/7 ) on the labour
decisions of an agricultural single household (no off-farm family labour)
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Figure 4.3 shows that starting from the initial equilibrium Er, the considered agricultural household
perceiving a fixed lump-sum payment /, benefits from an increase in his income which makes him to
adjust his labour decisions. This income effect leads to the final equilibrium E2. Hence, with respect to
the initial situation, the fixed lump-sum payment induces: i) a decrease in the quantity of labour used
on farm (from Lt to L2) and ii) an increase in the leisure time, the total income and the utility level of
the household.
4.2.2.3. Thefixed lump-sum payment and investment decisions
Fixed lump-sum payments may also affect both producers' output choices and output level decisions
through their potential positive effect on producers' investment decisions (we adopt now a long-term
perspective and consider that capital and land factors are variables).
This positive impact of fixed lump-sum payments on agricultural investment may result from two
different effects. On the one hand, fixed lump-sum payments increase farm incomes over retums from
the market alone. Then, in the absence of perfect capital and information markets, a significant amount
of these payments are likely to be invested in the farm (Phimister, 1995; Roberts, 1997). On the other
hand, fixed lump-sum payments increase farm wealth. Hence, they may modiff investment decisions
by providing farmers improved credit facilities.
Finally, this potential positive impact of fixed lump-sum payments on farmers' investment is likely to
facilitate farm access to improved technology, to increase farm input use and then to increase farm
output supply.
4.2.2.4. TheJixed lump-sum payment and risk
Due to the risk perception of agricultural producers, fixed lump-sum payments may affect output
choices and output level decisions when risk is taken into account. More precisely, as fixed lump-sum
payments increase farm incomes they may induce two effects related to the risk perception of
producers. The first effect is an income effect, which implies a shift of the profit distribution function
to a lower range of risk aversion in the producer's utility function. 3t The second effect is an insurance
effect resulting from a reduced income variability, ceteris paribus. Both the income and the insurance
effects contribute to increase agricultural output supply and input utilisation relative to a situation
where fixed lump-sum payments would not exist (Hennessy, 1998).
35 Assuming, as it is well-admitted, a decreasing absolute risk aversion.
94
4.2.2.5. The question of the measurernent of the degree of decoupling of income support policy
instruments
Predetermined fixed lump-sum payments may affect output choices and output level decisions of
farmers, so that they cannot be considered as fully decoupled, because: i) they modifu labour decisions
of agricultural households, ii) they influence farmers' investment decisions and iii) they reduced risks
facing agricultural producers.
Obviously, these three effects may also be observed when income support is provided through more
coupled policy instruments. Hence, the main question at stake is the one of the magnitude of these
three effects when income support to agricultural producers is provided through fixed lump-sum
payments relative to more coupled policy instruments. Of course it is difficult to answer this question
on a general ground and it is likely that only pieces of answers, on a case by case and empirical basis,
can be provided.
There are few analysis, and moreover of available quantitative assessments, of the effects of direct
payments to agricultural producers on their output choices and output level decisions. For French
cereal farms (with risk excluded from the analysis), Benjamin and Guyomard (1998) show that the
CAP 1992 compensatory payments have little effects on the probability of off-farm labour
participation of agricultural households' wives. A study of acreage responses in the US by Chavas and
Holt (1990) finds that elasticities of area planted in soybean and corn with respect to farm incomes are
more than half those relative to the own output prices (for example, their estimated elasticity of corn
area is nearly 0.10 with respect to income and nearly 0.30 with respect to corn price). Hennessy (1993)
examines the impact of the US 1990 deficiency payments for a 400 acres Iowa farm specialised in
corn mono-production. His analysis takes into account risk faced by the producer and distinguishes,
within the total impact of the US deficiency payments on nifogen fertiliser use and on yield, the
effects related to risk (i.e., the above-mentioned income and insurance effects) from the coupling
effect. Hennessy shows that, among the effects related to risk, the estimated income effect on nihogen
fertiliser use and on yield remains very low while the estimated insurance effect on these two variables
is substantial and markedly greater than the coupling effect. With respect to a free market situation, the
considered US deficiency payments make the nitrogen fertiliser use and the obtained yield to increase
by respectively 17% and 3.1 Yo, the coupling effect explaining only l0 to 20% (according to various
assumptions on the level of policy variables and on the producer's preferences) of these changes.
It is difficult to conclude definitely from these few studies, but one may however emphasise that even
supposedly decoupled income support instruments may have substantial effects on output choices and
output level decisions of agricultural producers.
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4.2.3. Decoupting income support poticy insffuments: The timits of the fficîency argument in a
second-best world
The efficiency argument for decoupling agricultural income support instruments is established only
under the first-best assumption, i.e., when no distortion do actually exist within the considered
economy. In practice however, in all economies, market and policy distortions do exist. He,nce, real
agricultural markets and sectors remain far removed from the theoretic first-best situation. Therefore,
in this paragraph, we show how the efficiency argument for decoupling agricultural income support
may be questioned when the rather restrictive first-best assumption is relaxed.
4.2.3.1. Thefixed lump-sum payment and the marginal cost of taxation
In the previous paragraphs, it is implicitly assumed that the total amount of lump-sum payments
granted to domestic agricultural producers equals the total amount of tax levied on domestic taxpayers.
In other words, it is assumed that the opportunity cost of public funds (or the marginal cost of
taxation) equals zero.
In practice, the opportunity cost of public funds is most often difierent from zero, i.e., one monetary
unit levied on taxpayers allows less than one monetary unit paid to agricultural producers. It is clear
that in all economies, the income distribution problem addressed by national governments goes far
beyond the only objective ofsupporting agricultural producers. In fact, governments intervene in order
to redistribute national income across all domestic economic agents and activities, i.e., the various
production sectors, the various types of consumers and the various types of taxpayers. To this regardo a
share of the national income must be levied on specific groups to be redistributed to other groups.
Operated levies do not induce distortions, nor national net welfare loss, only when they result from
lump-sum taxation. In practice, lump-sum taxation implementation is impossible since it requires
governments to know perfectly all the characteristics of all economic agents. Hence, practically,
indirect taxation systems, based on, for example, consumption of the various goods, wages, individual
income, etc are always used. As, such indirect tax instruments affect individual behaviours, they
induce distortions and lead to a net welfare loss (i.e., the loss of surplus of levied agents exceeds the
gain of surplus of agents benefiting from the income redistribution) for home economies. In other
words, used taxation systems are distorting and the marginal cost of taxation is usually different from
z,e10.
Several studies provide empirical estimates of the marginal cost of taxation for various countries.
Their results vary substantially and suggest that the marginal cost of taxation ranges (according to the
country, the time period and adopted hypotheses) from few percents to more than 50Yo of each levied
monetary unit. Findlay and Jones (1982) find that in 1978-79, the marginal cost of taxation in
Australia ranged from 0.1 to 0.56 cents of each levied Aushalian dollar, their favourite estimate being
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0.4. Ballard et al. (1985) show that in 1973, the US opportunity cost of public funds ranged from 0.17
to 0.56. Browing (1987) estimates that in 1984, the US marginal cost of taxation lied between 0.32to
0.47.
Thus, all these studies indicate that the marginal cost of taxation in the various countries is likely to be
different from zero. In this case, the effrciency of the fixed lump-sum payment for supporting
agricultural income is questioned. In fact, the higher the marginal cost of taxation, the greater the
national welfare loss induced by lump-sum payments, or more generally, decoupled policy
instruments, ceteris paribus. This raises the question of the relative efficiency of more coupled policy
instruments in economies characterised by high marginal costs of taxation. The Moschini and Sckokai
(1994) answer to this question is mitigated. In fact, they show analytically that when the home's
government objective is to ensure a minimum level of income to domestic producers in presence of a
positive marginal cost of taxation, the fixed lump-sum payment to producers always belongs to the
optimal policy instrument package. More specifically, they show that the optimal policy is a lump-sum
payment to producers, associated with two more coupled instruments: an export tax in order to
improve the terms of nade of the home country and a consumption tax in order to correct the distortion
induced by the marginal cost of taxation.
4.2.3.2. TheJixed lump-sum payment and externalities
Agricultural production is a well-kno\fir source of negative and positive externalities. In other words,
market distortions do actually exist on agricultural markets. Such distortions are not taken into account
in previous paragraphs, so that the free hade equilibrium constitutes the most efficient equilibrium for
the considered home country. Consequently, the fixed lump-sum payment, which as a decoupled
instrument does not change the initial free trade market equilibrium, appears as the most efficient
instrument for supporting domestic producers'income. However, it is a well-known result that when
market distortions do exist, the free trade equilibrium is no longer efficient for the home country.
Specifically, in presence of negative and positive externalities related to the domestic agricultural
production, the free trade market forces lead to an "over-production" of negative externalities and an
"under-production" of positive externalities, relative to the social optimal corresponding quantities.
Thus, starting from such an initial situation, if the home government's concern is still to fansfer a
certain level of surplus to domestic agricultural producers, is the predetermined, fixed lump-sum
payment the most efficient policy instument? More generally, is the decoupling of agricultural
income support instruments justified, in welfare terms, when the national agricultural policy seeks
simultaneously various objectives?
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In the following, we show that more coupled instruments may be more efficient than fixed lump-sum
payments for fransferring surplus to agricultural producers when the domestic agricultural production
generates positive extemalities (such as landscape preservation or rural employment and development,
for example). Figure 4.4 below illustrates this point. An important hypothesis in Figure 4.4 is that the
generation of positive externalities increases with the production volume of the considered agricultural
output (i.e., the agricultural output and the positive externalities are joint in production).
kr Figure 4.4,the supply curve resulting from the domestic producers' optimisation programme, i.e.,
the aggregate private marginal cost curve, is denoted o. The aggregate public marginal cost curve is
denoted op. This curve corresponds to the output supply curve, which would be observed if domestic
producers were paid for the positive externalities they produce in conjunction with their output supply
quantity. In the free trade market situation, for a world market price p', the home net welfare loss due
to the positive externality distortion corresponds to area cBÇ . T|he domestic supply is O', whereas the
required social optimal quantity is OP'. Hence, the free trade market equilibrium is not optimal from
the social point of view since it leads to an under-provision of positive externalities.
Starting from this situation let suppose that the home government decides to support domestic
producers' income through a guaranteed market pnce pr. Then, domestic output supply increases to
O". As already mentioned, the guaranteed market price induces a welfare loss on the supply side
(triangle cef ) anda welfare loss on the demand side (triangle ibù. However, Figure 4.4 shows that
following the guaranteed market price implementation the under-provision of positive externalities is
reduced with respect to the initial situation, so that the related welfare loss is now limited to arca fBq .
Therefore, the guaranteed market price may lead to a net welfare gain for the home country if the gain
resulting from the correction of the positive externality distortion (i.e., area ch6 ) is greater than the
welfare loss due to the price support instrument (i.e., areas cef and ib1).lf this is actually the case,
thus the coupled guaranteed market price instument is more efficient than the decoupled fixed lump-
sum payment (ensuring domestic producers the same hansfer of surplus than the guaranteed market
price, i.e., corresponding to area prgicp'), which does not change the situation of the home country in
terms of welfare relative to the initial situation. 36
36 It is important to note that the production subsidy instrument is still more efficient than the guaranteed market
price sincà for an equivalent surplus tansfer to producers, it does not generate a welfare loss on the demand side.
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Such a result indicates that in a second-best world, coupled policy instruments may reveal more
efficient than decoupled measures. 37
Figure 4.4. The relative efficiency of the coupled guaranteed market price and the decoupled
fixed lump-sum payment when output production generates positive externalities
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4.2.3.3. Decoupling agricultural income support instruments in a multi-output, multi-instrument
framework
In most developed countries, numerous policy instruments are in force on agricultural markets. Hence,
it is rather uncommon that for national governments, the initial situation for policy intervention
corresponds to the free trade market equilibrium. Moreover, in a lot of developed countries, support to
agriculttral producers is still partly provided through coupled policy instuments. And most often
decoupled internal support instruments are implemented in order to replace previous more coupled
instruments.
37 One may underline that this result is contingent to the assumption of jointness relationships between the
agriculhual output and the positive externalities that we adopted in our analysis.
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In the following, we show that, in a multi-output framework where price support instruments are
initially in force on considered markets, the replacement of some of these coupled instruments by
"decoupled" direct payments does not necessarily allow to correct previously existing production and
hade distortions. It can even be shown that in some cases, those existing distortions are aggravated
following such a partial decoupling process.
For simplifring the presentation, we suppose that the considered country produces only two
homogeneous agricultural products, a vegetal product and an animal product, on a fixed land area Z.
Let suppose first that a coupled policy instrument, such as a guaranteed market price or a production
subsidy, is implemented in order to support the domestic vegetal producers' income. In such a case'
policy intervention in the vegetal sector induces, ceteris paribus, an increase in the domestic crop
supply and an increase in both the variable input use and the volume of primary factors employed in
the vegetal sector. Regarding the land factor, as the domestic total land area is fixed, the policy
intervention implies a change in the acreage allocation, favouring the vegetal sector to the detriment of
the animal sector. Let suppose now that the previous coupled instrument is replaced by a fixed lump-
sum payment. At least three effects will contribute for this decoupling process does not allow to
remove previous production and hade distortions resulting from the coupled instrument.
Firstly, due to the fact that the income support in the vegetal sector was previously provided through a
coupled policy instrument, a time delay is needed for the domestic vegetal output supply to adjust on
its free trade level. particularly the stock of stockpiled capital, resulting from past investment decisions
driven by the previous coupled policy instrument, will continue to partly determine the vegetal output
volume produced on during a certain time period. In fact, it has been shown (Johnson and Pasour,
1981) that the lower the depreciation rate of capital, the longer the time delay for the output supply to
adjust down (ceteris paribus).
Secondly, taking into account risk, the risk diversification effect according to the so-called portfolio
choice model is likely to appear. Clearly, fixed lump-sum payments granted to vegetal producers may,
ceteris paribus, reduce the variability of profits resulting from the vegetal production. Therefore, it is
very likely that the decoupling process in the vegetal sector will not allow to restore the free trade
market equilibrium, the vegetal sector being still favoured to the detriment of the animal sector in the
final situation.
Thirdly, a more general effect, related to the coexistence of various support policy instruments in force
in the different agricultural sectors, must also be emphasised. Such an effect is illustrated on Figure
4.5. The free tade equilibrium corresponds to point E where the marginal retum to land used in
vegetal production equals the marginal retum to land used in animal production. Then, at point.8, the
acreage allocated to the vegetal sector is LVE':VE'while the acreage devoted to the animal sector is
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LAE':AE'. Let suppose now that the national government chooses to support producers' income in
both sectors through direct payments per hectare, scy for the vegetal sector and sca for the animal
sector. For simplification purpose, we assume in Figure 4.5 that these direct payments per hectare
induce no distortion in acreage allocation. 3t Hence, the new equilibrium situation corresponds to point
F located just above point E.
Starting from the f'equilibrium, we assume that the national government replaces the direct payment
per hectare by a fixed lump-sum transfer in the animal sector. Hence, the new acreage allocation
equilibrium corresponds to point G on Figure 4.5. Consequently, the decoupling process in the animal
sector induces an increase in the vegetal sector acreage (from LVF':YF'=VE' to LVG':YG) and a
decrease in the animal sector acreage (from LAF'=AF':AE'to LAG'=AG). Thus, it is easily shown
that the final equilibrium G corresponds to a more distorted acreage allocation, with respect to the free
hade equilibrium E, than the initial equilibrium F, though for the overall domestic agricultural sector
the share of total support granted through decoupled instuments increases when shifting from the F to
the G situation. Thus, Figure 4.5 suggests that production and hade distorting effects may be
aggravated when implementing decoupled agricultural support instruments while coupled instuments
remain in force.
This last result is very important as regards to future discussions on eligibility conditions to the "green
box" which are likely to occur during the Millenium Round. In fact, it suggests that agricultural
support measures should not be judged on an individual basis, as implied by the current URAA green
box definition, but as part of a policy package. kr the same way, supposedly decoupled measures
should not be automatically included in the "green box" since their practical production or tade
distorting effects may be far different from their theoretical ones.
38 Obviously it does not mean that the considered support policy does not generate any distortion on the
corresponding agricultural markets. Furthermore, in a situation where the total agricultural land area would not
be fixed, the considered support policy would lead to increase the land area used in agriculnrral production to the
dehiment of alternative uses (such as forestry or recreational purposes for example), due tô the increasing
marginal retum to land used in agriculture.
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Figure 4.5. Effects of the fixed lump-sum payment on acreage allocation in a multi-output'
multi-instrument framework
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4.3. Are the green box decoupling criteria for direct payments to producers well-designed:
Taking into account adjustments on the land market anÙor in the number of farmers
Annex 2 of the uRAA provides the eligibility criteria to the green box. As far as direct payments to
producers for income support purpose are concerned, Annex 2 states that such instruments are
considered as decoupled from production and trade if they meet the two basic criteria set out in point
1:
(i) the support in question shall be provided through publicly-funded government programme ... not
involving transfers from consumers;
(ii) the support in question shall not have the effect ofproviding price support to producers;
plus the five policy-specific criteria set out in point 6:
(i) eligilibity for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria such as income, status
ofproducer or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined and fixed base perlod;
(iD the amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the type or
volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the base
period;
r02
G'
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€_
F'
(iii) the amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the prices,
domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base period;
(iv) the amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the factors of
production employed in any year after the base period;
(v) no production shall be required in order to receive such payments.
In the previous section it has been shown that these green box decoupling criteria duplicate the
working of the theoretical lump-sum payments, provided that the considered framework corresponds
to the one taditionally used in the welfare theory. But, as soon as one relaxes one or more hypotheses
of this usual simplified framework, even fixed lump-sum payments do have effects on producers'
decisions, so that they are not fully decoupled. In other words, in practice, and as far as agricultural
production is concerned, fully decoupled policy instruments do not exist since it is virtually impossible
to break the link between income support to farmers and their production decisions.
In this section, contrary to most existing studies, we hold the hypotheses of the usual model of the
welfare theory. Then, we show that even within this usual framewor! one may question the
consistency ofthe green box decoupling criteria.
4,3.1. The key role offactor mobility assumptions
hr this paragraph, the analysis relies on an analytical framework, which allows it to highlight the key
role of factor mobility assumptions in determining the effects on production of alternative income
support policy instruments. The proposed model expands the one developed by Hertel (1939) by
considering two sectors. 3e
4.3.3.1. The theoretical model
The proposed framework is a static partial equilibrium model with trvo perfectly competitive
agriculttnal sectors indexed by j = a,v . Each sector is characterised by a mono-product, constant
retums to scale production technology. The production level of sector j is denoted yi .Each sector
uses three inputs: an aggregate variable input .ri (such as fertilisers, pesticides, feed, etc.), a specific
primary factor of production available in fixed quantity Ki = P (such as an aggregate of labour and
capital, for example), and another primary factor of production /i (such as land, for example). Total
supply of the variable input is perfectly elastic at price wi , whereas total supply of land (Z) is
'n O* ptoposed model is concerned with the supply side only while Hertel's model takes into account both the
supply and the demand side.
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assumed to be fixed. Hence, production technologies of both sectors are interrelated only due to
competition for the available land. This latter may then be considered as an "allocatable fixed" factor.
Each sector determines its output supply and input derived demands by maximising its profit æi
subject to technological and market constraints. It is assumed that output prices pi arc exogenous.
public intervention in both sectors can take various forms: production subsidies (spt ), variable input
subsidies (svi ) and direct payments to producers based on primary factors of production (sci for the
allocatable fixed factor and sf i for the specific factors).
The profit-maximising programme of each sector proceeds as a usual two-stage process (see, e.g.,
Chambers and Just, 1989). In the first stage, the output and variable input optimal quantities are
determined for a given land allocation. This first sub-programme may be written as:
ntbtîlot ,*t ,r!t ,lt ,x') t . 
-' 
(t)
=i*lç' + rp'\y' -(*i -sui)xr ; vr = f 'Ç' J' ,r<'\ i =o,,
where y' = f tF' ,f ,rt)is the production function of sector 7 '
programme (1) defines a restricted profit function which is linearly homogeneous and convex in prices
and subsidies; monotonically increasing in the output price, the output subsidy and the variable input
subsidy; monotonically decreasing in the variable input price, and monotonically increasing and
concave in land and the specific factor.
In the second stage, optimal land allocation is determined by solving the following sub-programme:
ft'lp J ,spi ,wi ,ru' ,N ,ro' ,F)
= maxTrj
1i
(, i ,spJ ,wi ,svi ,li ,Ki + sai .li -N .li i =d,v
where il is the price of land in sector j , as defined later. The first-order conditions of the
maximisation sub-programme (2) yield:
niÇrt ,rpt ,wi ,svi 1i ,F)* rot -N - oi =a,, (3)
where rl(.) denotes the partial derivative of the restricted profit function with respect to land.
Equations (3) implicitly define the derived demands for land of both sectors:
Idr(.)=6tlUi ,spi ,wi ,svr ,sai ,F,N) i =o,u (4)
(2)
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The derived demand for land of sector j depends on output and input prices and subsidies prevailing
in sector j, as well as on the land-based direct payment and the specific factor level observed in this
sector. All arguments of the land derived demand functions (4) except the price of land N , arc
exogenous. In fact, the land prices N are endogenous and determined through the land market-
clearing equations.
The issue at stake is thus to speciff land supply functions for both sectors. Most agricultural
production analyses consider land as a homogeneous factor (see, e.g., Coyle, 1993; Guyomard et al.,
1996; Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996). kr this standard case, the total supply of land is fixed at
level Z and the land market-clearing equation is simply:
\ut (.)=7
Thus, the equilibrium price of land is the same for both sectors:
^a ^v ^L =IL =L
Therefore, using equations (4),
allocation to each sector can be
îr}=?rb' ,po ,spu ,spo ,w',wo ,
pi,spi,wi,svi,
v'(.)= vt Pb, po ,spu ,spo ,wu ,wo ,sv' ,svo ,sau ,sao ,K' ,Ko ,L yi
(5)
(6)
(5) and (6), the equilibrium price of land, as well as the optimal land
written as functions of exogenous variables:
sv' ,svo ,sa' ,sao ,K' ,Ko ,L (7)
t'(.)=r(p ' , po ,spu ,spo ,wu ,wo ,svu ,svo ,sa" ,seo ,K' ,Ko ,L J =a,v
Optimal output supply funotions and variable input derived demand functions of each sector are then
obtained by applying Hotelling's lemma to each sector-specific profit function (l), evaluated at the
optimal land allocation (8):
(8)
(e)
;/\ ,( pt ,rpt ,*j ,sr| ,
-x"\.)=x'l .t 
-\-\lJ lp", p",sp',spo,w',wo,.svu,svo,.sou,sao,Ku,Ko,LlKt
J =a'v
J =a,v (10)
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Hence, due to the land constaint, optimal allocation of land to one sector, as well as this sector's
output supply and variable input derived demand, depend not only on prices, subsidies, the land-based
direct payment and the specific factor level prevailing in this sector but also on prices, subsidies, the
land-based direct payment and the specific factor level observed in the other sector.
Although the land homogeneity assumption is very common in applied agricultural models, essentially
because of its tractability and its parsimony, it is not realistic and moreover embodies strong
assumptions on price elasticity of supply (Hertel, 1999). The capacity of a given plot of land to
produce a particular farm product varies with soil type, location in the watershed, and climatic
conditions. These characteristics all combine to determine the yield, given a certain level of nonland
inputs. Models based on the homogeneity assumption of land will then overstate supply response,
since they do not take into account the agronomic and climatic constraints placed on the production of
specific farm commodities.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models focused on agricultural sectors usually attempt to
capture these constraints in a tractable fashion. oo To our knowledge, three main approaches have been
used to model heterogeneity of land, and more generally, of primary factors of production. The first
one consists in specifuing a transformation function, which takes total land as an input and distibutes
it among various sectors in response to relative rental rates. The standard parametric function used in
CGE models is the Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function, where the elasticity of
hansformation is a synthetic measure of land heterogeneity (see, e.g., Hertel and Tsigas, 1988;
Peerlings, 1993). The second approach has been developed by Robidoux et al. (1989) in their
Canadian CGE model.They assume different types of land, which substitute imperfectly each other in
the production of a given agricultural good. The third approach, which has been used for example in
the Walras model (Burniaux et al., 1990), is based on the specification of migration functions that
determine factor flows between the various considered sectors. ar
For parsimony considerations, we follow the Walras model approach by distinguishing two types of
land and speciffing migration functions. More specifically, we assume that total available land Z may
be broken down into two land types, so that both sectors face two land supply functions. These
functions are indexed by j = a,v inorder to indicate that each type of land is more well-suited to the
specific production process of the corresponding sector. However, land is not a specific factor for each
a0 In partial equilibrium (PE) models, a continuum of land types is often assumed (see, e.g., Lichtenberg, 1989;
AntlJand Just, 1990; Caswell et al., 1990). Depending on data availability, this continuum is summarised by an
observed index, such as the Land Capability Class in the US.
or This approach has also been used by Abler and Shortle (1992).
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sector since "land migration" between sectors is allowed. Therefore, due to this migration possibility,
each land type supply function depends on the prices of both land types. Thus, we have:
to"(.)=6'Qç,Y1 (11)
to']= 7-to'(.)=7-to'6 ,N)=to"(r,r) e2)
where the supply function of land type j, tot(.),is increasing in its own price Àr, decreasing in the
price of the other type of land and homogeneous of degree zerc in land prices.
In other words, the derived demand for each type of land (resulting from the optimisation prograûrme
of the corresponding sector) depends only on its own price whereas the supply of each type of land is a
function of both land type prices. One may notice that the land homogeneity assumption corresponds
to a particular case of the more general heterogeneity assumption, where land supply functions (11)
and (12) are perfectly elastic with respect to both land type prices. In the following, we will carry on
with the general land heterogeneity specification.
Finally, the total profit of each sector is defined as:
ft'0=nt
Fb" ,po,spu,spo,w',wo,svu,svo,sau,seo,K',Ko rL tr) + sf r .Ki j = a,v (13)
pi ,spi ,wi ,svi ,
(r4)
This profit is homogeneous of degree one with respect to the specific factor Ki . Hence, v/e may
write:
"70+sfi =1ti i=a,v
where pr denotes the opportunity cost or the shadow value of the specific factor in sector j.
4. 3. 1. 2. Comparative static analysis
The comparative statics of land allocation, land prices and specific factor shadow values are obtained
by total differentiation of equations (3), (1L), (12) and (14), and solving for dli ,dN ,dpr . The
corresponding system is reported in appendix 1. The comparative statics of each endogenous variable
is given bya2:
o' nl,Q denotes the second partial derivative of the restricted profit function of sector j (corresponding to
programme ( 1)) with respect to variables q i and z i . Exponent j of variables has been omitted for simplicity.
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(17)
(18)
(1e)
(20)
with d =nitJoi -ni,Jo"* -l<0
Once the comparative statics of land allocation is determined, the comparative statics of output
supplies and variable input derived demands are easily obtained:
dy' =n'oo.(dpj +dspj)+nj*.(dwj -dsvj)+nrr,.dlj +nton.dF j=a,v (21)
- 
dxj ="L.(apt + dspr)+ n;.(awj - dsvj)+ ntr.dtj + nt r.dI( j = q,v (22)
Equations (15) and (16) provide the comparative statics of land allocation between both sectors. They
show that land use in sector j is increasing in the total quantity of available land 7, in its own land-
based direct paym ent sai and in its own output subsidy spl under the assumption of non-inferiority
of the land input. One also sees that land use in sector j is decreasing in both the land-based direct
payment and the output subsidy implemented in the other sector. The impact of a change in each
sector's variable input subsidy (sv/) or specific factor level (F) on land use in sector j is
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ambiguous. It depends on substitution-complementarity relationships between land and both other
inputs (i.e. the variable input and the specific factor) in the production technologies of each sector (i.e.
on the respective signs of ni,* and nl*, j = a,v).
Equations (21) clearly show that the output supply in sector j, still under the assumption of non-
inferiority of the land input, is increasing in the total quantity of available land, its own land-based
direct payment and its own output subsidy, while it is decreasing in both the land-based direct
payment and the output subsidy applied in the other sector. Obviously, the output supply response of
sector i to a change in variable input subsidies or specific factor levels is also ambiguous.
At this stage, one may notice that in the particular case where land is homogeneous (i.e., poll+ *1,
equations (15) and (16) become respectively:
I G;,.(oo" +dsp')+ni'(ar' -arr")+n;u.ar +asa') I
l-fu , @r" + dsp" ) + ni'(at - at ) + niu.d K + a, o")+ n;,.aZ )
(23)
_1
dlv 
-- 
'
ni, +ni,
dl'=dL-dl'
Hence, all results regarding the impact of the various considered policy instruments on land allocation
and output supplies presented above are also valid under the land homogeneity assumption.
4.3.l.3.Factor mobility and the green box decoupling criteriafor direct payments to producers
The previous comparative static equations can now be used to discuss the validity of some policy-
specific eligibility criteria to the green box.'We focus attention on criteria (ii), (iii) and (iv) of point 6
of Annex 2 of the URAA. Let us begin with criterion (iv). It stipulates that to be considered as
decoupled a factor-based direct payment must be calculated on the basis of the used quantity of this
factor observed during the base period. It is worth mentioning that in contrast to criterion (ii), criterion
(iv) does not specifu whether it applies at the farm, the concerned agricultural sub-sector (crop or
livestock sub-sectors for example) or the whole agricultural sector level. This (probabty intentional)
imprecision is however of major importance when analysing the degree of decoupling of such direct
payments to producers. a3
The comparative static results stemming from our theoretical framework clearly show that the
production effects (i.e. the degree of decoupling) of the direct payments based on specific factors y'i
o'A. 
an example, CAP crop land-based cornpensatory payments, which are limited to a national historical base
area in each EU Member State, comply with criterion (iv) if this latter is interpreted at the crop sub-sector level.
In contast, these conpensatory payments do not conform to this criterion if it is interpreted at the farm level.
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(24)
are fû different from those of the land-based direct payments sai . In fact, the direct payments y'/
conform to criterion (iv) defined at either the farm or the agricultual sub-sector level, whereas land-
based direct payments sai comply with criterion (iv) defined at the level of the whole agricultural
sub-sectors a andv.4
Hence, the comparative static equations (15) to (21) show that specific factor-based direct payments
s/l have effectively no effects on land prices, land allocation and, consequently, on output supplies.
They only induce a positive effect on the shadow values ofboth specifîc factors (see equations (19)
and (20)). Therefore, such direct payments are effectively decoupled from production. In contrast,
land-based direct payments actually affect land prices, land allocation and so output supplies. Thus,
such a policy instrument may not be considered as decoupled from production even though it complies
with criterion (iv) if interpreted at the whole sector level' as
At this stage, two remarks are in order. Firstly, equations (15) to (21) show that even if specific factor-
based direct payments sf i are adjusted to domestic or international price changeso they will remain
neufal with respect to domestic output supplies. Therefore, in that case, criterion (iii) is redundant.
One must underline however that this result relies on our simplified framework which does not take
into account risk, dynamics, financial market constraints, etc. Secondly, it is obvious from equations
(15) to (21) that even if specific factor-based direct payments s/i are differentiated according to the
sub-sector they are applied to (i.e. if dsf " differs from dsf " ), they also will remain neutral regarding
domestic output supplies. In that case, criterion (ii) also becomes redundant.
Consider now the land-based direct payments. It is easily shown from equations (15) to (21) that
criterion (ii) may be inconsistent. More precisely, criterion (ii) stipulates that eligible direct payments
must be independent from the type or volume of production undertaken by the producer in any year
after the base period. In our theoretical framework, this criterion implies that our land-based direct
payments implemented in each sub-sector should be equal (i.e. dsa' = dsao ). Equations (23) and (2a)
suggest that criterion (ii) in addition to criterion (iv) effectively ensure decoupling when land is a
homogeneous factor, since in that case, we have:
* Thot is, for oxanple, at the crop sector level if sub-sector d corresponds to grains while srù-sector v relates to
oilseeds and protein crops, or at the whole agricultural sector level if sub-sector 4 represents animal production
and sub-sector v vegetal production.
ot Onr may notice that the same result would be obtained in a theoretical framework where our current
agriculturaisub-sectors a andv would correspond to two non-joint production processes of a unique agricultural
rub-re"tot or farm and criterion (iv) interpreted at the sub-sector or the farm level.
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for dpj =dspi =dwi =dsvi =dKi -dL=g j=a,v
dl" =dlo -dy'=dy'=0 ifandonlyif dsau =dseo
However, when land is a heterogeneous factor, even uniform land-based direct payments may affect
domestic output supplies (see equations (15), (16) and (21)). Hence, in that case, criterion (ii) in
addition to criterion (iv) fail to ensure decoupling since a direct payment system conforming to both
criteria may have significant effects on domestic production. Furthermore, equations (15) and (16)
clearly show that when land is heterogeneous, the decoupled land-based direct payment system is a
package of sub-sector differentiated payments satisffing the following equation:
lo'*.dsa' = -lo'*.dsa" (2s)
Hence, under the land heterogeneity assumption, criterion (ii) is inconsistent since it makes no
decoupled direct payments to producers eligible for the green box. This result is essential with regards
to the future discussions on the green box definition during the Millennium Round since, quite
obviously, primary factors used in agricultural production, particularly land, are not homogeneous.
Furthermore it is likely that their degree of heterogeneity varies across countries.
h this respect, equation (25) emphasises the crucial importance of migration parameters loi, and toi"
with respect to the degree of coupling/decoupling of direct payments based on an allocatable fixed
factor. In fact, the situation where one of these migration parameters is null corresponds to the specific
factor case previously described. In such a case, as has already been mentioned, land-based direct
payments remain production neuhal, and so decoupled, even if they are differentiated across sub-
sectors. On the other hand, for positive and finite values of migration parameters, only differentiated
land-based direct payments are production neutral and may be considered as decoupled.
All these results suggest that the same direct payment system applied in two countries may lead to
very different production (and trade) effects, provided that the concerned agricultural production
technologies and factor mobility situations are different in both countries. In other words, one may not
qualify a direct payment system as coupled or decoupled without considering the "technological"
characteristics of the targeted sector (more generally of the whole economy), especially its production
technology and the extent of primary factor heterogeneity or mobility. Any attempt to measure the
degree of decoupling of direct payment systems should ideally take these characteristics into account.
4.3.2. The key role of adjustments on the land market and in the number offarmers
In this paragraph, the analysis relies on an analytical framework, which allows it to highlight the key
role of simultaneous adjustments in the number of farmers and on land market as regards to the effects
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on production and trade of various income support policy instruments. The proposed model is inspired
from the one developed by Leathers (1992) in order to examine the impact of policy instruments on
the number of producers.
4.3.2.1. The theoretical model
A potential agricultural producer n has an initial endowment in land equal to li,. He faces perfectly
elastic supplies for all factors of production, including land, and takes their prices as given. However
the agricultural industry experiences a rising supply curve for land. It is thus an increasing-cost
industry (Hughes, 1980). Land can be acquired/let through rental only. The buying/selling price of
land is assumed to be adequately approximated by the discounted sum of future rental values so that a
prediction about the direction of the rental price is equivalent to a prediction about the direction of the
buying/selling price (Leathers, 1992).
There are N potential agricultural producers and N is large. In order to simplifu presentation and
analysis, we assume that they have the same production function.
We consider four alternative income support instruments: a decoupled subsidy without mandatory
production mno, a decoupled subsidy with mandatory production mo, a land subsidy l, and a
production subsidy sp.
Agricultural producer behaviour
The profit-maximising program of a potential agricultural producer n may be defined as (the index n is
omitted):
ïnâXy,r,r @ + sp)y -wx -r(l -fi)+ tl + mo + mno s.t. y = f(x,l,nf)
= 
n(P + sP'w,r 
- 
t,nf) + rli + mo + mno
(26)
where y denotes the agricultural output, .x an aggregate variable input, / the amount of land used for
production and nf the family labour. The price of output isp, the production subsidy is sp, the price of
the variable input is w, the rental price of land is r, the land subsidy is l, the decoupled subsidy with
mandatory production is mo and the decoupled subsidy without mandatory production is mno. Tlte
production function y = f (x,l,nf) is assumed well-defined for all non-negative variable input, land
and family labour quantities. It is everywhere twice-continuously differentiable' non-negative, non-
decreasing and concave. Program (26) detines a profit function n(p + sp,w,r - t,nf) which is well-
defined for all positive prices, everywhere twice-continuously differentiable, non-negative, increasing,
linearly homogeneous and convex in prices, increasing and concave in family labour (Diewert, 1974).
In program (26\, r(t 
-/i) represents the cost ofrenting additional land at price r per unit (in that case,
rt2
r(l 
- 
li) > 0 ) or the earnings from leasing part or all of initial land endowment, also at price r per unit
(in that case, r(l 
-/t) < 0 ).
Output supply, land demand and variable input demand equations are obtained by applying Hotelling's
lemma, i.e.,
An@+sp,w,r-t,nf)/ôp=nr(p+sp,w,r-t,nf)=y(p+sp,w,r-t,nf) (27)
-An@+sp,w,r-t,nf)lôr=-TE,(p+sp,w,r-t,nf)=l(p+sp,w,r-t,nf) (28a)
- 
ùn(p + sp,w,r 
- 
t,nf) I ôw = -n,(p + sp,w,r - t,nf) = x(p + sp,w,r - t,nf) (28b)
The individual supply function for the agricultural commodity is an increasing function of the output
price, the production subsidy and the land subsidy. It is decreasing in the variable input price and the
rental price of land, and it does not depend on decoupled subsidies with or without mandatory
production (equation (27)). The individual derived demand function for land is an increasing function
ofthe output price, the production subsidy and the land subsidy. It is decreasing in the rental price of
land, and it does not depend on decoupled subsidies with or without mandatory production. Impacts of
changes in the variable input price on land demand depend on (Marshallian) substitution and
complementarity relationships between production factors x and I (equation (28a)).
System equilibrium equations
The model involves three equilibrium equations. The first one is the equilibrium condition in the
output market. It requires the aggregate supply of the agricultural commodity to equal the aggregate
demand (i.e., domestic demand and exports).The second one is the equilibrium condition in the land
market, which implies that there is zero excess supply in this market. The third equilibrium equation
corresponds to the entry-exit condition.
The equilibrium equation in the agricultural commodity market may be written as:
Zy@ + sp,w,r -t,nf)=K.nr(p + sp,w,r -t,nf)= OD(p)+ DE(p) (2e)
where K is the number of producers who effectively produce, DD(p) is the domestic aggregate
demand function and DE(p) is the export aggregate demand function.
The equilibrium equation in the land market may be written as:
Iti + ^s/(r,/s) = K .t(p + sp,w,r - t,nf) + Dl(r,ld) (30)
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Land supply is the sum of initial endowments in land of the N potential farmers, plus an upward-
sloping function S/(r,/s), which conesponds to land supplied by land orwners who are not potential
farmers (,S/" > 0 ). Land demand is the sum of derived demands for land by the K farmers who decide
to enter and produce the agricultural commodity, plus a downward-sloping function Dl(r,ld), which
corresponds to land demanded by land users who are not potential farmers (Dl, < 0 ). Parameters /s
and Id are function shifters.
The last equilibrium equation corresponds to the entry-exit condition. A potential farmer will choose
not to enter if he can eam more money by leasing out all his land endowment and holding the best
possible alternative in terms of wages (PA),i'e.,if
n(p+sp,w,r-t,nf)+rli+mo+mno<PA+rli+mno (31)
As a result, a potential farmer with initial endowment /, will be indifferent between farming and not
farming if:
n(p + sp,w,r 
- 
t,nf) + mo = PA Q2)
From (32), one notes that the entry-exit decision does not depend on the initial land endowment /i.
However this latter has a proportional impact, for a given land rental price, on total profit a farmer can
earn by entering and producing (see program (26)). One also notes that the entry-exit decision does not
depend on the decoupled subsidy without mandatory production (mno), but on the decoupled subsidy
with mandatory produc tion (mo).
At this stage, it is useful to explain the working of both types of decoupled subsidies. Without loss of
generality, let us assume that the initial situation corresponds to a no support regime with Ki farmers
who produce. Let us now assume that the govemment seeks to support farmers' incomes by means of
a decoupled subsidy without mandatory production. Equation (31) implies that the latter is granted to
the Ki farmers only, even if some of them decide to go out and not to produce in the new situation, but
not to new entrants. Let us now assume that the income support instrument is a decoupled subsidy
with mandatory production. Equation (31) shows then that the latter is granted to any farmer who
decides to produce in this new regime, but not to farmers who produced in the initial situation and now
prefer to go out and lease out all their land endowment. These assumptions allow us to write the entry
and exit conditions in only one equation, i.e., equation (32).
The solution of equations (29), (30) and (32) gives the equilibrium price of the agricultural commodity
p, the equilibrium rental price of land r, and the equilibrium number of farms, K, composing the
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industry. The analysis of farm programs proceeds then by totally differentiating (29 (30) and (32), and,
solving the resulting system.
4.3.2.2. The impact of income support policy instruments on trade
We directly derive the comparative static effects of the four considered policy instuments on the price
of the agricultural output, the rental price of land and the number of farms/farmers. Then, using these
comparative static results, \rye may obtain the effects of policy instruments on exports, from the export
aggregate demand function DE( p). Details of calculations are provided in appendix 2. The main
results of the comparative static analysis are summarised in Table 4.1.
At this stage, one may underline that the four considered insfuments have been chosen because they
cover a range of measures complying more or less with the basic criteria of point I and the policy-
specific criteria of point 6 of Annex 2 of the URAA. Indeed, according to the green box requirements,
the decoupled subsidy without mandatory production mno may actually be considered as decoupled
since it complies with all criteria of points I and 6. The decoupled subsidy with mandatory production
lzo is less decoupled than mno since it does not comply with criterion (v) of point 6. The land subsidy
I is even less decoupled than mo since it does not comply with both criteria (iv) and (v) of point 6.
Finally, according to the green box definition, the production subsidy sp is the less decoupled
instrument since it does not comply with criteria (ii) and (v) of point 6, nor with the basic criteria (ii)
ofpoint L
Globally, results reported in Table 4.1 indicates that the basic and the policy-specific decoupling
criteria of both points 1 and 6 are well-designed as far as both the most decoupled (i.e., mno) and the
least decoupled (i.e., sp) instruments are considered. Indeed, the decoupled subsidy without mandatory
production, which complies with all criteria, has actually no trade distortion effect and no effect on
production. At reverse, the production subsidy, which does not comply with one basic and two policy-
specific decoupling criteria has actually a positive trade distortion effect and a positive effect on
production. In other words, if one considers only these two policy instruments, criteria of points 1 and
6 of Annex 2 do ensure decoupling and do ensure that a policy instrument not complying with all the
criteria is less decoupled (i.e., has greater frade distortion effects) than a policy instrument in full
compliance.
However, when taking into account both other instruments the consistency of these criteria is less
obvious.
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Table 4.1. The comparative static analysis of alternative income support policy instruments
Impact of a decouPled subsidY without mandatory production
(mno) on
Ouput price
Number of farms/farmers
Rental price of land
Agricultural outPut exPorts
0
0
0
0
Impact of a decouPled subsidY with mandatory production (mo)
on
Ouput price
Number o f farms/farmers
Rental price of land
Agricultural output exPorts
Ambiguous: - when 
"tr 
3l;
+/_ when e,, > I
+
Ambiguous: * when el <l;
+/- when e/ > I
Ambiguous: + when ,'r 3l;
+/- when er, > 1
of a land on
General case Particular case (S/" = Dl, =0)
Output price
Number o f farms/farmers
Rental price of land
Agricultural output exPorts
Ambiguous: * when el <l;
+/- when e/ 21
+
+
0
0
+
0
ofa
Output price
Number of farms/farmers
Rental price of land
Agricultural output exPorts
Ambiguous: * when 
"'r 
3l;
+/_ when er, > I
+
+
The decoupled subsidy with mandatory production mo
The effects of a decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo) on the endogenous variables and
on domestic ûade are given bY:
detM.(dp/dmo)=-Knon,(1-sl)-(^S/, - Dl,)no (33)
detM .(dr I dmo) = Kæoo(-rt,)(1-ei )-(DD r+ DEr)(-n,)
rt6
(34)
detM.(dK/dmo)=K2('rcoo'rco-n'0,)+Knrr(,s/, 
- 
Dt,)-(DDo+DE)(Kn, +^g/" 
- 
Dl,)>O (35)
dx I dt = DE o.(dp / dmo) (36)
where e', = ôlogy(p + sp,w,l,nf)/ ôlog/ is the restricted Marshallian supply elasticity of output y
with respect to land quantity /, while el =ôlogl(!,w,r-t,nf)/ôlogy is the restricted Hicksian
derived demand elasticity of land / with respect to output levely.
Hence, the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production has only one unambiguous effect: a positive
effect on the number of farms/farmers (equation (35)). The impacts of the decoupled subsidy with
mandatory production on all other variables are indeterminate and depend closely on the levels of ef
and e/ relative to one.
The effect of the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production on the price of the agricultural
commodity (equation (33)) is unambiguously negative when the restricted Marshallian supply
elasticity of output with respect to land quantity (ef ; is lower than unity. When this elasticity is
strictly greater than one, the effect can become positive if the positive impact of the first right-hand
side term of (33) outweighs the negative impact of the second right-hand side term of (33). The effect
on the rental price of land (equation (34)) is unambiguously positive when the restricted Hicksian
derived demand elasticity of land with respect to output level ( e/ ) is lower than unity. When this
elasticity is strictly greater than one, the effect can become negative if the negative impact of the first
right-hand side term of (3a) outweighs the positive impact of the second right-hand side term of (3a).
On may notice that convexity in prices of the profit function defined by program (26) implies that the
product of elasticities e/r.ei is always smaller than one. It follows that the decoupled subsidy with
mandatory production cannot simultaneously increase the output price and decrease the land price. au
Finally, the impact of the decoupled subsidy with ma.ndatory production on agricultural commodity
exports (equation (36)) is indeterminate. It is positive (respectively, negative) when the price of the
agricultural commodity decreases (respectively, increases).
The ambiguous effects of the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production may be explained as
follows. All other things being equal, the decoupled subsidy favours the entry of new producers into
farming, creating subsequently excess supply in the output market and excess demand in the land
market. A new equilibrium of the economy may be obtained through either an output price decrease
and an increase in the rental price of land ( e! < I and e/ < I ), an output price increase compensated
ou If the output price increases, then the land price increases too. And if the land price decreases, then the output
price decreases too.
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by a higher increase in the rental price of land ( e', > l and el < I ), or an output price decrease sufficient
to cope with a decrease in the rental price of land (t1,<1 and e/ >1). These price adjustments
obviously reduce the incentives for potential producers to enter the sector, but never outweigh the
initial positive effect of the decoupled subsidy on the number of farmers.
The land subsidY
The effects of a land subsidy (t) on the endogenous variables and hade are similarly derived from the
total differentiation of equations (29), (30) and (32). We obtain:
detM.(dp I dt; = -(s/, - Dl,)æ r(-n,) <0 (37)
detM .(dr I dt) = Kln.n'o + n oo(-n,)' + 2n,n r(-r")] - (DD, + DE )(-n,)' > 0 (38)
detM.(dK I dt) = (Sl, - Dl,)lKn oo(-æ,Xl -ei) -(DD, + oE r)(-n,)\
dx ldt = DEr.(dp/dt)>0 (40)
Thus, the land subsidy will unambiguously decrease the output price (equation (37)), increase the
rental price of land (equation (38) and increase the exports of the agricultural commodity (equation
(40)). However, its effect on the number of farms/farmers is indeterminate (equation (39)). When the
restricted Hicksian derived demand elasticity of land with respect to output is lower than one, the
effect of the land subsidy is to increase the number of farmers. When this elasticity is greater than one,
the effect is ambiguous and can become negative if the negative impact of the first right-hand side
term of the square brackets in (39) outweighs the positive impact of the second right-hand side term of
the square brackets in (39).
some further results can be wrung out of equations (37) to (40) when sl,=p1, =0. using the
developed expression of detM provided in appendix 2, we obtain:
dp / dt =0 (41)
dr / dt =1 @2)
dK / dt =0 (43)
dX / dt =0 g4)
Hçnçg, in the particular case where the land supply and demand coming from the rest of the economy
correspond to fixed amounts, the only non-zero effect of the land subsidy is to raise the rental price of
land by the same amount (equation (42)). Equations (41), (43) and (44) show that, in this particular
(3e)
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case, the land subsidy has no impact on the price of the agricultural product, neither on the number of
farms/farmers, nor on the exports of the agricultural commodity.
This last result suggests that a land subsidy may be considered as a decoupled income support
instrument, provided that there are restrictions on eligible land (and hence, payments) through the use
on an aggregate base area. o' In other words, this result shows that a policy instrument that does not
fully conform to all green box eligibility criteria, as defined in points 1 and 6, may nevertheless has no
or minimal distortion effects on trade.
From a EU perspective, the situation depicted in the above particular case corresponds to the current
situation in the Common Market Organisation (CMO) for cereals, oilseeds and protein crops (hereafter
COP crops), if we consider COP crops as one aggregate only. Therefore, from a WTO negotiation
point of view, the EU could rightfully argue that the area payments in force in the EU COP sector have
(at least at the aggregate level) minimal hade distortion effects (so could be considered as decoupled),
although they do not fully conform to URAA decoupling criteria. a8
Finally, when comparing the impact on trade of both the decoupled subsidy with mandatory
production and the land subsidy with restriction on eligible land, one may question the consistency of
the green box decoupling criteria. Indeed, obtained comparative static results suggest that decoupling
criteria as defined in point 6 do not necessarily ensure that a policy instrument complying nearly with
all criteria is more decoupled (i.e., has lower positive effects on tade) than a policy instrument
conforming with less criteria. In fact, it is possible to show that the decoupled subsidy with mandatory
production, which comply to all criteria of point 6 but the criterion (v), may have positive effects on
trade (when rl, < t ) while the land subsidy, which does not conform to both criteria (v) and (iv), may
have no effect on trade, provided that there are restrictions on eligible land. ae
ot Of co*rr, this result is contingent to the model used, i.e., a static framework without risk and uncertainty and
considering only one aggegate output.
a8 Obviously, this does not mean that the current EU area payments to COP crops have no effect on the domestic
aggregated supply of COP crops with respect to a free market situation. This would be the case only if the
current EU base area for COP crops is not larger than the total area which would be devoted to COP crops in a
non interventionist regime. The URAA however does not, at least explicitly, strictly constrain to take the free
Fade situation as the reference situation. For a discussion on the eligibility to the green box of EU corrpensatory
payments granted in both the COP and the beef sectors, see for example Gohin and Guyomard (2000).
ae In that case, the land subsidy does not comply with criterion (iv) only if this latter is defined at the farm level
(cf. the discussion on this point in the previous paragraph).
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4.4. promoting multifunctionality while minimising trade distortion effects: The relative merits
of traditional policy instruments
In this paragraph, we keep with the previous theoretical model but we enlarge the analysis in order to
deal with the multifunctionality. Our purpose is to classiff the previously considered policy
instruments according to their ability not only to support farmers' income but also to achieve other
goals traditionally assigned to agricultural policies'
we consider only three of the four previous agricultural income support programs: the decoupled
subsidy with mandatory production (mo),the land subsidy (t) and the production subsidy (sp). As the
only non-zero effect of the decoupled subsidy without mandatory production (mno) is to raise, by the
same amount, the farmers'individual profit, results of the comparison analysis with other instruments
are quite obvious.
Three agricultural policy goals are considered: supporting agricultural income, promoting positive
externalities and/or public goods provision and correcting negative extemalities (pollution). 50
However, as the WTO discipline requires domestic policy programs to have no, or at most minimal,
hade distortion effects or effects on production, the WTO rule of "the minimal induced trade
distortion" is considered as a fourth "policy objective".
Each policy objective is directly related to a specific target variable. And the ability of each program
to achieve each policy objective is evaluated through its impact on the related target variable. More
specifically, the target variable associated with the policy objective of supporting agricultural income
(policy objective nol) is the individual total profit of farmers (denoted PRO). Vy'e consider that a
program inducing an increase (a decrease) in the individual total profit of farmers contributes
positively (negatively) to the policy objective of supporting agricultural income. The target variable
associated with the policy objective of minimising the trade distortion effect induced by domestic
programs (policy objective no 4) is the agricultural commodity exports (denoted,Y). We consider that a
program resulting in an increase (decrease) in agricultiral exports goes against (favours) the policy
objective of preserving the compatibility of domestic programs with WTO rules. The target variable
associated with the policy objective of reducing the negative externalities (policy objective no 3) is
individual yields per hectare (denoted in for individual intensification). tt In other words, we assume
that negative externalities arise from an "excessive" use of variable inputs (mainly fertilisers and
pesticides).We admit that a program inducing a decrease (an increase) in yields per hectare contributes
positively (negatively) to the policy objective of reducing negative externalities arising from
50 twe do not consider the issue of price and/or income stabilisation as we use a static analysis framework
without risk and uncertainty.
tt yi.ld, have been retained instead of the aggregate variable input use per hectare because the comparative
static results are far easier to derive for yields per hectare than for the variable input quantity used per hectare.
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intensification of agricultural production. Finally, the target variable associated with the policy
objective of maintaining/increasing the provision of positive externalities and/or public goods (policy
objective no 2) is the number of farmers. In fact, following Hueth (2000), we assume that (most) non-
food or non-market benefits are directly linked to the number of (high marginal cost) farmers. This is
of course a very restrictive assumption. However it allows us to simply represent the multi-product
nature of non-food benefits by considering that the society perceives a connection "between the
existence of relatively high-cost farm operations and the preservation or sustainability of rural
communities" (Hueth, 2000, p. 22).
The preservation of a "large" number of relatively small family-style farms is generally viewed as
more effective to the sustainability and well-being of rural communities than a "small" number of
relatively large farms (European Commission, L999; Hueth, 2000). In a more general but cumbersome
framework where potential farmers have different abilities (a higher ability corresponding to lower
marginal costs), any increase in the number of farms/farmers means that relatively high-cost farmers
choose to enter and produce (Leathers, 1992; Guyomard et al., 2000). One can reasonably assume that
the society derives non-market benefits from the production of these relatively high-cost farmers by
valuing their production beyond its market value (Hueth, 2000). Under this assumption, the policy
objective of an increased number of farms/farmers may be viewed as a reduced form of a more general
policy objective, i.e., ensuring the fulfillment of the positive multifunctional role of agriculture. Since
the same conclusions are derived from both the "general" model (farmers with different abilities) and
the "simplified" model used in this paper (farmers with identical abilities), one can interpret any
increase in the number of farms/farmers as an increased supply of public goods/positive externalities
produced by agriculture.
The previous comparative static results provide the effects of the three policy insfuments on the
endogenous variables (including the number of farms/farmers) as well as on the agricultural exports.
Using this comparative static results, it is also possible to determine the impact of the instruments on
farmers'total profit (from programme (26)) and on yields per hectare (from equations (27) and (28a)).
Details of calculations are provided in appendix 2.
Then, the comparative static effects of the three policy instruments on the four target variables are
compared on an equal budget cost basis. This allows us to classifu the instruments according to their
ability to achieve the four considered policy objectives. For that purpose, we assume that the initial
situation corresponds to the free trade equilibrium. tt In other words we consider that the four income
support programs are initially not in force. Such an assumption implies that the comparison of the
effects of instruments on an equal budget cost basis is equivalent to a comparison on an equal total
agricultural income support basis.
tt In purug.aph4.3.2,we did not specify the status of the initial market situation because derived comparative
static results are valid whether the initial situation corresponds to the free tade equilibrium or not.
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In a first step, we determine the differences between effects induced by each pair of instruments for
the three endogenous variables and the four policy objectives related variables, for a constant budget
cosyincome support. Then, we examine the signs of these differences. Results of this first step are
reported in Table  .Z.I1 a second step, the three programs are classified according to their relative
ability to achieve the four considered agricultural policy objectives. Results of this second step are
synthesised in Table 4.3.
4.4.1. Compartson of the fficts of alternative agricultural income support programs for a constant
budget cost/income suPPort
The differences between the effects induced by each pair of programs for endogenous and target
variables are provided inTable 4.2.
As previously shown, when a progpm has an ambiguous effect on a variable, the sign of this effect is
always closely related to the order of magnitude relative to one of, either ef (the restricted
Marshallian supply elasticity of output with respect to land quantity), e/ (the restricted Hicksian
derived demand elasticity of land with respect to output level), or both. It is thus, not surprising that
when the difference between the effects induced by each pair of instruments on one variable is
ambiguous, its sign depends always directly on the level of one or both these elasticities relative to
one.
Table 4.2. Equal cosUsupport comparison of the effects of each pair of instruments on the
various endogenous and target variables
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The decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (na) vs the land subsidy (r)
panel4.2.a. shows that, for an equal budget cost, the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production
leads unambiguously to a greater increase in the number of farms/farmers than the land subsidy. For
all other considered variables, the signs of the differences between the impacts of both instruments
depend exclusively on the level of the restricted Marshallian supply elasticity of output with respect to
land quantity ( ef ) relative to one.
If this elasticity is lower than unity, then the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production leads to a
higher decrease (in absolute terms) in the price of the agricultural output than the one induced by the
land subsidy. In that case, the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production leads to a greater positive
hade distortion effect than the land subsidy. In the opposite case (i.e., ttr tt), the positive trade
distortion effect induced by the land subsidy is always greater than the trade distortion resulting from
the application of the decoupled subsidy.53
Similar results may be derived for the rental price of land and the farmers' individual profit. When the
restricted Marshallian elasticity e! is lower than one, the increases in the rental price of land and then
in the farmers' individual profit generated by the land subsidy outperform those obtained with the
decoupled subsidy. tn In the opposite case (i.e., t', t 1 ), the implementation of the decoupled subsidy
leads to higher increases in both the rental price of land and the farmers'individual profit than the land
subsidy.5s
Finally, once again, similar conclusions arise when comparing the effects of both instruments on
yields per hectare. When the restricted Marshallian elasticity ef is lower than one, the decrease in the
level of intensification resulting from the implementation of the land subsidy outperforms the one
s3 Whe.r t, t 1 , the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production may lead either to a decrease or an increase
in the price of the agricultural output. In case of a decrease, this latter will be lower (in absolute terms) than the
one inàuced by the land subsidy. Hence, agricultural commodity exports will raise more with the land subsidy
than with the decoupled subsidy. In case of 
"n 
in r"ur", exports of the agricultural commodity,will decrease with
the decoupled subsidy while raising with the land subsidy. Therefore, in both cases, the positive trade distortion
effect resulting from the land subiidy application will be higher than the trade distortion effect (positive or
negative) induced by the decoupled subsidy.
5o Let's remind that the change in the rental price of land and, consequently, in the farmers' individual profit
resulting from the application-of the decoupled subsidy may be positive or negative. It is positive if the restricted
Hicksian derived demand elasticity of land with respect to output level (ef ) is lower than one, and negative
othenvise.
ss Let,s remind that etrel is always smaller than one. Therefore, when ef is greater than one, e I is necessarily
lower than one. In other words, when e', > 1, the decoupled subsidy leads necessarily to increase the rental
price of land and, consequently, the farmers' individual profit. And these increases are greater than the ones
induced by the land subsidY.
124
observed with the decoupled subsidy. In the opposite case (i.e., ,', ,I), the decoupled subsidy leads
to a decrease in the level of intensification, decrease which is higher (in absolute terms) than the one
induced by the land subsidy.
The decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo) vs the production subsidy (sp)
As in the previous case, Panel 4.2.b. indicates that, for an equal budget cost, the decoupled subsidy
with mandatory production leads unambiguously to a grcater increase in the nurnber of farms/farmers
than the production subsidy. However, for all other considered variables, the signs of the differences
between the impacts of both instruments now depend exclusively on the level of the restricted
Hicksian derived demand elasticity of land with respect to output quantity (e/ ) relative to one.
The following results apply when this elasticity is greater than unity. The decoupled subsidy
necessarily leads to a decrease in the price of the agricultural output, decrease which is greater (in
absolute terms) than the one induced by the production subsidy. Therefore, the decoupled subsidy
generates a positive trade distortion effect that is higher than the one induced by the production
subsidy. The increase in the rental price of land and then in the farmers' individual profit generated by
the production subsidy is always greater than the change observed in both variables (which may be
positive or negative) with the decoupled subsidy. Finally, the decoupled subsidy induces an increase in
the level of intensification, increase which is greater than the one resulting from the production
subsidy implementation.
One observes opposite results when the restricted Hicksian elasticity e/ is lower than one.
The land subsidy (/) vs the production subsidy (qp)
As shown in the previous paragraph, the land subsidy and the production subsidy both lead
unambiguously to a decrease in the price of the agricultural output. However, Panel 4.2.c. suggests
that, for an equal budget cost, the land subsidy induces a lower output price reduction (in absolute
terms) than the production subsidy. Therefore, on an equal cost/support basis, the positive trade
distortion effect generated by the land subsidy is always lower than the one resulting from the
production subsidy.
In the same way, it has been shown in paragraph 4.3.2 that both instuments raise the rental price of
land and, consequently, the farmers' individual profit. However, on an equal cost/support basis, the
increase observed in both variables is always greater with the land subsidy than with the production
subsidy.
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The comparison of the impacts of the land and the production subsidies on the level of intensification
is quite obvious since the former induces a decrease in yields per hectare while the latter makes this
indicator to increase.
Finally, panel2.c.reveals that, conhary to the two previous pairs of instruments, the only ambiguous
result regarding the comparison, on an equal cost/support basis, of the impacts of the land and the
production subsidies relates to their relative effects on the number of farms/farmers. When the
restricted Hicksian elasticity ef is lower than one while the restricted Marshallian elasticity e/, is
greater than one, then the increase in the number of farms/farmers induced by the land subsidy is
always higher than the change observed in the same variable with the production subsidy (change
which may be positive or negative). One observed the opposite situation when the restricted Hiclsian
elasticity e/ is greater than one while the restricted Marshallian elasticity e', is lower than one. When
both elasticities are lower than one, both instruments make the number of farms/ farmers to increase.
But the sign of the difference between their relative impacts remains ambiguous.
4.4.2. Classification of the alternative income support programs according to their ability to achieve
the four policy obi ectives
Based on the results reported in Table 4.2, we are in a good position to classifu the programs with
respect to their ability to achieve policy objectives. Table 4.3 reports the obtained classification, for
each of the three possible sets of conditions, with grade 1 for the most effective program and grade 3
for the worst effective one.
Table 4.3. Ranking of equal cosUsupport instruments according to the four policy objectives
subsidy rzo subsidy sp
t
Income support
e'rsl andef sl
e'rSlandef>l
e', > I and ef 31
2
3
I
3
2
3
I
2
Provision of positive externalities
e'r(1 ande/sl ?
3
2
?
2
3
I
I
Et,
Et,
and
and
I
1
el >l
El <l
Reduction of negative externalities
ei3l andef<l
e', 3l and ei > I
e'r>l andef <l
2
3
1
I
I
2
3
2
3
Minimising trade distortion
e'r<lande/<1
eiSlande/>l
e'r>lande/<l
2
3
I
I
1
2
3
2
3
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Hence, on an equal cosVsupport basis, the following results arise:
i) for all possible sets of conditions on the levels relative to one of the Marshallian and Hicksian
elasticities, et, and e/, the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production (mo) is the most effective
instrument as regards to policy objective no 2, i.e., under our hypotheses, for promoting the provision
of positive externalities and/or public goods;
ii) when tt t 1 and e/ < 1 , the decoupled subsidy (mo) is the most effective instrument as regards to
the four policy objectives. In order words, this decoupled subsidy program is the most effective
instrument for simultaneously supporting agricultural income, promoting positive externalities and
reducing negative externalities, while generating minimal distortion effects on hade;
iii) forthe two other sets of conditions (i.e., r', <l and e/ <l or rt <1 and e/ >1), the decoupled
subsidy is never the most effective instrument as regards to policy objectives no 1, 3 and 4.It is always
dominated by, at least, the land subsidy;
iv) whene/, < I and el <l or e! < I and e/ > 1, the land subsidy (r) is the most effective program as
regards to policy objectives no 1, 3 and 4. In other words, the land subsidy is more effective than other
instruments in supporting agricultural income and reducing negative externalities, while inducing
minimal trade distortion effects;
v) whatever the possible set of conditions on the levels relative to one of the Marshallian and Hicksian
elasticities, ef and e/, the production subsidy (sp) is never the most effective instrument as regards to
the four considered policy objectives. When u', u L and e/ < 1 , it ranks last for all policy objectives.
When tt < I and e/ < l, it ranks last for all policy objectives, but no 2 (where the ranking between
the land and the production subsidies is indeterminate). When ,', 3! and e/ > l, the production
subsidy dominates the decoupled subsidy for all policy objectives, but no 2.
From a policy perspective, our theoretical framework allows us to state that, on an equal cosVsupport
basis, and except specific conditions, no program uniformly dominates others for achieving
simultaneously the four considered policy objectives. su In other words and in accordance with the
"targeting ruIe", no instrument does allow to achieve effectively simultaneously several policy
objectives. Thus, a government considering a specific instrument necessarily faces tade-off between
56 Specific conditions corresponds here to the case where ef > I and ei <l.Indeed in that case, the decoupled
subsidy with mandatory production dominates both other instruments as regards to the four considered policy
objectives.
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objectives. In the same vein, a government pursuing different policy objectives may be well-advised to
mobilise various policy instruments.
From a WTO negotiation perspective, our production subsidy program would certainly be qualified as
an amber box measure while both other instruments would likely be considered as green or blue box
measures. Our theoretical framework then suggests that amber-box measures are not likely to be the
most effective instruments in promoting multifunctionality, provided the definition of this notion in
this analysis. By way of consequence, promoting multifunctionality does not appear as an undeniable
justification for claiming the continuation of amber box measures in future WTO negotiations. On the
other hand, determining which green or blue box measure promotes most effectively
multifunctionality while minimising trade distortion effects is not a trivial matter. This depends on
conditions that cannot be predicted by theory alone. To this regards, our results put emphasis on the
key role of both the restricted Marshallian supply elasticity of output with respect to land quantity and
Hicksian derived demand elasticity of land with respect to output quantity.
4.5. Conclusion and policy recommendations
The objective of this chapter was to contribute to the debate on decoupling and multifunctionality
issues, in relation with the current URAA green box definition. More specifically, two main questions
were addressed. First, are the decoupling criteria of the green box well-designed? Second, what are the
relative merits of various haditional income support policy instruments as regards to the promotion of
multifunctionality?
In order to address both these questions we developed trvo different analytical frameworks allowing to
analyse the effects of policy instruments on production and trade, the first model putting emphasis on
the key role of factor mobility assumptions, the second one emphasising the key role of adjustments in
the number of farmers and on the land market.
The first partial equilibrium model with two mono-product sectors using a variable input, a specific
factor and a "fixed allocatable" factor reveals a suitable tool for exploring several issues relating to the
decoupling of agricultural policy instruments.
Firstly, it allows us to highlight the key role of production technologies and factor mobility
assumptions as regards the degree of decoupling of policy instruments. In particular, it has been
pointed out that a same instrument (or a same set of instruments) may lead to very different production
effects when applied in two countries characterised by different agricultural production technologies
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and factor mobility situations. It has also been shown that production effects induced by a policy
instrument may differ whether this instrument is applied only in one sector or in both sectors and
whether this instrument is implemented alone or in conjunction with other instruments.
These concems emphasise the need for suitable indicators of the degree of decoupling of internal
support policy instruments. Such indicators would get round some drawbacks of the cunent WTO
classification process into "boxes" where each policy measure isjudged as coupled or decoupled on an
absolute basis, i.e. without considering the "technological" characteristics of the targeted sector, and
on an individual basis, i.e. without considering other measures used or contemplated by the countries
concerned.
This model and our related analysis also highlight the key role of the factor mobility assumptions
regarding the current definition of the green box direct payments to producers. In fact, one of the main
results obtained with this first model is to show that the eligibility criteria of point 6 of Annex 2 of the
URAA do not necessarily ensure decoupling when factor mobility is taken into account. In particular,
it has been shown that when land is heterogeneous, the decoupled land-based direct payment system
corresponds to a sector differentiated payment system. In that case, the decoupled system does not
comply with criterion (ii) of point 6, which requires direct payments to be independent of types of
production. In contrast, the uniform land-based direct payment system, conforming to criterion (ii),
actually has effects on production and, consequently, is not decoupled.
This result is of major importance for future discussions on the green box definition. h this respect,
one may emphasise that this result relies strongly on the extent of land heterogeneity, i.e. in our model
on the magnitude of land migration parameters. Although land heterogeneity is well-admitted in
agricultural production analysis, there is very little information on the extent of this heterogeneity in
regions or countries. Thus, further research should be directed at providing empirical estimates of
heterogeneity parameters of land (or other factors) for various countries.
Our analysis obviously relies on simpliffing assumptions that future research must ûry to overcome
(introduction of dynamics or risk, modelling of new insftuments, extension of the model in order to
measure the hade effects of policy instruments, etc.). Nevertheless, even with its simplified structure,
our proposed framework provides valuable insights for the decoupling issue of agricultural policy
instruments. A numerical application of this framework to the main WTO member countries will
certainly enhance its relevance.
The second theoretical framework also suggests that in some cases the WTO green box decoupling
criteria may be questioned. krdeed it has been shown that in the particular case where the land supply
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and demand coming from the rest of the economy correspond to fixed amounts, the only non-zero
effect of the land subsidy is to raise the rental price of land by the same amount. In this particular case,
the land subsidy has no impact on the price of the agricultural product, neither on the number of
farms/farmers, nor on the exports of the agricultural commodity. This result suggests that a land
subsidy may be considered as a decoupled income support instrument, provided that there are
restrictions on eligible land (and hence, payments) through the use on an aggregate base area. In other
words, this result shows that a policy instrument that does not fully conform to all green box eligibility
criteria may nevertheless has no or minimal distortion effects on trade. Therefore, from a 
'WTO
negotiation point of view, the EU could rightfully argue that the area payments in force in the EU COP
sector have (at least at the aggregate level) minimal trade distortion effects (so could be considered as
decoupled), although they do not fully conform to URAA decoupling criteria.
From a more general point of view, our second developed model, which allows for free entry into the
agricultural sector and land price endogeneity, shows that attempts to evaluate the relative merits of
various agricultural policies should take into account the impacts that these policies have on both
individual producers (impact at the individual margin) and the number of producers (impact at the
collective margin). For some instruments and some policy goals, impacts may be contrary to intuition
or to results derived from a model with a fixed number of firms and/or an exogenous price of
farmland.
Secondly, our theoretical framework allows us to state that, on an equal cosVsupport basis, and except
specific conditions, no program uniformly dominates others for achieving simultaneously the four
considered policy objectives. In other words and in accordance with the "targeting ruIe", no instrument
does allow to achieve effectively simultaneously several policy objectives. Thus, a government
considering a specific instrument necessarily faces trade-off between objectives. In the same vein, a
government pursuing different policy objectives may be well-advised to mobilise various policy
instruments.
Thirdly, from a WTO negotiation perspective, our production subsidy program would certainly be
qualified as an amber box measure while both other instruments would likely be considered as green
or blue box measures. Our theoretical framework then suggests that amber-box measures are not likely
to be the most effective instruments in promoting multifunctionality, provided the definition of this
notion in this analysis. By way of consequence, promoting multifunctionality does not appear as an
undeniable justification for claiming the continuation of amber box measures in future WTO
negotiations. On the other hand, determining which green or blue box measure promotes most
effectively multifunctionality while minimising trade distortion effects is not a trivial matter'
Finally, our model allows to identifu the two key parameters that have a substantial bearing on the
relative effectiveness of various instruments. The next step on the research agenda will obviously be
the empirical evaluation of these crucial parameters.
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Many research directions represent important avenues for further study. For instance, the model is
very stylized with only one output, and one single and crude indicator for negative extemalities as well
as for positive externalities. This is valuable for conceptual understanding of the importance of entry-
exit decisions and land market characteristics, but specific policy problems should be analyzed for
particular agricultural industies with more carefully specified technologies and indicators.
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APPEI\IDIX 1
Comparative statics of the model of paragraph 43.1
The system corresponding to the total differentiation of equations (3), (11), (12) and (la) is written in matrix form:
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"L.(d*' - dsr') - niu.a t( - asf '0
where:
æf is negative due to the concavity assumption of the restricted profrt function with respect to land,
loiisthe positive derivative of the supply function of land type v with respect to its own price; lo'* is the negative derivative of the supply function of land
type v with respect to the price of land type a; loi" differs frorn lo', in absolute value due to the homogeneity assumption of land supply functions with
respect to land prices,
nL = nk is a measure of the substitution relationship between land and the specific factor in production technology of sector j, which is positive if both
factors are net substitutes,
nio = nL and nlo = frir7 trêmarginal productivities of land and specific factors; they are assumed to be positive,
n!* = nt, and ni, = nt*u aremeasures of substitution between the variable input and both primary factors,
æfo is negative due to the concavity assumption of the restricted profit function with respect to the level of the specific factor.
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APPEI\DIX 2
Comparative statics of the model of paragraph43.2
Total differentiation of equations (29), (30) and (32) gives:
(s1)
Kî. w
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-nr
or, in more compact notation,
t-
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The determinant of M, detM, is positive since it can be written as:
(al) detM =Kfn-r''r+æoo(-n,)'+2ær,no(-n.)l+ (-DDo-DE)(-n,)'z+(S/, 
-Dl,)n2o>0
'We now illustrate how the analysis proceeds on the example of the decoupled subsidy with mandatory production. From (S2) we immediately obtain:
I apl
,,,, 
l:;l 
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0
0
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with
M -t = (lldet M
Hence:
It -frrfrp DI
-fr,T, n'o -n,(Knoo-DDo-DEo)+Kærno
-Knrfi,+rEp(Klt. + SI,- Dl,) n,(Kn* - DD o- DE o)- Knon, (Kfr* - DD o - DE )(Kn- +'S/, - Dt,)-1Knr)'
,)KîErn,-no(Kn-+S/,-
(a2) detM .(dp / dmo) = K 7c rn, - (Kn- + Sl, - Dl,)n o
(a3) det M .(dr / dmo') - -(k * - DD o - DE )n, + Kn *n o
(a4) det M .(dK / dmo) = (K n po - DD o - DE )(Kn - + SI, - Dl,) - K' n',
These three equations may equivalently be written as:
(a5) detM. (dpldmo)--Kæ-rolt,.#J-(s/, -Dl,)no=-I{n;co(l-"',)- (sl,-Dl,)no
(a6) detM.(drldmo)=Kn*(-n")U*4?l-(DDo+DE)(-n,)=KnooÇn,Xl-ei) -(DDo+DE)(-n,)
n 
*(_fi,)
(a7) det M .(dK / dmo) = K' (n *n o - n'r) + Kn *(Sl, - Dl,) - (DD e + DE )(Kn - + Sl, - Dl,) > 0
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The impact of mo ony and,I may be written as, respectively:
dy / dmo = n *.(dp / dmo) + æ 
',.(dr I dmo)(a8) =(I/detM)lnoofKæo,n,-(I<rc.+Sl,-Dl,)rcoJ+nr"f-(Knro-DDo-DE)n,+Kn*no)J
=(l/detM)l-K(n*æ- 
-npJt,p)*p -n*(Sl, - Dl,)n, +æ.,(-DDo - DEr)(-n,)J<0
dl / dmo = 
-n,p.(dp I dmo) - æ..(dr / dmo)
(a9) =(r/detM)f-n*fKnrn,-(Kæ-+sl"-Dl,)noJ-n.ï-(Knro-DDo-DEr)n"+Kn*æ)J
= (l / det M )l- K (n *n _ - n *n o")(n,) + æ *(^S/, - Dl,)n, - n _ (- DD o - DE )(-n,)J < 0
From (a8) and (a9), we readily derive the impact of mo on intensification ln (yields per hectare):
12.(din/ dmo) = (dy / dmo)J 
-(dt / dmo).y
(a 1 0) ==ii 
::illil ;
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n'))
Finally, the impact of mo on farmers' individual profit may be written as:
(all) ùPRO / dmo = æ o.(dp / dmo) + n,.(dr / dmo) + li.(dr / dmo) + I = li.(dr / dmo)
Proceeding similarly for the land subsidy (r) and the production subsidy (sp) yields the following comparative static results:
(aI2) detM.(dp / dt) = -(,S/, - Dl,)n o(æ") < 0
(al3) det M .(dr / dt) = Kln 
-n2, + n *(-n,)' + 2n o,n o(-î. )l - (DD o + DE )(-n,)' > 0
(aI4) det M .(dK / dt) = (Sl, - Dl,)lKn *(-æ,Xt - ei ) - (DD o + DE )(-æ,))
(al 5) /'z. det M .(din / dt) = 
-(^S/, - Dl,)n oln ofr'o * n oo(-æ,)' + 2n o,æ o (-r, )] < 0
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(alQ ùPROldt =li.(dr ldt)>0
and
(al7) det M .(dp / dt)= 
-(,S/, - Dl,)æ oGr, ) < 0
(al 8) det M .(dr / dt) = Kln on"o + n *(-n,)' + 2n rn o?n,)l - (DD o + DE )(-n,)' > 0
(aI9) det M .(dK t dt) = (Sl, - Dl,)lKn *(-n,Xl - ai ) - (DD o + DE )(-n,)7
(r20) l'z .detM.(din / dt)= 
-(S/, - Dl,)n oln on'o * n *(-n,)' + 2n rn oFr,)l < 0
(azl) ùPRO / dt = li.(dr I dt) > 0
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5 - ASSESSING TIrE DEVELOPMENT oF TIrE woRLD MARKET Er\ryrRoNMENT
Simulating the impact of further trade liberalisation on world agricultural markets using the
WATSIM model
'ù/ilhelm Henrichsmeyer, Martin von Lampe and Claus Môllmann
Parbner 3: University of Bonn, Institute of Agricultural policy (IAp)
5.1. Introduction
The objective of this part of the project (i.e., subtask 1.3) was to revise and update the World
Agricultural Trade Simulation (U/ATSIM) Modelling System, in order to allow for a comprehensive
analysis of issues arising with the ongoing multilateral negotiations on hade in agricultural
'ô'mmodities. 
The overall task can be broadly divided in three main directions of work, namely the
update and extension of the WATSM Data Base, further developments in the IVATSM simulation
model, and applications in the context of the cunent negotiations.
The Data Base has been updated to now include time series up to 1997, with additional data for l99g
and 1999. More important, however, seems the complementation of the existing Non-spatial Data
Base by a completely new Spatial Data Base, comprising full and consistent hade flow matrices for all
commodities and regions considered by the simulation model.
The simulation model itself was revised with respect to two main areas. On the one hand, its original
representation of net hade developments has been changed to now endogenously consider gross
imports and exports on the same market. On the other hand, and based on the gross trade approach, the
model's representation of tariff barriers and export subsidies has been improved. Moreover, tariff rate
quotas that have become relevant particularly after the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, are
now explicitly modelled.
Finally, the model was applied for three types of analysis: First, a baseline or reference run was
performed to picture the likely medium term outlook for regional and intemational agricultural
commodity markets. Second, the question about to what degree policy measures like the EU CAp
compensatory payments are coupled to or decoupled from agricultural production, is important to
reflect in the model. Even though the answer on this question cannot be found within WATSIM,
alternative assumptions on the degree of decoupling of EU area and headage payments were
considered with respect to the impact on EU and global markets. Third, based on the experience of the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, a stylised liberalisation scenario was simulated to analyse
the possible impact of a future WTO agreement.
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the WATSIM Data Base, with a special focus
on the new developments with respect to the new Spatial Data Base. Section 3 presents the simulation
model, with a particular attention paid on the representation of gross trade and of policy measures' The
following section 4 presents and discusses the main assumptions and the outcome of the reference run'
picturing likely developments of regional and intemational markets until 2010. Then, section 5 focuses
on the results of some alternative simulations performed with the model. Section 6 finally summarises
the main findings and brings some concluding remarks'
5.2. The IilATSIM Modelling system: The WATSIM Data Base
A solid, comprehensive and consistent data base is required for a sound understanding of past
developments as well as current situation on agricultural markets. In addition to that, the data base
serves as the basis for projections of future market developments, which in turn are '.lie reîerence for
possible alternative policy scenarios. Thus, the WATSM Data Base has been updated and now
consists of two parts, namely the Non-Spatial Data Base (NSDB), and the Spatial Data Base (SDB).
The general concept of the WATSIM Data Base can be summarised by the following criteria:
- Long time series. Most time series in the NSDB now include the period 1961 to 1997, with some
series extending to 1999. Time Series in the new SDB comprise the years 1988 to 1997.
- Regional dffirentiation.Tlteprincipal data are available at the single country level (NSDB only).
- 
product dffirentiation.Time series on supply and utilisation are incorporated for a set of some 110
agricultural commodities and hence in much more details than needed for the simulation model itself
(NSDB only).
- Consistenq. Regional data provide full consistency, i.e. market balances, processing coefficients, etc
are checked.
- Flexibitity. Both on the regional and the product side, àexible aggregation tools allow for adjustment
of agglegation levels to the user's (and modeller's) needs (NSDB only).
- Easy and quick access. The technical realisation of the WATSM Data Base allows for an easy and
efficient access to the large amount of data, both for the user and the model's programming routines.
The WATSM Data Base now consists of two sub-sets. Based on the existing systemsT, the WATSM
Non-Spatial Data Base (NSDB) has been updated and redesigned for the purposes of this project.
Additionally, the WATSM Spatial Data Basu (SDB) lias been newly devcloped to incorporatc
5t See uon Lampe (1999).
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bilateral fade flows and prices across the model's regions. In this section, both the NSDB and the
SDB are outlined in their construction and content, with a particular focus on the improvements and
further developments as compared to the former data base.
5.2.1, The IYATSIM non-Spatial Data Base
5.2.1.1. Data sources
The 'WATSIM NSDB has been designed already for the former version of the system. It brings
together data from various sources on production, demand and trade of agriculhral commodities,
macroeconomic and sectoral data, as well as policy data. Specifically, the WATSM NSDB is fed by
the following sources" :
- FAOSTAT. The FTP-accessible (license needed) data base of the Food and Agriculture Organisation
of the UN provides supply, demand, stock and hade data for several hundred commodities at the
single country level. In addition, prices and nutrient consumption figures are included. On the
macroeconomic side, irrigation data are used, while population data are generally taken from the UN
statistics. Time series comprise the years l96l to 1997,partly up to 1999.
- Production, Suppiy and Distribution (PS&D). The freely web-accessible data base of the United
States Department of Agriculture also provides supply, demand, stock and hade data for some 60
products and product aggregates, again at the single country level. Data are generally less detailed
with respect to the demand structure, but comprise the years 196l to 1999.
- World Development Indicators. Most macroeconomic data are taken from the 'World Bank's daia
base on CD-Rom, such as figures on GDP and inflation. Time series comprise the years 1960 to 1998,
albeit some of them are incomplete.
- Iîorld Population Prospects. The UN estimations on urban, rural and total population not only
provide ex-post time series from 1960 to 1997,but also projection until 2050.
- Producer and Consumer Support Estimates (PSE/CSE Data Base).The data base of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development represents the main source for agricultural policies and
is also important in terms of domestic and intemational prices. :
Various other sources are used to obtain price and income elasticities, prices, feed parameters and
policy data.
58 The years given for the time series refer to the time of download for the current version of the WATSIM Data
Base. At the time of writing this report, inost sources provide more recent data than stated here.
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5. 2. 1.2. Data processing
Data from all sources were updated such that the current base year for model simulations now is 1997.
Data from the different sources are merged, with a clearly defined list of priority if figures with the
same content are provided by more than one source. For example, commodity balance data are '-
generally taken from FAOSTAT, supplemented by PS&D data in cases where FAO data are missing.
Similarly, population data are generally taken from the UN, but may be supplemented by FAO data in
case. Of course, where different sources are merged, data are not simply copied, but in general growth
rates are used rather than absolute figures.
A consistency routine is then run across all data sets, to ensure balanced supply and utilisation
accounts, consistent net tade figures, and realistic processing and yield coefficients. Eventually,
aggregation routines yield data sets for the regional and commodity aggregates used in the simulation
model (see below for details).
5.2.2. The WATSIM Spatial Data Base
In contrast to the NSDB, the V/ATSM SDB represents a completely new and unique data base
developed during the last three years. The need for the representation of bilateral hade flows resulted
from the aim to consider gross trade rather than net trade in the simulation model. Due to the fact that
the model works on an aggregated regional level, gross imports and exports for individual countries
reported by both FAOSTAT and pS&D cannot be used for the model itself. 
5e To calculate gross hade
figures for regional aggregates, bilateral trade flows across individual countries are therefore
necessary.
5.2.2.1. Data sources
In principle, there are four sources available for bilateral trade flows on agricultural markets,
including:
- COMEXT.COMEXT is the official data base on extemal trade statistics of the European Union (EU)
and on internal trade across EU member countries. COMEXT comprises bilateral hade between the
EU and its trade parfiters, but excludes hade between non-EU regions and countries. It is therefore not
suitable for the construction of global hade matrices'
sn The sum of gross imports of all countries within a region does not necessarily (and in fact, will only by
chance) equal the gfoss import of the regional aggregate, due to intra trade that cannot be distinguished from
extra tade.
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- FATUS. Similar to COMEXT, FATUS represents the foreign hade statistics data base of the United
States, containing trade flows (imports and exports) between the US and its trade partners. Again,
trade flows between non-US regions and countries are not considered, making FATUS alone unsuited
for the construction of global frade matrices.
- TMINS. The TRAINS data base is developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (LINCTAD) and contains import data across a broad number of countries. In fact,
TRAINS represents a subset of the under-mentioned COMTRADE data base and was therefore, after
thorough examination, excluded from the further consideration in the WATSM SDB.
- COMTMDE. The Commodity Trade Data Base, developed and maintained by the United Nations
Statistics Division, comprises both import and export quotations by origin and destination for more
than 100 countries and a wide set of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, with time series
extending from 1988 to 1998. While in this project, both COMEXT and FATUS were basically
excluded from consideration in the SDB because of their regional limitationstr, COMTRADE
represents the main source for bilateral trade flows. Môllmann (forthcoming) uses FATUS data to
check the WATSM SDB with respect to its plausibility.
The WATSIM team did not have direct access to the COMTRADE data. Instead, staff of the EU
Commission's Directorate General Agriculture (DG-Agri) assisted by providing regionally aggregated
trade flows for further processing by the WATSM team. With respect to the product aggregation,
significant difficulties had to be solved due to the high degree of product differentiation in
COMTRADE (Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, HS 96) and in WATSM
(aggregated basically from the Standard International Trade Classification, SITC, used by
FAOSTAT). In particular, conversion rates applying for the processing of raw products to derived
commodities were used. Table 5.1 shows the commodity representation in the different data bases as
well as the applied conversion rates for the example of wheat.
* Orrc could, however, use both COMEXT and FATUS in addition to COMTRADE in order to improve the data
base, an effort that was left for future projects.
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Table 5.1. Commodity representation of wheat in WATSIM, FAOSTAT and COMTRADE
WATSIM
CONB
1VATSIM
coNc
Aggregate FAO
Element
Code
Conversl
on factor
Elements in
aggregate
FAOSTAT
Code
(SITC Rev.2)
Conversl
on factor
COMTRADE
HS 96
WHEAT WHEAT WHEAT
&
PRODUCTS
2s1t L0000 WHEAT l5 1.0 l00l
1.3889 FLOURWHEAT l6 1.0 I l0l :l 103.1 1.21
1.3889 MACARONI l8 1.0 I 902. l l.l 9
1.1574 BREAD 20 1.0 I 905.1 0,40
1.0526 BULGUR 2t 1.0 I lM.29ex
1.3889 PASTRY 22 1.0 I 905.20.30.90ex
1.6340 WHEAT,STARCH 23 1.0 I 108.1 I
1.0000 BREAKFAST
CEREALS
41 1.0 1904
Source: FAOSTAT (1999), WATSIM Data Base
5. 2. 2. 2. Consistency adiustment
A major task in the construction of the Spatial Data Base was to ensure full consistency both within
the SDB and compared to the NSDB. Given that statistics on bilateral trade flows generally come from
two different sources, i.e. the quoting importer and the quoting exporter, the same trade flow is
described by two figures 'ffithin the original data base. Experiences show that this "double reporting"
does not necessarily yield in mutual confirmation, but may lead to significant contradictions within the
data base. Clearly, these inconsistencies cannot be satisfactory in a useful data base, and may result in
significant problems with respect to the simulation model that is based on such data. Problems and
inconsistencies include the following phenomena:
- Lack of data. Some of the trade flows are not reported at all by either importers or exporters, or both.
In some cases, these problems arise in regions with traditional hade across open borders (e.g. beef
trade within West Africa, see von Kirchbach, l99l).
- Inconsistencies of import and export quotations.In many cases, bilateral trade flows are reported
with significant discrepancies between the reporting importer and its exporting counterpart.
- Inconsistencies of total trade compared to a region's net trade. The sum of all exports, net of the
sum of all imports reported of a given country or region, should equal the region's net trade that is
available from other (official) statistics, if these are credible. This, however, often is not the case. In
some extreme cases, for a region with significant net exports or net imports, no exports or imports are
reported at all.
- Unit problems.In some cases, inconsistencies appear to result from the use of incorrect quantity or
value units (e.g., 1000 tonnes instead of I tonne).
- Reliabitity. Often, trade flows are more accurately documented by the importer than by the respective
exporter, given that many countries rigorously control imports, but put less emphasis on exports.
Similarly, industrialised countries tend to report their trade more accurately than developing countries.
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Before we will focus on the methodology applied to calculate consistent trade flow matrices for the
WATSM SDB, another approach used for the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP, see Gelhar,
1996) will be presented and briefly discussed. This approach is generally based on the assumption
that, for each trade flow reported by one exporter and one importer, only one of the two figures
provides proper information on the actual hade flow. Since, however, one cannot argue that a certain
country has perfect quotation for all markets, the decision which figure has the highest priority has to
be made for each market individually, based on the Index of Retiability.6r For this index, the level of
consistency is calculated in a first step for each hade flow and the respective export and import
quotations, by dividing the absolute difference between reported import and export by the import
quotation. For a given country and a given market, the index of reliability of imports is then calculated
as the sum of imports in hade flows with a consistency level better than a given threshold, divided by
the sum of all imports of that region, with each of the sums taken over the available partner (i.e.,
exporting) regions. Similarly, the index of reliability of exports takes the sum of exports in trade flows
with a consistency level better than a given threshold, divided by the sum of all exports of that region.
For each region and each commodity, this procedure will therefore yield one index of reliability on the
import side, and one on the export side. For the threshold applied to distinguish between acceptable
and unacceptable discrepancies between import and export quotation, a margin of 20Yo is used.
For the construction of the consistent fade flow matrix, the exporter's index of reliability of exports is
compared to the importer's index of reliability of imports for each trade flow. The figure reported by
the country with the lower index is dropped, and the figure provided by the country with the larger
index is used and taken as the true figure.
While this approach has the advantage that it works without any generalisation, in that each hade flow
is checked individually and no hading region is "condemned wholesale" for any reason, the described
procedure has three major disadvantages for the construction of the WATSM SDB:
- Missing consistenqt with the WATSIM NSDB. The index of reliability based approach provides hade
matrices that are intemally consistent. However, it cannot assure that resulting trade flow match the
net trade positions given by other sources, such as the WATSM Non Spatial Data Base.
- Loss of information. Given that the data provided by the "less reliable" trade partner is dropped, it is
implicitly assumed that the informational content of those data is nil, while full trust is given to the
respective partner counby. One can expect, however, that even the "more reliable" country might
make inaccurate quotations, while the "less reliable" country may still provide some information.
6l At this point, we ignore the fact that GTAP works with values only, a fact that implies further complications in
that fob- and cif-based volumes need to be converted to uniform fob volumes. See Gelhar, 1996, for details.
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- Arbitrary choice of the threshold value. The fixed threshold value at 20% is arbitrarily chosen, but
may have significant impacts on the outcome. Since the use of this threshold makes reliability a zelo-
one decision, no difference is made between equal quotations and trade flows, where discrepancies
between import and export figure are just below those 20olo, while the impact of the discrepancy being
I9%o or 2l%o is immense. Another threshold value, say 25oÂ, might therefore completely change the
order of reliability across regions.
For the construction of the WATSIM SDB, another approach is used, based on the assumptions that:
- All available data is useful to provide some information, where the informational content depends on
the market and the reporting region.
- The net trade data available in the WATSIM-NSDB is taken as right-hand side values, i.e. they are
assumed to be correct.
- V/e do not want to add any information that we do not actually have.
We therefore employed an entropy-based approach. 62 The principal assumption of this approach is
that each data point in fact is a stochastic variable with a certain mean, a certain range of possible
values, and a specific probability distribution within this range. While the Maximum Entropy (ME)
approach starts with an equipartition of probabilities within the given range, the Cross Entropy (CE)
approach explicitly allows for a priori information on the probability dishibution. A general
formulation of the CE approach is given by the following problem:
maxc(p)= 
-,.à,rpi'r'"',,.k^(*)=-,,à,1',,"''orîb'"''""r)*,,à,,1,"'''otn(q'"'''''o)
sJ.
(a) \P,,".r,,.0 =l
k
O) | P,,,,r,,^o,r * SPi,,,,',i^p,r, = lMP,.,.,'
k
(c) \P,,.r."a.t * sP,,,,,',""0,r = ÛXP,,,,,' (1)
k(d) Erc,,,.,, = IMP,.r., * XCORRT
(e) 28p,,.,, -\tuP,,,.,, = NETP,::''
r' r'(0 )ttvtr,,,,, = I < PIMP,::''
(g) 2nXP,,,,,. = / < PEXP,::ou
62 See Golan, Judge and Miller, 1996.
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where: C(p) Cross enûopy objective variable
p Probability of support point k
q A priory probability of supporr point k
SP Supportpoint
IMP Calibrated import flow
EXP Calibrated export flow
XCORR Conection factor for global market (see text)
NET?NSDB Net tade data from non-spatial data base
PIMPNSDB Gross import data from non-spatial data base
Pf,XPNSoa Gross export data from non-spatial data base
i Productindex
r,r' Region index
t Trade flow type index, te {imp,exp}
k Supportpointindex
The relevant optimisation constraints can be interpreted as follows:
(a). Probabilities for each import or export flow must sum up to unity.
(b). The import flow is the sum of the import support points, weighted by the probabilities associated
to them.
(c). The export flow is the sum of the export support points, weighted by the probabilities associated to
them.
(d). The export of commodity i by the reporting region r to trade parher r' must be equal to the import
of that commodity by the reporting region r' from the hade partner r, adjusted only by a global, market
specific correction factor. This correction factor results from the fact that the NSDB itself is not fully
consistent in that total net exports are not exactly equal to total net imports, and assures that the
balance in the hade flow matrix is the same as in the non-spatial data.
(e). Total gross exports, net of total gross imports, of a reporting region r, must be equal to the net
hade of that region documented in the NSDB.
(0. kt the case of single countries, total gross imports of a reporting country r must equal the gross
imports of that country documented in the NSDB. In the case of regional aggregates, total gross
imports must not exceed the NSDB imports (which are the simple sum of imports of the aggregate's
member counbies and may include inha-trade).
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(g). In the case of single countries, total gross exports of a reporting country r must equal the gross
exports of that country documented in the NSDB. In the case of regional aggregates, total gross
exports must not exceed the NSDB exports (which are the simple sum of exports of the aggregate's
member countries and may include intra-hade).
Four support points are defined for each import quantity and each export quantity such that:
- First, both the inner two and the outer two support points are centred around the reported quantity,
respectively.
- Second, the distance of the inner two support points positively relates to the relative deviation of the
import and export quotation of the respective trade flow (i.e., on the reliability of the quotations of this
trade flow).
- Third, the outer two support points are chosen far away from the quoted data in order to ensure
solvability even if the quoted gross trade figures have little to do with each other and with the net
(aggregates) or gross (individual countries) trade figures taken from the NSDB.
By assigning large a priori probabilities (i.e., 0.49 respectively) to the inner support points, and small
ones (0.01, respectiveiy) to the outer support points, the model ensures that the inner supports (and
hence, the reliability of the trade quotations) are relevant for the results whenever solvability allows
for this, while breaking out towards one of the outer supports forces to significantly worsen the
objective function, since the relative increase of the respective probability then needs to be very large.
Generally, hade prices in contrast to trade quantities are not subject of calibration, but are only
checked for plausibility. Prices are mechanistically considered to be implausible if they are more than
twice as high, or less than half as high, as the average model's world market price on that market, and
are therefore dropped. Missing (or dropped) prices are recalculated according to the following list of
priorities:
- If the price of the respective hade partner is available, and both prices for that trade flow exist in
other years, the relative price difference between the partrers is used to calculate the missing price.
- If this is not possible, but prices for comparable commodities are available for the respective year,
the relative price difference on those markets is used.
If this is not possible either, but prices for comparable commodities are available for other years, the
relative price ditïerence in these years is used.
- Ifthis is not possible either, but prices for the given trade activity exist for other years, the relative
change of the model's world market price is used.
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- Finally, if no prices are available for the given trade activity at all, the model's world market price
itself is applied.
Values are then recalculated by simply taking the product of price times quantities for imports and
exports.
The described approach allows for the construction of consistent trade matrices, matching to the data
provided by the NSDB. It makes use of all information available without imposing additional
assumptions that are not necessarily valid, weighting the value of each figure by the level of
correspondence between the reported exports and imports, respectively, which, in conhast to the
above-mentioned index of reliability, is a continuous function rather than a zero-one decision. The
disadvantage of the procedure, the fact that in case of implausible quotations basically all trade figures
are adjusted to some degree resulting in that few figures are exactly equal to those found in the
original statistics, is closely related to the main assumption of the approach that each figure contains at
least some information.
5.2.2.3. Results of the consistenqt calculation
Generally, more recent data seem to be more accurate than data from earlier years. Figure 5.1 presents
the calibration results for wheat, showing the comparatively large discrepancies between export and
import quotations even for this well-documented commodity. Better consistency was found for the
base year's pigmeat markets as shown by Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.1. Results of the consistency calibration process for wheat, 1997
Source: COMTRADE Data Base, own calculations
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5.3. The \ryATSIM modelling system: The simulation model
This section focuses on the description of the WATSIM modelling system by first briefly outline the
overall concept of the model, referring to existing publications wherever applicable. Emphasis is then
put on the two main recent developments of the model, namely the shift from a pure net trade
representation to a gross trade model that considers both imports and exports on the same market
simultaneously, and the enlargement of the representation of agricultural policy measures.
5,3.1. Overall concepfs
The World Agricultural Trade Simulation Model (\MATSIM) is the result of a development that
started with the SPEL-Trade Model in the late 1980s. The system, as it stands today, was developed in
order to comply with the needs for a policy simulation tool for the preparation of the current
multilateral trade negotiations in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It can be
broadly characterised as follows:
- Partial equilibrium framework.In contrast to general equilibrium models, WATSIM only covers a
part of the whole economy, namely the markets for agricultural commodities. Developments in the
overall economy and on other markets are taken exogenously or are neglected.
- Multi-region, multi-commodityframework. The current version represents 10 countries and regional
aggregates, representing the whole world (Figure 5.3). For each region as well as on the global level,
markets for 29 agricultural commodities are included, covering cereals (5 products); starchy products;
sugar; pulses; oilseeds (4 products); vegetable oils (4 products); vegetable oil cakes (4 products); meat
(4 products); eggs; milk; and milk products (3 products). Both the regional and the commodity
aggregation level can, however, be easily adjusted to the user's needs within the data base (see above,
section 5.2).
- Comparative staticframework. The model is solved for a given set of target years, results of which
can be compared to the base year's situation or with the outcomes of other simulations. In contrast to
dynamic models, however, no information is given on the path of adjustment between base and target
years.
- Deterministic framework. Tlte model disregards all kinds of risk and uncertainty, and assumes
"average" conditions, though issues like weather and other stochastic variables may well be important
for the agricultural markets.
u' A ,nor. detailed discussion on the modelling concept of WATSIM can be found in von Lampe (1999)'
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- Non-spatial framework World markets for all commodities are assumed to be spot markets, with no
differentiation of bilateral hade flows. Traded commodities are, however, differentiated from domestic
sales by both producers and consumers (see paragraph 5.2.2 for details on the gross trade approach).
- Synthetic framework. Most parameters used to describe supply and demand behaviours are not
estimated within the WATSM system, but borrowed from other models or literature. Exceptions
include, however, feed requirement parameters (i.e., feed energy use per unit of livestock production)
and the adjustment of income elasticities of demand due to economic growth. Of course, all price
elasticities are subject to careful calibration to meet microeconomic theory. n
- Consideration of kqt shift variables for supply and demand. Both medium and long term projections
of supply and demand are improved by taking into account the underlying shift factors, including
population and income growth, urbanisation, expansion and reduction of availability of land,
irrigation, and feed efficiency. Technical progress is assumed to follow its longer term 
- 
though not
necessarily linear 
- 
trend.
- Consideration of key policy variables. By explicitly modelling the most important policy measures,
policy relevant simulations are possible as they are necessary, for example in the context of the current
multilateral negotiations on further tade liberalisation. Instead of using simple price wedges between
domestic and foreign trade prices, WATSIM distinguishes between specific and ad-valorem tariffs and
variable levies on the import side. Additionally, the model explicitly considers tariff-rate quotas. On
the export side, export subsidies are modelled in combination with limits on subsidised exports
resulting from the URAA. Domestic support is differentiated in product-related subsidies and factor-
related payments (area payments, headage premiums). See section 5.2.3 for details on the modelling of
policy measures.
* See uon Lampe (1999), p. 53 f.
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Figure 5.3. Regional differentiation of WATSIM
Source: WATSIM Modelling Sytem
Figure 5.4 below shows the principal structure of the equilibrium model. In the core of the model,
supply and demand (and their respective components) for each commodity market in each region are
modelled as constant elasticity functions with respect to the relevant domestic own and cross prices
(e).'While demand is differentiated to domestic sales and imports depurding on the respective price
ratio (assuming constant elasticities of substitution o., CES), supply is divided into domestic sales and
exports (assuming constant elasticities of tansformation 01, CET). Net exports (positive or negative)
from all regions meet on the single world market that has to be balanced. To achieve this after a shock
(shifts, policy), world market prices are adjusted and transmitted to regional prices for imports and
exports via the policy-driven price transmission. Together with the (equilibrium) domestic sales price,
this results in adjustments in the producer and consumer prices according to the price aggregation
derived from the CET and CES functions. Changed prices eventually induce the changes in supply and
demand quantities necessary to balance world markets.
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Figure 5.4. Schematic structure of WATSIM
Source; WATSIM Modelling System
IVhile inter-regional relationships are represented by the world market clearing condition, intra-
sectoral relationships are represented by means of the following issues:
- Cross-price elasticities. Both supply and demand are modelled considering the full set of cross-
commodity price effects by using not only own-price elasticities, but also cross-price elastictities
wherever applicable. In particular, this refers to substitution and complementary conditions within the
human consumption bundle, within agricultural supply and within the feed mix.
- Feed balances. Feed energy use and the requirements from livestock production are balanced using
feed energy balance equations. This ensures that, ceteris paribus, an increase in livestock production
must be followed by an increase in feed demand.
- Input-output ratios.In the processing industries for oilseeds and for milk, constant input-output ratios
ensure the balance between raw product processing and derived commodity production quantities.
5.3.2. Representation of regional gross tradefs
Among a number of reasons that a given counûry or region both imports and exports a specific
commodity within the same period is that the homogeneity assumption on commodities often is not
World market price
Export
price
Domestlc sales
price
lmport
price
Export
prlce
Domestlc salos
price
lmport
prlce
Produzer Gonsumer Producer Gonsumer
Production Demand Production
policy and
Demand
Exports Domestic
sales
lmports Exports Domestic
sales
lmports
Net trade Net trade
Region 1
= endogenous
variables
World market
(dis-)equilibrium
Region 2
û = exogeneousdata / parameters
ut This section heavily draws on von Lampe (2001)
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met. 66 Domestically produced and imported goods of the same type are not considered equal by
consumers, and producers supply different commodities to the domestic and foreign markets. Despite
those differences, however, these commodity pairs to a certain degree represent substitutes for
consumers or producers, implying a specific link bet'ween domestic and foreign markets.
The key assumption Armington (1969) made upon the relationship between the demand for a certain
commodity and its distribution on domestically produced and imported quantities is that the elasticity
of substitution between the two origins of one commodity is independent of both prices and the
demand quantities of other commodities (though not necessarily constant over time), resulting in a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function for the aggregate demand. ut Hence, according to this
assumption, the total demand of commodity i by region r may be written as:
1 
-na.- 
I
DEMD',,, = sd,.,*Vdd,,,* DSLSl.,-od'' +did,,,* PIMP.',,-*''" It4" (2)
where: DEMD Total demand i Product index
DSLS Demand for domestically produced commodities, r Region index
domestic sales t Time index
PIMP Demand for imported commodities, imports
sd Scaling Parameter
ddd,did DistributionParameters
pd Substitution parameter (pd > -l)
On the production side, Powell and Gruen (1968) have formulated similar relationships as on the
demand side. Even if transformability between the production for domestic and export markets can be
expected to be much stronger than on the demand side, information costs, different product qualities,
labelling, etc give some arguments that transformation is limited, too. Hence the pendant of the CES
function, the constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, is employed in the following way:
t 
-".. -. Lr
suP|,, = ss,., * ldds,,"* DSLSI,-p"'' + des,,,* pB1çp'',,-p''' lo''" (3)
uu The.r are several other possible arguments, including the geographical expansion of countries and regions
(resulting in imports frorrr one neighbour on one border while exporting from the other border to another
partner), dynamiis (resulting in imports in parts of a period, while exporting in other parts of the same period),
specific bilateral tade agreements and others.
ut In fact, Armington assumed that consumers would distinguish between products across various origins, i.e.
between imports from different countries, and domestic commodities. We use a simplified approach by assuming
imports from different countries to be firlly substitutable. See the discussion on the theoretical limitations of this
approach in the summary and conclusions.
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where: SUPP
PEXP
ss
dds,des
ps
Total supply
Supply of export commodities, exports6s
Scaling parameter
Distribution parameters
Transformation parameter (ps < -l)
Other symbols already declared
Nt,,
Other symbols already declared
5.3.2.1. Derivation of model equations
The demand side
Employing the Lagrange function on the cost minimisation problem for the consumers, we can derive
the functions that give us the shares of domestic sales and import in the total demand, depending on
the price ratio of, respectively, domestic and imported goods:
DDSH't.,
DSLS:., 1
( 
, 
pa,., \
.l*0,, + did,lh * ddd,,,# .Wk)'* 
)
( 
- 
pdi.,
- 
[r,n, 
+ ddd,,,i,t". * drd,.,ffi .(Hh)*
DEM4," sd,,, (4)
(s)
and
rMSHi,, _ 
PIMq,, 
= 
I
DEM(., sd,,,
]-
where: DDSH
IMSH
CPIM
CPDS
Domestic demand share of total demand
Import share of total demand
Consumer price for imported commodities
Consumer price for domestic sales
Since the aggregate price must represent the average price of imports and domestic sales, weighted
with the import and domestic share respectively, the aggregate price can be computed as a function of
domestic and import prices as follows:
cPN:,, hoo,,,'o' " * cp D s!,,t 
oo' 
" + did..,oo' " * cpIM 1,,' "dt' Ï+=l*sd,., (6)
with
, I -6d,.,
Pd i-, =' 6d,."
(7)<+
68 Note that in the model, possible intervention purchases are added to the export position. On this point, see
paragraph 5.3.3
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where: CPRI
DSSHi.,
od
Aggregate consumer incentive price
Elasticity of substitution (0 < o < æ)
Other symbols already declared
Finally, just like in the net trade version of WATSIM, total demand and its components react to prices
according to doublelog functions with constant elasticities, e.g. for human consumption:
HCPC:,, =ucpci:!û.U(ry1'" (8)
where: HCPC Human demand per capita Other symbols already declared
rcon Price elasticity of human demand
shift Variable value in target period' given constant real
prices
As a result, three relationships are needed for the demand side in the model:
- Aggregate commodity price is a function of prices for domestic and imported quantities,
respectively.
- Total demand (or its components) is a function of aggregate commodity prices.
- Import and domestic shares of total demand are functions of the price ratio between domestic
and imported goods. The supply side
Equations on the supply side can be easily derived in analogy to the demand side. Here, the elasticity
of substitution is replaced by the elasticity of transformation, which has a negative sign. Production
shares of domestic sales and exports are defîned as6e:
DSLS:., 1 *
=-=-'
suPPt',, ss,,,
dds,,, + des,,,T*o'u * dds,,,*wu *
PPEX:,
PPDS\,,
PJi,r
)*'
(e)
and
PEXPT',, 
= 
I 
*
SUP4,, ss,,"
( 
. 
pfi.r
I 
' 
Psi'r (PPDS' )i."'''
I des,.,+ dds,."vo'u * des,.,Gp'u 
-l-fefX;)
t
(10)
6'Note that the export share captures not only actual exports, but also intervention purchases necessary to avoid
subsidised exports to exceed the limits set by the URAA'
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where: DSSH
EXSH
STOP
PPEX
PPDS
Domestic supply share of total supply
Export share oftotal supply
Political stock changes, intervention purchases
Producer price for exported commodities
Producer price for domestic sales
Other symbols already declared
Other symbols already declared
The price aggregate can be represented by the following equation:
PPN:., bù,,,o''' * ppDS',,'-o"" + des,,,o"' * ppEX',,'-o"'' Ï+I xJSi,.
with
(11)
(12)
(l 3)
I 
- 
o.i,.,
PSi., =
osi,,
where: PPRI
os
where: LEVL
gtup
shift
Aggregate producer incentive price
Elasticity of fransformation (0 > o > -æ)
Finally, again like in the net fade model, supply react to prices according to doublelog functions with
constant elasticities, e.g. for crop areas:
LEî/L' i., = LEVL' ;,'.!'t- n [ffi) 
-
Other symbols already declared
Again, a set of three relationships is needed to represent the supply side in the model:
- Aggregate commodity price is a function of prices for domestic and exported quantities,
respectively.
- Total supply (or its components) is a function of aggregate commodity prices.
- Export and domestic shares of total supply are functions of the price ratio between domestic and
exported goods.
Activity level, i.e. crop area (or animal number)
Price elasticity of supply
Variable value in target period, given constant real
prices
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5.3.2.2. Derivation, estimation or "guestimation" of parameters?
One of the most important questions in terms of the application of the Armington approach in a trade
model is how to obtain appropriate parameters to fill the functional relationships described in the
previous points. In particular, there are three sets of parameters necessary for the CES demand
functions and the CET supply functions, including the elasticities of substitution and transformation,
respectively, the distribution parameters and the scaling parameters. Given that the sum of distribution
parameters must equal unity, there are thus three parameters to find for each region and commodity
and each of the supply and demand sides. The discussion here focuses on the demand side, but the
calculations on the supply side are done in an analogous way.
Since quantities and prices are known for the base year, the distribution and scaling parameters can be
derived unambiguously if the elasticity of substitution is given, making use of equations (2) and ( ).
The distribution parameter ddd referring to domestic sales in total demand can be calculated from a
given elasticity of substitution by using the following formula:
CPDS bas DSTS brc odi,,
ddd
CPIM bæ (14)).IFIMPF
t,r
,.(#ffi).(ffi)*
The derivation of the remaining distribution parameter did and the scaling parameter sd is then
straightforward.
Consequently, the problem of finding the necessary parameters reduces to the definition of the
elasticities of substitution. Since these parameters describe the reaction of demand patterns due to
price changes, they cannot be derived from base year data. Instead, there are two ways of handling this
problem. One option would be to estimate the parameters based on available time series for demand
and import quantities and domestic and import prices. The other option is the utilisation of parameters
published in other sources, which is easier to do and fits to the general approach of a synthetic model.
Due to data restrictions, but also because of resource limitations, the former option was impossible to
realise for the WATSM team. However, for the time being, reliable publications on elasticities of
substitution between domestic and imported commodities (and even more so on elasticities of
transformation between commodities for domestic and export markets) are lacking. The specification
of market-specific elasticities is therefore postponed until further data becomes available. Instead'
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WATSIM uses a value of +3.0 for the elasticity of substitution on all markets, and assumes a higher
elasticity of transformation with 
-5.0. 70
5. 3. 2. 3. Regional exceptions
For a set of reasons, a number of markets were excluded from the Armington assumption. Markets are
generally represented as net trade markets, if one of the following conditions was met in the base year:
either imports or exports were (close to) zero or domestic sales were (close to) zero (i.e., either
domestic demand was met exclusively by imports, or all domestic supply was exported).
Table 5.2. below shows those markets were the Armington assumption was dropped and net tade was
modelled instead.
Table 5.2. Markets in the WATSIM model represented by net trade rather than gross trade
Source: WATSIM Modelling system
70 A sensivity analysis of the model outcomes to the values of the elasticities of substitution and transformation
is provided in appendix l.
815 CEE RUS CHN JAP ANZ USA cAtl MER ROIV
BARL Net hade Net trade
MNZ Net trade Net trade
OCES Net trade Net trade
RICE Net trade Net hade Net trade Net trade
STAR Net hade Net trade
SUGA Net ûade Net hade
P{JLS Net trade Net hade
SOYA Net trade Net trade Net trade
STJNF Net hade Net trade Net trade
RAPE Net trade Net hade
SEDO Net trade Net trade
OSOY Net trade
OSUN Net trade Net trade
OR,ÀP Net trade Net trade
CSOY Net frade
CSI.]N Net hade Net trade
CRAP Net trade Net hade Net trade Net trade
CSDO Net trade
BEEF Net trade
MEAO Net trade Net trade
POT'L Net hade
MILK Net trade
BTCR Net tade
MILS Net hade
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5.3.3, Representatîon of policy instruments
The main objective of the modelling system WATSIM is the simulation of possible changes in
agricultural policies, in particular in the context of the current WTO multilateral negotiations on
further steps of trade liberalisation. Adopting the URAA classification, policy changes that could
result from the Millenium Round may be categorised by three main issues: market access, domestic
support and export subsidies. The representation of agricultural policy instruments in WATSIM
closely relates to these toPics.
5.3.3.1. Market access
Four kinds of import barriers are represented in the WATSM model, including specific tariffs, ad-
valorem tariffs, flexible levies and - as implemented by a number of regions for complying with the
UR minimum market access commitments - tariff-rate quotas. While specific and ad-valorem tariffs
are represented by simple linear elements in the price transmission fturctions for imported goodsTr,
both variable levies and tariff-rate quotas deserve a more elaborated discussion.
Flexible levies
Flexible levies become relevant whenever a minimum import price is specified, which is independent
from international prices. In real world, this may be due to administrative definition of threshold prices
or to more or less continuous adjustments of applied tariffs according to changed foreign trade and
internal prices. In V/ATSIM, flexible levies are modelled in those cases where agricultural policies
involve defined price floors for domestic markets, such as the intervention prices in several Common
Market organisations of the EU, but also in other regions such as Japan.
Flexible levies, and hence minimum import prices, represent a policy measure that makes the price
transmission function not only non-linear, but even non-differentiable. Figure 5.5 shows that, in that
case, the transmission function has a knee where the reference price for imports is exactly at the
minimum import price.
tt 
see non Lampe (1999), p.26,for more details on this aspect.
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tr'igure 5.5. Graphical representation of the price transmission function in the case of a minimum
import price
' -' Smooth approximation
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Source: WATSIM modelling system
Given that this non-differentiable hansmission function may cause a significant problem for solvers of
nonJinear programst' if initial values for the variables are not very close to the final solution, it is
necessary to smoothly approximate the exact relationship. This is done by using the following
formulaT3:
DPIM = 0.5 * RPIM + MLnDPIM + (nnu 
- 
MInDPIM)' +(oetta* MinDPIM)'z( (1s)
where: DPIM
RPIM
MinDPIM
Delta
Approximated domestic price for imports
Reference price for imports
Minimum domestic price for imports
Approximation parameter (see text)
The approximation parameter Delta, is gradually decreased in the solution process to reduce the
approximation enor. Note that the above equation exactly meets the max-formulation if Delta
becomes zero.
t' S", pu.ugraph 5.3.4 for the technical realisation of the model.
t' Indirer for regions, commodities and time are dropped for readability
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Tariff-rate quotas
Tariff rate quotas (TRes) were introduced after the URAA in the context of the minimum access
commitments. TRQs may be globally defined or, referring to earlier trade partnerships, bilateral.
Generally, a TRQ consists of three distinct data, namely an import quota of a certain amount, a
preferential tariff relevant for imports within the given quota, and the MFN tariff relevant for imports
above the quota. Figure 5.6 illustrates the working of TRQs. As can be easily seen, the effective tariff
can approach different levels, depending on the filling of the import quota:
- If the quota is unfilled, i.e., if imports are smaller than the import quota Qpq, the effective tariff or
"real protection" t.6 is equal to the preferential tarifftp."r.
- If the quota is overfilled, i.e., if imports exceed the import quota, the effective tariff is equal to the
MFN tariff tMFN.
- If the quota is exactly filled, i.e., if imports are equal to the import quota, the effective tariff may
assume any value between tprer and tyep, depending on the domestic market situation.
The latter situation is particularly interesting, since the real protection here is no longer exogenous to
the system. Instead, the effective tariff has to be found such that the following condition holds:
DEMD + PEXP 
- 
PROD = TRO (16)
Figure 5.6. Schematic representation of tariff-rate quotas and approximation by the model
Note: The approximation of the effective tariff is
tett
tupr,r
tpret
-Effective 
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discussed further below in the text.
Formally, the functional relationship between the level of imports and the effective tariff may be
written asTa
t"f = trr"f
te,q <tû <tMFN
t"î = trrr
Çn
tpref
tunu
PIMP
TRQ
t*=tor*
v PIMP < TRg
V PIMP = TR9
v PIMP > TRo
(17)
(18)
where: Effective tariff rate, real protection (endogenous)
Preferential tariff line (exogenous)
MFN tariff line (exogenous)
Level of imports
Import quota level, quantity
Obviously, this relationship is non-differentiable in the point where the level of imports is equal to the
import quota. And this raises some problems for embedding tarifÊrate quotas in the gross-hade
framework of WATSIM. Indeed, this type of function is illegal for solve with available NLP solvers,
such as the employed CONOPT2 solver. it It is therefore necessary to find a smooth way of
representing the above relationship. Practically, we use a sigmoid approximation of the exact function
(which is also represented in Figure 5.6):
*"[.,(*âË*).'*,r)
_*,((wry).on"r) *Qr^ -tro)1+
Two notes are in place to explain the sigmoid function. First, an additional parameter SigDel is
introduced that allows to change the degree of approximation to the exact relationship. The larger this
parameter, the closer the sigmoid function approaches to the exact, discrete function. Figure 5.6
presents the approximation with different values for the parameter SigDel,with higher values resulting
in functions that closely approach the exact relationship. Second, in order to make the degree of
approximation independent of the magnitude of the TRQ (and of the unit of measurement), the
difference between the import quantity and the import quota is not entered in absolute terms, but
relative to the quota quantity.
Given that the TRQ schedules allow for the specification of both specific and ad-valorem tariffs for
both preferential and MFN levels, and that WATSM traditionally worlcs with both types of tariffs too,
the above relationship is implemented for each of the tariff types in order to allow for maximum
7a To improve readability, indices for the commodity and the region as well as the time index are omitted.
75 In principle, this type of function corresponds to a mixed complementary problem (MCP) that could be solved
by specific MCP solvers.
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flexibility. Hence, from the point of implementation in the WATSIM framework, there is no need to
transform specific tariffs into ad-valorem equivalents.
5. 3.3.2. Domestic support
Domestic support may occur by means of various policy measures, many of which are realistically
portrayed by'WATSIM. In principle, the model distinguishes between product-related payments (in
particular, direct payments), factor-related payments (i.e., area payments and headage premiums), and
production quotas. While the product-related payments are simply added in the price transmission
function to increase the incentive prices, factor-related payments and production quotas again deserve
some further elaboration.
Factor-related payments
Factor-related payments, such as the EU compensatory payments, are paid for each unit of production
activity (i.e., land or livestock number) rather than per unit of production. Hence, they have a different
impact on supply than price measures. In WATSIM however area and headage payments are
transformed to price equivalents. Since WATSM assumes yields to be independent from prices, area
and headage payments can indeed be transformed to price equivalents by taking into account the
(fixed) yields in the target year.
Even though this approach implicitly takes into account a degressive impact of area and headage
payments in course of increasing yields, it still assumes full coupling of these payments to production.
Although there has been a number of studies showing that area and headage payments are not fully
coupled to production (see, e.g., chapter 4), hade models like WATSIM are not able to represent
properly the partially coupled specificity of such policy instruments. Instead, the model allows for
different assumptions on their degree of (de)coupling by weighing these payments with a coupling
factor.76
Production quotas
Production quotas are an important quantitative tool to restrict (subsidised) supply in a number of
markets, such as the EU sugar and milk markets, and the Canadian milk market. In WATSIM,
production quotas are represented by fixing production quantities independently from current prices.
This simplified representation ignores that the supply of other commodities depends on the production
level of the quota product through the corresponding shadow price (i.e., marginal cost). Instead, it
implicitly assumes that the supply of other commodities depends on the market price of the
constrained product. Since the cost functions, in those markets where production is bound by a quota,
76 See sections 5.4 and 5.5 for simulations with different assumptions on the level of (de)coupling.
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are not known and difficult to calibrate, WATSM abstracts from this interesting but difficult
problem.TT
5. 3.3.3. Export subsidies
Export subsidies play an important role particularly in the EU. They bridge the gap between high
domestic market prices and lower foreign hade prices for exports. Just like import tariffs, they
represent an element of the price hansmission function on the export side, and can either be
represented by a linear element or reflect a minimum export price policy. Both types are modelled in
WATSIM in ways similar to the import side. i8
The URAA involves commitments to reduce export subsidies and subsidised exports. WATSM
therefore considers upper limits of subsidised exports. They are endogenously taken into account in
the model through the introduction of two adjustment options in the solution process:
- If administrated minimum prices are given, the model forces administrated stock purchases when
subsidised exports exceed the corresponding upper UR limit.
- If no administrated prices are given, the magnitude of the per-unit export subsidy is reduced until
exports meet the bound.
The question whether or not subsidies are necessary for exports (and hence, whether or not the export
limit applies) depends on the domestic and reference prices for exports. However, exports without
subsidies may be possible even if the average domestic price for exports is above the reference price,
due to seasonal fluctuations and the volatility of prices across years. Due to its comparative static and
annual structure, however, WATSIM cannot reflect this explicitly. According to von Lampe (1999, p.
74 f.), instead a SYo gap between the domestic and the reference prices is accepted to still allow for
exports without subsidies.
5, 3. 4. Technical realis atio n
The WATSIM Data Base is realised in a fairly standardised way, making use of programming routines
and data formats that are developed and used within the Institute for Agricultural Policy not only for
this project, but for a number of other quantitative models as well, with some routines modified to fit
the requirements of the WATSM system. Most of these routines are based on the programming
languages FortranTT and C+ and use a user-friendly XVT-based interface. For the simulation model,
all tasks related to data transfers (i.e., getting the data from the data base, and writing results back to
77 Chapters 7 and 8 deal with this question in the case of EU milk quotas.
tt Note that, due to limited data availability on export subsidies, applied tariffs are often used as proxies for the
magnitude of export subsidies.
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the data base) are written in these languages as well, while the model algorithms are formulated in the
General Algebraic Modeling System GAMS. 7e Eventually, to solve the various calibration models
(elasticities, trade matrices) and to find the new equilibrium for a specific target year, the NLP solvers
MINOS5s0 and CONOPTZS| are applied, the latter of which is particularly well suited for large models
with many nonlinear equations.
5.4. Likely Medium-Term Developments on Agricultural World Markets: The \ryATSIM
Reference Run
Based on the year 1997, the WATSM reference run aims to reflect likely developments on regional
and international markets for agricultural commodities for the target years 2005 and 2010. While it is
subject to numerous uncertainties, that have to be taken into account for the interpretation of the
outcome, it is the result of careful consideration of the influencing factors on the supply and demand
side. This section will first briefly discuss the main underlying assumptions on both the macro-
economic and sectoral framework and the agricultural policies. Following that, the main results of the
reference run will be presented and discussed in the context of the historical background, and of other
market projections.
5.4.1. Basic assumptîons
On the macro-economic side, general assumptions were basically taken from other publications.
Population growth and urbanisation is assumed to follow the estimations published by the United
Nations (1998). Income estimations follow those of the World Bank (1998) and the Intemational
Monetary Fund (1998), In addition, projections used by the Food and Agriculture Policy Research
Institute (FAPRI, 2000) are taken into account. Exchange rates are assumed to be at their 1997 levels
(for the Euro-US$ rate, it is held constant at 1.05 US$/€). Trends for agricultural land use are
estimated considering the increasing urbanisation and, similar to irrigation trends, counterchecked
with Alexandratos (1997).
With respect to agricultural policies, the reference run represents a status-quo simulation. Agricultural
policies are assumed to remain as they were in the base year, unless other decisions are already made.
In particular, this means the full incorporation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA), including reductions in tariffs, domestic support and subsidised exports. For the United
States, the reference run assumes full implementation of the 1996 Fair Act, implying the removal of all
coupled payments, even though a number of additional measures were used in recent years. For the
7e Brooke et al. (1997).
to Gill.t al. (2ool).
tt ARKI Consulting and Development (2001).
166
European Union, policy is assumed to follow the Agenda 2000 resolution, implying the reduction of
intervention prices, the increase of compensatory payments for cereals and beef, the reduction of
oilseed payments to the level applied for cereal areas. Set-aside is assumed to be at the default rate of
10%, with small producers being exempted from the set-aside obligation.
5.4.2. Likely developments on agricultural marketss2
5.4.2.1. Grains
World grain production is projected to continue its growth at a slightly reduced rate of 1.2%o per year,
reaching a total of 2.2 billion tonnes in 2010 (see Figure 5.7). The strongest growth is found for maize,
extending its share in total grain supply from below 3lYo to almost 32.5%. While rice is also projected
to grow above average, barley and other cereals markets are expected to grow at moderate rates only,
decreasing their combined share in world grain production from l7%o inthe base year to below 16% in
2010. The increase of the maize share is particularly due to the rising importance of feed cereals in
some important regions, such as China (see below).
Figure 5.7. Globat grain production (incl. rice) and shares of individual types of grains, 1961-
1997 and projections to 2010
Source: WATSIM Data Base, WATSIM reference run
82 All results can be found in detailed tables in the Complementary Data File provided in accompanying
diskeftes. Aggregated results are also included in appendix 2.
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Clearly, the structure of grain production differs significantly across regions. While rice dominates in
Japan, China and other parts of Asia, maize is the main type of cereals in the US and the Mercosur
region (Table 5.3). Wheat still represents the most important type of grains in most developed regions.
This general structure in grain production will remain relevant in the medium term as well, as
indicated by the reference run. t'
Table 5.3. Global grain production and its regional breakdown by cereal types' 1997
E15 CEE RUS CHN JAP AI\Z USA cAtl MER ROW
grain production (mio. t) 206,9 83.3 86.7 378.3 9.2 31.6 334,6 49.6 86.8 640.9
46% 38o/o 5r% 33o/o 6% 62% 20% 49% 23% 29%
Barley 25% t6% 24% t% 2o/o 22% 2% 27o/o 2o/o 5%
t9% 27% 3% 28% <loÂ 2% 70% t4% 6t% l9o/o
cereals 9% t9% 22o/o 3% <loÂ tl% 6% 9% 5% tt%
Rice t% <lYo <loÂ 36% 9t% 3% 2% <l% 9% 3s%
Source: WATSIM Data Base
International reference prices for cereals - as well as for other agricultural commodities - showed a
significant depression after the peaks in the mid-1990s (see Figure 5.8). Prices are projected to recover
over the projection period, with average rates of real price changes ranging between -1.60/o and -2.1%o
per year over the projection period for the main cereals, and a stronger -0.3% per year for rice (see
Figure 5.9). Given the current depression, price projections in general are more favourable for the
second sub-period than for the 1997-2005 period.
83 See the discussion on regional developments below
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tr'igure 5.8. International reference prices for grains, 1960-1998 and projections to 2010
Source: USDA, }VATSIM reference run
Note: Projections are calculated from 1997 prices and simulated changes of real world marketprices.
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tr'igure 5.9. Real world market price proiections for grains, 1997-2010
Source: WATSIM reference run
Since the mid-1980s, China has been the largest grain producer in the world. Together with the US
and the EU, it produces almost 50o/o of world grain, with their share in total grain demand being
somewhat smaller at 43yo, and most of the remainder in both supply and demand (33% and 40%,
respectively) being located in the Rest of the World aggregate.
In China, 30%o of the domestic grains demand is used for livestock feed, a relatively small share as
compared to industrialised countries where the feed cereal shares range around 50%. According to the
reference run, however, the share of Chinese feed use will reach 39% by 2010, a result from the
significant expansion of livestock production, particularly poulfy and pig meat (see below). Given
that 80% of Chinese feed grains comes from maize, domestic com demand is projected to increase
significantly with an average 2.6%pa year, comparedto 0.2oÂ and}. o/o per year growth in wheat and
rice demand, respectively. Production of maize is projected to slightly lag behind the demand
development, inducing an import of some 12 mio. tonnes by 2010 (see Figure 5.10). At the same time,
there will be some imports of wheat and barley, adding to some 20 mio. tonnes of cereal imports,
while another 3 mio. tonnes of rice will be exported. According to these projections, China will act as
a moderate importer of coarse grains only, rather than putting real pressure on intemational markets as
t70
projected by some extreme positions. to This will conhibute to the relatively weak development of
international grain prices.
figure 5.10. Development of gross exports and imports of grains by China, lggg-1997 and
projections to 2010
Source: WATSIM Data Base, rWATSIM reference run. Projections refer to net ûade for markets indicated in
Table 5.2.
For the European Union, the main factor driving grain markets is the Agenda 2000 reform that is
assumed to be completely enforced by 2005. Due to the reduction of adminisfrated prices and a
competitive exchange rate of 1.05 US$ per 
€, wheat exports are projected to be possible without the
use ofexport subsidies already by 2005. Therefore, over the projection period, the domestic price of
wheat will depend more on international markets than on the administrated cereal prices, resulting in a
shengthening of the relative price of wheat among the EU cereals. Wheat production would therefore
be the main winner of the policy reform, with 106 mio. tonnes in 2005 and 111 mio. tonnes in 2010.
The growth in supply is projected to be moderate for maize and rice and negative for barley and other
cereals. On the demand side, the development is less favourable for wheat due to its comparatively
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high price. ts Additional feed demand is projected also for maize. Consequently, EU wheat exports are
projected to increase significantly, reaching some 27 and 32 mio. tonnes in 2005 and 2010,
respectively (see Figure 5.11). At the same time, wheat imports are projected to expand somewhat to
reach 5 mio. tonnes in each of the target years, up from 3.6 mio. tonnes in the base year. Bound by the
limit on subsidised exports, barley exports are projected with 10 mio. tonnes in both target years,
assuming this allocation of export subsidies in the coarse grains aggregate. Without adjustments in the
price or set-aside policy86, some 1.1 mio. tonnes of barley would have to be purchased by intervention
stocks in 2005, and some 0.6 mio. tonnes in 2010.
Figure 5.11. Development of gross exports and imports of grains by the EU, 1988-1997 and
projections to 2010
Source: V/ATSIM Data Base, WATSIM reference run
The US is projected to shengthen its position as the largest grain exporter in the world. Despite a
moderate growth rate of l.2Yop.a. in cereals production over the projection period, total US grain
exports are projected to exceed 120 mio. tonnes by 2010, up from some 79 mio. tonnes in the base
year (Figure 5.12). By far the largest share both in production and exports is contributed by maize,
tt Notc that thc modcl obstaots from the fact that an increasing part of EU wheat prodtrcfion might he feed
wheat, that is not exportable at competitive prices, and may therefore be particularly interesting for livestock
producers due to its higher energy and protein content as compared to coarse grains. In fact, this might result in
somewhat lower wheat exports and hence higher world market prices.
86 The set-aside rate in the EU is assumed at l0!/o throughout the projection period.
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output of which increases at an average l.SYo p.a. Wheat exports, in conhast, though increasing as
well, are projected not to exceed the levels already reached in the early I 990s.
Figure 5.12. Development of gross exports and imports of grains by the US, 19gg-1997 and
projections to 2010
Source: V/ATSIM Data Base, WATSIM reference run
5.4.2.2. Oilseeds
World oilseed production is projected to grow with an average 2%o p.a., reaching almost 585 mio.
tonnes by 2010 (Figure 5.13). All four categories of oilseeds are to contribute to this growth, with a
slight shift from sunflower towards rape seeds. Other oilseeds, however, and here particularly oil palm
products, represent the largest part of total oilseed production. This is particularly true for the Rest of
the World aggregate, but holds for China as well. In Canada and the EU, rape seed is the dominant
oilseed, while in the US and Mercosur, soybean represents basically all oilseed production. Sunflower
seed is particularly important in Russia (Table 5.4). Production of vegetable oils and oil cakes is
projected to show similar growth, with oils reaching some 108 mio. tonnes in 2010, and oil cakes
reaching almost 200 mio. tonnes. While again the largest share of vegetable oils comes from other
oilseeds, the main source for oil cakes, which represent an important protein feed, is soybean, resulting
from its high protein content.
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Figure 5.13. Global oilseed production and shares of individuat types of oilseeds, 1961-1997 and
projections to 2010
Source: WATSIM Data Base, WATSIM reference run'
Table 5.4. Gtobal production of oilseeds, vegetable oils and oil cakeso and regional break-down
by oilseed types, 1997
Source: \VATSIM Data Base; all quantities in 1
USA MER CHN E15 cAll CEE RUS AI\Z JAP RO\M
Oilseeds 83130 50380 4s698 26903 10334 3794 3305 2000 196 221599
Soybean 88% 82% 32% 5% 26% 5% 8% 4% 74% 4o/o
Sunflower seed 2% 1lo/o 3% t5% t% st% 860/o 7% 0o/o 3%
Rape seed t% o% 2t% 32% 64% 42o/" 5% 43% t% 4%
Other oil seeds 9% 7% 44% 47% 9o/o 2% t% 46% 260/o 89%
Vegetable oils 9705 8695 8820 I 1666 1737 1509 787 24s 1857 39143
Soybean oil 74% 65o/o 20% 23% l6% 3o/o 2% 60/o 37% 6%
Sunflower oil 4% 26% 5o/o 2t% t% 54o/o 94o/o 26% 0% 5%
Rape oil 2% 0% 33% 27o/o 79% 39o/o 20Â 22% 46% 7%
Other veg. oil 20% 8% 43% 29% 5% 5% 1% 46% l60/o 82%
Oil cakes 34859 27779 21890 20265 3207 2038 940 502 4533 37896
Soybean cake 89% 88% 40% 57% 38% 9% 8% t3% 64% 28%
Sunflower cake t% 9% 3% t5% 0% 48% 87% 8% 0% 7%
Rape cake t% 0% 24% 2t% s8% 40% 3% 8% 26% t3%
Other oil cakes 9% 4% 33% 7% 3% 3% 2% 70% tl% s3%
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000 t.
While for soybean, sunflower and rape, both the seeds, oils and cakes are fuaded, other oilseeds are
haded almost exclusively in their processed forms, i.e. as oils and cakes. International prices for
oilseeds are projected to develop relatively strongly as compared to cereal prices. Real seed prices are
to decline in real terms by less than or around 
-l%o per year, with the exception of rape seed (Figure
5'15). This is roughly what was observed during the late 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 5.14), while it
implies some recovery from the depression of recent years. tt
Real prices for vegetable oils are also projected to decline by moderate rates only. particularly soybean
oil shows annual growth rates comparable to those for seeds, whereas real prices for other oils are
expected to decline at somewhat higher rates of -2.8Yop.a. over the projection period, due to the stong
growth of the oil-rich palm crops. The stongest decline is projected for real oil cake prices, again
particularly for other oil cakes, with up to 
-7o/o p.a. over the second sub-period, while again soycakes
are expected to develop somewhat stronger.
Figure 5.14. International reference prices for oilseeds and products, 1978-1998 and projections
to 2010
Source: USDA, WATSIM reference run
Note: Projections axe calculated from 1997 prices and simulated changes of real world market prices.
tt-Note-thut 
recent payments for US farmers in excess to Fair-Act payments, that may have contributed to the
relatively low prices in the past, are not assumed for the target years in this reference run. Such payments,
however, could induce higher US supply on international markets and would therefore reduce world marketPrices' 
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Figure 5.15. Reat world market price projections for oilseeds and products, 1997-2010
Source: \MATSIM reference run.
Despite the fact that livestock production in the EU is projected to increase with moderate rates only
(see below), the region is expected to have a continuous import demand for oil cakes and, with the
exception of rape, oilseeds. Given the moderate gro'ùrth of oil demand in human consumption, the
increasing oilseed crush leads to increasing oil exports by the EU. Rape seed is the main oilseed in this
region, with basically all seeds being crushed in the Union, and oil exports projected to further
increase (Figure 5.18). On the other hand, 260Â of sunflower crush, and more than 80% of soybean
crush, are imported from abroad, making the region the largest oilseed importer (Figures 5.16 and
5.17). Similar to the rape markets, cakes are needed for livestock production in excess of the domestic
supply, while oil exports are projected to slightly increase over the projection period.
The US are by far the largest soybean exporter, and export significant quantities of soybean oil and
cake, too (Figure 5.16). At reverse, the US show only small foreign trade on the sunflower and rape
markets. Soybean production is projected to continue its comparatively sfong gro'wth, particularly in
the first sub-period. While livestock production, and particularly poulûry supply, is also expected to
expand significantly, projections still show some increase in soybean cake exports. Soy oil exports are
projected to increase with even higher rates due to a moderate grov/th in domestic human
oonsumption.
Similar to the US, the Mercosur region exports significant amounts of soybean, and is the largest
exporter of soy oil and soycake. On the markets for sunflower oil and cake' this region is the largest
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exporter, too (Figure 5.17), while it does not show significant trade on the rape market. Soybean
production is projected to increase significantly, though at somewhat more moderate rates than in the
US. Basically all additional soybean seeds are expected to be crushed domestically, leaving soybean
exports more or less unchanged over the projection period. Given that more than 50% of the soy oil
production and 75o/o of cake supply are exported, the significant growth of domestic oil and cake
demand does not prevent this region from a significant further increase in its exports of these products.
The Mercosur region is the world's largest sunflower seed producer. And supply of sunflower seeds in
Mercosur is also projected to increase significantly. Virtually all quantities are used for oil and cake
exports, which are projected to increase correspondingly.
While being a minor player on the soya and sunflower markets, Canada represents one of the main
rape (canola) producers and exports significant quantities ofboth rape seed, oil and cake (Figure 5.18).
The projected increase of rape production (2.5% p.a. in average, with 1997 corresponding to a below
average rape harvest in Canada) results in a strong expansion of rapeseed exports, whereas oil exports
are projected to increase more moderately. Due to its shong growth in meat production, Canadian rape
cake exports are projected to decrease slightly between 1997 and20l0.
China is the world's largest rapeseed producer, and produces significant quantities of soybean and
sunflower seed as well. In contrast to western regions, about one fourth of China's domestic demand
for soybean comes from human consumption. Production of rapeseed is projected to continue its
strong growth with almost 3% p.a. Due to the overall economic growth, however, domestic demand
for rape seed, and particularly for oil and cakes, is projected to increase even shonger, resulting in
some seed imports and significant imports of rape oil and cake (Figure 5.18). Similarly, China is
projected to expand imports on the soy markets, both in terms of soybean, and in terms of oil and cake.
Russia, an important producer and the largest exporter of sunflower seed, is not expected to
significantly recover from its depression in livestock production. Similarly, the crushing indusûry
should be under pressure as well due to missing capital. Given a moderate increase in sunflower seed
production (0.9% p.a. in average between 1997 and 2010), exports are projected to increase and to
reach 1.3 mio. tonnes by 2005 and 2010. Sunflower oil exports, and cake imports, are projected to
remain more or less unchanged at their 1997levels.
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X'igure 5.16. Devetopment of regional trade in the soybean complex, 1988-f 997 and projection to
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X'igure 5.17. Development of regional trade in the sunflower complex, 1988-1997 and projection
to 2010
Source: WATSM Data Base, WATSIM reference run.
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Figure 5.18. Development of regional trade in the rape complex, 1988-1997 and projection to
2010
Source: WATSIM Data Base, WATSIM
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reference run.
5.4.2.3. Meat
Global meat production is projected to continue its strong growth, though at a somewhat more
moderate speed, to reach 241 mio. tonnes in 2005, and some 263 mio. tonnes in 2010 (see Figgre
5.19). while production of all types of meat is projected to increase significantly, most of the growth
will be contributed by poultry meat both in relative and in absolute terms. Therefore, the poulfiy share
in total meat will increase from below 29Yo in 1997 to well over 3l%;o in20l0. The main looser among
the meat types, though still increasing at 7.4oÂ and L.ZYop.a. in the two intervals, is beet the share of
which is projected to drop from more than2To/o to below 260/o.Pigmeat is projected to loose some of
its share between 2005 and 2010, while other meat remains to play a minor role on the global scale.
Figure 5.19. Global meat production and shares of individual types of meat, 1961-1997 and
projections to 2010
Source: TWATSIM Data Base, IVATSIM reference run.
International meat prices are projected to decrease slightly slower in real terms than observed over the
longer past (Figure 5.20). Real world market prices for pig meat, poulùy and other meat should
decline by an average of around 0.5%o,p.a., while those for beef is projected to be roughly constant
(Figure 5.21). After inflation, however, all meat prices are expected to rise over the projection period.
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Figure 5.20. International reference prices for meat, 1960-1998 and projections to 2010
Source: USDA, WATSIM reference run.
Note: Projections are calculated from 1997 prices and simulated changes of real world market prices
Figure 5.21. Real world market price projections for meat' 1997-2010
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At the regional level, the European Union, the United States and China represent the main meat
producers, accounting for 59Yo of global meat production in the base year, and some 6l% in 2010.
With roughly 7% of global production, the Mercosur region is another important world producer. The
Rest of the World aggregate accounts for some 23%o of world's meat production.
In the European Union, growth in meat production is projected to slow down significantly, and to
originate only from poultry and pig meat production. Production of ruminant meat, in contrast, is
expected to decrease, particularly after 2005. Similarly, growth in meat consumption will focus on
poultry and pig meat, while beef consumption is projected to increase only slightly in the first period
due to price reductions in the context of the Agenda 2000 policy reform, and to decrease thereafter.
Meat hade is projected to remain roughly at tbe L997 level, while the trade structure should change
(Figure 5.22).Beef exports are expected to decrease somewhat due to the decline in supply, meaning
that the limit on subsidised exports would become unbinding in the medium term. Exports of pig meat,
in contrast, are projected to expand with fairly favourable world market prices, allowing for an
increase of the EU's world export share.
Figure 5.22. Development of EU gross exports and imports of meat, 1988-1992 and projections
to 2010
Source IVATSM Data Base, WATSIM reference run.
For the US meat markets, the model projections indicate a somewhat stronger growth in total supply
as compared to the EU, with an average of l.5o/o p.a. between 1997 and2005, and l.2yobetween 2005
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and 2010. More than two thirds of the additional meat supply will come from poultry production, and
most of the remainder (particularly over the first sub-period) from pig meat production, while beef
supply will grow at a more moderate pace with some 0.60lo p.a. over the projection period. Even
though meat demand in the US will increase as well, the meat trade is projected to show a significant
growth in exports, particularly in poultry meat, but also in beef and pig meat (Figure 5.23), whereas
imports are unlikely to change very much.
Figure 5.23. Development of US gross exports and imports of meat, 1988-1997 and projections to
2010
Source: WATSIM Data Base, WATSIM reference run,
World market developments strongly depend on the outlook for the Chinese markets, even though, in
the past, foreign trade in meat was comparatively moderate. Meat supply in China is projected to
continue its considerable growth, even though at a somewhat slower pace, with total output increasing
by some 3.5% p.a. in average between 1997 and 2005, and 3.lYo thereafter. 
'While more than half of
the additional meat will be pig meat, poultry and beef show the sfrongest growth in relative terms with
up to 5% p.a. until 2005, and 4.7Yo and 3.2% p.a. between 2005 and 2010, respectively. This stong
growth in Chinese meat supply should be followed by the domestic demand, triggered by economic
growth and the increase in, particularly, urban population. Per capita meat consumption is projected to
reach some 59 kg by 2010, up from 42 kg in 1997, and total meat demand will grow by some 3.47o
and3.2%o p.a. in the two sub-periods, respectively. Consequently, Chinese meat trade is expected to
expand somewhat on both the export and the import side, implying a slightly more open market to
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trade in China (Figure 5.24)'Increasing exports of pig meat are opposed to rising poultry imports, but
given the size of the markets, hade quantities remain small.
Figure 5.24. Development of Chinese gross exports and imports of meat, 19gg-1997 and
projections to 2010
Source: WATSIM Data Base, WATSIM reference run.
5.4.2.4. Milk and dairy
Global milk production has seen considerable growth during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, but has
slowed down signifrcantly since the early 1990s due to two distinct factors. On the one hand, the
infoduction of the quota system in 1984 has stopped and partly reversed the growth path in the EU.
On the other hand, the economic crisis after the break-down of the East block lead to significant
reductions in milk production in the countries of the former Soviet Union and of Cental and Eastern
Ernope. Milk production increasingly takes part in the Rest of the World aggregate, particularly in
hdia. With growth in this region expected to basically follow the historical path, and production
conditions particularly in Cental and Eastem Europe to slowly recover, world milk production is
projected to exceed 580 mio. tonnes in 2010 (see Figure 5.25).
An even more considerable growth can be observed in the production of processed milk products,
particularly up to the mid-1980s, indicating a slower growth in the utilisation of fresh milk products.
h WATSM, these processed dairy products are represented in three categories: cheese, butter &
cream, and skim milk products. With a production share of 43oÂ in cheese, 36Yo inbutter & cream, and
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39% in skim milk products, and similar shares in world demand, the European Union is by far the
largest world producer and consumer of these commodities, followed by the US for cheese and skim
milk products. Even though Australia & New Zealandhave a high share in global production only for
skim milk products (15%), this region represents the largest exporter of dairy products. The largest
importer is the Rest of the World aggregate.
Figure 5.25. Global production of milk and milk productso 196l-1997 and projection to 2010
Source: WATSIM Data Base, WATSIM reference run.
International prices for dairy products are projected to decline slightly in real termso with average rates
of 
-l1% p.a. for butter & cream, and skim milk products, and 45% for cheese (Figure 5.26). With
these rates, development of world market prices of dairy product is comparable to that of meat prices
and more favourable than those for most crop products.
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Figure 5.26. Real world market price projections for milk and dairy products, lggT-2010
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Source: WATSIM reference run.
Figure 5.27. Development of EU gross exports and imports of dairy products, lggg-1992 and
projections to 2010
Source: WATSM Data Base, WATSIM reference run.
Due to the quota system, milk production in the European Union is basically fixed, accounting for
only the expansion of the EU milk quota and the increase of average fat and protein content. EU
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supply and demand of dairy products, particularly cheese, are projected to increase slightly given the
quota expansion. Foreign trade of dairy products, however, is not expected to change much (Figure
s.27).
Milk production in the United States is projected to continue its moderate expansion that this country
has experienced since the mid-1970s, growing with an average I%o p'a. With 1.9% p.a., cheese
production is projected to increase more significantly, while production of butter & cream and skim
milk products are expected to decline slightly. This corresponds to the development of US demand for
cheese and butter & cream, whereas skim milk demand is also projected to increase slightly resulting
from the growth in livestock production. Consequently, exports of skim milk products are projected to
decline, while particularly cheese imports are to expand significantly (Figure 5'28)'
Figure 5.28. Devetopment of US gross exports and imports of dairy products, 1988-1997 and
projections to 2010
Source: WATSIM Data Base, WATSIM reference run.
In Australia & New Zealand, most of the dairy production is for exports, while domestic consumption
is limited. Milk production is projected to show a continuous growth with above 20Â p.a., and similar
rates for dairy products. With only 40oÂ of production used by domestic demand of cheese, and even
less for othcr dairy products, most of the odditional produotion will be exported (Figure 5.29). The
region will therefore strengthen its position as the largest dairy exporter in the world.
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Figure 5.29. Development of gross exports and imports of dairy products in Australia & New
Zealandr 1988-1997 and projectons to 2010
Source: WATSM Data Base, 1VATSIM reference run.
5.4.3. The ITATSIM rcference run under an alternative assumption on the degree of decoupting of
area and headage payments in the EU
The reference nrn generally assumes that all compensatory payments in the European Union are
coupled to production. Even though they are coupled to harvested areas and livestock numbers, given
the price-independent yield assumptions, this would hanslate to a price equivalent for each payment.
The degree of (de)coupling of these payments cannot be determined within the WATSIM framework.
However it is interesting to examine the extent to which the results of the WATSM reference nrn are
sensitive to the adopted (de)coupling assumption. Hence the reference run has been simulated under
an alternative assumption about the degree of decoupling of EU area and headage payments. This
alternative simulation of the reference run, called the "partial de-coupling" scenario, assumes a relative
de-coupling tate of 50%o, i.e., one 
€ of compensatory payment per tonne in the target year is assumed
to have the same impact on production as 50 Cents of a direct production subsidy.
Area payments are paid for cropping cereals, protein crops and oilseeds, whereas sugar and starchy
products (potatoes) do not benefit from these payments. While payments for cereals have been
increased in the context of the Agenda 2000 reform package, payments for oilseeds, that were
significantly higher than those for cereals after the 1992 CAP reform, have been reduced to the cereal
o
L
o
a.x
IIJ
2,000
1,500
1 ,000
500
ooo
0
o
L
o
CL
È 500
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2oo2 2004 2006 2008 2o1o
Year
trButter&Cream
I Cheese
ESkim Milk
Products
189
level. Some higher payments are still in force for protein crops and for durum wheat' 
88 Headage
payments, on the other hand, are relevant for beef & veal production, for sheep and goat meat and,
after the Agenda 2000, for milk. 8e
With respect to the basic reference run, modelling a partial (de)coupling of area and headage payments
in principle can be considered as a reduction of (effective) payments for those commodities where
payments are increased between base and target year (i.e., cereals, beef, other meat, and milk), and an
increase of payments for those where payments are reduced (i.e., oilseeds). Consequently, the impact
of the changed assumption with respect to the coupling factor on agricultural production in the EU is
basically negative for cereals, beef & veal, and other meat, and positive for oilseeds, with some cross
price effects on other commodities as well. Given that no policy changes are modelled between the
target years 2005 and 2010, the impact of the partial de-coupling assumption is very similar across
these two years. The following discussion will therefore focus on the final target year.
Among cereals, barley and wheat are simulated to be most sensitive to the level of coupling of the area
payments. With payments only coupled by S}oÂ,wheat production would increase much less than with
full coupling, and barley supply would decline more significantly. Simulated wheat production in the
,,partial de-coupling" scenario is 3.6%o lower than in the reference run by 2010, reaching only some
107 mio. tonnes instead of 111 mio. tonnes in the basic reference run. similarly, barley production
would be 5.2%below reference run level in 2010 and reach some 48 mio. tonnes instead of 50 mio.
tonnes. Majze and other cereals react significantly less, with differences in 2010 being less than l%o
between the reference run and the "partial de-coupling" scenario. This is probably due to the fact that
wheat and barley production areas in the EU are more on the high-yield side, while regions where
other cereals are predominant are generally less productive, resulting in lower area payments for the
latter than for the former commodities'
Oilseeds, in contrast, would be better off under the partial de-coupling assumption: the reduction of
oilseed payments implied by the Agenda 2000 reform would mean a smaller reduction of the
incentives to produce oilseeds, as compared to cereals. In the "partial de-coupling" scenario,
particularly soybean production would expand much stronger than in the reference run: EU supply
would be some l4Y, abovereference run level in 2010 - though still a minor crop in the EU. The other
oil crops 
- 
sunflower seed and rape seed - respond more moderately, with changes in 2010 being?%
and less than loÂonly, respectively, between the reference run and the "partial de-coupling" scenario.
Again, the different reference yields in the EU regions may result in these differences across crops'
88 Dorum wheat is not represented separately in'WATSIM.
8n Note that due to the quota systerrl milk supply is not expected to respond to the cow premiums. Instead, these
premiums as well are designed in terms ofbeef production.
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Harvested areas for starchy products, i.e., primarily potatoes in the EU, and hence production, would
be reduced more slowly in the "partial de-coupling" scenario, with production simulated to be l%
above reference run level in 2010.
On the livestock side, beef & veal, and other meat (i.e., sheep and goat) would see significant impacts:
the decline in the beef production would be stronger in the "partial de-coupling" scenario, with supply
in 2010 being some 4%o below baseline level. Similarly, production of other meat would decline
already in the first sub-period, and supply would be 5Yo below baseline level in 2010. On the other
hand, production of non-ruminant meat would see an even stronger expansion, with poultry production
in 2010 being almost 2Yo above baseline level, while pig meat production would be 0.7% higher. The
corresponding figure for the eggs production is 0.5%. Projections for the EU cereal, oilseed and meat
production under both assumptions on the degree of decoupling of area and headage payments (i.e.,
coupling vs partial de-coupling) are presented in Figure 5.30 below.
Figure 5.30. Development of cereal, oilseed and meat supply in the EU under different
assumptions on the degree of de-coupling of area and headage payments rlggT-2010
Source: WATSIM simulation results.
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Given the higher EU meat production, overall domestic feed demand would be slightly higher,
particularly feed use of corn, other cereals, and oil cakes, would be higher than in the reference run. In
contrast, the use of wheat would be below baseline level due to higher wheat prices.
International prices would develop slightly differently than in the reference run. Due to the reduced
domestic supply, EU wheat exports would be some 2.4 mio. tonnes below baseline level, and an
additional 0.7 mio. tonne would be imported, pushing international prices well above reference run
level. By 2010, world market prices would be almost 30Âhigher in the "partial de-coupling" scenario
than in the reference run, changing the average geometric growth rate (ggr.) by some 0.2 percent
points. Barley prices would be 40Â higher, or 0.3 percent points in the ggr. Due to the large import
share of the EU, oil cake price would also be higher by between around I to 3%o (up to 0.26 percent
points in the ggr. of other oil cakes). Meat prices are signifîcantly less sensitive with the exception of
other meat, which would be almost 2%o morc expensive in 2010 than under baseline conditions (0'1
percent points) (Figure 5.31).
Figure 5.31. Development of real world market prices for cereals, oilseeds and meat under
different assumptions on the degree of de-coupling of EU area and headage payments, 1997'2010
Source: WATSIM simulation results.
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commitment level in the "partial de-coupling" scenario. Structural intervention purchases become,
therefore, unnecessary under these circumstances.
5.5. The impacts of further liberalisation of agricultural markets
5.5.1. The lltTO scenario
The second scenario focuses on possible further steps in the hade liberalisation process. The last WTO
multilateral agreement as far as agriculfure is concerned, the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture (URAA), committed the member countries to the following policy changeseo:
- Tariffication of all border measures, and reduction of tariffs by 36% in average, with a minimum of
I5oÂ for each tariff line.
- Provision of a minimum market access, often realised by tarifÊrate quotas.
- Reduction of domestic support (the Aggregate Measure of support, AMS) by 20%.
- Reduction of export subsidies by 36Yo, and of subsidised export quantities by 2l%.
Furthermore, the agreement included the continuation of the liberalisation process by means of new
multilateral negotiations, which are currently under way. While the final outcome of these
negotiations, lead by the WTO, is still unknown, a scenario similar to the URAA outcome has been
simulated with WATSIM to analyse possible impacts on regional and global agricultural markets. In
particular, the following assumptions were applied in the WTO scenarioer:
- A further reduction of remaining tariffs (or MFN tariffs on markets with tariff-rate quotas) by 36%
- An expansion of tariff-rate quotas by 50%.
- A further reduction of all domestic support measures by 20%.
- A further reduction of the limits on subsidised exports in value and volume by 36% and 2l%o
respectively, with the level of export subsidies per unit of exports reduced according to the tariff
reduction. r
e0 Basis for the reduction commitments was the period 1986/88, unless measures were higher on I January,
1995.
nt Note that all policy changes are assumed to be in force already in 2005, with no further policy shifts occurring
between the target periods.
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5,5.2. Impacts offurther tiberalîsation on agricultural matkets
Impacts of the W1O scenario on agricultural markets are particularly significant in regions with high
border measures, such as JaPan.
International market prices of grains show the most significant impact for barley, which prices would
be 6.g%higher in 2010 under more liberalised markets than in the reference run (Figure 5.32). This is
particularly due to the tightened commitment on subsidised EU exports (already constraining in the
reference run), resulting in barley exports by this region to be 6.4 mio. tonnes in both 2005 and 2010,
instead of l0 mio. tonnes as in the reference run. Consequently, barley intervention purchases in the
EU would be 4.1 mio. tonnes in 2005 and 3.6 mio. tonnes in 2010 in the WTO scenario, instead of 1.1
mio. tonnes and 0.6 mio. tonnes in the reference run.
On the other hand, given increased imports due to reduced tariffs, particularly in Japan where grain
imports are some 0.7 mio. tonnes above reference run level in 2010, and also cross price effects in
supply and demand, world market prices for wheat, maize and other cereals would be between loÂ and
2.2%o abovereference run level under the WTO scenario.
Under more liberalised markets, the world pig meat price in 2010 would be loÂ higher, compared to
the reference run, while other meat prices would be around 0.2o/o higher than corresponding reference
run levels. International meat prices are particularly influenced by the impacts of the WTO scenario in
Japan. Under more liberalised conditions, the Japanese pig meat and poultry meat imports would be,
respectively , 9Vo and 2% higher in 20 10 as compared to the reference run (corresponding to additional
0.11 mio. and L7 000 tonnes respectively). Similarly, pig meat and poultry imports by Central and
Eastern Europe would be some 23 000 and 6 000 tonnes higher, respectively, in 2010, while in the
same time exports of both types of meat would be reduced by 23 000 and 16 000 tonnes, respectively.
On beef markets, a slight reduction of EU and Canadian exports would also cause the world price to
be higher under the WTO scenario than in the reference-run.
On milk markets, the most important change following the WTO scenario would be the increase in the
tariff-rate quotas for cheese, butter & cream, and skim milk products in the EU. Particularly for butter
& cream, the increase in EU imports (+61 000 tonnes), only partly compensated by additional exports
(+22 000 tonnes), causes international prices in 2010 to be more than3Vo above reference run levels.
For cheese, the increase in EU imports (+32 000 tonnes) is almost completely compensated by
additional-exports (+30 000 tonnes), dampening the impact on international prices. e2 The impact of
nt It is interesting to note that, given the virhrally unchanged international prices, none of the other regions
significantly incrJases its exports. This might be interpreted by arguing that any third country's exports going to
*rË fU under the expanded-quota might.èdu"e that country's exports to other regions, leaving its total cheese
exports more or less unchangid. It is, however, also a problem in the model methodology in that the Armington
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the WTO scenario on skim milk markets, where intemational prices in 2010 are slightly lower than in
the reference run, is caused by the interrelationship between skim milk products and butter & cream:
given the higher butter prices, supply of both commodities is increased, putting pressure on the skim
milk prices. The expansion of the EU tariff-rate quota for skim milk powder has no effect on the
results due to the fact that the applied in-quota tariff (i.e., 475€/t) is already relatively high, and the
quota (68 000 tonnes) is significantly under-filled in the base year (16 000 tonnes).
Figure 5.32. Development of real world market prices for cereals, meat and milk products under
the reference run and the WTO scenario, 1997-2010
Source: TWATSIM simulation results.
5.5.3. The WTO scenario under the assumption of partial de-coupling of area and headage
payments in the EU
If the compensatory payments in the EU are assumed to be only partially effective on supply (see
paragraph 5.4.3), the above described principal impacts of the WTO scenario would not be
substantially modified.
approach is simplified to represent only gross frade, but no bilateral hade flows. Not only can the source of the
additional cheese imports to the EU not be identified by this concept, but its theoretical weakness might lead to
the interpretation that the EU now "imports its own exports",
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Given that under the partial de-coupling assumption, subsidised EU barley exports would not longer
be bound by the WTO limits, the effective reduction of these exports would be 1.9 moi. tonne smaller
than under the full coupling assumption. Consequently, the impact on the world barley price would be,
in2010, a4%oincreaseonly,withrespecttothereferencerunlevel,insteadofa6.8%increase(Figure
3.33). The impact on intemational wheat, maize, other cereals andrice prices would also be smaller
than under the full coupling assumption.
The impact of the WTO scenario on meat and dairy markets is largely the same under alternative
assumptions regarding the degree of decoupling of EU area and headage payments, with price effects
being slightly smaller under partial de-coupling than under full coupling.
Figure 5.33. Development of real world market prices for cerealso meat and milk products under
the the Refernce Run and the WTO scenarioo assuming partially de-coupled area and headage
payments in the î'A,1997'2010
Source: WATSIM simulation results.
5.6. Conclusion and policy recommendations
The aim of the WATSIM-related tasks in this project was to improve both the WATSIM Data Base
and the simulation model in order tg alluw for'better leflection of policy'rclcvant issues on ogrioulturol
markets. The Data Base has been updated and extended, in that in addition to the existing Non-Spatial
Data Base (NSDB), a Spatial Data Base has been constructed to reflect bilateral trade flows across the
model regions. The United Nations' COMTRADE data base was used and consistency both within the
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SDB and between SDB and NSDB was achieved due to a calibration process, making use of a cross-
entropy approach.
The simulation model has been modified in particularly two aspects. Firstly, the general net-trade
concept has been abandoned, and a modified Armington approach was used to represent gross imports
and exports simultaneously. Then, based on this gross trade approach, the second step was to properly
consider a broad set of trade related policy measures. In addition to import tariffs and limits on
subsidised exports, that were incorporated already in the net-trade model, but are portrayed much more
realistically in the gross trade model, the concept of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) has been included to
take UR market access commitments into account. Due to restictions in the data availability during
the project phase, TRQs are actually included only for three markets, i.e. the EU markets for milk
products, but additional TRQs can be considered basically by adding the respective data, since the
model formulation is generally symmetric with respect to all markets. In addition to the trade related
measures, domestic support is also considered in detail by the model. Different assumptions with
respect to the degree of (de)coupling of specific measures can be made by simply changing
parameters.
The WATSM reference run indicates that intemational markets for agricultural commodities should
recover only slowly from the depression of the recent years. With average changes between 
-1.8%o and
-2.5% p.a. from 1997 to 2005, real world prices for cereals are projected to develop only slightly more
favourable than in the past. However, this is partly due to still relatively high prices in the 1997 base
year (though already well below the 1995 peaQ. Between 2005 and 2010, prices are projected to
develop more favourable. Sensitivity analyses with respect to the Armington parameters (i.e., the
elasticities of substitution and of transformation) have shown a relative robustness of the reference run
results.
Assuming a partial de-coupling of EU area and headage payments, however, results in quite
interesting differences as compared to the basic reference run. If payments are coupled to production
only by sÙyo,Eu production of wheat and barley after the Agenda 2000 reform would be significantly
lower than under the basic reference run assumptions, whereas supply of oilseeds (particularly
soybeans) would be higher. Similarly, the production of ruminants would be smaller in conhast to the
production of pig meat, poultry meat and eggs. It seems important to note that, given a partial de-
coupling of these payments, the excess supply of barley would be below the limit on subsidised
exports, thus eliminating the need for intervention purchases both in 2005 and 2010.
A further step in the liberalisation process, as could be assumed as an outcome of the current WTO
negotiations, would allow international prices to develop more favourable. Here, the reduction of
subsidised EU barley exports, the expansion of EU tariff rate quotas for milk products, and the
197
decrease of tariffs in highly protected regions such as Japan on the other hand, would result in higher
world market prices. This impact is particularly strong for barley, but is significant also for butter &
cream and for cereals in general. For the EU, given unchanged domestic policies, this would result in
significantly increased intervention purchases of barley, both in 2005 and 2010'
In principle, the impact of the liberalisation scenario is changed only slightly' if compensation
payments in the EU are assumed to be partially de-coupled. Price effects are, however, somewhat
smaller, particularly for barley, where the reduction in exports would be less significant. In any case,
however, the model results for the liberalisation scenarios indicate some pressure on the EU to change
domestic policies, in order to avoid significant amounts of barley to be purchased for intervention
stocks.
The WATSM model has proved to be a useful tool for the analyses of agricultural markets and
policies. It still has, however, some weaknesses that require further research and development. To
increase the usefulness of the model for the EU decision makers, further topics like the enlargement to
Central and Eastern Europe have to be considered. Similarly, the Free Trade Area of the Americas
may become relevant in near future. Consequently, the WATSIM model needs to be able to capture
regional trade agreements, simulations of which are not possible with the current system'
The overall outcome of model results has proven to be relatively robust with respect to alternative
assumptions on the elasticities of substitution and of transformation. Specific fade developments,
however, may well be influenced by changes in the parameters, which are not very soundly justified in
the current model. Further research is necessary to identifu the empirical parameters, and to test
whether the assumption on limited substitution and transformation is justified for agricultural
commodities. In addition to that, it is important to note that the simplification of the original
Armington approach, assuming that limited substitution exists between domestic and imported goods
while substitution across imports from different origins is assumed to be perfect, to a certain degree
lacks theoretical consistency. On the one hand, the approach draws on the assumption that there are
some kind of quality differences between domestic and imported commodities of the same type, and
similarly between domestic and export sales. On the other hand, howevern the concept of a spot world
market assumes homogeneity of the commodities, given that there is only one price (index) relevant
for all quantities exported to or imported from this spot market. Clearly, there is some contradiction.
Further research is necessary that may eventually lead to a fully spatial representation of international
hade (i.e., the original Armington approach), or to a representation of gross trade different from the
Armington approach.
Finally, while the model structure allows to consider all types of policy measures for all regions
symmetrically, data on actual policy is missing for a number of regions. The impact of administrated
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hade barriers or of domestic policies, however, may be significant in developing countries as well. For
example, policy measures in China may well influence both domestic and international markets.
Further research is necessary to reflect actual policies in all regions both in the data base and in the
simulation model.
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APPENDIX 1.
Sensivity analysis: Sensitivity of the model outcomes with respect to the values of the elasticities
of substitution and of transformation
One of the most important questions in terms of the application of the Armington approach in a hade
model is how to obtain appropriate parameters to fill the functional relationships. In particular, there
are three sets of parameters necessary for the CES demand functions and the CET supply functions,
including the elasticities of substitution and hansformation, respectively, the distibution parameters
and the scaling parameters. Given that the sum of distribution parameters must equal unity, there are
thus three parameters to find for each region and commodity and each of the supply and demand sides.
Since quantities and prices are known for the base year, the distribution and scaling parameters can be
derived unambiguously if the elasticities of substitution and transformation are given. Consequently,
the problem of finding the necessary parameters reduces to the definition of the elasticities of
substitution and transformation.In the WATSIM modelling system, uniform elasticities of substitution
and of transformation are used due to lack of specific data on these parameters. WATSIM uses a value
of +3.0 for the elasticity of substitution on all markets, and assumes a higher elasticity of
transformation with 
-5.0.
As this choice of elasticity values may have an influence on the model outcomes, a sensivity analysis
is carried out. Hence, we use the existing reference run and perform some ceteris-paribus runs, only
changing the (still uniform) elasticities of substitution and transformation, according to the following
Table 5.5.
Table 5.5. Elasticities of substitution and transformation in the sensitivity analysis
Even though the change in the elasticities in absolute terms is equal between the two sensitivity runs
RSUB and ISUB, both runs are shown to evaluate the degree of symmetry in the sensitivity. To keep
the discussion readable, we restrict ourselves here to thc results for the Duropcan Union, and to some
key commodities, wherever they appear to be of general relevance, but of course point out important
findings for other markets where necessary.
Elasticity of substitution Elasticity of transformation
Reference run (REFB) +3.0 -5.0
Reduced-substitution run (RSUB) +2.0 -4.0
Increased-Substitution run (ISUB) +4.0 -6.0
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As a general result of the analysis, as one would expect, the main variables influenced by the
Armington parameters are trade quantities. Whereas on the supply side, only few of the results differ
by more than lYo between the reference run and either of the two sensitivity runs (with only the
production of "other meat" showing a reaction that large in the EU), there are large differences in
gross hade figures, of up to 360/o in gross imports (other meat to Mercosur) and 35Yo in gross exports
(other oil cakes from China). Mainly, large (relative) differences can be found in markets with only
little trade, as in the two examples given above. For the EU, large differences in gross x.ade can be
found for cheese imports (up to 32%), beef exports Q0%), wheat imports (I3%) and skim milk
products imports (12%). For the main trade flows (such as cereal exportse3, oilseed and products fade
and meat trade -other than the mentioned beef exports), the sensitivity with respect to changes in the
Armington elasticities is moderate with less than or around 5% in either direction. With the exceptions
of beef and other meat, and also rape seeds and butter&cream, changes in the EU net trade positions
are moderate as well. Due to the fact, that the absolute net trade quantity in many cases is much
smaller than either imports or exports, net trade figures can be expected to be more sensitive to
parameter changes than gross hade at least in relative terms. In some markets, however, such as
protein crops and oil cakes from sunflower and rape seeds, higher Armington elasticities result in
larger exports and lower imports, thus reducing net imports by relatively much even in absolute terms.
As it is true for the supply side, demand is liule affected by the choice of the parameters. Total
demand shows no changes larger than 5.8% (rape seed cake in Russia), with most changes well below
loÂ and large changes mainly on small markets again. For the EU, only the demand for cakes of other
oil seeds shows a moderate change with up to 1.5%o.
Finally, most international prices show only marginal sensitivity to the parameter values. Exceptions
are again the market for cakes of other oil seeds (up to 5olo), cakes of sunflower seeds (2.5%) and milk
(2.5%), while most of the remaining price changes are below 1% in either direction. Given the 8-year
horizon of the simulations, the impact on annual price changes can be considered to be small.
With respect to the question of symmetry of the outcome sensivity posed above, we state that the
changes do not show much symmetry, with differences in the relative changes being unsystematic. For
international prices, and ignoring the sign, most changes are larger in the Reduced-substitution run
than in the Increased-Substitution run, which would be expected since the relative change in the
parameters is larger in the former than in the latter. Prices for sunflower seeds and rape oil, however,
react less in the first sensitivity run than in the second. The same holds for quantities, where most
changes in the first scenario are larger than in the second, but again some markets show the opposite
direction.
e3 Due to the limits on subsidised exports, exports of barley are not influenced at all.
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In order to check the relevance of the two sets of elasticities (i.e., elasticities of substitution and
elasticities of transformation), two additional runs are performed, with only the elasticities of
substitution or the elasticities of transformation being increased. The main result with respect to
international prices is that they are affected almost exclusively by changes in the elasticities of
substitution, while changes due to a higher elasticities of transformation are all below 0.7% (cheese),
and mostly below or around 0.2%. By construction, this is also true for gross imports, while of course
exports are more affected by the changes in the elasticities of transformation. Exports, however, show
a significant sensitivity to changes in the elasticities of substitution, too, with most changes showing
different signs for the two latter model runs'
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APPEIYDIX 2.
Aggregate results of the WATSIM reference run
Table 5.6. List of Commodities, Regions and tr'ood Balance Sheet Items in the WATSIM Model
Product Code Item.Gode
& Products area, slaugter , milking/laying animals
& Productst)
& Productsl)
$eld per ha or head
Cereals & Productsr) use for human consumption
& Productsr)2) consumption per capita
WHEA
BARL
MAIZ
ocEs
RICE
STAR
SUGA
PULS
SOYA
SUNF
RAPE
SEDO
osoY
OSUN
ORAP
osDo
csoY
csuN
CRAP
csDo
BEEF
PMEA
MEAO
POUL
EGGS
MILK
CHES
BTCR
MILS
LEVL
YIEl
PROP
CONP
HCPC
FEEP
DEMP
PEXP
PIMP
Productsi)
& Productsi)
& Productsr)
Seed
Oilseeds
oit
Seed Oil
oit
of Other Oilseeds
Soybean Cake
Seed Cake
Rapeseed Cake
of Other Cakeseeds
& Veal3)
Meat3)
(bovine only)
Mercosur
USA
of World
Code
production
use for feed
domestic use (hum.cons., feed, seed, processing, other use, waste)
Exports
lmports
and Eastern Europe
& NewZealand
CEE
RUS
CHN
JAP
ANZ
MER
USA
CAN
ROW
Notes:
& Cream
milk products
in raw product equivalents
milled equivalent
incl. products; carcass weight equivalents
1)
2l
3)
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Table 5.7. Results of the WATSIM reference run hectares or ggr.
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1975
ggr.
1985
1994t
96
1997 20051974 t
76
1984'
86
E15-Oils 1964 
'66
7AO% 1.04o/o 0.87o/o1.4',|o/o 1.2Ùo/o11,665 12,673 13,232
.!,247 4,787 5,248PROP 3,693
' 3.13o/o 0.83%22.O1 .O.640/o 0.77o/o14.08 19.97 21.34-12:77 13.79HCPC 11.99
0.84o/o 0.94% 0.91%8,027 8,2674,724 4,897 7,4UCONP
0.760/o188 0.51% .0.69"/655 152 18149 52INDP
0.95% 0.58o/o0.83o/o 1.2$o/o 5.17Yo12,693 13,0636,426 6,501 11,7655,255 5,706DEMP
6;20o/o 1.88o/o 1.12o/o4,61o/o 4'.4101o3,662 4,249 4,4931,155 1,780 2,316PEXP 737
2,50o/o -1.537.o O.24o/o4,323 2.O9%3,747 4,113 4,2712,179 2,679 3,429PIMP
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
2005 2010 ggr.
1975
lSl,4t
86
'199'1,
96
t9971964 
'86
1974 I
76
E15.
Cakes
3.22o/o 7.52o/o 0.35% 0.56%21,426 1.90068,487 10,241 20,265 20,8355,1 19 6,181PROP
0.70o/o1.580/o 2.69o/o 6.51% 0.760/o36,316 37,61016,031 18,086 34,184FEEP 10,510 12,290
6.40% O.760/037,757 1.460/o 2.72%18,191 34,324 36,46110,792 12,476 16311DEMP
3.72o/o -4.98o/o -1.63%794 1.12o/o1,721 2,436 1,297 8621,068 1,'t94PEXP
1.11o/o 0.0.93% 2.540/o 3.EE%15,095 16,488 17,1267338 9,55E 10,360PIMP 6,782
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
1997 2005 20101974 t
76,
1984 
'86,
1994 
'g8
E1S-Meat 1964 
'68
0.50o/o1.A80/o 3.8OTo 0.610/o35,356 36,246 1.'l5o/o19,343 21,538 23,620 33,682PROP 17,251
0.72o/o 0.49o/o0.81Yo 0.86% 1.957o83.32 88.25 90.4260.63 66.0€ 69.35HCPC 55.94
0.81% 0.45o/o33,967 1.O1Vo 1.03%22,624 24,116 31,138 33,209CONP 18,474 20,424
0.78o/o 0.45Yo1.007031,386 33,411 u,17318,540 20,481 22,69 24,197DEMP
2.!lo/o -1.46Yo 0.72o/o3,023 2.34o/o2,967 3,279 2,9161,557 1,971 2,483PEXP
-0.420/1.38%950 0.96%3;1% 3,600 869PIMP ,2,Vt2
ggr.
2010
ggr.
1975
ggr. "
1985
ggr.
2005
2005 2010:19741
76
198/r 
'86
t994 r.
'90 ,,'
1997E15.
CHES
19641:r
0.08%.6.300/0 0.69%6,818 6,844 1.15Yo 1.240/o2,742 3,101PROP
0.61% 0.160lo0.98% 0.81o/o 5.00o/o16.96 17.107.U 8.31 9.00 9.81 16.16HGPC
0.69% 0.13%6,422 1.18o/o3,08:t 3,411 6,039 6,382CONP 2A6S 2,794
0.69% 0.12o/o1.18To6,045 6,389 6,428'2,492 2,802 3,086 3,415DEMP
2.19Yo -'1.29o/o 1.84o/o -0.52o/o531 'l.65To551 722 471 il5
..376 443PEXP
1.49o/o :15.25To 5.260/o -0.17o/o1 115457 4U 560 634 77PIMP
204
CEE-
Cereals
1954 
'66
1574 I
76
1984 
'86
1994 I
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
.ggr.
1985
gg1.
1995 
':
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 25,319 24,966 24,385 24,257 24,631 23,631 23,166 -O:'l4o/o 4.23Yo 0.0870 -0.52% -0.40%
YIEl 1.96 2.24 2.85 3.38 3.33 3.54 1.36% 1.23o/o 2,44o/o -0.19% 1.240/
PROP 49,582 55,966 61,75s 69,170 83,341 78,729 82,088 1.220/o o.99% 2.53% -0.71o/o 0.84Yo
HCPG 202.42 196.32 186.64 180.31 161.29 159.45 157.88 4.31o/o -0.50% -1.210h
-0.14o/o -o.200Â
CONP 11 17,959 17,456 17,260 16,626 16,527 16,297 4.08o/o 4.ZETo 4.41o/o -0.07o/o -0.28%
FEEP 26,870 32.815 40,070 48,966 46,959 46,937 47,910 2.O2% 2.O2% ,1.33% -0.01o/o 0.41Yo
INDP 1,05./ 1,156 1,438 1,674 2,445 2,558 2,665 0.907o 2;21o/o 4.52o/o 0.570Â 0.82o/o
DEMP 52,853 59,055 66,446 75,865 76,548 76,263 77,074 1.12o/o 1.19o/o 1.19o/o -0.05% o.210/
PEXP 2,149 3,)2 2,524 3,680 4,032 5,630 7,695 4.130À -2.4101o 3.98% 4.260/o 6.45o/o
PIMP 747'l 6,635 8,416 9,6&t 3,335 3,165 2,680 -1.18% _ ..2;l1yo . -7;42o/o -0.65% -3.270À
CEE.
Oilseeds
1964 
'66
1974 I
76
lg84t
86
1984 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
9gr.
t995
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 1,667 1,793 1,970 1,9ô3 2,707 3,236 3,277 0.73% 0.95% 2.680h 2.260/o 0.25o/o
YIEl 1.09 't22 't.28 1.33 1.40 1.51 1.59 1.15o/o Q.41c/o OfEYo 0.9370 1.10o/o
PROP 1,823 2,1çt6 2,514 2,609 3,793 4,881 5,220 .1,88o/o 1.360/o 3,490/o 3.20o/o 1.350/o
HCPC 0.65 0.37 0.41 0.49 1.30 1.66 1.90 -5.48o/o . LO9o/o 10.060/o 3.040/o 2.81o/o
CONP 58 u 39 47 134 171 196 -5.290,/o 1.34o/o 10.937o 3.09% 2.77o/o
FEEP 31 31 42 35 162 137 132 o.14% .3.O4% 11.9141o -2.07% -0.74o/o
INDP 1,737 2,093 2,396 2,636 3,787 4,346 4,509 1.88o/o 1.3do/o :: 3.89% 1.74o/o 0.74%
DEMP 1.938 2,2U 2,613 2,æ1 4,368 4,972 5,166 1.66% 1,35o/o 4.37.o/a 1.630/o 0.77o/o
PEXP 245 334 .,'25'l 148 555 480 629 3.16% -2.81Yo '6;83o/o -'|.80o/o 5.56%
PIMP 392 419 398 450 499 572 575 0.65% 4.51o/o ' 1:91o/o 1.72o/o 0.10o/o
CEE-Oils 19æt
66
1974 I
76
1984/
.86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
t975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
200s
ggr.
2010
PROP 652 813 907 998 1,509 1,728 1,790 2.24o/o .,1r097o ,4.Uoh 1.71o/o 0.71o/o
HGPG 6.47 6.82 7.42 7.98 11.37 13.16 14.01 0.52o/o o.E6% 3.62Yo 1.84o/o 1.26%
CONP 579 '624 ,694 7U 1,172 1,34t 1,447 o,750/o 1.08o/o 4:46Io 't.910/o 1.19o/r
lNDP 1 1 1 51 33 39 3.82o/o 7.64Yo 32.8% -5.Q1o/o 2.860/o
DEMP 751 810 91S 1,021 1,616 1,832 1,951 0.75o/o 1,28o/o 4;82o/o 1.58o/o 1.27o/o
PEXP 111 279 244 267 521 587 591 9.69% -1.330Â 6.537o 1.50o/o O.14o/o
PIMP 240 265 ,2ôg 298 615 691 751 0.97o/o 0.13o/o '7.17o/o 1.47o/o 1.68%
CEE.
Cakes
1964 /
66
1974 I
76
1984 
'86
1994 /
96
1997 200s 2010 ggr.
:1975
ggr.
1985
99r. '
1995
ggr.
200s
ggr.
2010
PROP 887 '1,042 1,235 1,388 2,038 2,329 2,414 1.630/o 1)l1o/o ",4:260/o 1.680Â 0.720/o
FEEP 1,504 1,927 2,685 3Jô4 3,493 3,742 3,804 2.51o/o 3.37o1o .:,,?;22yo 0.86o/o 0.33%
DEMP 1,5{N 't,927 2,685 3,7æ 3,493 3,742 3,804 2.51o/o 3.3lYo 2,22% 0.86% 0.33o/o
PEXP u 19 35 597 769 819 .5.537o 7.610/o '25.1!ale 3.220/o '|.27o/o
PIMP 652 904 1,501 2.437 2,048 2,180 2,210 3.337o 5.zOW 2.63% 0.7ÙYo 0.27%
CEE-Meal 1964 
'66
1574 I
76
lS8,l
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
198s
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 4.974 5,e48 6,263 7,643 7,027 6,784 6,796 1.280h 1;Mo/o '0.9670 -0.44o/o O.04o/o
HCPC 49.30 53.39 58.63 68.06 63.05 63.69 63.58 0.8070 0,940/o 0.01% 0.13o/o -0.030/o
CONP 4,412 4,885 5,485 6,517 6,499 6,601 6,563 1.O2% 1.17Yo '1.4241o 0j9% -0.12o/o
DEMP 4,596 5,114 5,72 6,78S 6,580 6,692 6,655 1.07olo 1.13o/o .1.11% 0.21o/o -0.11o/o
PEXP 606 770 958 750 503 529 2.42% 'O.4Oo/o {.55% 4.87o/o 1.01o/o
PIMP 216 239 267 126 230 411 389 1.037o 1.09% ',-1.25% 7.560/o -1.097o
CEE.
CHES
1964 
'66
1974 I
76
1984'g6'' 1994'98 1997 2005 2010
ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 503 571 792 883 1,031 1,099 1260/o , 1.52% 2.410h 1.960/o 1.29%
HCPC 5.18 5.72 7.66 7.80 8.98 9.59 1.01% 1.32o/o '1;50% 1.78o/o 1.32o/o
CONP 463 524 611 7U 804 931 990 1.23% 1.55% 2.32o/o 1.850Â 1.24o/o
DEMP 469 530 620 744 806 933 992 1.24o/o 1,57o/o .2.22% 1.85o/o '1.23o/o
PEXP 32 50 ..50 48 107 137 147 4.63Yo -0.æ% 6.51% 3.14o/o 1.42o/o
PIMP 2 E 2 35 38 40 10.92% -1.620/o 19.23% 1.03o/o 1.03o/o
20s
RUS.
Gereals
1964 r
66 .,,'
19741'
76 .'
1984'
86
1994 t
.96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 68,397 66,0(X 64,475 68,924 52,393 53,795 53,464 -0.36% 4.23o/o -1.71o/o 0.33o/o -0.12o/o
YIEl o.96 1.09 .1.26 1.22 1.65 1.45 1.51 1.35o/o 1.38o/o 2.33% -1.620/o
PROP 65,474 72,229 80,932 tl:t,755 86,694 78,141 80,976 0.99% 1.14"/o O.57To -1.29% 0.72Vo
HCPC 249.51 237.37 248.16 234.17 156.02 165.31 170.42 -0.507o 0.45o/o 0.73o/o 0.610/o
CONP 31,60E 30.et3 32.535 31,2il 23,037 23,742 24,037 -O.31o/o 0.607o 0.25o/o
FEEP #1.1V #w #tw 43,742 43,654 46,327 #tlV #tw #tlV -0.03%
INDP #M/ #M/ #1.1\r 1,994 2,575 2,691 #tlV #N/ : 3.25o/o 0.89%
DEMP 77,180 88,465 101,706 104,920 85,216 86,980 90,083 1.37To 1.4oo/o 0.26Yo
PEXP 7,208 .826 279 7,176 805 322 337 -19.48o/o -10.28o/o 9.23Yo -10.82o/o 0.91o/o
PIMP 23.930 18,æ2 21,929 27,U3 5,5ô4 9,162 9,441 -2.479/o 1.21o/o -1O.49"/o 6.43o/o 0.60%
RUS.
Oilseeds
1s64, 1984'86.
1994 
'g6
t997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
20'|.0
LEVL 4,577 4445 4,2æ 4.167 4,394 4,391 4,344 -O.29To 4.41Yo -0.01% -0.21o/o
YIEl o.77 O,EE . 0.80 o.92 0.75 0.83 0.85 '1.350/o '.1.OzVo 1.30%
PROP 3,534 3,4(X) 3,824 3,304 3,662 3,692 1.06% -1.43o/o 4.24% 1.29o/o 0.16%
HCPC 2.22 2.41 2.29 2.43 0.28 0.62 0.60 0.857o -0.53% -16.07o/o 10.53o/o -0.79o/o
CONP : ....311 300 324 41 89 85 1.O4% -0.37o/o -15.29o/o 10.19% -0.920À
FEEP 170 172 155 154 433 524 663 0.1070 -1.O2o/o 8.93% 2.41o/o
INDP . 3,06€ 3,566 3,235 3,445 1,811 1,690 1,æ7 1,450/o -0.91o/o 4,72o/o -0.86% -0.51%
DEMP 4,778 5,300 4,890 5,109 2,640 2,655 2,744 1.MYo -0.80% -5.01% 0.07o/o
PEXP 27 25 322 1,049 1,385 1,363 -1.10o/o 4,786/o 3.53% -0.32Yo
PIMP 1.280 ,'t,399 1,517 2,OT7 222 379 414 0.897o O.82o/o -14.E0% 6.91% 1
RUS-Oils 1964 
'66
1974 I
78
19Vtr
86.
1994'
98,
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
.ggr.,
1985 .
ggr.
t995
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 1,233 1,490 1,354 1452 787 726 701 1.9'l 
o/o
-0.9s% 4:.42o/o -1.00% -0.70o/o
HCPC 6.76 7.16 7.15 7.72 7.72 6.94 7.06 0.58% -0.01o/o 0.647o -1.32o/o 0.33%
CONP 925 936 1,030 1,140 997 996 o.77% 0.149 -1.66% -0.020Â
INDP #NV #NV #I.IV #Nv 0 79 88 #NV #NV #Drv/o!
DEMP 1,',t52 1;265 1;244 1,198 't,617 1,511 1,537 0.94qlo -0.16% 2.21o/o -0.840/o 0.34o/o
PEXP 243 227 196 692 28 24 21 -2.17o/o -1.45o/o -1.86% -2.640/o
PIMP . 10Ë ,48 65 98 856 807 855 -7.75o/o 3.M"/o -0.73Yo 1.160/o
RUS.
Cakes
1964 
'66
19741
76
1984 I
88
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
'1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 1,2æ 1,544 1,4U 1,502 940 883 866 1.74o/o .-0,74o/o -3.460/0 -0.78o/o -0.39%
FEEP 5,682 5,949 7,693 6,567 977 1,067 1,228 O.46"/o 2.600/o -15.80o/o 1.11o/o 2.85o/o
DEMP 5,6E2 5,949 7,693 6,567 977 1,067 1,228 0.46o/o 2.600/o -15.EOe/o 1.11o/o
PEXP 111 203 8 1 5 1 1 6.22o/c -27.37o/o 4.12o/o -22.91o/o 17.82o/o
PIMP +,4çA 4,608 6,268 5.067 41 184 364 0.250/o 3.12o/o -34.24s/o 20.640/o 14.62%
RUS.
Meat
'1984 
'66
1974t
76
1984'
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 4,616 5,591 6,305 6,958 4,736 4,580 4,895 1.93% 1.21o/o -2.36Yo -0.42o/o 1.34%
HCPC 40.56 47.38 52.11 59.46 51.89 50.03 51.29 '1,57o/o 0.96% -0.04o/o -0.460/o 0.50%
CONP 5;142 6,117 6,833 7 7,186 7,234 1.',110/o -0.80% 0.13%
DEMP 5,177 6,162 6,88it 7,691 7,211 7,260 1.760/o -0.80% 0.14Yo
PEXP 194 219 41 66 96 0.00% 12,13"/o -12.21o/o 6.260h 7.78o/o
PIMP 561 772 1,167 2,995 2,698 2,463 '|-.070/o 2. 11.96% -1.30o/o -1.81o/o
RUS.
CHES
1964 
'66
1574t
76
19Vtt
86
1994/
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
198s
ggr
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 288 378 336 360 1.460/o 3.960/o -1.460/0 1.39%
HCPC 1.27 1.64 .1.85 2,21 3.46 2.68 2.90 2.630/o
2.82olo
1.23o/o
1.39o/o
5.34olo -3.14o/o 1.59%
CONP 160 212 243 295 511 410 -3.48Yo 1.27%
DEMP 160 212 243 511 385 410 2.821/o -3.48o/o 1.27o/o
PEXP 0 0 0 0 2 15 17 0.00% 0.00o/o 0.007o 28.ilo/o 2.53o/o
PIMP 4 7 6 6 136 æ 66 4.73o/o 29.55o/o 0.620/o
206
CHN.
Gereals
1964 /
66
1974 I
76
198Ét
86
1994 
'96
1997 200s 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggl'
1995
ggr,
2005
9gr.
2010
LEVL 92,U0 91,804 96,009 97,578 92,779 91,177 88,811 -0,11o/o 0.45o/o -0.280/o -0.22% -0.52o/o
YIEl 1.M 1.59 1.96 4.08 4.65 4.98 1.00o/o 0.97o/o 7.31% 1.660/ 1.39o/o
PROP 133,502 145,793 167,897 191,432 378,270 424,072 442,611 0.E8% 1.42o/o 7.Qïo/o 1.44o/o 0.86%
HCPC 148.76 147.06 155.63 160.38 192.66 182.37 173.70 -0.12o/o 0.57o/o 1.79o/o -0.68o/o
-0.97Yo
GONP 109,170 116,501 133,109 146,656 240,959 242,193 238,216 0.65% 1.34o/o 5.07o/o 0.06% -0.33%
FEEP 12,119 16,687 20,307 28,827 111,737 145,024 170,796 3.25% 1.980/o 15.27olo 3.31Yo 3.33%
INDP #NV #NV #NV #NV 12,587 13,728 14,885 #NV #NV #NV 1.09% 1.63Yo
DEMP 150,971 173,038 196,758 395,796 433,966 457,817 0.EE7o 1.37o/o 7.14o/o 1.16% 1.08o/o
PEXP 1,773 1,840 1,778 3,069 3,941 4,394 0.370/0 -0.34o/o 4.650/o 3.18o/o 2.20o/o
PIMP 7,571 5,955 7,035 8,634 6,371 13,834 19,600 -2,37o/o 1.680/o 4.82o/o 10.18o/o 7.22o/o
CHN.
Oilseeds
1964 /
66
1574 I
76
1964 
'86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 18,916 17,9t4 17,394 17,331 25,713 27,111 27,515 '0.53o/o 4.31o/o 3.31o/o 0.66% 0.30%
YIEl 0.84 0.96 1.00 1.78 1.88 2.00 1.31o/o 0,42o/o 4.89o/o 0.74o/o 1.2Qo/o
PROP 15,949 17,229 17,422 18,328 45,698 51,098 55,038 0.77o/o 0.1'to/o 8.37% 1.41o/o 1.50o/o
HCPC 6.08 6.18 5.94 5.58 6.23 6.70 7.09 0.160/o 4,41o/o 0.400h 0.91Yo 1.',140/o
CONP 4,466 4,894 5,072 5,099 7,800 8,895 9,734 0.92sÂ 0.36o/o 3.657o 1.660/0 1.82o/o
FEEP #NV #NV #NV #NV 4,939 6,493 7,208 #l\I\/ #NV #tw 3.48o/o 2.11o/o
INDP 7,162 8,096 8,466 9,280 u,450 43,388 47,769 1.23o/o O.45o/o 12.41% 2.93o/o 1.94o/o
DEMP 15,483 17,0E6 17,W 18,768 51,155 63,391 69,619 0.997o 0,29o/o 9.317o 2.720Â 1.89%
PEXP 661 681 492 405 444 232 173 0.317o -3.20e/o -0.E5% -7.80o/o -5.70o/o
PIMP 252 503 6E7 1,027 5,811 12,526 14,753 7.16% 3.167o 19.48o/o 10.08% 3.33%
CHN-Oils 1964 /
66
1974 I
76
lS84t
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
198s
ggr'
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 1,661 1,857 2,000 2,208 8,821 11,003 12,100 1.12o/o 0.75% 13.1670 2.800/ 1.92o/o
HCPC 1.68 1.7Q 't.75 1,81 6.50 7.94 8.63 0;13% 0.zgoh 11.*o/, 2.52o/o 1.70o/o
CONP 1,2y 1,350 1,500 1,656 8,140 10,540 11,825 0.90Yo 1.0670 15,140/0 3.28Yo 2.33o/o
INDP #NV #NV #NV #l.J\/ 1 1 1 #NV #NV #NV 0.20% 0.80o/o
DEMP 1,649 1,836 2,037 2,260 11,623 15,141 16,983 1.087o 1.04o/o 't5.62% 3.36% 2.32o/o
PEXP 95 95 69 79 611 873 949 -0,03o/o -3.15o/r 19.94% 4.560/o 1.680/o
PIMP 73 73 105 150 3,558 5,011 5,831 0.08% 3.7Oclo vt.0E% 4.370/0 3.080/o
CHN.
Gakes
1964 /
66
1574 I
76
19Vl'
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr'
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 4,046 4,581 4.873 5,360 21,891 27,942 30,849 1.25Yo 0.620/o 13.U% 3.10o/o 2.00o/o
FEEP 2,835 3,23€ 3.535 3,814 22,229 31,078 35,712 1,Uo'/o 0.88% 16.56% 4.28o/o 2.820/0
DEMP 4,028 4,555 4,660 5,361 25,170 35,049 40,145 1.24Yo 0.650/o 14.69To 4.23o/o 2.75%
PEXP 30 45 35 37 379 73 62 4.07o/o -2,58o/o 22.Wolo -18.60% -3.220/
PIMP 12 18 36 3,660 7,180 9,358 3.92o/o 3.02o/o 51.7tV2 8.79o/o 5.440Â
CHN.
Meat
1964 /
66
1574t
76
1984t
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr
1975
ggr.
1995
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 6,633 7,597 8,507 9,666 52,949 69,682 81,005 1.37o/o 1.14% 16fo/9 3.49o/o 3.06o/o
HCPC 8.85 9.49 9.79 10.46 42.35 52.02 59.02 0.70o/o 0.31% 12.98% 2.600/o 2.560/o
CONP 6,498 7,515 8,387 9.5ô6 52,970 69,078 80,927 1.47% 1.10o/o 16.60% 3.37% 3.22%
DEMP 6,507 7,526 6,399 9,580 53,024 69,156 81,021 1.47% 1,10% 16.607o 3.38o/o 3.22o/o
PEXP :168 131 1U 1E5 795 1,962 1,914 -2.450/o 3.Æ% 12.U"fo 11.960/o -0.49o/o
PIMP 40 61 100 870 1,436 1,931 4.18% 2,27olo 2,44% 6.460/o 6.10%
CHN.
CHES
1964'
66
1574 I
76
lS04t
-86 ,
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975.
ggr.
1985 .
ggr."
1995
9gr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 59 54 61 191 223 238 -1.06% 0.33o/o 11,020h 1.96% 1.31o/o
HCPC 0.08 0.07 0,ffi 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.20 '1.75Yo 4.40o/o 7.9t5% 2.O70/ 0.89%
CONP 59 53 55 ,62 203 2U 274 -1,U% 0.35% 11.6% 2.84o/o 1.530Â
DEMP 59 55 62 203 2& 274 -1,Uo/o 0.35To 11.47% 2.84o/o 1.53%
PEXP 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 4.42% 4.U% 45.æoÂ -10.50% -1.81Yo
P .',..0 1 1 14 31 36 2.18o/o 2.26% 28.78o/o 10.450/o 3.Mo/o
207
JAP.
Gereals
1964'86.
1574t
. 7.6..;
1984 
'86
1994t
98
1997 2005 201 0 ggr.
't975
gg1.
1985
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 4,305 4,O12 3,158 2,912 2,197 2,020 1,910 -0.707o -2.360/o -2.98Yo -1.05% -1.11o/o
YIEl 3.14 3.60 3.5€ 3.91 4.17 4.36 4.50 1.3E% 4.137o 1.33% 0.56% 0.67Yo
PROP 13,529 14,455 11,229 1 1,367 9,153 8,798 8,603 0.660/o -2.49Yo -1 -0.49"/o -0.45o/o
HCPC 152.31 147.5'l 142.79 142.39 132.46 130.60 128.99 4.320h 4.32o/o -0.18% -0.25To
GONP 15,058 15,(X0 15,097 15,679 16,695 16,611 16,389 -o.o'lo/o o.Mo/o 0.u% -0.06% -0.27o/o
FEEP 6,032 8,257 1't,155 121444 16,999 15,465 14,267 3.19o/o '3.05o/o -1.18o/o -1
INDP #t.I\/ #$t\/ #t.I\/ #tw 2,921 3,139 3,102 #NV ,#tw -Q.24o/o
DEMP u,w 25,2t6 28,162 30,274 37,245 35,819 34,344 0.98o/o 1.12Yo 2.36"/o -0.49o/o -0.84Yo
PEXP 91 .,.200 558 299 405 352 328 8.13olo 10,820/o -2.640/o -1.73% -1.41Yo
PIMP 10,193 12,803 15;93S 19,537 28,954 27,373 26,070 2314/o 2.22o/o 5.10% -O.70o/o -0.97o/o
JAP.
Oilseeds
1964r.
66.
19741
76
19ld4r86,
1994 
'96
't997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL #NV #NV #NV #NV 98 116 112 #NV #t{v .#NV .: 2.18o/o -0.70o/o
YIEl #tnl .#l.tv #NV fNV 2.01 1.98 2.02 #NV #tw #tw -o.160/
PROP #NV. #M/ #tù/ #tw 196 230 226 #tlV #NV #1.I\/ -0.35%
HCPC 8.13 8.90 9.09 8.87 9.70 10.35 10.68 0.91% O.21o/o 0.55% 0.80% 0.63%
CONP 961 977 1,222 1,315 1,356 1.?201o 0.570/o 2.O20Â 0.92% O.620/o
FEEP #M/ #NV #rw 254 208 186 #NV #t.l\/' #w -2.47o/o -2.21Yo
INDP 2,574 :.. 3,230 4,'t00 4,175 6,274 6,413 6,497 2.260/o 2,41Yo 3.61% 0.27% 0.260/o
DEMP 346-4 4,221 5,135 5,224 7,899 8,089 8,193 2,00o/o 1.98o/o 3.65% 0.30%
PEXP 3 ,0 0 1 3 1 I -22'42% 3.69% 20.430/0 -12.15o/o -2.600/o
PIMP 3,089 3,64S 4,950 4,961 7,885 7,859 7,967 2.220/o 2.55Yo 3.96% -Q.Q4o/o 0.27o/o
JAP-Oils 1964 
'66.
1974 I
78
1944 I
86
1994 r
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
201 0
PROP 741 867 1,060 1,094 1,857 1,888 1,909 2.14o/o 2,04o/o 4.78o/o 0.21o/o 0.22Vo
HCPC 4.ES 6,79 8.32 't2.90 12.98 13.26 2.04o/o 1.27o/o 5.49o/o 0.08% 0.43Yo
CONP 4U 718 916 1,625 1,653 1,686 2,35Yo 1.64% 7,O50-/o 0.21o/o 0.40o/o
INDP #t{v #N\r , #tw ,#t.|\' 0 0 0 #tw #tw #tw' #Dlv/01 #Dtv/o!
DEMP 724 903 1,096 1,278 2,548 2,599 2,662 2.24o/o 1.967o 7.28% 0.25% 0.48o/o
PEXP 24 26 52 41 25 49 60 0.857o 7.360/o 6.15o/o 9.05% 4.13o/o
PlMP 46 .63 s2 217 717 759 810 3.2oo/o 3.E3% 18.66"1 0.71Yo 1.310/o
JAP.
Gakes
1964 
'66
1974 I
76
1984t
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 201 0 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 1,832 2,291 2,973 3,105 4,533 4,609 4,638 2.260/o 2.64o/o 3.58o/o 0.21o/o 0.13olo
FEEP 1,964 2,442 3,2U 3,413 5,525 5,087 4,886 2.20o/o 3,01o/o 4.43o/o -1.03o/o -0.80%
DEMP 1,964 2,442 3,2U 3,413 5,525 5,087 4,886 2.20o/o 3.01% 4.43% -1.O3%
PEXP #NV #NV #NV #tw 3 42 93 #NV #NV #NV 41.88Yo 17.25o/o
PIMP 136 162 311 339 994 520 341 1.79o/o 6.73Yo 't0.16% -7.77o/o -8.1 0olo
JAP-Meat 1964 
'66
1974 I
7ô
lg8/.l
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP &49 1,125 1,670 2,059 3,094 3,037 2,916 2.85o/o 4.02o/o 5.28o/o -O.23%o -0.81%
HCPC 9. 12.45 17.72 21.29 41.96 47.25 50.26 3.100/o 3.597o 7.45Yo 1.49o/o 1.24o/o
CONP 908 1,271 1,876 2,U5 6,010 6,385 3.41% 3.97Yo 1.610/o 1.22o/o
DEMP 927 1,296 5,397 6,133 3.41o/o 3.987o 9.O2o/o 1.610/o 1.220/
PEXP 1 2 E b I 7 -8.967o 11.6E% 11.82o/o 5.34o/o -4.9QYo
PIMP 91 245 353 2,302 3,102 3,604 4.18o/o 2O;50o/o 3.80% 3.05%
JAP.
CHES
1964 
'66'
1974 I
76
19E4 
'86
1994 I
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.{975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
20't0
PROP 18 42 50 114 125 138 6.357o 2.?20/o 8.58olo 1.160/o 2.00o/o
HGPC 0.31
31
0.59
60
0.73
77
2.26 2.38 2.60 6.63% 2.12o/o 0.65% 1.78o/o
CONP 284 303 330 6.95o/o 2.49o/o 11.487o 0.81o/o 1.72o/o
DEMP 31 60 77 284 303 6.95% 2.49o/o 11.480/o 0.81% 1.72o/o
PEXP 0 0 0 1 3.66% 36.27o/o 2.63%
PIMP 26 35 45 1 178 193 1.79% 2.83o/o 14.17olo 0.58% 1.63%
208
ANZ.
Cereals
lS6Ét
66
1974 I
76
lS8É't
86
1994 /
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
9gr.
2010
LEVL 13,116 11J93 12.601 16,070 16,880 17,776 2,230/o -1.31To 2.83o/o 0.620/o 1.04%
YIEl 1.14 1.17 '|.40 1.97 2.14 2.29 -1.16% o.29% 1.04o/o 1.37Yo
PROP 13,491 14,962 13,495 17,632 31,614 36,086 40,684 1.Uoh -1.43o/" 7,35o/o 1.670/o 2.430/
HCPC 103.93 104.'t4 98.76 90.57 88.11 84.37 82.79 0.02o/o -0.537o -0.957o -0.u% -0.38%
CONP 1,457 1,540 1,550 1,513 1,947 2,010 2,074 0.55% 0.067o 1.92o/o 0.40o/o 0.63%
FEEP #NV #NV #NV #NV 5,878 6,553 6,839 #NV #NV #NV '1.370/o 0.867o
INDP u7 376 421 491 530 837 892 0.8370 1.13o/o 1.93o/o 5.87% 1.28o/o
DEMP 4,825 5,657 6,185 5,863 10,379 1 1,598 12,082 1.600/o 0.907o 4.41e/o 1.40% 0.82%
PEXP 7,523 7,377 11,014 8,960 24,660 24,861 28,977 4.20o/o 4.09o/o 6.95% 0.10o/o 3.11o/o
PIMP 183 78 81 106 185 374 377 -8.210/o 0.36% 7.16% 9.20o/. 0.160/o
ANZ.
Oilseeds
1964 
'66
1ir74 t
7ô
1984 /
86
1994/
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
t975
9gr.
198s
gg1.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 1M 131 339 381 1,312 1,458 1,597 2.33o/o 9.94:o/o 11.94o/o 1.33o/o 1.84o/o
YIEl 0.83 0.96 0.76 0.81 1.52 1.74 1.85 1.45o/o -2.36% 5.967o 1.70o/o 1.210/o
PROP 87 't27 257 309 2,000 2,U3 2,958 3.82o/o 7.35% 18.637o 3.0s% 3.07o/o
HCPC 3.78 4.25 3.99 3.86 4.91 5.44 5.69 1.180/o -0.637o 't.750/o 1.28o/o 0.92%
CONP 53 63 63 65 109 129 142 1.71% {.0570 4.72o/o 2.15o/o 1.94o/o
FEEP #NV #NV #NV #NV 569 659 696 #NV #NV #NV 1.85o/o 1.10o/o
INDP 218 246 313 334 943 1,050 1,128 1.21e/o 2.42o/o 9rilD/o 1.35o/o 1.Mo/o
DEMP 27E 324 390 426 1,648 1,872 2,003 1,55o/o tr,880/o 12,7ïelo 1.61o/o 1.360/
PEXP I 103 51 705 1,073 1,362 27.15Yo 2,,55% 17.42% 5.39% 4.89o/o
PIMP 199 210 187 170 352 404 407 0.567o -1.19o/o 5,440/o 1.74o/o 0.14o/o
ANZ-Oils 1964 /
66
1574 I
76
19Vu
86
1994 /
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 49 55 87 103 246 274 295 1.O7% 4,760/o 9.MVo 1.36% 1.49o/o
HCPC 4.09 4.21 5.20 7.44 17.41 17.01 18.23 O,28olo . 2;13o/o '10.6070 -0.29o/o '1.400/
CONP 57 62 82 125 386 405 457 0.81% 2.75% 13.E2% 0.60% 2.45%
INDP #NV #NV #NV #NV 3 4 4 #t.l\/ #I.IV #rw., 3.66% 0.00%
DEMP 90 102 1U 't68 501 528 599 1,30c/o 2.74% 11.&o/o 0.66% 2.560/o
PEXP 4 3 6 11 58 76 85 -1.75o/o 7'.03o/o 24.e??/o 3.47o/o 2.26%
PIMP 45 56 76 325 332 390 1.17o/o 1.OOo/o 15.U:/o 0.27o/o 3.27o/o
ANZ.
Cakes
1964t
66
1574 I
76
1984 /
86
1994 /
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP .69 101 141 502 560 601 2.360/o 4.OOo/o 14.26% 1.38o/o 1.42o/o
FEEP 67 128 't58 &13 8't6 911 3.057o 3,460/o 1Q,39Yo 3.020Â 2.230Â
DEMP 67. 128 643 816 911 3.057o 3.460/o 14.Q9j/o 3.02o/o 2.23o/o
PEXP 1 2 .2 1 38 15 10 5,32o/o -2.86o/o 30.Q!7e -11.O1o/o -7.79o/o
PIMP #NV #tw #NV #NV 180 269 319 #NV #NV #NV. 5.15o/o 3.47%
ANZ-Meal 1964 
'66
1974t
76
1984'
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 2,596 2,730 3,270 3,425 4,571 4,938 5,079 0.51o/o 7.82o/o 2,63T0 O.97o/o 0.56%
HCPC 107,71 't05.55 111.89 109.18 101.45 106.93 107.44 'O.ZOYo 0.59% 4.81olo 0.66% 0.107o
GONP 1,509 1,562 1,757 1,824 2,242 2,546 2,690 0.34% ; 1,1p% 2,O5Vo 1.60% 1j1%
DEMP 1,573 1,642 '1,883 .1,891 2,338 2,655 2,801 O.43o/o 1.3E% 1;82o/o 1.600/o 1.08o/o
PEXP 1,026 1,063 1,391 1;527 2,261 2,U5 2,349 0.36% 2.7ïch 4;13Yo O.460/0 0.03o/o
PIMP 2 32 al 71 -1.98t:Yo 1.21o/o '2At)oot^ 9.24o/o 2.10o/o
ANZ.
CHES
1964 
'66: 1974 t.76 19E4 '86 1994'96 1997 2005 2010 9gr.1975 99rr'.1985
ggr. 
.
1995 ..
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 163 179 182 552 672 742 0.937o O.21Vo 9,87.% 2.490Â 2.000/
HCPG 3.22 3.87 3.64 5.37 9.95 10.70 11.32 i.86% .0.59% 8.73o/o 0.91o/o 'l.130/o
CONP 45 57 57 90 220 255 283 2,41o/o 0.007o 11,E70/o 1.86% 2.11o/o
DEMP 45 57 57 90 220 255 283 2.410A 0.(X)% 11.87% 1,860/o 2.11o/o
PEXP 121 126 128 110 386 472 520 O.4ïo/o 0.16% 9.63% 2.55o/o 1.960/0
PlMP ,4 6 33 55 6'l 3.10% 2.82e/a tr4.81o/o 6.5970 2.09o/s
209
MER.
Cereals
1964 t ,19741
.76. tg&r,86,,
t994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
oor
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 27,139 29,622 32,113 32,753 33,976 34,353 0.88% O.57o/o 0.370/o 0.46% 0
YIEI 1.34 1.33 1.41 1.55 2.65 2.80 3.03 -0.10% 0.59% 0.671o
PROP 36,438 39,3E1 '44,185 49,755 86,770 94,976 104,181 O.78o/o .1.160/o ',5.79o/o 1.87o/o
HCPC 108.43 108.89 105.69 110.58 111.29 115.94 117.87 0.04% 0.51% 0.33%
CONP 13,412 14,459 14,997 16,753 25,609 29,419 31,698 O.7SYo 1.75o/o 1.50o/o
FEEP 't2,172 14,463 16,674 18,801 37,320 42,U9 48,197 1.74% 1.680/o
INDP #tlv #IIV #rw 2,028 2,084 2,310 #t.I\/ 2.
DEMP 30,185 .:34,0q3 37,032 41,379 74,035 84,366 93,320 1,21o/o o.u% 5.940Â 1.65%
PEXP 10,717 9,853 10,821 17,173 15,759 16,582 -2.31o/o 1,510/o -1.07o/o 1.02o/o
PIMP 3,160 :.:i.31677 2,897. 4,328 2,401 5,149 5,720 't.50% -2.36Yo 10.01Yo 2.13o/o
MER.
Oilseeds ,86. i:.
19Uu 1994 I 1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 7.,347 9,021 10,692 13,297 25,506 26,847 27,732 2.O7% ,1.71o/o 7.51o/o 0.640/o 0.650/o
YIEl .'. o.77 . ,.:, .0J'l 0.78 1.O1 1.98 2.19 2.30 419o/o 0.99o/o I 0.96%
PROP 5,625 6,378 6,33S 13,455 50,380 58,788 63,711 1.270/o 2.721/o 16-17.olo 1.95% 1
HCPC 4.76 5.32 4.63 3.30 3.75 3.78 3.94 '|.,110/o -'1.%o/o 0.08% 0.87o/o
CONP 590 705 656 500 863 958 1,061 1.80% -0.697o 1.31o/o 2.060/0
FEEP #NV #NV #NV #NV 1,143 't,158 1,224 #tlV #NV #tlV 0.16% 1.11o/o
INDP 4,142 4,600 6,109 8,679 38,734 49,236 53,499 1,O5"h 2.88o/o 16.640lo 3.04o/o 1.670/o
DEMP 5,378 '. ::,6'114 7,618 10,171 42,556 53,323 57,841 'l.29To 2.27/o 't5. tlvo 2.860/0
PEXP :',271 614 2,789 9,957 8,731 9,386 1O.07o/o 8.51%
, '26:130/0
-1.63% 1.460/o
PIMP 10 48 1,316 3,266 3,515 6.85o/o 7;61e/o 33.E.2% 12.03o/o 1
MER-Oils 1964' ,
66
1974t
76
1984 
'86
1994 
'
g6
1997 2005 2010 gg1.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 1,257 .'1.'340 1,648 2,022 8,696 10,913 11,870 0.640lo 2.09o/o 14.87olo 2.88o/o 1.70o/o
HCPC .5.68 . 6.42 6.85 E.4€ 13.24 16.19 18.20 1.23o/o 0.65% 5.640lo 2.55% 2.37o/o
GONP '.' .853 973 1,283 3,047 4,109 4,894 1.940/o 1.33o/o 9.98% 3.81o/o 3.56%
INDP #NV #rw ; #t.I\/ #tw 4 10 12 #M/ #tw #NV 12.14Yo 3.71o/o
DEMP ,, J;o97 't,492 4,427 5,980 7,102 1.76% 1,32o/o 12.33Yo 3.83% 3.50%
PEXP 477 5&4 607 4,962 5,768 5,814 0,72o/o 1.320Â 19.52"/o 1.90% 0.16%
PIMP 62 '8,2 115 266 837 1,047 3.O7olo -0.25o/o
'10.33o/o 15.40% 4.58o/o
MER.
Gakes
1964 
'66
15741
76
1984 t 1994 I
96
1997 2005 201 0 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
201 0
PROP 2,013 2,175 3,222 4;975 27,779 35,574 38,638 0.78% 4.01o/o 19.66% 3.14o/o 1.670/o
FEEP 661 761 968 1,736 7,659 9,281 10,847 1.42o/o 2.44o/o 18.81olo 2.43o/o 3.17o/o
DEMP 670 , 793 976 1,739 7,659 9,281 10,847 '1.700h 2.10o/o 18;73o/o 2.43o/o 3.17o/o
PEXP 1,338 .1,3U 2,226 3,252 20,977 27,138 28,845 0.33% 4.87olo 20.551 3.27o/o 1.23o/o
PIMP #ÎW #NV #l.l\t 36 845 1,053 #NV #T.IV #tlV 48.2oo/o
MER.
Meat
1964 
'66
1984 
'86
1994 
'
1997 200s 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
gg1.
,1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 6,E93 7,035 7,353 16,669 19,186 21,312 '1.72% 0.20o/o 1.77o/o 2.12o/o
HCPC .40.47 44.72 42.75 44.U 65.51 70.59 74.99 3.620/o 0.94o/o 1.22o/o
CONP .; 5,941 6,06s 1 17,914 20,1æ O.21o/o 7 2.18o/o 2.39o/o
DEMP 5,025 q,se3 6,112 6,755 15,423 18,009 20,272 1.780/o O.2$o/o 8.0201o 1.96%
PEXP 802 -:'1:'914 658 1,280 1,335 1,243 1.32o/o 0.44o/o 2.47olo 0.53% -1.42o/o
PIMP 60 19 160 203 2.17o/o 4.3E% 30.42o/o 4.88o/o
MER.
CHES
I 1984 
'86.-: :
1994 
',,.96 'l
1997 2005 2010 gg1.
1975
ggr.
t98s
ggr.
1995
ggr
200s
ggr.
2010
PROP '., 232 298 561 634 732 0.69o/o 6.260/o 1.141o 2.920/o
HCPC 1.83 '!.87 1.93 2.48 2.56 2.79 0.21o/o*A.g2Vo 0.03%
0.77%
2.34o/o 0.40o/o 1.74%
CONP 249 267 292 571 @19 750 6.54% '1.610/o 2.94o/o
DEMP 227 249 267 29.2 571 649 7 0,92o/o 6.54% 1.610/o 2.940/
PEXP 6 7 34 37 42 -0.89% -O.1Eolo 17.O4o/o 1.060/o 2.57o/o
PIMP i 1 '':;,' I 1 44 51 60 1.04o/o 1.860/o 3.30%
2t0
usA.
Gereals
lS6/t
66
1974 I
76
1984 I
86
lss4r.96' 1997 2005 2010
ggr.
1975
.ggr.
1985
,ggr. i.,
.t995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 60,833 62,716 60,460 68,271 64,659 &,032 64 0.31% .37% -0.12o/o 0.07o/o
YIEl 2.88 3.25 3.58 3.35 5.17 5.73 6.06 1.22o/o 0.96% .3.12o/o 1.28o/o 1.13o/o
PROP '175,316 204,068 216,422 229,U5 334,561 366,920 389,372 1.53% 0.597o 3.70% 1.160/o 1j9%
HCPC 84.15 82.81 79.68 81,86 115.90 119.03 121.49 -0.16% .0.387o 3.170h 0.33% 0.41o/o
CONP 16,806 16,q)0 17,E60 31,497 34,262 36,310 0.'160/o 4.10|/o 5.337s 1.060/0 1.17o/o
#NV #NV #NV #NV 167,300 174,646 177,383 #NV #NV #NV 0.540/o 0.31o/o
INDP 6,586 7,1& 10,107 40,394 47,472 52,441 0.830/o 1,470/o 14.12o/o 2.040Â 2.01o/o
DEMP 145,087 158,390 173,583 1 248,671 266,358 276,411 0.88% O.92o/o 3.04o/o 0.86% 0.74%
PEXP 45,332 37,n9 43,U1 74,U6 78,969 107,786 120,207 -1.810/o 1.38o/o 5.13% 3.97o/o 2.21o/o
PIMP 436 372 532 523 7,268 7,220 7,246 '1.57o/o 3.637o -0.08% 0.07o/o
USA.
Oilseeds
1964 
'66
11t74 t
76
1984 
'86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 -ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 24,632 22,166 24,0U 27,893 35,732 39,892 42,055 O;72o/o 0.837o 3,3401o 1.390/o 1.060/o
YIEI 1.56 1.60 1.62 2.33 2.55 2.62 0.98% 0.230h .:.3..17.% 1.14o/o 0.59%
PROP 29,2æ 34,675 38,549 45,251 83,131 101,649 110,386 1.71o/o 1.06% . p:6170 2.55o/o 1.660/o
HCPG 4.5S 4.63 4.83 4.69 5.30 5.50 5.63 0.09% o.41% tl9To 0.45o/o 0.47o/o
CONP 917 955 1,023 1,024 1,440 1,582 1,683 0.41o/o 0.6970 2,89% 1.18% '1.25o/o
FEEP #NV #NV #tw #NV 2,941 2,850 2,822 #NV ,#NV #NV,,, -0.39% -0.20o/o
INDP 20,376 21,026 25,403 25,823 44,630 52,159 57,990 0.31o/o 1;91o/o q.q% 1.97o/o 2.14o/o
DEMP 23,721 24,691 29,390 30,.143 55,512 u,239 71,058 o,4E% 1.68o/o 5.44?10 1.Mo/o 2.04o/o
PEXP .6,574 8,224 72,137 13,739 27,235 39,476 41,659 2.260/o 3,970/0 . 6.97V0 4.750Â 1.O8o/o
PIMP 1,409 1,511 1,195 658 1,444 2,065 2,330 o.70% -2.32o/o 1:5970 4.570/o 2.44o/o
USA-Oils 1964 
'66
1944 I 1994t
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 4,068 4,169 5,0,14 5,U7 9,705 11,214 12,371 0.24?/o 1.9?/o : q:09% 1.82o/o 1.98o/o
HCPC 13.88
... 
15,24 16.68 17.81 24.66 26.38 27.45 0.94% 0.91% .e.Er 0.84o/o 0.80%
CONP 2,772 3,143 3,536 3,887 6,702 7,593 8,207 1.26Yo 7.19olo ,:5:4794 1.57o/o 1.57%
INDP 0 0 t83 TE 27 15 16 1.06% rOO./O7o ,11.!?Va -7.08o/o 1.30o/o
DEMP 3,699 3,975 4,524 4,794 9,328 10,479 11,284 O.72o/o 1.307o 6.2% 1.47o/o 1.49o/o
PEXP 814 1,057 1,008 2,434 2,898 3,361 -2.8201o 5.637o '7.20o/o 2.21o/o 3.01o/o
PIMP 377 442 6(N u7 1,773 2,163 2,274 1.60% 3.17olo 9.39% 2.52Yo 1.O1o/o
USA.
Cakes
1964'
66
1574 I
76
1984'
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr. '
1985
.ggr.'
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 13,857 15,099 18,555 ,18,U4 34,858 40,744 45,314 0.86% ,2.0QT, i 5.397ô 1.97o/o 2.15o/o
FEEP 11,512 1't,930 14,245 14,104 28,258 33,373 36,70s 0.367o . ,7i7931o , j;5l9Ï96 2.10o/o 1.92o/o
DEMP 11,530 11,930 14,2E5 14,196 29,134 34,330 37,701 0.34o/o 1.ÙWo '6.1?.11 2.07% 1.89o/o
PEXP 2,375 -3,212 .4,281 4,674 6,756 7,910 9,324 3.O7% .2.910Â 3.887o 1.99% 3.34o/o
PIMP 48 1,032 1,495 1,711 .1.03%
'13.36c/o .,4.Q:!.9,!/s 4.74o/o 2.74o/o
USA.
Meat
1964 
'66
1974 I
76
1984 
'86
1994/
96'
1997 2005 2010 991. l:.,'
1985'
.. .ggr.r ,.l
1995'
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 18,394 20,068 21,93 2.1,36€ 34,664 39,067 41,478 0.88% Q.71% 4.91% 1.51o/o 1.20o/o
HCPC 94.39 101:02 106.16 101,7,1 117.05 121.47 122.43 0.68% ,0.50% :.0,w4 0.460Â 0.16%
CONP 18,854 20,829 22,519 22,189 31,812 34,967 36,592 1.00% .0.780/6 ..?.ezy, 1.19o/o 0.91o/o
DEMP 18,88q 20,w 22,æ8 22,272 31,986 35,176 36,813 1.00% : .,O.79ole ',2.95Yo 1.20o/o 0.91olo
PEXP 161 1U ..132 193 4,081 5,318 6,045 -1,74% :lO.19% :r0!i91,fr 3.36% 2.600/o
PIMP 666 '. '914 1,163 1,11! 1,478 1,428 1,379 3.210h 2:Q2% -0.430Â -0.70o/o
USA.
CHES
t964 /:66: 1574 I76' 
.
lt vu 1997 2005 2010 ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP f;19J 1,297 ..1,576 1,737 3,U4 4,2U 4,676 0.80% 1.97% 724% '1.980/o 1.86%
HCPC ô16 7.70 ::t8,37 13.91 15.59 16.52 O.72Vo 1.53o/o ,5.069 1.44o/o 1.17o/o
CONP 1.,230 1,364 1,633 I,E26 3,780 4,489 4,936 1,0Éo/o -1;qzllo .7;24o/o 2.17o/o 't.920/o
DEMP 1237 1,372 1,643 1,83€ 3,781 4,490 4,938 1.U% .. 
.1.82o/o r.1geh 2.170/o '1.920/o
PEXP 40 15 15 -0.12% .0.35% 2 i4+% -1'1.54o/o 0.00o/o
PIMP
, l;tq 143 241 277 ,4.68% 0.36% 5.87% 6.74o/o 2.82o/o
2tt
CAN.
Cereals
1964 
'oo
1974 I
'', 76 :
t984 
'86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggt.
1975
ggr.
1985
9gr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL #t{v , #M/ #NV #NV 19,049 18,822 18,807 #NV #NV #NV -0.1Sio -0.02o/o
YIEl #NV #l.l\/ #M/ 2.60 2.91 3.05 #t{v #r.tv #NV 1.420/o 0.92o/o
PROP #NV #NV #tlV 49,552 u,794 57,309 #tw #M/, #tw 1.260/o 0.90%
HCPC 90.17 ,88.88 87.72 87.46 104.22 102.85 105.48 -o.14% -0.13% 1.45o/o -0.17Yo 0.507o
CONP . 1,775 -. 1,835 1,998 3,154 3,276 3,481 0.3,40h 0.360/o 4.3s% 0.48o/o 1.22Yo
FEEP fNV , #tw #w 21,599 22,784 23,987 #tlV ,#NV #l.l\/ 0.67o/o 1.03o/o
INDP #tw #M/ #tw 1,174 1,358 1,312 #tw #tw fNV 1.84o/o
DEMP 17,932 22,397 22,U7 28,684 30,275 31,714 o.90% 1.33o/o 2.08% 0.68% 0.93%
PEXP 15,816 10425 17,7.99 15,433 24,910 28,312 29,584 -4.08% 5.507o 2.84:o/o 1.61% 0.88o/o
PIMP , 560 1,251 2,097 3,793 3,990 3.49% 4.92o/o 11.63% 7.69% 1.02o/o
CAN-
Oilseeds
1964t
.66
1974 I
76'
19',/I 1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
g9r.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
201 0
LEVL ,''J;569 2,866 2,356 7,010 7,750 7,988 O.23o/o 6.210h 7.74o/o 1.26% 0.61%
YIEl 0.88 o.92 '. 1;01 0.96 1.47 1.65 1.73 0.397o 0.957o 3.z',1o/o 1.40o/o 0.96%
PROP 1,354 '. .7,441 2;693 2,302 10,334 12,774 13,813 O.620/o 7.22o/o 11.19% 2.690/0
HCPC #NV #NV 1 #Î.rv #tw 7.16 7.73 8.33 #NV #t.l\/ 0.97o/o 1.50%
CONP .#ÎW #try 216 247 275 #NV #t.l\/ 1.69% 2.1
FEEP #1.1V #tû/ #l.lv #tIV 1,062 '1,006 1,038 #NV #NV -0.670/o 0.630/o
INDP 692 975 1,030 4,956 5,696 6,116 0.91% 2.57% 14.510h 1.75o/o 1
DEMP 962 1,061 1,4U 1,492 6,701 7,462 7,984 1.1 EYo 2.64Yo 13.91% 1.35o/o 1.360/o
PEXP 775 1,66E 1,277 4,479 5,974 6,515 0.160Â 7-%o/o 8.58o/o 3.67To 1.75o/o
PIMP 537 '475 446 599 662 685 -1.24% 0.29o/o 1.71o/o 1.260/o 0.69%
GAN-Oils 1364 
'
1974 t
76
1984 I
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
,1975
ggr.
't985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 151 t. 179 244 264 1,737 2,006 2,167 '1,74o/o 3.14o/o 1V.77o/o 1.82o/o 1.56%
HGPC , 7.75 10.12 10.89 20.06 20.41 21.05 2.10o/o 0.60% 5.860/o o.22% 0.620/o
CONP ,r::.';" 197 607 650 696 2.58o/o 1,1Qo/o E.V"/o 0.86% 1.38%
INDP #NV' . lr#NV-,' #i.lv , #NV 12 25 36 #tw #NV #tw 7.57o/o
DEMP ,.,,238 , - '.269 ., 320 '368 1,520 1,659 1,794 1.27o/o 1.72olo 13.88% 1.10o/o 1.58To
PEXP 40 670 803 874 1.23o/o 8.07o/o 22.630/o 2.29Yo 1.71o/o
PIMP 110 :; ,".,.117 136 146 317 455 502 0.617o 1.65% 7.170h 4.620/o 1.99o/o
CAN.
Cakes
1964 t 1974 I
76
.19'd/t 
.
88
1994 
'95
1997 2005 20'|.0 ggf.
1975 1985
ggr.
r995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 510 ,, ',557 697 726 3,207 3,667 3,930 '0.89o/o 2.260/o '13.57Yo 1.69% 1.390/o
FEEP . 491 624 ,.766 854 2,682 3,822 4,561 2.42o/o 2.OEoh 11.00o/o 4.53o/o 3.60%
DEMP 766 854 2,682 3,822 4,561 2.42% 2.08o/o 11.00% 4.53o/o 3.60%
PEXP 229 :;r. 151 165 129 1,238 933 722 .4.05% 0.860/o 18.30o/o -3.47o/o -5.00o/o
PIMP 211 .,.225 713 1,089 1,352 0.36% o,29e/o 10.10% 5.43o/o 4.43o/o
CAN.
Meat
1964 
''66
1974 t
76
1984 
'.86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
g9r.
1985
ggr.
,t995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 1,736 ., 1,889 2,107 2,161 3,274 3,694 4,031 0.85o/o 'l.10o/o 3.74o/o 1.52o/o 1.760/0
HCPC 86.15 .:: r91,59 95.85 94.76 91.62 94.86 96.74 0.61% 0,460lo 4.37o/o O.43o/o 0.39%
CONP 1,695 '., I.E91 2,080 2,165 2,773 3,022 3,194 'i.10o/o 0.960/o 2.42% 1.08o/o 1.11o/o
DEMP r,:. 1.739 2,140 2,ru 2,873 3,133 3,307 1.10% 0.99o/o 2.48o/o 1.09% 1.09%
PEXP ,62 ... 61 . 103 88 840 1,000 1,159 -A17o/o 5.41o/o 19.0E% 2.20o/o 3.00%
PIMP , ,110 '. 147 438 438 433 4.ilYo 2.24% 1O.13o/o 0.00o/o -0.23Yo
GAN.
CHES
t964 
'
1574t
r.76, ' '
1984
'86
I 'r994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
r985
ggr.
1995'
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP ,,, 130 147 350 360 386 1.12o/o 8.60% 0.35o/o 1.40o/o
HGPC
CONP
4.27 4.94 7.13 11.48 1 1.61 11.89 2.00o/o 5.52o/o 0.14o/o 0.48o/o
131 163 347 370 392 'l..97o/o 0.81% 1..l67o
DEMP .132 163 351 374 396 2.51"/o 8.52o/o 0.80% 1.15Yo
PEXP 15 23 17 20 0.837o -1.20To 3.90% -3.71o/o 3.30%
PIMP .t .::..,:'t! :.16 23 31 31 4.81To '2.3OTo 3.30% 3.80% 0.00o/o
::.-:,,:.
2r2
ROW-
Gereals
1964 t
66
1974 I
76
1984 
'86
1994'
s6
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr. 
,
1985
99r,
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 317,749 328,177 328,392 335,494 364,581 371,974 383,796 0.32o/o .0,01o/o 0.87P/o 0.25o/o 0.637o
YIEl 0.98 1.07 1.16 1.20 1.76 1.97 2.06 0.897o 0.84o/o 3.5070 1.460/o 0.89o/o
PROP 310,900 350,954 381,8s0 403,331 a+0,868 734,374 791,915 1.22o/o 0.E5% 4.41o/o '1.720/o 1.52o/o
HCPC 142.71 146.83 145.63 162.03 163.78 '165.46 '0.0370 0.299/o 0.82To 0.130/o 0.200/
CONP 229,183 245,903 271,896 2E9,623 529,418 624,687 685,923 0.710/o 1.O1o/o 5.71% 2.09o/o 1.89%
FEEP 62,355 76,771 85,496 128,686 143,771 1*,367 2.12o/o 2.1Qo/o 4.40% 1.40o/o 1.43o/o
INDP 3,893 4,189 5,010 5,557 10,731 12,470 13,559 0.73o/o 1,810/o 6;55% 1.90o/o 1.690/o
DEMP 329,351 406,799 436,688 753,688 874,957 954,429 O.9l4olo 1.19o/o 5,270/o 1.88o/o 1.75o/o
PEXP 29,329 27,507 27,111 26,820 6,671 6,173 6,057 '0.ù4o/o 4.14o/o -11.O30h -0.97o/o -0.38%
PIMP 45,005 47,442 52,866 68,540 120,697 146,755 168,570 0.5ll7o 1.090/o 7.12o/o 2.47o/o 2.81Yo
ROW.
Oilseeds
1964 
'6ô
1974 I
76
1984 
'86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
99r:
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
LEVL 65,305 65,437 69,167 70,805 96,455 107,230 113,236 0.020/o 0.560/o 2,81.o/o 1.33o/o 1.10o/o
YIEl 1.19 1.19 1.24 1.30 2.30 2.50 2.U O.O7clo o.40% 5.26% 1.05o/o 1.09%
PROP 77,491 78,156 85,939 92,247 221,599 267,846 298,656 0.0970 0.95% 8.21o/o 2.40o/o 2.20o/o
HCPC 6.42 6.02 5.97 6.05 8.02 9.39 9.94 -0.64olo 4,1oo/o 2.00o/o 1.15o/o
CONP 10,277 10,374 11,046 12,O25 26,188 35,821 41,239 0.097o 0.630/6 :7.46Yo 3.99% 2.860Â
FEEP 1,W 1,871 1,975 1,618 3,944 4,069 4,160 1.3070 0.55% 5.9370 0.390/o 0.44o/o
INDP 55,æ3 55,856 63,470 70,709 188,182 223,389 248,040 A15o/o 1.290Â '9.48o/o 2.17o/o 2.12o/o
DEMP 71,441 72,923 81,876 90,004 229,009 275,966 307,501 O.21o/o 1.16% , 8.957c 2.360/o 2.19o/o
PEXP 10,029 8,832 8,100 6,6't5 3,220 6,055 6,696 -1.260/o {.860/o .7.4OVo 8.21o/o 2.03o/o
PIMP 4,071 3,90S 4,181 4,790 11,012 14,175 15,540 -O.41o/o 0.68o/o .8,400/0 3.21o/o 1.86%
ROW-
Oils
1964 
'66
1974 I
76
1984 
'86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 gg1.
1975
,ggr.
1985
ggr.
1995
ggr
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 10,175 11.035 12,593 14,151 39,143 46,325 51,368 0.81o/o 1.330/o 9.91% 2.13o/o 2.090/
HCPC 4.85 4.97 5,19 5.53 8.65 8.72 8.86 o.23% ., O.43Yo !.3ç% 0.10% 0.31o/o
CONP 7,772 E,555 '9,602 10,997 28,285 33,271 36,707 0.9670 1.160/0 9.42% 2.05o/o 1,990/o
INDP 4 4 6 10 59 107 116 o.43% 3.700h , 20.510h 7.680/o 1.650/o
DEMP 9,163 10,005 11,272 12,750 37,062 43,842 48,348 0;887o 1.20% 10,43e/o 2.12o/o 1.987o
PEXP 2,469 2,556 3,329 4,487 8,480 9,785 10,920 o.y% 2.68% 8.10% 1.81o/o 2.22o/o
PlMP 1,393 1,661 2,2ffi 2,65E 6,426 7,301 7,898 1,77o/o 2.88Vo 9.32Yo 1.610/o 1.58Yo
ROW.
Gakes
1964 
'66
1974 I
78
lgvlt
86
1994 
'96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
1985
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 12,039 13,054 't5,072 17,060 37,897 45,097 50,917 0.81Yo 1.45Yo 7.99o/o 2.20o/o 2.460/o
FEEP 9,239 10,256 I 1,989 14,297 42,497 49,851 54,992 1.050h 1;57o/o 11.12o/. 2.02% 1.98%
DEMP 9,258 10,274 12,009 '14,320 42,715 50,095 55,263 1.05% ,1:â7c/o '11.153/o 2.O1% 1.98Yo
PEXP 3,473 3,729 4,æ2 4,000 4,659 6,676 8,206 0.710h 0.8670 1.15% 4.600/o 4.21o/o
PIMP 772 905 '1,153 1,430 9,660 11,672 12,552 1,607o 2.45o/o 19.3Eo/o 2.39o/o 1.460Â
ROW.
Meat
1964 t
66
1974 t
76
1984r'
86
1994 /
96
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 18,270 20,uE 22,5æ 24,819 47,169 54,764 59,ô40 1.18o/o 8.94o/o ,6.UlYo 1.880/o 1.72o/o
HCPC 10.95 11:42 11.58 12.07 15.08 15.04 15.06 0.420/o 0.'t5% '2;2% -0.03o/o 0.03o/o
CONP 17,92 1s,66Q 214æ 24,013 49,266 57,387 62,391 '1.15o/o .0.86% 7.17%. 1.9370 1.69%
DEMP 17dt5 19,770 21,576 24,142 49,783 57,997 63,065 1.15% , 0.6E% '|.?Yo 1.93Yo 1.69%
PEXP 1,246 1.530 1,776 1,688 521 772 922 2.O7olo 1:50% -9.72% 5.04o/o 3.620/o
PIMP 628 735 809 1,034 3,104 4,006 4,348 1.5870 o.96% 11;86% 3.24o/o 1.650/0
ROW.
CHES
1964 
'66
1974t.
76 :'
1984/
86
1994 
'g6
1997 2005 2010 ggr.
1975
ggr.
2005
ggr.
2010
PROP 1,073 1.?08 1,295 1,438 2,023 2,142 2,205 1.19% 0.700h. 3.79% 0.72o/o 0.58%
HCPC 0.68 0.71 o.71 o.74 0.69 0.63 0.59 0.44% 0,03% -0.260h -1.08o/o -1.31o/o
CONP 1,087 1.222 1,318 1478 2,255 2,414 2,457 1.18% O,76o/n 4,æoh 0.86% 0.35%
DEMP 1,089 1,224 13m 1,460 2,270 2,431 2,474 1.18alo 0.760/0 4.62yo 0.867o 0.35%
PEXP 54 67 73 79 141 140 1U 2.11o/o 0.96% 5.61% -0.09o/o 1.92o/o
PIMP 68 86 101 122 388 429 423 2.31% 1.610/0 11.8E% 1.260/o -0.28Yo
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6 - MECOP: A MODEL OF'TIIE EU's PRODUCING SECTOR OF CEREALS, OILSEEDS
AI\D PROTEIN CROPS
Agenda 2000 and beyond: Impact of reforms of the Common Market Organisation for "grandes
culturestl
Alexandre Gohin
Partner l: INRA-ESR, Rennes
6.1. Introduction
The objective of this part of the project (i.e., subtask 2.1) was to develop a tool for simulating policy
reforms in the arable crop sector of the European Union (EU). This sector plays a central role in the
EU agricultural sector, as illustrated by the following figures. In 1996, the contribution of COP
products (Cereals, Oilseeds and Protein crops) in EU final agricultural output was roughly llYo and
their share in aggregate farm income was estimated at 2L%o. The total area used for the cultivation of
these products accounted for around 42% of the EU Utilised Agricultural Area and 2,75 million
holdings were involved in these productions. The rate of EU self-sufficiency was estimated at 120%
for cereals, 45oÂ for oilseeds and 80% for protein crops. Finally, the EU is the third most important
cereal producer and accounts for 18% of world exports for wheat and lloÂ for coarse grains. On the
other hand, the EU is the most important oilseed importer with 35oÂ of world imports of oilseeds in
1999.
The huge public intervention is another striking feature of this sector. For instance, this sector received
in 1999 17 866 millions euros from the European budget or, equivalently,45%o of the European public
expenditures for the whole agricultural sector. Since the 1992 CAP reform, an unique Common
Market Organisation (CMO) regulates this sector. In a very general way, this 1992 CAP reform
reduced cereal price support, removed oilseed price support, introduced compensatory payments based
on areas and strengthened supply management measures (set-aside policy). This shift in support
mechanism for the arable crop sector partly allowed to conclude the Uruguay Round negotiations on
agriculture.
The EU adopted in 1999 a new reform of the CAP, the so-called Agenda 2000 CAP reform. As far as
the arable crop sector is concerned, this new reform basically follows the principles of the 1992 CAP
reform with new cuts in cereal price support compensated by increased direct payments for cereal
areas while direct payments for oilseed areas are reduced to the level of the former. An urgent question
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is to determine whether this new version of the CMO for arable crops can be accepted by EU trading
partners in the context of the new multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade organisation
(WTO). In particular, area direct payments cannot be actually challenged at the WTO due to the blue
box exemption and the peace clause. However, it is more than likely that this exemption will be under
scrutiny during the new round of negotiations. consequently, cAP area direct payments could be
challenged during these negotiations, unless it can be proved that these payments have no, or at most,
minimal distortion effects on production and trade, so that they could be qualified as green box
measures. Evaluating the consequences of area direct payments on production is therefore of great
interest. In the same time, it is also crucial to examine the impacts of the new system on various
indicators that are rarely discussed in existing studies, such as the evolution of agricultural income,
land retum and public expenditures.
To our knowledge, no well-designed model is actually available to deal with these issues. The model
developed in this project fills a gap in the stock of research tools available to EU decision makers.
Obviously, there already exists several models focused on the arable crop sector, defined either at the
European level or at national levels. no These models generally differ in terms of product coverage,
calibration process, data sources, behavioural relations, etc. Results, given by predictions, simulations
or elasticities, are thus not easily comparable, claiming for a new unified framework for all EU
Member States. Our model precisely is implemented at the national level for various European Union
Member States, which are the main COP crop-producing countries, and thus offers this advantage,
while keeping enough flexibility in order to take account of the particularities of each EU Member
State.
We label our model MECOP where the acronym stands for Maximum Enhopy on Cereals, Oilseeds
and protein crops. In a general way, this model describes the behaviour of agricultural producers with
respect to the supply of COP crops, the allocation of land across these crops and their decision in yield
levels. The main policy instruments of the CMO for arable crops, i.e. the direct payment system, the
set-aside requirement, etc. are explicitly incorporated in the model. This permits the evaluation of the
effects of these instruments on the decision variables of arable crop producers. As such, impacts on
production levels of previous reforms of the arable crop CMO (in particular the 1992 or MacSharry
reform) may be simulated with the MECOP model. In the same vein, MECOP allows to assess the
likely future impacts of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform and, of gleat importance, the potential effects of
propositions that may emerge during the WTO talks. This is a crucial feature of the MECOP model
since the objectives of this FAIR programme were to clearly understand the process by which policy
no Fo, e*ample, MacQuinn (2000) for lreland, Judez et al. (1999) for Spain, Moro and Sckotai (1998) for ltaly,
Jensen (1996) for Denmark, Guyomard et al. (1996) for France, oude Lansink and Peerlings (1996) for The
Netherlands, cahill (1997) for the uEl2. This list is obviously non exhaustive.
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changes impact on supply, derived demand, final demand and trade as well as to provide policy
makers with sound economic and policy-oriented analyses to back their proposals in these tallc.
Our model has been specified according to some clearly defined scientific principles. The developed
specification is strongly based on production theory. The producer's problem is to select levels of
variable inputs and allocate total land among COP crops in order to maximise profits subject to
technical and market constraints. Market conshaints are captured by input and output price vectors and
agricultural policy instruments. We use the duality theory to represent technical conshaints and we
assume that land is a quasi-fixed but allocatable factor.
As the name of the model suggests, behavioural parameters specified in this model are calibrated in a
stochastic manner using the Generalised Maximum Entropy (GME) econometric technique. This
technique is more and more widely used in empirical sfudies because it reveals more appropriate in
some circumstances than other "traditional" techniques, such as the least square or maximum
likelihood ones. In particular, when collinearity between exogenous variables is strong, haditional
econometric estimators are highly unstable while it has been proved that GME estimators are much
more efficient. In the case of the MECOP model, we observe strong collinearity between COP crop
prices, making judicious the choice of the GME technique.
The theoretical model is applied to six European counhies: Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Spain
and UK. Nine COP crops are distinguished: five cereals (soft wheat, barley, maize, oat and rye), three
oilseeds (rape, sunflower and soya) and one protein crop (field peas). Parameter estimation is carried
over 1973-1999 using annual data suppliedby Eurostat.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 deals with the theoretical aspects of the MECOP
model. V/e explain the specification of behavioural relationships (supply functions, land allocation
functions, etc.). They derive from an explicit optimisation program which incorporates the main policy
instruments of the arable crop CMO. Section 3 is devoted to the estimation framework based on the
GME approach. The principles of the GME econometric technique are first briefly reminded and then
we discuss the implementation of this technique for the MECOP model. Estimation results are
presented and discussed in section 4. kr section 5, we define policy experiments and analyse results.
Finally, section 6 concludes, providing some policy recommendations.
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6.2. Theoretical framework
The modelling of the behaviour of agricultural producers has received considerable attention from
agricultural economists, notably since the 1992 CAP reform. Many methodological approaches have
been investigated in the literature. The theoretical foundation of the MECOP model is the duality
theory in the presence ofallocatable quasi-fixed factors. 
es
6.2,1. Pretiminartes: The duality theory under allocatable quasi-ftxedfactor
Consider a multi-output firm with a fixed amount of an allocatable quasi-fixed factor î. that can be
devoted to 1 enterprises. We assume that technologies of enterprises i=1,'..,1 are disjoint, i.e. the
production technology is non-joint in variable inputs but is characterised by the existence of an
allocatable quasi-fixed factor. The producer's problem is to select levels of N variable inputs for each
of the 1 enterprises and to allocate the quasi-fixed factor among them. Assuming that the producer is
a price taker in the output and variable input markets, its profit-maximising program may be written
as:
nÇ,,r,Z)= #?ï,,lLo,y, -ft r,*,,,rr, = f '(x,.,,t,),ir, =z] (1)
where y is the vector of the / outputs, p is the corresponding price vector, x is the vector of the N
variable inputs, w is the corresponding price vector, / is the vector of the quantities of the quasi-fixed
factor allocated to the 1 enterprises and /t 6^,J,) is a concave production function for enterprise I .
This program defines a restricted profit function which is linearly homogeneous and convex in prices,
monotonically increasing in output prices, monotonically decreasing in variabte input prices, and
monotonically increasing in the allocatable quasi-fixed factor'
Due to the separability assumption of the production technology with respect to variable inputs, this
program may be solved in two stages. kr the first stage, the optimal quantities of variable inputs and
outputs are determined for a given allocation of the quasi-fixed factor. The program corresponding to
this first stage may be written as:
n'(p,,w,l,)=T.filo,r,-f^r,*,,,,!, = f'(",,,,r,)] vi=1,...,1 (2)
We then obtain an output-specific profit function which measures the quasi-rent to the allocatable
quasi-fixed factor. This function is linearly homogeneous and convex in prices, monotonically
e5 For a presentation or applications of this approach, see, among others, Just et al. (1983), Shumway et al.
(1984), Chambers and Jusi (tlSl;, Moschini (1989), Coyle (1993), Jensen and Lind (1993), Oude Lansink and
Peerlings (1996), Guyomard et al. (1996), Ball et al. (1997).
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increasing in output prices, monotonically decreasing in variable input prices, and monotonically
increasing and concave in the allocation of the quasi-fixed factor. The latter property implies that the
quasi-rent is decreasing in the amount of the quasi-fixed factor. In the second stage, the optimal
allocation of the quasi-fixed factor between the 1 enterprises is obtained by solving the following
maximisation program:
n(n,r,t)=-f.[* n'(p,,r,L\ft, =7] (3)
Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions of the producer's program are:
fu'(p,,w,1,)l ô1, 
-),=o vi =1,...,1
Vi =1,...,1
(4)
(s)l, =Lt
where l, is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint resulting from the fixed total
amount of the allocatable quasi-fixed factor. From conditions (4), we observe that, at the optimum of
the multi-product firm, the shadow prices or marginal quasirents of the allocatable quasi-fixed factor
are equalised across the 1 enterprises. Conditions (4) and (5) defines a square system of /+1
endogenous variables and equations. Solving this system yields:
x()=xÇ,*,t) (6)
1,0=t,(0,*,1) vi =1,...,1 (7)
Thus the optimal allocation of the quasi-fixed factor as well as its shadow price depend on all output
prices, variable input prices and the total amount of the allocatable quasi-fixed factor. The comparative
statics ofthese endogenous variables are given by:
dÀ =[i ,,,I']-'[rz* E6',,,1'n',,,,dp,.ËÉ(";,rI'r',,*,,dw.f (s)
dr, = 6,,,,,f1>{"1,,1'l' oZ
-6',,,,\'n7,o,dp, *G',,,,I'[iht,, ]'] 'É{rl, l'ni,o,do, (9)
>Zft4,l'n!,,,.d,,,I'[É{'t,,}'] 'f6',,,,1' n',,,,, dr, * (n1,,,
where fi'u are the second order derivatives of the ouput-specific profit functions. From the properties
of these output-specific profit functions mentioned above, we can infer that the shadow price is
2t8
decreasing in the amount of the quasi-fixed factor, increasing in the prices of outputs if the quasi-fixed
factor is non-inferior. Moreover, this shadow price is homogeneous of degree one in output and
variable input prices. However, the sign of the effect of variable input prices on the shadow price is
indeterminate. Equation (9) provides the comparative statics of the optimal allocation of the quasi-
fixed factor. Allocation of the quasi-fixed factor to one given enterprise is an increasing function of
the total amount of this quasi-fixed factor and of the price of the corresponding output, again under the
assumption of non-inferiority of the quasi-fixed factor. It is a decreasing function of the price of other
outputs. Finally, it is homogeneous of degree zero in prices. The sign of the effect of variable input
prices on the optimal allocation is also indeterminate'
Finally, output supply and variable input derived demand functions are obtained by applying
Hotelling,s lemma to each output-specific profit function evaluated at the optimal allocation of the
quasi-fixed factor:
y,0 = y,(p,,*1,(p,*,L))= tu'b,,rJ,b,*,7)l ap, Yi =1,"'1 (10)
",,,(.)= *,.,b,,*,1,Ç,r,L))=-tu'b,,',t,(p,',1)l a*, Yn=l'"''N;vi=l'"''I 
(11)
Despite the assumption of non-jointness in variable inputs, we must underline that these output supply
and variable input derived demand functions depend again on all output prices, variable input prices
and the amount of the allocatable quasi-fixed factor, through the allocation of the quasi-fixed factor'
Their comparative statics are given by:
N
dy, = tt'o,r,dp, * i r{p,,ndwn +n'r., dl, vi =1,""1 02)
n=l
I
wnPi ap, -Lil,nn^dw^ -Ir'nn,,dl, Yn =1r...,N;Yi =1,,..,1 (1 3)
Supply of a given output is increasing in its own price and in the amount of quasi-fixed factor,
decreasing in other output prices, under the assumption of non-inferiority of the quasi-fixed factor'
This supply function is also homogeneous of degree zero in output and variable input prices. The sign
of the effect of variable input prices on output supply is still indeterminate. By symmetry, the sign of
the effect of output prices on the derived demands of variable inputs is also ambiguous. The derived
demands of variable inputs are homogeneous of degree zero in output and variable input prices and
decreasing in their own Price.
This methodological approach displays several attractive features. Firstly, the relevance of this multi-
product framework to agricultural production is readily apparent. For a producer specialised in arable
crop farming, this approach can represent a land allocation problem, where a fixed farm acreage can
dx,,, = -fi
2r9
,,0 = y,(p,r,Z)t t,(t,*,r)= r,Çr,*,r)
be devoted to altemative crops. This could also represent a production model of the agricultural sector,
with the quasi-fixed factor being the total available land for a region or a country. Secondly, the dual
approach to the specification of a system of output supplies, variable input derived demands and land
allocations has well known advantages over estimation of a single output supply or acreage response
equation (Coyle, 1993). In particular, the dual system approach permits the incorporation of theoretical
restrictions on coefficients across equations implied by hypotheses of competitive profit maximisation
and also the recovery of the underlying technology. Furthermore, the duality approach provides other
advantages when empirical estimation of behavioural parameters is considered. In a primal approach,
production and/or transformation functions can be estimated directly. However, as pointed out by
Varian (1984) or Chambers and Just (1989), it has been difficult to find a functional specification of
the production technology which is simple enough to be estimated directly and does not impose too
many a priori restrictions on economic parameters. On the other hand, the duality approach yields the
option of larger flexibility in econometric description by allowing the use of flexible functional forms.
Thirdly, if land is the allocatable quasi-fixed factor, yields are determined endogenously while in
many approaches, especially with mathematical programming models, these yields are often assumed
to be constant. Yields are given by:
(14)
They are homogeneous of degree zeto in output and variable input prices. However, the effects of
exogenous variables are a priori indeterminate. Fourthly, policy instuments can be incorporated
explicitly in that framework. For instance, Moro and Sckokai, Oude Lansink and Peerlings or
Guyomard et al. have introduced in different ways the policy instruments of the arable crop CMO in
their model and we will discuss below our own modelling of arable crop CMO instruments.
Despite this appealing features, this framework has not been applied, up to now, to the arable crop
sector of all EU Member States. One possible explanation lies in the difficulty to estimate
econometrically the behavioural parameters of the system of output supplies, variable input derived
demands and allocation of the quasi-fixed factor. This difficulty results from the multicollinearity
between output prices. As underlined by Coyle (1993), all crop acreage allocation frrnctions are
seldom estimated simultaneously and moreover all output prices are not included in these functions.
However, we must note that the GME econometric technique is well-suited in such context,
facilitating the application of this framework to the arable crop sector of various EU member states.
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6.2.2. The theoretîcal structure of the MECOP model
For the MECOp model, we apply the duality theory under allocatable quasi-fixed factor reviewed
above. We assume that land is the only allocatable quasi-fixed factor between / COP crop enterprises
of a representative farm for each EU Member State. The number of considered activities will depend
on the EU Member State and therefore will be defined later. However, for all of them, we assume the
existence of only one aggregate variable input (N=1) due to data constraints. We explicit the first
stage of the optimisation process before turning to the second one.
6.2.2.1. Thefirst stage
COp crop-specific profit functions are approximated by Normalised Quadratic (NQ) forms defined on
normalised output price s ( p t I w ). Thus, they can be written as:
n''' b,,,,w,,1,,,,1)= o, + b,1,,, + 
", 
L!-+e,t
+ o.s d,(L) + o.s e,t?.,+ o.5ry,t 2 (1 s)
* f,Ll,., + g,l,.,t*7r. Po 1 ,vi=1,...,1
-wtwl
where 0,,b,,c,,d,,e,,f,,gt,hi,6i,Vi are behavioural parameters to be estimated and / is the index
for the years included in the analysis.
The specification of this restricted profit function deserves several remarks. Firstly, a time trend is
included as an explanatory variable and is assumed to represent the effects of technical change on
profits, output supplies, variable input derived demands and land allocations. This specification of
technical change is quite arbitrary but is commonly adopted in empirical work.
Secondly, the choice of the NQ functional form is driven by practical considerations. As will become
clear later, use of this flexible functional form permits a closed-form solution to acreage allocations
insofar as the equation system composed of (4) and (5) is linear.
Thirdly, the behavioural parameters listed above must satisfu some constraints in order to fulfil the
theoretical requirements of output-specific profit functions. These constraints are:
d,>-Q,Vf = 1,..,,/ (16)
e, < 0,Yi =1,,.., I (17)
f.>0,Vi=1,...,1
22r
(18)
Constaints (16) ensure the convexity in prices of the output-specific profit functions. Constraints (17)
ensure the concavity in the land allocation of these functions. Finally, if we assume that land is a non-
inferior input, then constraints (18) must hold.
Fourthly, by applying Hotelling's lemma to these profit functions, one obtains the supply functions for
a given land allocation:
y,,,(p,,,,w,,1,,,,t)= 
", 
+d, L+ f],., + h,t ,Vi =L,...,1 (le)
These supply functions are linear in parameters and in explanatory variables.
Fifthly, we assume that agricultural producers make naive price expectatons. In other words, expected
prices are supposed to be equal to past prices.
6.2.2.2. The second stage
We now turn to the second stage of the optimisation process, which focuses on the land allocation
decision. With the 1992 CAP reform, internal support for arable crop growers has significantly
changed. The Agenda 2000 CAP reform basically deepens this change. In a general way, these
reforms involve significant support price reductions, compensated by area direct payments and a land
set-aside scheme. The direct payment and land set-aside programs are highly complex as they include
many exemptions or special cases. For instance, the levels of area direct payments differ between COp
crops and regions because they are based on historical regional average yields and historical crop
areas. Furtherrnore, these area direct payments are contingent upon idling a certain proportion of
historical base areas for "professional" producers, i.e., those with an area more than that needed to
grow 92 tonnes of cereals. On the other hand, "small" producers need not set aside part of their arable
crop area in order to qualiÛr for area direct payments. Moreover, the levels of area direct payments can
be revised, depending whether maximum eligible areas are exceeded or not. The land set-aside scheme
also includes many particularities. We can distinguish between the rotational, non-rotational and
voluntary set-aside programs, which differ with respect to the rate of set-aside. Consequently,
producers located in different regions or endowed with different land resources are affected in
different ways by these reforms.
These intricate mechanisms are necessarily captured in an imperfect manner in the MECOP model,
which is designed at the national level. Nevertheless, MECOP provides "average" indicators which are
quite useful for policy makers. These policy mechanisms are explicitly introduced in the second stage
of the optimisation program for the representàtive farm, which is given by:
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n' (P,,r,,i,ct1,e1,r)= 
ry-t n,., b,,,,w,, r,,,,t)+ a,., / w, J,,, +af, / w,Jf,
Q0)
subject to: it,,, *tf, 
=T
(21)
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(22)
The first-order Kuhn and Tucker condifions for this program are:
b,*e,t,,, *t,#*r,,.ï_T=o 1 t,,, ào nu
's. Q3)4t,., +lf, -L, s0 ! À, >0
(24)
Condifions (23) imply that aparticnlar cro
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Before the 1992 cAP reform, the system of conditions e3)-e0reduces to:
b, +e,l,,, *.f,L!-* g,, 
-L=o r 1,., >owt wt
ft,,,-q=o 1 À,>o
A, =O,a.f, =Ùra,,, =0
.É
b,+f,l*t,t
Assuming interior solutions, this system leads to:
b,+.f, lL* sJ
wr
ei
À,=
w,
>0
IL,*Z
>0
Qs)
(26)
Q7)
É ei
L,
j=l êi
I 
,,,
I
_b,_ f,ï_ r,Iet \rre,j=l
From the conshaints (16)-(18) on behavioural parameters, one can easily check that the normalised
land shadow price is decreasing in the total amount of land, increasing in the prices of outputs and
homogeneous of degree one in output and variable input prices. Land allocated to one COP crop is an
increasing function of the total amount of land and of the price of the corresponding output. It is a
decreasing function of the price of other outputs and is homogeneous of degre e zero in prices. The
effect of the variable input price on land allocation is indeterminate.
After the implementation of the t992 CAP reform, the level of endogenous variables are given by
(always assuming an interior solution):
nu This notation stands for complementary slackness: (x > 0 I / > 0)<+ (r > 0,y >0,xy =0)
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b, + f,l* r,
i -tf, *Z
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ei
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(28)
>0 (2e)
Irre,
i=l
*o tt
wl
1-tf, *Zj=r ej
1
-b,- f,P't -r-1-ou
wt wlIi,,
êiIIIei
Equations (2g) and (29) show that the set-aside requirement has a positive effect on the normalised
land shadow price and a negative effect on land allocated to each crop. Direct payments for cultivated
crops have a positive effects on the normalised land shadow price. We can also observe that acreage
allocation to one given crop is an increasing function of its own direct payment and a decreasing
function of direct payments for all other crops. The direct payment for idle land has no effect on these
variables but only on the opporhrnity cost of the set-aside requirement (cf. equation 28). Finally, we
must note that the effects of the prices and the total available land are as described before.
6.2.3. Miscetlaneous by-products of the MECOP model
kr addition to the previously described COP crop supply functions (equations 19), land allocation
functions (equations 27 for the cultivated areas before the 1992 CAP reform; equations 29 for tbe
cultivated areas after the L992CAP reform) and the land shadow price function (equations 26 and28),
several other interesting results may be derived from the MECOP model.
Firstly, as indicated above, yields are obtained by dividing output supply by corresponding cultivated
areas:
n,,0 = f ,*(r, + d, L+ n,,)r L.,0 ,vi =r,...,1 (30)
Secondly, public expenditures induced by area direct payments can be computed for each COP crop
(they are denoted by P8,.,) and for the entire arable crop CMO (they are denoted by PE,):
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P8,,, = a,,,1 ,,, (3 1)
I
PE, 
-ZPa,,, + af,lf,
i=l
Thirdly, elasticities of output supplies and land allocations with respect to output prices, direct
payments and total available land can also be computed. The levels of these elasticities depend on the
year. Their expressions are given below for one year after the implementation of the 1992 CAP
reform.
(32)
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Finally, we can insulate the impacts of each explanatory variable on endogenous variables. For
instance, the impacts of the tend on cultivated areas, output supplies and yields are given by:
{s'/L ./o
oôi
ù,, 
-ôt .r,9!*t,otôt et II t//"t
0r,., | (
-:-l
ôt /,,, I ,,.,)!*0,) (34)(,f,
226
6.3. Estimation framework: The Generalised Maximum Entropy
In order to implement the MECOP model, we need to calibrate the behavioural parameters involved in
the COP crop supply and land allocation functions. These parameters ate'. b,,c,,d,,e,,f,,g,,h, so that we
have 7*I parameters for each EU Member State. 
e7 One can easily check that data required to calibrate
these parameters are limited to production levels, output and input prices, cultivated and idle areas,
direct payments and set-aside rates. The Eurostat CRONOS database provides series for the first three
variables for most EU Member States over the period 1973-1997. The two others are taken from
ONIC (Office National Interprofessionnel des Céréales).
Ideally, output supply, land allocation and land shadow price equations should be estimated
simultaneously in order to incorporate restrictions on coefficients across equations and to obtain
maximum estimation efficiency. However, applications of the iterative Three-Stage Least Squares
(3SLS) procedure, as well as the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure, lead to
unstable estimates because explanatory variables, especially output prices, are highly collinear.
precisely, the design matrix made of explanatory variables does not have a numerically stable inverse
matrix, such as traditional estimators have high variances. This in tum results in small changes in the
data potentially leading to large changes in parameter estimates, increased variation in parameter
estimates (wrong signs/implausible magnitudes), tests of hypotheses about parameters having little
power and finally a general lack of faith in inference procedures.
This situation has motivated our choice of the GME econometric technique which leads to estimators
with higher degree of precision. We first remind the principles of this technique before explaining its
implementation for the MECOP model.
6.3.1. The Generalked Maximum Entropy approach
The Maximum Entropy (ME) econometric technique has been used in empirical economic work for
several years but the number of applications has recently boomed with the publication of the book
"Maximum Entropy Econometrics: Robust Estimation with Limited Data" written by Golan, Judge
and Miller (G.IM) in 1996. There also exist several theoretical papers looking at the properties of this
technique, providing some refinements or comparing ME with "traditional" econometric approaches'
In this section, we first expose the principles of the ME, next describe the GME approach and finally
provide a general discussion. e8
et The other parameters specified in the COP crop profit functions are not estimated due to lack of data
conceming profit levels'
e8 The materials in this section draws heavily upon the numerous works of Perloffet al. and Fraser (1999).
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6.3.L1. Principles of the Maximum Entropy
The entropy-information measure of Shannon (1948) reflects the uncertainty we have about the
occurence of a collection of events. Let define x a random variable with possible outcomes
)c,,s=1,...,n with probabilities px" satisfuing f,O*,=I. Shannon defines the entopy of the
r=l
distribution px as:
ubù=-Ë px,tog(px,)
s=l
(3s)
To understand this function, suppose that we have a sample of I draws of the identically and
independently distributed random variable x. Because the draws are independent, a list of the number
of times each value occurs contains all information this experiment provides about the random
variable. The order contains no information about the probabilities. Let define the outcome of an
experiment as a vector f =(.fr,...,f,,) where /] is the number of times 4 occurs. We have:
Ël = T and px, =+ 
^particular 
outcome may be obtained in a number of ways. For example,
the outcome (1, Z 
- 
1,0,...,0) can occur in Z possible ways. Let define ,(/) as the number of ways that
a particular outcome can occur. This is given by the multinomial coefficient W(T, px):
W(T,p*) TI TI (36)
llf t flrpx,t
r=l s=l
Suppose that we have no information about the draws and are asked which outcome is the most likely.
An "intuitive reasonable" response is that the outcome that can occur in the most number of ways is
the most likely outcome. Thereforen the most likely outcome is given by maximising tttt, which is
directly related to the Shannon entropy measure: nn
n(p*)xT-tlnv(f ,p*) (37)
Therefore, by maximising the entropy function, we maximise the number of possible permutations that
result in a given outcome.
on Thi, relation is obtained using Stirling's approximation.
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Based on the Shannon entropy measure, Jaynes (1957) proposed a way by which to recover the
unknown probabilities of a distribution. Suppose now that we know some particular moments (for
instance the mean or variance) of a probability distribution. obviously two or more probability
distributions could have generated these moments. Given that two or more might satisfu this conshaint
or information, Jaynes suggested to select the one which is least informative, or most uncertain
according to the Shannon entropy criterion. Equivalently, the selected distribution is the one which can
be obtained by the most number of ways. The derived solution then agrees with the known
information but expresses maximal uncertainty in relation to other things.
To sum-up, the Shannon entropy function gives the frequency distribution that may be generated in the
largest number of ways in repeated sampling. Maximum enhopy methods were developed by Jaynes
to recover an unknown probability distribution from given moment constraints. Jaynes proposed
selecting the probability distribution that satisfies the moment constraints and maximises Shannon's
entropy criterion. In other words, according to Jaynes, the maximum entropy distribution agrees with
what is known but expresses maximum uncertainty with respect to all other matters.
6.3.1.2. The Generalised Maximum Entropy
The main contributions of GJM have been to generalise the ME formalism in order to solve standard
econometric problems and to derive the properties of the GME estimators. In the haditional ME
approach, sample information in the form of moment conditions is assumed to hold exactly' In
contrast, the GME approach uses each observation directly while allowing these moment conditions to
hold only approximately by heating them as stochastic restrictions. Let consider the standard linear
model:
! = XP+e (38)
where y is a (T*1) vector of endogenous variables, X is the (T*K) design matrix, p is a (K*1)
vector of unknown parameters and e is a (T*1) vector of disturbances. It is clear that many vectors p
and e satisff the linear regression equations (38). The GME approach allows to choose one of them.
Because the arguments of the Shannon enhopy function are probabilities, parameters and disturbances
must be written as proper probability distributions defîned over some supports. By the rway, we can
note that speciffing the supports is similar to imposing prior restrictions in the Bayesian method or in
the mixed estimation framework. Thus, implementation of the GME technique starts by choosing a set
of discrete points, called the support space, for all parameters and dlstwbances.
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M1
Êo =I Pmzn
Specifically, we convert each parameter as follows
(3e)
where pk is a Mo - dimensional proper probability vector corresponding to a M* -dimensional vector
of weights 
"r. 
t* This last vector defines the support space of B* . Therefore each parameter is
converted from the real line into a well-behaved set of proper probabilities defined over the supports.
The issue related to the definition of these supports is discussed later. Similarly, we hansform the
disturbances as follows:
e =lw,u, (40)
where w is a 
"/ - dimensional proper probability vector corresponding to a ./ -dimensional vector of
weights v. These conversions then allow us to re-express the standard linear equations (38) as follows:
!=XF+e=XZp+Vw @D
with Z (respectively Z ) is a matrix of support values for parameters (respectively disturbances) and
p (respectively w) the associated probability vector.
Using these conversions, it is possible to formulate the standard linear estimation problem as a GME
problem:
Ma:c HÇt,r)= 
-pln p -wlnw (42)
subject to equations (41) and proper probability vectors.
Due to the form of the entropy function, it is not possible to derive an analytical solution to this
optimisation program. Therefore, the maximum enhopy distibution does not have a closed-form
solution and numerical optimisation techniques must be used to compute the probabilities. As a result,
parameter estimators do not have a closed-form solution as well. Nonetheless, the properties of these
estimators have been established. For instance, Mittlehammer and Cardell (1,997) have proved the
consistency and the asymptotic normality of GME estimators in the general linear model. More
rmAproperprobabilityvectorischaracterisedbytwoproperties: p"-2L,vm=r,...,Mr andfnn=t,
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recently, Golan et al. (2000) have derived the properties of the GME estimators in the context of a
nonlinear set of equations: y = f (X ,B) * , . They find that if:
i) the support space for the disturbances is a convex set that is symmetric around zero,
ii) the support space for the parameters span the true values for each one of the parameters and have
finite lower and upper bounds,
iii) for each equation, the errors are independently and identically distributed with mean zero and with
contemporaneous variance-covariance x of the vector of disturbances for the set of equations such
that Ele,dl= X @I ,
iv) p lim (t t r\af I a|)'(af / ôB) exists and is non singular,
then, the GME estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal with:
f("0)-'-.nr(o,o)
and c) = p fim(l / r)l@t/ aP) (E-' @IXô/ / ôB[' (43)
6.3.1.3. Discussion
The GME econometric technique is more and more widely used, particularly in the field of
agriculttyal economics. tot However, we must underline that the main difficulty when implementing
the GME approach is the choice of support points for parameters as well as for disturbances. For
example, if we intend to estimate a demand system with a large number of parameters, it is rather
diffrcult to introduce appropriate support points for the parameters of the system, especially if prior
information only exists on the sign and magnitude of elasticities which are complex ftrnctions of
parameters and variables. In fact, the liberty given to the modeller, in terms of the choice of the
support values, can be viewed as a virtue or a drawback of this approach, depending on the available
prior information. If the modeller has a precise knowledge of the parameters' domain of variation,
then this approach allows him to incorporate that information. On the other hand, if little or no such
information on the plausible values of parameters do exist, then that liberty may reveal awkward.
This aspect has been dealt with in a large extent in the entropy literature. Many papers (for example
GJM, 1996; Lence and Miller, 1998; Fraser,1999) examine the sensitivity of GME estimators to the
choice of support points for parameters as well as for disturbances. Three main results emerge from
r0r Agricultural applications include Paris and Howitt (1998), Lence and Miller (1998), Heckelei and Britz
(1999), Leon et al. (1999), Oude Lansink (1999), Oude Lansink et al. (2000), etc'
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these sensitivity analyses. Firstly, changing the support points has little impact on the GME estimators,
provided they contain the true values of the parameters. Secondly, for the case of general a priori
ignorance about the parameters, it is suggested to distribute the support points over a large interval, i.e.
between a large negative to a large positive bounds, since the larger the interval of the supports, the
less the enhopy criterion penalises deviations from a priori expectations. For the disturbances, the
three sigma rule is recommended (cf Pukelsheim, 1994). Thirdly, whatever the support space
including the true values of the parameters, GME estimators exhibit greater precision than other
estimators. lo2
However, prediction powers of the GME estimators are generally lower than those of traditional
estimators. That is to say, there is a hade-off between the prediction and the precision losses. GJM
(1996) show that it is possible to increase the predictive capability of GME estimators by placing
weights in the objective entropy function (a2). This function includes enfopies for both the parameter
and disturbance distributions. As a result, the entropy objective reflects statistical losses in the sample
space (prediction loss) and in the parameter space (precision loss). Depending on the problem at hand,
we may wish to recover an image of the underlying system that reflects greater prediction and
precision fidelity. As such, we may wish to place relatively more or less weight on the parameter and
elror components of the objective function in order to reflect the relative importance of these
components.
The choice of the optimal weight in the objective function may be based on the normalised enhopy
criterion. This criterion, usually denoted S(p, ,), is given by:
sb,r)= - H(P'') g4)
Irn(u r)+ r h("r)
t=l
It can be shown that this criterion equals the entropy of the distributions divided by the entropy of the
uniform distribution and is comprised between zero and one. A value of zero reflects perfect
knowledge or no uncertainty as regards to the value of the parameters and the disturbances. They are
fully determined by the constraints. At the opposite, when the normalised enhopy equals one, this
indicates a state of full ignorance. The choice of the optimal weight, as well as the number and the
levels of support points, can be made through the maximisation of this criterion.
102 Precision is generally measured in terms of mean squared error
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6.3.2. Imptementation of the Generalised Maxintum Entropyfor the MECOP model
6.3.2.L The set of estimated equations
Our main objective with the GME approach is to estimate the parameters involved in the COP crop
supply and land allocation functions previously described. In order to do so, we first add disturbances
to these equations. These disturbances are noted ey,,, for the supply functions and e1,., for the land
allocation functions. They capture specification errors, omitted variables, optimisation errors, etc.
Secondly, it can be seen from equation (19) that the optimal output supply is a function of the
normalised own price, time and the cultivated area. As this latter explanatory variable is endogenous,
we introduce its expression in the supply function during the estimation stage. Therefore, the system
of estimated equatons is given bY:
! t., = c i + d, lJL + f ,/,,, (-) * lt,t + ey,,, + f ,e\,.,,Y i = 1,"', I;v t = 1,"',7
b,+f,T*r,t
€i
-b,-f,P" -g,'
wt
Ii.Zj=r
t,,,
1
1I
+ el,,,,V i = 1,..., I ;V t = I,,..,71 -l
ei
€iUIj=r
,(-cr,)-ao +l
bi+f, ., *ot'tr,Pi,, + g
wt
j=r êj
-b,-, Pt' -gJ-a''wt wl (4s)+ e|,,,,,,, - 
",
€iIItj=r
Vi = 1,...,1;Vt =TL,...,7
where Zl corresponds to the year of implementation of the 1992 CAP reform.
All land derived demand and supply functions are estimated simultaneously using a GME technique.
V/e directly estimate structural parameters and not reduced-form parameters. So doing, parameter
restrictions are automatically satisfied. We do not omit one equation, as it is usually done with
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traditional estimators, but add an additional constraint on land residuals. The sum over COP crops of
these land residuals must equal zero. We furthermore add, during the estimation stage, the restictions
on land shadow prices (equations 26 and 28). Adding these inequality restrictions is quite easy with
the GME estimation procedure. This mainly provides efficiency gains (Dorfman and Mclntosh, 2001).
On the other hand, it becomes much more difficult to define the distribution of the estimators and in
particular to derive the variance of estimators. Testing can still be performed using the enfopy-ratio
statistic (see for example Golan et al, 1999). For example, if the purpose is to test the significance of
one parameter, we need to re-estimate the model imposing the nullity of this parameter. Then, under
the null hypothesis, two times the difference between entropy measures obtained from unconstained
and constrained models follows a Khi-deux disfibution with one degree of freedom. The significance
of all parameters involved in the MEcoP model is tested using this procedure.
6.3'2'2. The choice of support values for parameters and disturbances
In this point, we only describe how we have chosen the support values for parameters and
disturbances. Their exact levels are reported in the following section.
For all parameters and disturbances, we retain three supports values, i.e. M r = J = 3, as it has been
demonshated that the number of support values has no effects on estimates. to' Furthennore, rve
assume that these support values are distibuted symmetrically between the lower and upper bounds of
the support spaces. Therefore, it remains to determine these bounds.
For the two kinds of disturbances, we adopt the three sigma rule advocated in many papers. So doing,
we only need to compute the standard deviations of the endogenous variables for each EU Member
State. Regarding the behavioural parameters, let start with I . From supply equations (19), we observe
that this parameter measures the response of the supply of crop i to an increase in the area devoted to
this crop, other things being equal:
. ù,,,t'= AÇ g6)
We therefore suspect that its value lies around yield level. Hence, the bounds for this parameter are
determined by the average yield more or less two standard deviations. For parameter d,, the lower
bound is given by the constraint (16) which ensures the convexity of profit functions with respect to
lo3 Obviously, two is the minimum.
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prices. In addition, from the supply equation, it is also easy to show that this parameter is related to the
price elasticity of output supply, for a given land allocation:
) 
- 
q1- 
- 
^vt., !t', (47)o'=
uW *)1,,., "oi"''t''lt''Çi')
'We 
assume that this elasticity is not greater than three and determine the upper bound of d,
accordingly.
For parameter e,, we know from constraint (17) that it must be negative. Its upper bound is therefore
zero. However, we have no other prior information for the lower bound of this parameter. We assume
arbitrarily this lower bound at -1000 for all products. In the same vein, we have no prior information
for the bounds of other parameters: b,,c,,g,,h,. For all of them, we adopt large negative values for
lower bounds (-1000 and 
-10000) and large positive values for upper bounds (1000 and 10000).
6.4. Estimation results
The MECOp model is designed at the national level. We apply the previously described framework to
six EU Member States: France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain and Denmark. We distinguish
nine COp crops of which five cereals (soft wheat, barley, maize, oat and rye), three oilseeds (rape,
sunflower and soya) and one protein crops (field peas). For oilseeds, we only consider food
production. Each EU Member State produces only part of the nine COP crops. Hence, we distinguish
seven crops for France, six for Germany and Italy, five for Spain and only three for the United
Kingdom and Denmark (cf. Table 6.1). Therefore, in all six EU Member States, the supply and land
allocations of other COP crops are considered as exogenous variables'
The six EU Member States realise most of the EU15 COP crop productions. Their respective
contribution is provided in Table 6.2 for the year 1996/97 . We can see that the six retained Member
States together account for around 70% to 90% of the EU15 production for all considered COP crops,
except for oats. This crop is primilarly produced by the new Member States which have joined the EU
in 1995 (Austria, Finland, Sweden).
In this section, we present and discuss estimation results for France only. Results for other Member
States as well as elasticities computed for the year 1999 are reported in the appendix.
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COP crops France United
Kingdom
Germany Italy Spain Denmark
Soft Wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ +
+
+
+
Table 6.1. List of COP crops by EU Member State
Table 6.2. Production levels in1996197 (000 tonnes)
Source: European Commission.
Documents, DG Agriculture.
Situation and Outlook. Cereals, Oilseeds and Protein Crops. CAP 2000 Working
6.4.1. Application to France
From Table 6.3, it appears that, of the 49 behavioural parameters, 17 (respectively 22) parameter
estimates are significant at the 0.05 (respectively 0.10) level of significance or better. We observe that
no â, parameters are significant, even at a high level of significance. Only one c, parameter (for
barley) is significant at the 10% level of significance. At this stage, it can be noted that these two
structural parameters appear only in the constants of land and supply equations. The test of the
significance of these constants shows that only two constants (for rape and sunflower) are statistically
COP crops France United
Kingdom
Germany Italy Spain Denmark EUl5 Share
(%)
Soft Wheat
Barley
Maize
Oats
Rye
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
34330
9379
t3776
15848
7857
18973
12093
2834
t629
4241
ls09
3894
t406
9087
292
4212
10001
3664
608
4500
4166
90229
52187
33707
8062
5728
5736
3954
1018
3750
90.6
86.0
87.r
38.2
74.0
87.8
93.7
71.3
7r.s
21s8
1918
1 188 182
566
726
1221
2593 89
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significant. (cf. Table 6.a) . only one r/, parameter (for rape) is statistically significant (cf. Table 6'3)'
That means that, in general, the price effects on production levels mainly occur through their effects
on land uses. on the other hand, all et patameters are significant at the 0.05 level of significance,
suggesting that profit functions are strictly concave in land allocations. All f, parameters, but
sunflower and soya, are significant at the 0.05 level of significance. Therefore, the land variable
performs strongly as a determinant of production decisions. Finally, four g, parameters and three l,,
parameters are statistically significant at the 0.10 level of significance or better. These skuctural
parameters caphne the impacts of the trend on land uses and productions levels. The exact impacts of
the trend on these variables as well as their level of significance are also reported in Table 6'4' We
observe that the hend also performs strongly as a determinant of the evolution of production levels'
Tabte 6.3. Structural parameter estimates
Significant at the 0.05 level; *: Significant at the 0'10 level.
Table 6.4. Reduced-form parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level;
ei o6tct d h,r,b,COP crops
-ss69.1 83
-6780.083*
-1168.663
-3543.916
-t900.276
-65.50
-2640.638
-0.287*',|
-0.321*'l
-0.698*'l
-2.782*4
-0.734*4
-9.t79*4
-23.875**
4.390*' 9.580*
5.154*'. -17.373
5.877*' 5.813
2.633*' 69.089t*
2.043* 29.060*
t.523*' 18.592
3.933 539.048**
759.470
487.498
487.288
-t24.970
440.149
-16.820
-554.153
26.364
9.78s
0.504
5.3324
3.081
0.128
5.399
537.123
90.153
297.875
t66.32t*
12r.285*
57.620
4.5
Soft Wheat
Barley
Maize
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
COP crops
!r;L: ,)e,l lve, I\ jr )
Constant in the
land equation
Constant in the suPPlY
equation
",*Ler
fr,,",2i--b,
Irre,
Trend impact on
land allocation
fs, r,,
J1--- oJëi
Itte,
I
gi
0,."1\'"'' -,,)e'l ltt e, I\ '/'r )
Trend impact on
production level
SoftWheat
Barley
Maize
Rape
Sunflowor
Soya
Field peas
tt70.62
r99.37
92.71
-197.15**
-1t76.63**
47.97
40.95**
430.15
-5752.54
-623.19
4063.01*
4304,14**
-138.56
-2801.69
6.44
-78.21**
-2.79
22.06
29.06
1.18
22.25**
565.40**
-105.20**
t49.94*
179.36**
116.99**
6.35
177.68**
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*: Significant atthe 0.10 level.
Next, we test for residual first-order autocorrelation using the generalisation detailed in Moschini and
Moro (1994). Basically, these authors propose a new parametric specifîcation of the autocorrelation
matrix for singular equation systems that satisfies the restrictions of adding-up and that entails only as
many parameters as the number of equations. Accordingly, we test the residual first-order
autocorrelation with different autocorrelation coeffrcients for each land equation and for each supply
equation. We also perform additional tests using the same autocorrelation coefficient for all land
equations. These nested tests fail to reject the absence of serial correlation. We also test for structural
changes of behavioural parameters and do not find statistically significant structural changes.
The normalised enfropy measures are quite high. They are 0.720 for the parameters, 0.977 for the
disturbances and 0.946 for the system as a whole. From the fact that they are smaller than one, it can
be inferred that data on production and land allocation contain some information and that this
information has been used to determine the values of behavioural parameters. We also report in Table
6.5 correlation coefficients between observed and estimated series. In a general way, these figures
suggest that the estimated model fits the data reasonably well.
Table 6.5. Correlation coefficient between observed and estimated series
COP crops Land equations Supply equations
Soft Wheat
Barley
Maize
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
0.806
0.919
0.528
0.853
0.907
0.896
0.898
0.932
0.7rt
0.915
0.895
0.909
0.899
0.790
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Tables 6.6 and 6.7 report the elasticities of cultivated areas with respect to, respectively, prices and
area payments, computed for the yeat 1999'
Table 6.6. Estimates of price elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
Table 6.7. F,'.stimates of direct payment elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
In a general way, we observe that cereal areas are more price responsive to their own price than
oilseed and almost protein crop areas. For instance, barley areas exhibit the greatest own price
elasticity (+0.922) and field peas the lowest one (+0.040). It is interesting to note that all cereal prices
have significant effects on cereal areas and low effects on oilseed and protein crop areas. In the same
way, oilseed prices mainly influence oilseed areas and have low impacts on cereal areas. Among the
group of cereal crops, it appears that soft wheat and barley are strong substitutes in the competition for
land. Finally, all these price elasticities are lower than one in absolute values.
Direct payment elasticities of cultivated areas have smaller absolute values than their corresponding
price elasticities. We finally observe that own direct payment effects are in average greater for oilseed
areas than for cereal areas. Again, effects of direct payments on field peas area are nearly null.
Barley Maize RaPe Sunflower Soya Field PeasSoft wheatCOP crops
0.233
-0.426
-0.141
-0.074
-0.2r2
-0.229
-0.012
-0.125
0.922
-0.139
-0.073
-0.210
-0.226
-0.012
-0.073
-0.248
0.476
-0.043
-0.t23
-0.133
-0.007
-0.015
-0.052
-0.017
0.240
-0.026
-0.028
-0.001
-0.048
-0.162
-0.053
-0.028
0.508
-0.087
-0.004
-0.002
-0.007
-0.002
-0.001
-0.004
0.362
-0.002
-0.002
-0.006
-0.002
-0.001
-0.003
-0.003
0.040
Soft'Wheat
Barley
Mzize
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
COP crops Barley Maize RaPe Sunflower Soya Field PeasSoft wheat
0.15 1
-0.277
-0.091
-0.048
-0.138
-0.r49
-0.008
-0.073
0.541
-0.082
-0.043
-0.123
-0.133
-0.007
-0.039
-0.132
0.253
-0.023
-0.066
-0.071
-0.004
-0.012
-0.041
-0.014
0.190
-0.021
-0.022
-0.001
-0.046
-0.156
-0.052
-0.027
0.489
-0.084
-0.004
-0.004
-0.013
-0.004
-0.002
-0.006
0.605
-0.003
-0.001
-0.005
-0.002
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
0.029
Soft Wheat
Barley
Maize
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
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Tables 6.8 and 6.9 report the elasticities of output supplies with respect to, respectively, prices and
area payments, computed for the year 1999. Table 6.8 shows that supply functions of the seven COp
crops are upward sloping in their own price and respond negatively to cross prices. They are all
inelastic, with barley the most elastic (0.796) and fîeld peas and soft wheat the less elastic ones (0.298
and0.237, respectively). According to supply functions (19), own price supply elasticities may be
decomposed into a direct effect and an indirect effect due to the reallocation of land between the COp
crops. Direct effects may be evaluated from COP crop specific supply functions where land allocation
is fixed. They are reported in brackets in Table 6.8. One verifies that these direct effects are lower than
the total effects, which reflects the "Le Chatelier-samuelson" principle. These direct effects are rather
low, except for rape, sunflower and field peas. For rape and field peas, the direct effect accounts for
around, respectively,T0oÂ and90%o of the total effect. For cross price elasticities, the direct effect
equals zero by assumption since the "fixed allocation" technology is non-joint in variable inputs.
These cross price elasticities are much lower, in absolute values, than own price elasticities of COp
crop supplies. That certainly does not mean that they have no impacts on production levels.
Table 6.9 shows that COP crop supply functions are upward sloping in own direct payments and
respond negatively to cross direct payments.
Table 6.8. Estimates of price elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999; price elasticities of
COP crop supplies for a given allocation in brackets)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Maize Rape Sunflower Soya Field peas
Soft Wheat
Barley
Maize
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
0.237
[0.08e]
-0.314
-0.079 -0.046 -0.010 -0.030 _0.001 -0.001
0.796
[0.r l7]
-0.105
-0.182 -0.038 -0.120 -0.006 -0.005
-0.106 0.362
[0.004]
-0.030
-0.013 -0.040 -0.002 -0.002
-0.052 -0.052 0.548
[0.378]
-0.022
-0.020 -0.001 -0.001
-0.182 -0.180 -0.106 0.710
[0.274]
-0.053
-0.003 -0.003
-0.139 -0.137 -0.080 -0.017 0.331
[0.112]
-0.00,1
-0.002
0.298
10.266)
-0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.001 
-0.004
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Barley Maize Rape Sunflower SoYa Field peasSoft wheatCOP crops
0.096
-0.204
-0.069
-0.034
-0.118
-0.090
-0.006
-0.046
-0.399
-0.062
-0.030
-0.106
-0.081
-0.005
-0.025
-0.097
0.191
-0.016
-0.0s6
-0.043
-0.003
-0.008
-0.030
-0.010
0.135
-0.018
-0.013
-0.001
-0.029
-0.115
-0.039
-0.019
0.420
-0.051
-0.003
-0.002
-0.009
-0.003
-0.002
-0.005
0.366
-0.001
-0.001
-0.003
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
-0.001
0.021
SoftWheat
Barley
Maize
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
Table 6.9. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999)
Table 6.10 reports the elasticities of cultivated areas and output supplies with respect to total available
land and the variable inPut Price.
Table 6.10. Estimates of elasticities of cultivated areas and output supplies with respect to total
available land and variable input price (year 1999)
COP crops el; eY:L g
lr Er'
Soft Wheat
Barley
Maize
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
0.769
[0.3s1]
2.607
[0.314]
0.859
[0.146]
0.451
[0.036]
r.297
[0.137]
r.399
[0.004]
0.071
[0.012]
0.488
r.922
0.647
0.321
1.115
0.847
0.057
0.056
0.062
-0.131
-0.066
-0.063
0.201
-0.009
-0.054
-0.071
-0.103
-0.424
-0.328
0.010
-0.273
From the first column of Table 6.10, we observe that the elasticities of barley, sunflower and soya
areas with respect to total land are greater than one, while these elasticities are lower than one for the
other crops. Terms in brackets in the first column of Table 6.10 measure the change in cultivated areas
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of each crop due to an increase of one unit of total land for cropping. An additional hectare of land for
cultivationwouldincreaseallocationtosoftwheatby0.35l,tobarleyby0.314, tomaizeby0.146and
to sunflower by 0.137. The corresponding response for other COP crops are much lower. Table 6.10
also provides the elasticities of areas and output supplies with respect to the aggregate variable input
price. As expected, an increase in the variable input price would lead to a decrease in COp production,
except for soya. The effects of this price on land allocations may be positive or negative, depending on
the considered COP crop. Therefore, the aggregate variable input and land may be substitute or
complements in COP crop production technologies.
6.5. Policy simulations: The Agenda 2000 CAp reform and beyond
6.5.1. Background and motivation
In a general way, the Agenda 2000 CAP reform deepens the 1992 or MacSharry CAp reform, with
new cuts in support prices compensated by new or increased direct payments. As far as the COp sector
is concerned, the complete application of this new reform in2002will mainly involve a llyoreduction
in cereal intervention prices, an increase of direct payments for cereal areas from 54 Euro/tonne to 63
Euro/tonne, a reduction of direct payments for oilseed areas from 94.24 Euro/tonne to 63 Euro/tonne
and a reduction of direct payments for pulses from 78.5 Euro/tonne to 72.5 Euro/tonne. Moreover, the
direct payments for set aside areas are also reduced from 68 Euro/tonne to 63 Euro/tonne. Finally, the
mandatory set-aside rate is fixed to l0%, but the European commission (EC) might revise this rate
according to the evolution of market conditions. Therefore, with the Agenda 2000 reform, the
Common Market Organisation (CMO) for arable crops moves towards a standardisation across COp
crops of area direct payments.
Quantitative analyses of the likely impacts on markets of this new reform are obviously numerous.
Most often, they conclude that, despite the induced decrease in the domestic market prices of cereals,
the full implementation of this reform would expand cèreal areas as compared to a status quo scenario.
Table 6.11 suggests that only the OECD projects a slight decrease in cereal areas. All modelling
exercises also concede that their results are sensitive to the evolution of both the world market
conditions and the exchange rate between the Euro and the US dollar. On the other hand, the likely
impact of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform on oilseed areas is more discussed. Both FAPRI institutes, the
OECD and the University of Amsterdam forecast a decrease, the University of Bonn projects a
stagnation and finally the USDA-ERS expects an increase of the oilseed areas compared to a no-
reform baseline (cf. Table 6.11).
242
Table 6.11. percentage changes in cultivated areas between Agenda 2000 and baseline scenarios
(year 2005) according to various published studies
Area SPEL
(Bonn)
FAPRI
(Missouri)
FAPRI
(Iowa)
CAPMAT
(Amsterdam)
USDA OECD
Wheat
Soft wheat
Durumwheat
Coarse grains
Barley
Maize
Oilseeds
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
+2.6
+2.5
+3.4
+2.2
+2.2
+4.6
-0.3
-3.2
+2.4
+4.0
+4.0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
+2.6
+0.8
-2.8
-2.6
-3.1
-3.1
+5.9
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
+5.0
+3.5
n.a.
4.8
n.a.
-0.5
+2.6
+2.8
+1.4
-0.6
-0.5
-r.4
-2.9
4.0
-1.9
-2.5
+6.4
n.a.
n.a.
+4.5
n.a.
n.a.
+6.1
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
-l
n.a.
n.a.
-1
n.a.
n.a.
-5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Table 6.11 suggests that if some results are qualitatively identical in nearly all reported studies, such as
the increase in cereal areas, the huge difference observed between figures is striking. Such differences
are not so surprising since used models differ in terms of specifications, data sources, calibration
process, etc. Moreover, different baseline assumptions contribute to this heterogeneity across results.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of these differences is worthy to note. Let's consider obtained results for
wheat (including soft and durum wheat) in more details. Table 6.12 reports the forecasts performed by
six institutes for the campaign 2004/05.In this table, the absolute levels of the projected variables are
provided, as well as their observed levels for the campaign 1998199. While forecasts are often
analysed in comparison of a baseline scenario in order to highlight the impacts of policy instruments,
we compare here these forecasts to observed initial figures in order to avoid the arbifary nature of the
baseline scenarios. From the third column of Table 6.12, we observe that the expected adjustment in
wheat area between the campaigns 2004/05 and 1998/99 ranges between stagnation (- 0.06% for
FAPRI-IOWA) to a strong increase (+ 8.77% for OECD). In absolute levels, the expected wheat area
for 2004105 varies between 16.74 (FAPRI-IOWA) to 18.6 (OECD) millions hectares, representing a
1.86 million hectares gap or ll.lI% of the lower estimates. In terms of production, differences are
also considerable. According to FAPRI-IO\MA (respectively OECD), wheat production would
decrease by 1.49% (respectively increase by 9. |%)by the campaign 2004105 relative to the campaign
lggslgg.In absolute levels, the estimated wheat production lor 2004105 varies between 102.1 (FAPRI-
IOWA) and I11.70 (OECD) millions tons, representing a 10.64 millions tonnes gap or 10.52% of the
lower estimates. Finally, regarding yields, differences between results published by the various
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institutes are also substantial even if less important than those noticed for cultivated area and
production.
Table 6.12. Wheat forecasts according to different institutes (percentage changes from the
observed campaign 1998199 in parentheses)
Attempts to explain these differences have mainly focused on the assumptions regarding the evolution
of domestic market prices as well as the mandatory set-aside rate, in the baseline scenario and in the
Agenda 2000 scenario. The evolution of these explanatory variables adopted by the different institutes
in their Agenda 2000 scenarios are provided in the last columns of Table 6.12. These evolutions are
obviously divergent and may partly explained the observed differences in simulated endogenous
variables. However, it is still diffrcult to draw a clear picture of the specific impact of each policy
instrument (intervention prices, mandatory set-aside rate and area payments) on quantity variables.
Furthermore, the likely impacts of direct payments on the results and by extension on these differences
have never been underlined by these studies. More generally, the likely impacts of the Agenda 2000
area direct payment package have been only occasionally analysed (Salvatici et al., 2000). As an
exception, Gohin et al. (2000) examine, using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model
focused on the French agro-food complex, the sensitivity of results of Agenda 2000 experiments to the
modelling of area direct payments. They find that domestic production of soft wheat may increase by
6%o or decrease by 8% relative to the base period, depending on the adopted modelling of these direct
payments. Therefore, these figures suggest that sorting out the impacts of direct payments on results is
Institutes
(Model)
Campaign Area
(millions ha)
Yield
(tonne/ha)
Production
(mio. tonnes)
Market prices
(Euro/tonne)
Set aside rate
(%)
FAPRI-UMC
(GOLD)
t998t99
2004t0s
1998t99
2004t05
t998t99
2004/0s
1998
2005
1998/99
2004t05
t998t99
2004/05
17.046
t7.423
(+2.21%)
16.75
16.74
(-0.06%)
17.10
r8.20
(+6.43%)
17.06s
t7.246
(+1.05%)
t7.t
18.6
(+8.77%)
17.120
r7.335
(+t.2s%)
6.07
6.18
(+1.81%)
6.12
6.04
(-t.31'/o)
5.99
6.03
(+0.67%)
6.07
6.27
(+3.2e%)
5.98
6.00
(+0.33%)
6.00
6.30
(+s%)
103.478
107.610
(+3.e9%)
102.59
101.06
(-t.4e%)
t02.4
109.7
(+7.12%)
103.536
108.219
(+4.s2%)
t02.t
ttt.t
(+9.40%)
102.77s
t09.26t
(+6.31%)
126.0
124.0
(-1.60%)
120.0
112.7
(-6.02%)
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
120
tt4
(-s%)
n. a.
n. a.
5%
5%
(0%)
5%
t0%
(+100%)
5%
t0%
(+100%)
5%
t0%
(+100%)
5o/o
15.5o/o
(+2t0%)
5%
t0%
(+100%)
FAPRI.IOIWA
(FAPRT)
European
Commission
USDA-ERS
(ESrM)
OECD
(AGLTNK)
ONIC
(MONTC)
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clearly valuable. From a policy perspective, understanding and assessing the contribution of the
standardisation of direct payments is also relevant. The lgg2 CAP reform introduced differentiated
area direct payments favouring oilseed crops. This was motivated by the willingness to develop the
production of oilseed crops and then to reduce the European dependence on imports' This relative
advantage given to oilseed crops has however been severely criticised by third countries during the
Uruguay Round negotiations, leading to the Blair House agreement and some restrictions on the
European oilseed sector. The alignment of direct payments for oilseed areas to those for cereal areas,
decided in the Agenda 2000 CAp reform, will make irrelevant these restrictions but it is likely that this
will be to the detriment of the European oilseed production. Gauging the impacts of the direct payment
standardisation is therefore of great interest'
In that context, the purposes of the scenarios performed below with the MECOP model are twofold'
The first one is to isolate the effects of the changes in direct payments on the evolution of areas, per
hectare yields and productions from the effects of other policy instruments. We also provide the
impacts of our scenarios on the evolution of macro-variables such as the unit land return, public
expenditures on direct payments and profits. The second one is to examine the sensitivity of our
results to the evolution of market prices and set-aside rates, as there are still great uncertainties in that
respect.
6.5.2. Delînîtion of sîmulated scenartos
we first perform a baseline scenario and next three Agenda 2000 scenarios that differ in terms of the
assumed evolution of market prices and set-aside rates. For all scenarios, results are computed for the
campaign z}O4tl}s,when the Agenda 2000 CAP reform is completely implemented.
In all scenarios, we assume that the total land available for cropping is equal to the level observed
during a specific campaignræ, unless the unit land return becomes lower than the set-aside direct
payment. In this special case, the total available land for cropping is adjusted for the land return to be
equal to the set-aside direct payment.
In our baseline scenario, we maintain output market prices and area direct payments at their 1998199
level. The price of variable inputs is increased by l% per year. We assume that the mandatory set-
aside rate is l2%o.
In our three Agenda 2000 scenarios, area direct payments are adjusted according to the provisions of
the Agenda 2000 CAP reform. Hence, we perform an increase in cereal area direct payments and a
tm This campaign corresponds to 1996/9'7 in both the baseline and the central Agenda 2000 scenarios. While the
retained 
"unpuigo, 
are'1995196 and 1998/99 in, respectively, the pessimist and the optimist variants of the
Agenda 2000 scenario (cf. Table 6.13)'
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reduction in oilseed area direct payments as well as in the set-aside direct payment, which are both
align to those granted to cereals (cf. Table 6.13.). Finally, we set the direct payment for protein areas
at the level decided in the Agenda 2000 reform.
Then, the three Agenda 2000 scenarios differ in the assumed evolution of market prices and of the set-
aside rate. In the central scenario, we assume that the EU market price of soft wheat decreases by only
10%, while the decrease in the market prices of other cereals follows the l5oÂ reduction in the
intervention prices. The market prices of oilseeds and protein crops are assumed to remain constant (in
nominal terms) at their initial level. Regarding the variable input prices, we keep the assumption of a
lolo increase per year. Finally, we assume that the mandatory set-aside rate is 10%.
In the first variant, labelled the pessimist scenario, we assume that the evolution of world market
conditions and/or the evolution of the exchange rate are unfavourable to the EU arable crop sector.
Soft wheat market price now decreases by l5%o, prices of oilseeds and protein crops by S%o and
variable input prices increase by 2% per year. This unfavourable context also requires a greater effort
in terms of supply control, so that the mandatory set-aside rate is set et l5%.
Finally, the last experiment, labelled the optimist scenario, assumes favourable world market
developments and/or exchange rate evolution from the EU COP sector perspective. The EU market
price of soft wheat is assumed to remain constant while the EU market prices of other cereals are
assumed to decrease by only 5o/o. Market prices of oilseeds and protein crops now increase by 5%
while the variable input price remains constant. Finally, the mandatory set-aside rate is setat S%o.
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Pessimist scenario Cenhal scenario Optimist scenario
Changes in market Prices w.r.t.
1998/99 levels
Soft wheat
Other cereals
Oilseeds
Protein crops
Variable inputs
-t5%
-t5%
-5%
-5%
12oÂ per year
-10%
-t5%
0%
0%
+loÂper year
0%
-5%
+50Â
+50Â
0%
Mandatory set-aside rate
i.e. total available land for
cropping given by the camPaign
t5%
t994l9s
t0%
t996197
5%
1998199
Levels of area direct PaYments
Cereals
Oilseeds
Protein crops
Set-aside
63 Euro/ton
63 Euro/ton
72.5Eurolton
63 Euro/ton
Table 6.13. Adopted assumptions in the Agenda 2000 scenarios
6.5.3. The tikety impacts of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform: The central scenarto
V/e discuss the impacts of the central scenario in comparison first with the 1998199 campaign and next
with the baseline scenario. Table 6.14 presents the results of both the baseline and the central scenarios
in terms of land allocation, productions, yields and unit land return at the EU6level for 2004/05. The
corresponding levels of these variables in the 1998/99 base year are also reported in the first column of
Table 6.14.
The Agenda 2000 central scenario leads to strong effects on the European arable crop sector. As an
example, production of soft wheat would increase by 7.17%o, i.e. nearly 6 millions tonnes, while oat
production would decrease by 5.14%with respect to the 1998/99 base year. Regarding land allocation,
let's first remind that total land devoted to COP production decreases (by 1527 thousand hectares) due
to the increase in the mandatory set aside. All COP enterprises experience a decrease in cultivated
area. The most affected COP crops are soya, sunflower and rye as far as percentage changes are
concerned, and barley, soft wheat and sunflower when dealing with absolute levels. While the
simulated changes in cultivated areas and production quantities differ greatly across COP crops, we
observe less marked differences as regards to yield impacts. The yields of the "main" COP crops
increase,,vithin the range of 9 - 15%o, corresponding to a 1.5 to2.5%o increase in the average annual
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yield growth. Finally, the impact of our Agenda 2000 cenhal scenario on the unit land return is
negative (-6.44% or -22 EuroÆra).
Our results on soft wheat depart significantly from those obtained by other studies reported in Table
6.12' From 1998/99 to 2004105, soft wheat yield is expected to increase by 9.76% according to our
analysis, by 5% according to MONIC and to decrease by l.3l% according to FApRI-IOWA. Land
allocated to soft wheat decreases slightly (-2.36% or 299 thousand hectares) in our central scenario, so
that our estimate is below the estimates found in the literature (cf. Table 6.12). Nevertheless, we
forecast a 7.170Â increase in soft wheat production with respect to the lggS/gg level, which is in the
range of estimates obtained by other studies (except FAPRI-IOWA which forecasts a 
-1.49o/o
decrease).
The results described above capture not only the impact of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform but also the
trend effects. In order to isolate the impacts of the reform, we now compare the results of the central
scenario to the results of the baseline scenario. This comparison is reported in the last column of Table
6.14. As expected, the application of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform is tikely to increase areas devoted
to cereals (except oat) and decrease areas devoted to oilseeds. The impact ofthe reform on the protein
crop area is slightly positive. Our expected +3.2gyo increase in the cereal total cultivated area
corresponds roughly to the middle range of estimates published by other studies (cf. Table 6.11).
However, our expected impact of the Agenda 2000 reform on the area devoted to oilseeds is more
pessimistic than other available estimates. Nevertheless, like existing studies, we also find that rape (-
1.58%) would be less affected than sunflower (-3.95%o) and much more less affected than soya (-
20.24%). On the other hand, the application of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform would lead to a decrease
in cereal yields and an increase in oilseed yields. These impacts on yields would not outweigh those on
cultivated areas previously described, so that the effects ofthe reform on the produced quantities are
less pronounced than its impacts on land uses. In particular, cereal production would increase by
0.97yo, oilseed production would decrease by 2.79o/o and field peas production would increase by
0.40%. Finally, the impact of the reform on the unit land return is negative (-I3.33% or 48 Eurolha).
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Table 6.14. Impacts of the baseline and of the central Agenda 2000 scenarios on the EU6 arable
crop sector: land allocation, output supplies, yields and land return
Base levels
1998199
(r)
Central
scenario
(2004/0s)
Change in %
(D-(r)
Baseline
(200410s)
(nD
Change in %
(rD-0rr)
Land allocation
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
All cereals
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
All oilseeds
Field peas
All coP
(1000 hectares)
12648
9707
3574
687
834
27450
2t69
2333
355
4857
589
32896
12349
9234
3422
632
736
26373
-2.36
4.87
4.26
-8.05
-11.69
-3.92
2052
2093
264
4409
-5.40
-10.28
-25.57
-9.22
587 -0.36
31369 4.64
1 1883
895 1
3362
633
706
25535
+3.92
+3.16
+1.78
-0.16
+4.25
+3.28
2085
2179
331
4595
-1.58
-3.9s
-20.24
4.05
584 +0.51
30714 +2.13
Production
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
All cereals
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
All oilseeds
Field
(1000 tonnes)
79703
43173
29662
2004
4225
ts8767
6881
3921
r274
12076
2797
85419
4s225
31856
1901
4235
168636
+7.17
+4.75
+7.40
-5.14
+0.23
+6.22
7725
4t35
1414
13274
+12.26
+5.47
+10.96
+9.92
3285 +17.43
84038
4497r
3t662
2184
4t56
16701 I
+t.64
+0.56
+0.61
-r2.96
+1.90
+0.97
7802
4220
1633
13655
-0. 98
-2.0 I
I3 .41
79-2
3272 +0.40
Yields
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
(tonnes/ha)
6.301
4.448
8.299
2.917
s.065
3.r72
1.680
3.589
4.750
6.916
4.898
9.310
3.009
5.749
3.764
t.975
5.351
5.598
+9.76
+10.12
+12.18
+3.16
+13.50
+18.67
+17.55
+49.08
+17.85
7.071
5.024
9.417
3.450
5.884
3.741
t.936
4.939
s.607
-2.19
-2.51
-t.t4
-t2.78
-2.29
+0.61
+2.01
+8.34
-0.16
Land return
(Euro/ha)
334 312 -6.44 360 -13.33
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A decomposition of these impacts into the respective effects of market prices, direct payments and
total available land is clearly relevant to understand these evolutions. That decomposition is also
valuable from a policy perspective for clarifuing the specific impact of each policy instument, in
particular the impact of the area direct payment package of the reform on land uses, yields and
productions. Due to the linearity of the endogenous variables of the MECOP model with respect to
exogenous variables, such a decomposition is straightforward. It is provided in Table 6.15.
The increase in total land available for COP production affects positively the cultivated areas of all
COP crops, except soya. In physical terms, the greatest increases are observed for barley (+247
thousand hectares) and soft wheat (+207 thousand hectares), while oilseed areas are only slightly
affected (+94 thousand hectares as a whole). The increase in total COP land has a negative impact on
cereal and field peas yields and affects positively oilseed yields. However, these effects are quite
modest, so that the total impact of the total land increase on production is similar to its impact on land
uses. In physical terms, the most important impacts are once again observed for barley (+1286
thousand tonnes) and soft wheat (+1085 thousand tonnes). From a political point of view, these
outcomes illustrate the differentiated impacts of the set-aside policy on COP areas and productions,
which acts mainly to the detriment of cereal areas and productions. This suggests that the set-aside
policy is an effective mechanism to confrol cereal productions while slightly affecting oilseed
productions. Finally, the increase in total cultivated land reduces the competition among COp
enterprises for this scarce primary factor of production and therefore leads to a decrease in the unit
land return.
As expected, the whole effect of the area direct payment changes is an increase in cereal areas and a
decrease in oilseed and protein crop areas. For example, soft wheat area increases by 185 thousand
hectares while rape area decreases by 118 thousand hectares due to the changes in area direct
payments. The most affected COP crop is sunflower with a reduction of 300 thousand hectares. Field
peas area always receives a higher payment but this does not prevent a one thousand hectare decrease
in the cultivated area of this crop. The impacts of changes in area direct payments on yields differ
across COP crops. It is negative for cereals and positive for other COP crops. Once again, one may
observe that the impact of the Agenda 2000 area direct payment package on yields is quite limited.
Concerning COP production, the impacts on land uses dominate the impacts on yields, so that cereal
productions increase while oilseed and protein crop productions decrease. The alignment of oilseed
direct payments to cereal direct payments would reduce soya production by 258 thousand tons, rape
production by 290 thousand tons and sunflower production by 426 thousand tons. Finally, this direct
payment package would increase the unit land retum by 23 EuroÆra, suggesting that the positive
impact of increased cereal area direct payments overcomes the negative impact of reduced oilseed area
previous differentiated area direct payments on EU production of oilseeds. direct payments. From a
political point of view, these outcomes confirm the positive impacts of the
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Difference between the
central and baseline
scenarios
Price
effects
Direct payment
effects
Set aside
effects
Land allocation
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
All cereals
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
All oilseeds
Field peas
AII COP
(1000 hectares)
+466
+283
+60
-1
+30
+838
-33
-86
-67
-186
+3
+655
+74
-206
-80
-19
+7
-224
+56
+142
+24
+222
+2
0
+185
+242
+67
+6
+3
+503
-1 18
-300
-84
-502
1
0
+207
+247
+73
+12
+20
+559
+29
+72
-7
+94
+2
+655
Production
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
All cereals
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
All oilseeds
Field
(1000 tonnes)
+1381
+254
+t94
-283
+79
+t625
-77
-85
-2r9
-381
+13
414
-1924
-607
-343
-8
-3296
+136
+t96
+69
+401
+9
+710
+892
+379
+14
+11
+2006
-290
426
-2s8
-974
-5
+1085
+1286
+422
+46
+76
+29t5
+77
+145
-30
+192
+9
Yields
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
(tonnes/ha)
-0.155
-0.126
-0.107
-0.441
-0.135
+0.023
+0.039
+0.4t2
-0.009
-0.069
-0.104
+0.017
-0.420
-0.064
-0.018
-0.018
-0.047
-0.003
-0.036
-0.018
-0.049
-0.007
-0.005
+0.039
+0.037
+0.126
+0.020
(Obtainedby
difference)
-0.050
-0.004
-0.075
-0.014
-0.066
+0.002
+0.020
+0.333
-0.008
Land return
(Euro/ha)
49 49 +23 -23
Table 6.15. Decomposition of the total impacts of the central Agenda 2000 scenario on the EU6
arable sector: price, direct payment and set-aside effects
251
The reduction in cereal market prices contributes to increase cultivated areas devoted to oilseeds (+222
thousand hectares) and protein crops (2 thousand hectares). On the other hand, these market price
reductions have a negative impact on the cereal area (-224 thousand hectares). However, the negative
own price effects are compensated by the positive cross price effects in the case of soft wheat and rye.
One may observe that all yields, but maize, decrease as a result of the reduction in cereal market
prices. Yield adjustments dominate land adjustments in the case of soft wheat and rye, so that the
market price changes lead to a decrease in their productions. Similarly, productions of other cereals
decrease following the market price changes. At reverse, productions of oilseeds and protein crops
increase. As expected, the reduction in cereal market prices has a negative impact on the unit land
return.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the respective impacts of the three kinds of instruments. We first
observe that the positive impact on the unit land return of the direct payment package is lower, in
absolute value, than the negative impact of the price package. This situation is quite different from the
one corresponding to the 1992 CAP reform where area direct payments had been determined in order
to exactly compensate the price decrease effects on per hectare revenue. The negative price effects
also dominate the positive direct payment effects on cereal productions (-3296 versus +Z106thousand
tons)' Therefore, the positive effect of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform on cereal productions mainly
results from the reduction in the set-aside rate. On the conhary, the positive effects on oilseed
production resulting from both the reduction in cereal prices (+401 thousand hectares) and the
reduction in the set-aside rcte (+l9Z thousand hectares) are not sufficient to compensate for the
negative effects resulting from the direct payment package of the reform (-974 thousand hectares).
We finally examine the impacts of the baseline and the central scenarios on macro-economic
variables. The impacts of both scenarios on public expenditures in the guise of area direct payments
are reported in Table 6.16. Their effects in terms of profits for each COP enterprise are presented in
Table 6.17.
The application of the cenhal scenario leads to an increase in public expenditures in the guise of area
direct payments, compared to the base level. This increase amounts to 581 millions Euro or 5.20%o of
our base year estimate of area payment expenditures. Obviously, direct payments granted to cereal
areas increase Oy more than l\Yo for cereals considered as a whole), while those granted to oilseed
areas decrease (by 33.55%) withrespect to the base year. Public expenditures on set-aside areas also
increase due to the increase in these areas that compensate for a lower per hectare direct payment.
Compared to the no-reform or baseline scenario, the central scenario still induces an increase in public
expenditures. The extra-budgetary cost of the central scenario over the baseline scenario amounts to
457 millions Euro or 4.05% of the baseline simulated total area payment expenditures.
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Base levels
1998199
(r)
Cenhal
scenario
(2004t0s)
Change in %
(n)-G)
Baseline
(2004/0s)
(rrr)
Change in %
(ID-(UD
Direct payments
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
All cereals
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
All oilseeds
Field peas
All COP crops
Set aside
Arable crop
CMO
(mio. Euro)
3674
2325
13 16
t49
249
7713
1045
831
t64
2040
263
10017
I151
11168
4152
2521
T46I
153
255
8541
+13.00
+8.43
+11.02
+2.52
+2.44
+10.74
743
539
74
1356
-28.94
-35.12
-55.01
-33.55
256 -2.69
101s4 +1.37
1595 +38.58
tr749 +5.20
3433
2085
1238
133
2TT
7100
+20.94
+20.9t
+18.01
+15.04
+20.85
+20.29
1005
754
155
19l l
-26.07
-28.51
-52.25
-29.04
261 -1.91
9272 +9.51
2020 -2t.04
tt292 +4.05
Table 6.16. Impacts of the baseline and of the central Agenda 2000 scenarios on public
expenditures
The implementation of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform leads to an increase in the total profit of arable
crop farmers compared to the base level (1486 millions Euro). However, land remuneration decreases
in line with previous findings on the unit land return. On the other hand, reward of the other primary
factors of production increases by 2228 millions Euro with respect to the base level.
Finally, compared to a no-reform scenario, our central Agenda 2000 scenario leads to a decrease in
total farm profits (-636 millions Euro), with again a reduction in the land remuneration and a more
modest increase in the remuneration of the other primary factors'
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Table 6.17. Impacts of the baseline and of the central .A,genda 2000 scenarios on profits of COp
enterprises
6.5.4. Sençivity analysis: The sensivity of the Agenda 2000 simalation results to the assumed
evolution of market prices and the set-aside rate
The likely impacts of the Agenda 2000 reform on the EU COP sector reported in all existing studies,
including the present one, clearly depend on the retained assumptions regarding the evolution of COP
crop market prices as well as of the set-aside rate. Therefore, it is interesting to examine to what extent
our simulation results of the Agenda 2000 scenario are sensitive to these assumptions. This is the
purpose of this sensivity analysis.
Beyond the interest of such a sensitivity analysis in itself, the response of the likely impacts of the
Agenda 2000 reform on the EU COP sector to the assumed evolution of both market prices and the
set-aside rate is also interesting from a policy perspective. Indeed, whether the reduction in cereal
intervention prices adopted in the Agenda 2000 CAP reform will allow the EU to export cereals
without refunds is a crucial question. This obviously depends on the evolution of world market prices,
internal market prices and the EuroÂIS$ exchange rate. So fa4 a clear-cut answer to this question has
not emerged from existing studies. On the other hand, the evolution of the set-aside policy, namely of
Effects of the central scenario compared to
base levels (1998/99)
Effects of the central scenario compared to
the baseline scenario
Millions
Euro
Total profit Land
remuneration
Other factors
remuneration
Total profit Land
remuneration
Other factors
remuneration
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
All cereals
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
All oilseeds
Field peas
All coP
crops
Set aside
All activities
+494
+tt4
+172
-17
+g
+771
+1gl
+3
+g
+193
+79
+1042
+444
+1486
-338
-397
-133
-34
-35
-937
-68
-140
-31
-238
-11
-1 186
+444
-742
+833
+51 I
+305
+t7
+43
+1708
+248
+t42
+40
+431
+89
+2228
0
+2228
-86
+242
-39
+10
-3
+t24
-153
-108
-65
-326
49
-251
-385
-636
-532
-237
-140
-17
-r2
-938
-t42
-1 13
-22
-277
49
-1264
-38s
-t649
+446
+479
+101
+27
+g
+1062
-11
+5
43
49
0
+1013
0
+1013
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the mandatory rate of set-aside, is clearly dependent on the possibility for the EU to export cereals
without refunds.
It is therefore logical, from both the sensivity analysis and the policy points of view, to examine the
sensitivity of simulation results simultaneously to the assumptions retained regarding the market prices
and the mandatory set-aside rate evolution.
In the central scenarion by assuming a l0% decrease in the soft wheat market price and t l5o/o decrease
in other cereal market prices, we implicitly assume that the EU could export non-subsidised soft wheat
but that this possibility would be unlikely for other cereals. In the optimist scenario, we implicitly
assume that exports of all cereals do no longer need any export refunds so that the set-aside policy is
accordingly reduced. At reverse, the pessimist scenario implicitly rules out the possibility for the EU
to export any non-subsidised cereals, so that the supply control, through the set-aside policy, is
strengthened.
The results of our sensitivity analysis on main endogenous variables are reported in tables 6.18. and
6.19. Looking at the impacts on land uses and production levels of the central and the two variants of
the Agenda 2000 scenario with respect to the lgg9lgg levels, one may observe that the signs of the
effects of the Agenda 2000 scenario are in general unchanged but that their magnitudes are
substantially sensitive to the adopted assumptions on the evolution of market prices and the set-aside
rate. For instance, whatever these adopted assumptions, our results show that the global production of
cereals, oilseeds and protein crops increase with respect to the 1998199 campaign. For cereals
(respectively oilseeds) considered as a whole, the increase ranges ftom+2.900Â (respectiveiy +4.260/o)
in the pessimist scenario to +12.27%o (respectively +14.20%) in the optimist scenario. In the same
vein, the land allocated to oilseeds always decreases, between -12.41% in the pessimist scenario and -
g.4O% in the optimist one. On the other hand, the impact on the land allocated to cereals becomes
positive 1+1.48%) in the optimist scenario, compared to a decrease (-3.92%) in the central one. We
may again underline that most of the increase in total land available for cropping is devoted to cereal
production, suggesting that the set-aside policy is an effective mechanism to control cereals supply.
The impacts on crop yields are quite comparable among the three scenarios. This comes from the fact
that price and set-aside effects compensate for each other on these variables. In any case' they are
mainly driven by trend effects.
From a macro-economic point of view, it is interesting to note that the unit land return and the total
land remuneration become positive in the optimist scenario. One must also note that the total profit
never decreases with respect to the initial level, even with pessimist assumptions. Finally, as expected,
the level of public expenditures in terms of area direct payments is roughly the same in the three
scenarios.
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Change in % w.r.t. the
base levels
Pessimist scenario Central scenario Optimist scenario
Land allocation
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
All cereals
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
All oilseeds
Field peas
All COP crops
-6.47
-7.72
-6.56
-6.71
-9.93
-7.03
-8.03
-13.19
-34.10
-12.41
-0.88
-7.72
-2.36
4.87
4.26
-8.05
-11.69
-3.92
-5.40
-10.28
-25.57
-9.22
-0.36
4.64
+2.41
+0.87
+0.67
-0.09
-0.57
+1.48
4.Il
-10.53
-20.53
-8.40
+0.04
0
Production
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
All cereals
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
All oilseeds
Field peas
+3.44
+0.64
+5.61
-6.88
+1.28
+2.90
+7.55
-0.t2
+0.11
+4.26
+14.26
+7.17
+4.75
+7.40
-5.t4
+0.23
+6.22
+t2.26
+5.47
+10.96
+9.92
+t7.43
+11.87
+13.72
+tt.37
+t7.25
+9.45
+12.27
+16.22
+9.03
+t9.23
+14.20
+20.76
Yields
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
Sunflower
Soya
Field peas
+10.59
+9.06
+13.02
-0.r8
+12.43
+16.94
+15.06
+51.91
+15.27
+9.76
+10.12
+12.18
+3.16
+13.50
+t8.67
+17.55
+49.08
+17.85
+9.23
+t2.74
+10.63
+17.36
+10.08
+2t.20
+21.87
+50.04
+20.71
Land retum (Euro/ha)
-tt.37 -6.44 +4.30
Table 6.18. Sensitivity of the likely impacts of the Agenda 2000 scenario on the EU COP sector
to price and set-aside assumptions
2s6
Cenhal scenario Optimist scenarioPessimist scenarioChange in 7o w.r.t. the
base levels
Direct payments
All cereals
All oilseeds
Field peas
All COP crops
Set aside
+17.57+t0.74+6.78
-33.55 -32.37
-2.30
-2.69
-3.20
+6.88+t.37
+38.58 -8.09+69.40
+5.34+5.20+5.14
-36.2s
-2.25
cMoArable
Change in Euro w.r.t. the
reference year
Total profit
Land remuneration
Other factors remuneration
+1486 +3304+550
+380
-t203 -742
+2228+t753 +2924
Table 6.19. Sensitivity analysis of the likely impacts of the Agenda 2000 scenario in terms of
public expenditures and farm profits to price and set-aside assumptions
6.6. Conclusion and policy recommendations
In this research report, we first describe a new economic model designed to perform policy
simulations on the arable crops sector of the EU. This sector plays a central role in the EU agricultural
sector, quantitatively as well as politically. Since the inception of the CAP, a huge public intervention
regulates this sector and the arable crop CMO has often been the subject of intensive debates in
intemational negotiations. The nature of this public intervention has changed with the L992 and
Agenda 2000 CAp reform where we observe a partial shift from price support to a mechanism of area
direct payment and land set-aside.
The developed model, labelled MECOP for Maximum Entropy on Cereals, Oilseeds and Protein
Crops, is particularly well-suited to analyse such reorientation of the public intervention. The main
featues/originalities of the model are the followings. MECOP is basically a partial equilibrium model
focused on the representation of the supply side of the European COP sector. The specification of the
model is firmly based on the production theory. The duality theory is used to represent technical
constraints as well as the economic hehaviour of arable crops producers. The land market is explicitly
modelled, as we assume that land is a quasi-fixed but allocatable fixed factor. The main policy
instruments of the arable crops CMO are also explicitly represented in the model, task facilitated by
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the intoduction of the land market. Therefore, this model allows to explore the economic implications
of potential reforms of this CMO on many interesting variables, such as production levels, land uses,
per hectare yields, public expenditures in the guise of area direct payments and farm profits. The same
theoretical structure is applied to six European countries (Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and
United Kingdom) that are assumed to produce nine COP crops (soft wheat, barley, maize, oat, rye,
rape, sunflower, soya and field peas). The econometric estimation of the behavioural parameters is
another original feature of the MECOP model. These parameters are estimated using the Generalised
Maximum Entropy technique. This technique is for instance particularly recoûrmended when
collinearity between exogenous variables is important, as it is observed for output prices in the case of
MECOP. Moreover, the introduction of inequality restrictions on these parameters is easily done with
the technique and improves the efficiency of the estimation. h this report, we provide estimation
results. We also compute and report the elasticities of land uses and productions with respect to prices,
area direct payments and total available land. These elasticities may serve as input in other economic
models.
We simulate with MECOP the impacts of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform and discuss, in the last part of
the report, the results at the European level. Several quantitative analysis of this reform has already
been performed but from these existing studies, it is difficult to get a clear picture of the impacts of the
reform. They nearly all agree on the increases ofcereals area and production but there are no longer a
consensus on the magnitude of these increases. Results on other COP products are more mitigated and
the macro-economic impacts (on public expenditures, farm profits) are rarely assessed. Therefore, we
examine the impacts of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform on all these variables and moreover detail the
impacts of each policy instrument. We finally perform some sensitivity analysis of these results to the
levels of prices and set aside rate, as it is difficult to determine the evolution of these exogenous
variables.
The main results of our simulations are the followings. Compared to a no-reform scenario, the
application of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform as defîned in our central scenario, will lead to an increase
of cereals area (+J/o) and to a decrease of oilseeds area (4oÂ). The increase of cereals production is
limited to loÂ as the reduction of cereal intervention prices has a significant negative effects on yields.
The reduction of oilseeds area is largely governed by the alignment of oilseeds direct payments to
cereals direct payments while the positive impacts on cereals area largely results from the change of
the set aside commitment. From a macro-economic point of view, the application of the Agenda 2000
CAP reform will lead to only a slight increase of public expenditures, in the guise of area direct
payments, compared to a the 1998199 campaign. We also find a slight increase of farm profits and this
will mainly benefit to the rewards of non land primary factors. On the other land, the income support
will be less capitalised in the land, always compared to the 1998/99 campaign. Sensitivity analysis to
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prices and set-aside assumptions proves that our macro-economic results are quite robust and that the
signs ofthe effects on productions and land uses are also robust.
Therefore, from a political point of view, we can conclude that the Agenda 2000 CAP reform still
allow to support farm incomes with i) only a slight increase public expenditures in the guise of area
direct payments and ii) a significant reduction of cereal support prices that translate in benefits for
cereal consumers. Moreover, the farm income support will become less capitalised in land values and
conversely more in the rewards of other farm primary factors (mainly labour and capital). The
reduction of cereal intervention prices will also ease the exports of cereals to the world market without
export refunds. This has two crucial implications. Firstly, exporting without refunds will save budget
expenditures and the overall impact of this reform on public expenditures for the arable crops CMo
may become negative rather than positive. Secondly, the EU will be in better position (than without
the Agenda 2000 CAp reform) for negotiating on the export competition at the WTO millenium round.
As far as the intemal support dossier of these V/TO negotiations is concerned, several points must be
underlined. We already mention that the cereals production will increase which in tum, other things
being equal, will increase the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). on the other hand, the reduction
of the cereal intervention prices contributes to reduce the EU AMS and this second effect obviously
dominates the first one. Thus, the Agenda 2000 CAP reform will lead a reduction of the "COP crop
AMS" while slightly increasing area direct payments or the values of blue box measures. At this stage,
it is important to note that, compared to a no-reform scenario, the Agenda 2000 CAP reform will
favour the cereals production by only lYo andthat it is more than likely that the EU consumption of
cereals will increase by more than this percentage. So, at the end of the day, trade distortions of the
arable crop CMO are reduced.
Our analysis also shows that the application of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform will reduce per hectare
yields of nearly all COP crops, and therefore may have a positive effects on environment. On the other
hand, the main weakness of this reform concerns the production of oilseeds. It is clear that the
production of these critical products for the EU farm sector is not supported by this reform. Relaxing
further the control of supply through the set aside policy will partially alleviate the negative effects on
oilseed production but will mainly favour the production of cereals. The use of this instrument is
therefore extremely tricLY.
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APPEI\DIX
Estimation results for the united Kingdom, Germanyr rtaly, spain and Denmark
4.6.1. United Kingdom
Table 6.20. Structural parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level; *: Significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.21. Reduced-form parameter estimates
Significant at the 0.05 level; x: Significant at the 0.l0level
Table 6.22. Comelation coefficients between observed and estimated series
Table 6.23. Estimates of price elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Rape
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.236
-0.488
-0.107
-0.162
0.436
-0.124
-0.023
-0.079
0.257
COP crops bi ci ei r, 8i hid t
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
-30.882
755.139**
-66s.628
-5601.67r
4784.991
-t229.055
13.245
10.143
r.77t*
-0.764**
-0.503**
4.512**
5.830**
4.804**
2.596*
42.576*
-23.344
82.402**
302.599**
197.894**
44.385
COP crops
Constant in the
land equation
ft, ,,,I
el Irr e,
Constant in the supply
equation
(20,,,, lIti--o,l
I lrre, I\r'' )
c.+ f,
el
Trend impact on
land allocation
g,/e,
I
e.
-ùôl
l/ e,
Trend impact on
production level
.+( I,s,/',t'l
Irre,
h,
-o
Soft wheat
Barley
Rape
-s28.97
759.22
-230.2s
-8685.57*
-1137.70
-1824.48**
45.47**
-61.69**
16.53**
567.67**
-99.92
87.r2**
COP crops Land equations Supply equations
Soft wheat
Barley
Rape
0.939
0.955
0.965
0.958
0.889
0.970
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Table 6.24. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley RaPe
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.114
-0.236
-0.051
-0.103
0.275
-0.078
-0.015
-0.051
0.167
Table 6.25. Estimates of price elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999; price elasticities of
COP crop supplies for a given allocation in brackets)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley RaPe
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.263
[0.08s]
-0.362
-0.123 -0.017
0.487
[0.164]
-0.095
-0.059
-0.082 0.449
l0.2s2l
Table 6.26. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley RaPe
SoftWheat
Barley
Rape
0.086
-0.174
-0.039
-0.077
0.204
-0.060
-0.011
-0.038
0.128
Table 6.27. Estimates of elasticities of cultivated areas and output supplies with respect to total
available land and variable input price (year 1999)
COP crops e'; eY:L e'* et;
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.616
10.3721
2.t52
[0.56s]
0.469
[0.063]
0.466
1.594
0.360
-0.048
0.143
-0.064
-0.121
-0.058
-0.301
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4.6.2. Germany
Table 6.28. Structural parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level; *: Significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.29. Reduced-form parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level; Significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.30. Correlation coefficients between observed and estimated series
COP crops bi ci ei f, 8id hiI
Soft wheat
Barley
Matze
Oat
Rye
Rape
19.544
442.810
-567.145**
8lg.g07**
-136.490
-64.809
5 r4.60:
4145.362*'
-1102.642
-2683.097*r
-1054.6&
-7r1.244*
-0.469**
-0.648**
-6.236**
-1.124**
-0.635**
-13.134**
4.051*' 35.196**
5.286*' 23.741
5.514*, 94.917**
4.t34*, -29.374*
3.790*' 14.079
2.635 367.129**
223.261
132.325
64.5
2.t30
10.436
2.965
11.992**
2.328
1.373
57.407
7r.692
27.768
COP crops
Constant in the
land equation
rw')
Constant in the supply
equation
ft,,",
J't
_j- 
- 
D,
Irr e,", 
*L-
et
Trend impact on
land allocation
g,/e,
I
ei -oëtIrre,
Trend impact on
production level
'.r?#-' 
.
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
-341.24
406.74**
-tr9.69
569.99**
497.22**
-18.59**
-867.74
-199s.34
-t762.61
-326.77
-2939.12
-760.21
25.t5
0.50
g.g5**
46.97**
-r4.70**
26.17**
325. l5**
l34.gg**
118.97**
-136.75**
15.97
96.72**
COP crops Land equations Supply equations
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
0.992
0.838
0.983
0.964
0.86s
0.906
0.988
0.93
0.958
0.896
0.864
0.890
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Barley Maize Oat Rye RaPeSoft wheatCOP crops
0.230
-0.100
-0.064
-0.s92
-0.309
-0.014
-0.098
0.268
-0.055
-0.504
-0.263
-0.012
-0.013
-0.012
0.285
-0.068
-0.035
-0.002
-0.040
-0.03s
-0.022
r.264
-0.107
-0.005
-0.073
-0.063
-0.040
-0.372
0.592
-0.009
-0.005
-0.005
-0.003
-0.027
-0.014
0.053
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
Table 6.31. Estimates of price elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
Table 6.32. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
Table 6.33. Estimates of price elasticities of coP crop supplies (year 1999 ; price elasticities of
COP crop supplies for a given allocation in brackets)
Soft wheat BarleY Maize Oat Rye RaPeCOP crops
0.15s
-0.068
-0.043
-0.398
-0.208
-0.009
-0.056
0.153
-0.031
-0.288
-0.150
-0.007
-0.006
-0.006
0.139
-0.033
-0.017
-0.001
-0.032
-0.028
-0.018
1.025
-0.087
-0.004
-0.058
-0.050
-0.032
-0.294
0.468
-0.007
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.024
-0.013
0.048
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
Barley Maize Oat Rye RaPeSoft wheatCOP crops
-0.011 -0.034 -0.061 -0.004
-0.012 -0.010 -0.001 -0.004
-0.061
-0.043
-0.010
-0.045 -0.003-0.008 -0.025
-0.015 -0.027 -0.002
-0.408 -0.030
-0.649 -0.552
-0.222 -0.189 -0.025
0.155
[0.013]
-0.097 0.341
[0.082]
-0.037 0.310
[0.11e]
-0.074 2.6s6
lr.270l
-0.077 0.484
[0.058]
-0.008 0.165
[0.120]
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
263
Table 6.34. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Maize Oat Rye Rape
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
0.096
-0.06s
-0.029
-0.437
-0.t49
-0.008
-0.03s
0.148
-0.021
-0.316
-0.108
-0.006
-0.004
-0.005
0.093
-0.036
-0.012
-0.001
-0.020
-0.027
-0.012
1,.123
-0.062
-0.003
-0.036
-0.048
-0.021
-0.322
0.336
-0.006
-0.003
-0.004
-0.002
-0.027
-0.009
0.041
Table 6.35. Estimates of elasticities of cultivated areas and output supplies with respect to total
available land and variable input price (year 1999)
COP crops e'; eI
L
e" t
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Rye
Rape
0.877
[0.33s]
0.762
10.2421
0.487
[0.02s]
4.485
[0.13e]
2.341
10.2471
0.106
[0.012]
0.542
0.734
0.326
4.918
1.681
0.092
0.002
-0.051
-0.1t2
0.3t2
0.r42
-0.031
-0.012
-0.r32
-0.r94
-0.929
0.044
-0.147
2&
A.6.3.Italy
Table 6.36. Structural parameter estimates
**: Signifïcant at the 0.05 level; *: Significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.37. Reduced-form parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.38. Correlation coefficients between observed and estimated series
ci 8id hibi f,eiCOP crops
-3640.878
-2470.548
4037.959
-8s0.330
-2074.655
-0.368
-1.588**
4.659**
44.670**
-2.364**
3.310 -9.120
3.452* -7.682
7.073* 145.920**
2.054 347.509**
3.339** -5.304
r32.791
67.158
224.t46**
30.146
69.613
144.062
429.609
0.811
-504.607
-0.001
10.099
6.892
3.742
0.891
2.373
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Sunflower
Soya
COP crops
I
gt
Constant in the
land equation
lb, r e,i.l
--D.
J'
Irr e,
Constant in the suPPlY
equation
",."18u,'",_u,)e'l ltte, I\ .r-t )
Trend impact on
land allocation
e.
f,r,"' I4-- s,l
Irre, )
I
Trend impact on
production level
(fr,,", I
lffi')h,+Let
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Sunflower
Soya
49.92
t68.25
-34.69
-t4.93
-68.71
-3806.10
-1889.76
4283.32**
-881.00
-2304.08
-29.69
-5.97
30.93**
7.14**
-3.01
34.52
46.53
442.93**
46.31**
59.57
COP crops Land equations Supply equations
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Sunflower
Soya
0.972
0.804
0.858
0.803
0.835
0.844
0.698
0.910
0.754
0.880
265
Table 6.39. Estimates of price elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Maize Sunflower Soya
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Sunflower
Soya
0.508
-0.466
-0.055
-0.029
-0.487
-0.250
0.583
-0.013
-0.007
-0.114
-0.179
-0.078
0.t62
-0.005
-0.08r
-0.008
-0.003
-0.00r
0.037
-0.003
-0.253
-0.110
-0.013
-0.007
0.975
Table 6.40. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Maize Sunflower Soya
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Sunflower
Soya
0.2t7 -0.106 -0.072 -0.007
-0.003
-0.001
0.033
-0.003
-0.129
-0.199 0.247 -0.031
-0.056
-0.023 -0.005 0.066 -0.007
-0.012 -0.003 -0.002
-0.003
-0.207 -0.048 -0.033 0.495
Table 6.41. Estimates of price elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999; price elastcities of
COP crop supplies for a given allocation in brackets)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Maize Sunflower Soya
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Sunflower
Soya
0.691
[0.3ss]
-0.419
-0.165 -0.118 -0.005 -0.167
1.09s
[0.s71]
-0.010
-0.070 -0.003 -0.099
-0.041 0.t67
[0.04s]
-0.004
-0.001 -0.010
-0.023 -0.005 0.300
I0.27rl
-0.003
-0.005
-0.375 -0.087 -0.003 t.t72
10.4221
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Table 6.42. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat BarleY Maize Sunflower SoYa
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Sunflower
Soya
0.143
-0.r79
-0.018
-0.010
-0.160
-0.070
0.222
-0.004
-0.002
-0.037
-0.048
-0.028
0.049
-0.002
-0.025
-0.00s
-0.003
-0.001
0.026
-0.002
-0.085
-0.050
-0.005
-0.003
0.381
Table 6.43. Estimates of elasticities of cultivated areas and output supplies with respect to total
available land and variable input price (year 1999)
COP crops e!; e!L Ê" E!'
Soft wheat
Barley
Mzize
Sunflower
Soya
2.s21
[0.67]
1.098
[0.16]
0.045
[0.0s]
0.271
[0.01]
0.422
[0.11]
1.668
0.987
0.097
0.053
0.882
0.278
0.117
-0.111
-0.001
-0.493
-0.171
-0.466
-0.128
-0.272
-0.802
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4.6.4. Spain
Table 6.44. Structural parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level; *: Significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.45. Reduced-form parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.46. Correlation coefficients between observed and estimated series
COP crops bi ci di ei
"f, 8i hi
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Sunflower
477.833
-99.755
475.236*
646.673*
-r28.695
-1808.954
-5933927
-213.364
-578.538*
-248.649
2.134
19.929**
1.094
t.463*
0.300
-0.349**
-0.092*
-2.912**
-1.979**
-0.363f *
1.965*
1.951*
3.034
1.505*
0.660
-8.024
-l 1.509*
13.674
-2.61,6
16.519**
107.763**
199.334*
94.047*,
14.339*'
23.208
COP crops
Constant in the
land equation
rl#')
Constant in the supply
equation
lb, /e,l-t 
_ct
et Irr e,
Trend impact on
land allocation
,1t,,,", I112", -'' 
)
Trend impact on
production level
Zs,/,,
J-l
Irre,
h, l
-o
et
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Sunflower
t299.692
-1347.776
154.875
31,4.519**
421.310
744.94r
-8s63.438
256.526
-r05.187
-s26.713
47.943*
30.443
1.705
-5.722**
21.517
13.554
258.728
99.22t*
5.727
37.409**
COP crops Land equations Supply equations
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Sunflower
0.954
0.968
0.3s8
0.530
0.846
0.318
0.529
0.709
0.336
0.787
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Barley Maize Oat SunflowerSoft wheatCOP crops
0.489
-0.r27
-0.032
-0.060
-0.092
-0.299
0.233
-0.098
-0.185
-0.283
-0.018
-0.023
0.285
-0.011
-0.017
-0.0t2
-0.016
-0.004
0.249
-0.011
-0.052
-0.068
-0.017
-0.032
0.260
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Sunflower
Table 6.47. Estimates of price elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
Table 6.48. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
Table 6.49. Estimates of price elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999; price elasticities of
COP crop supplies for a given allocation in brackets)
COP crops Soft wheat BarleY Maiz-e Oat Sunflower
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Sunflower
0.376
[0.071]
-0.104
-0.186 -0.011 -0.008 -0.074
0.439
[0.248]
-0.033
-0.019 -0.011 -0.097
-0.011 0.131
[0.034]
-0.012
-0.003 -0.024
-0.064 -0.197 0.174
[0.34e]
-0.008
-0.046
-0.058 -0.180 -0.011 0.370
[0.04e]
Soft wheat Barley Maize Oat SunflowerCOP crops
0.241
-0.062
-0.016
-0.030
-0.045
-0.181
0.141
-0.059
-0.112
-0.171
-0.011
-0.015
0.186
-0.007
-0.011
-0.008
-0.011
-0.003
0.t74
-0.008
-0.074
-0.097
-0.024
-0.046
0.370
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Sunflower
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Table 6.50. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Maize Oat Sunflower
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Sunflower
0.150
-0.05r
-0.005
-0.032
-0.029
-0.113
-0.116
-0.020
-0.119
-0.109
-0.007
-0.012
0.063
-0.008
-0.007
-0.005
-0.009
-0.001
0.185
-0.005
-0.046
-0.080
-0.008
-0.049
0.236
Table 6.51. Estimates of elasticities of cultivated areas and output supplies with respect to total
available land and variable input price (year 1999)
COP crops etl
L eY:L s et;
Soft wheat
Barley
Maize
Oat
Sunflower
0.920
[0.16s]
1.203
[0.627]
0302
[0.020]
0.570
[0.02e]
0.871
[0.15e]
0.574
0.990
0.103
0.608
0.555
-0.075
0.045
-0.217
0.06r
0.008
-0.118
-0.21t
-0.108
-0.285
-0.044
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A.6.5, Denmark
Table 6.52. Structural parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level; *: Significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.53. Reduced-form parameter estimates
**: Significant at the 0.05 level; *: Significant at ttre 0.10
Table 6.54. Correlation coefficients between observed and estimated series
Table 6.55. Estimates of price elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley RaPe
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.057
-0.045
-0.034
-0.040
0.203
-1.000
-0.005
-0.t49
0"9t2
ci 8id hif,eibiCOP crops
-28.877
649.722
-165.869
-2598.582*', 9.700
-3959.204*', 12.042*
487.154 0.860
-19.503**
-0.500*'l
-3.878*{
6.053*
4502*
2.088',i
478.124
-30.2s9
5.311
74.379
tt6.549
13.908
SoftWheat
Barley
Rape
COP crops
Constant in the
land equation
,14,u""'-,,)
,lzrt", 
)
Constant in the supply
equation
"."1à,u,", -u,)''lE'"' )
Trend impact on
land allocation
tl.','"'' 
-r,)
''l lrr", I\rr /
Trend impact on
production level
.f, fs, r,,ï-_s,
Irre,
h'*
el
Soft wheat
Barley
Rape
-30.901
2t3.665*
-182.764
-2785.627*
-2997.283
-868.765
26.619**
-31.705**
5.085
235.504t*
-26.181
24.525**
COP crops Land equations Supply equations
Soft wheat
Barley
Rape
0.969
0.980
0.93s
0.957
0.854
0.938
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Table 6.56. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of cultivated areas (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Rape
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.024
-0.018
-0.014
-0.021
0.106
-0.s25
-0.004
-0.143
0.878
Table 6.57. Estimates of price elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999; price elasticities of
COP crop supplies for a given allocation in brackets)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Rape
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.297
10.2481
-0.040
-0.035 -0.004
0.585
[0.404]
-0.774
-0.133
-0.027 r.219
[0.s 13]
Table 6.58. Estimates of direct payment elasticities of COP crop supplies (year 1999)
COP crops Soft wheat Barley Rape
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.02r
-0.016
-0.011
-0.018
0.095
-0.406
-0.004
-0.128
0.680
Table 6.59. Estimates of elasticities of cultivated areas and output supplies with respect to total
available land and variable input price (year 1999)
COP crops e'; eY:
L elt et,
Soft Wheat
Barley
Rape
0.055
[0.023]
1.768
[0.865]
1.360
[0.112]
0.047
1.577
1.053
-0.011
0.046
-0.216
-0.257
-0.363
-0.680
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7. A MODEL oF Trm EU's DArRy AND BEEF pRoDUcTNc sEcroR
Agenda 2000 and Beyond: Impact of milk quota abolition on milk and beef production in EU
Member States
Alison Burrell and Roel Jongeneel
Parhrer 5: wageningen university, Deparrment of social sciences
7.1. Introduction
The objective of this part of the project (i.e., subtask 2.2) was to develop a tool for simulating policy
reform in the milk-producing sector of the European Union. The fundamental skucture of the market
regulations for the EU milk sector has remained unchanged since the introduction of milk quotas in
1984. Milk production is a major sector in EU agriculture: about 22 million dairy cows are kept on
nearly one million holdings, although not all of these holdings can be classified as commercial dairy
farms. In 2000, about 120 million tons of milk were produced, for which national quotas (deliveries to
dairies and direct sales) amounted to about 118.4 million tons. A structural milk surplus of about l0
per cent above domestic requirements is produced annually.
Milk prices are supported by market intervention arrangements for butter and skim milk powder. In
recent years, however, the combination of high tariffs on dairy products and internal supply conhol on
raw milk has probably been more responsible for maintaining milk prices within the EU at levels well
above the level implied by world market dairy product prices.
Despite years of stability and relative prosperity for the sector, reform of the EU's dairy policy is on
the agenda. The EU's exposed position within the international hading community regarding its large
volumes and expenditure levels for subsidised dairy products is one factor suggesting reform will be
needed. In addition, there are shong internal pressures from producers and dairy companies for
relaxation of quota limits. Moreover, arïangements for other CAP-regulated products have been
shifting away from market price support towards lower market prices in conjunction with direct
payments to farmers. Agenda 2000 inhoduced such an anangement for the dairy sector, to take effect
as from 2005' h the mean time, a small relaxation in quota limits has already started to be
implemented. An urgent question is whether this policy direction can be continued for milk, especially
when the consequences of such policy changes now have to be envisaged in the context of an
enlarging Union. These few observations sketch the policy context within which our model has been
designed.
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The model developed in this research fills a gap in the stock of research tools available to EU decision
makers. Although some national studies exist, there is no model available that depicts the milk-
producing sector at EU level in sufficient detail to articulate the types of policies currently
implemented or under discussion'
our model has been constructed according to some clearly defined scientific principles. First, it is
strongly based in production theory. In particular, it uses to the full the framework provided by recent
developments in duality theory for analysing production in the presence of supply constraints' Second,
it has been constructed in a way that maximises the contribution of empirical information on the sector
studied. The main behavioural relationships of the model are econometrically estimated, using a
combination of time series sampl e dataand non-sample information on technical, biological, structural
and institutional parameters of the sector. Third, the model is fully dynamic, allowing for immediate
short-run adjustment of outputs and variable feed use, but also for more gradual adjustment of the
livestocknumbers and land allocated to forage and grazing'
A special feature of the model is that beef and dairy production are fully integrated in the model' both
as regards the underlying decision making model and in speciffing the constraints and trade-offs
between the two types of production. This combined representation has been considered important for
several reasons. First, in many parts of the EU milk is produced on farms that also engage in beef
production from non-dairy herds. On these farms, the competition for resources and the income trade-
off between suckler cows and dairy cows is explicit. when policy changes and farmers react, it is
likely that these farms will find themselves "on the margin", more so than specialist farms with a less
diversified investment in one or other of these two enterprises and hence less flexibility to react.
Equally importantly, the dairy herd is a major source of beef production. Therefore, changes in policy
regarding the production of milk will, in so far as they affect dairy cow numbers, have an important
effect on the quantity of beef produced. Policy makers need models that explicitly recognise joint
production of commodities, in order to avoid displacing problems in the regulation of one commodity
into the market of a related commodity.
Finally, because of the joint production of milk and beef, the incomes not only of mixed livestock
producers but also those of specialist dairy producers are dependent on beefprices and policies. For a
complete study of the profitability of the dairy sector, its role as a supplier of beef must also be taken
into account.
The specific objectives of the research reported here were, therefore, to develop a simulation tool and
to provide policy simulations with a strong empirical and theoretical basis that would be able to:
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- represent the full complexity of current and likely future policy measures in the dairy sector;
- compare different policy options, either for milk separately or for the milk-beef complex;
- compare policy impacts between the different EU Member States;
- provide realistic time paths of adjustment, taking into account the different rates of adjustment of
various dimensions of the production process;
- calculate the likely consequences for budget outlays on different types of direct payment to
producers.
The model reported in this chapter represents the current outcome of our research efforts. The
simulations shown are a subset of what has been performed, and do not represent the model's full
capabilities (for example, budgetary transfers are not analysed in detail as between types of payment
and country recipient). Howevern they have been selected for their interest to a range of different
interest groups and their relevance to the current policy debate.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the philosophy and specification of the
Wageningen milk and beef production model for the EU-15. It also gives an overyiew of its role as a
policy simulator. Section 3 deals with the technical specification of the model, describes the estimation
procedure and presents and discusses estimation results. Section 4 reports and discusses simulation
results. Finally, section 5 concludes. It first provides a discussion on the sensivity of simulation results
to alternative assumptions regarding the degree of decoupling of beef and dairy direct payments, the
initial levels of quota rents and the yield growth. Then, it draws some policy conclusions and
recommendations.
7.2. A tool for simulating dairy policy reform
7.2.1. Philosophy of the model
The underlying philosophy of the model is summarised by several key strategic features:
- similar treatment for all countries;
- theoretical consistency;
- use of prior information (estimates from the literature, technical coefficients, etc.);
- econometric estimation in order to allow time series data to "correct" prior information on individual
parameters.
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Before presenting an overview of the model, it is useful to give the reasons for this philosophy, and to
explain its implications.
- Similar treatment for atl countries. Simulated scenarios of policy reform may have significant
implications for individual countries. using a standard methodology reduces the risk that the pattern of
changes across countries is distorted or biased by country-specific methodological choices.
Nonetheless, some country-specific features (dummy variables, country-specific time hends) have
been used sparingly to take account of different timing of entry into the EU, the impact of BSE, etc.
- Theoretical consistency. Rigorous theoretical constaints are imposed on the model when estimating.
These restrictions derive from the underlying assumptions of production theory, reflecting logical
constraints on technological trade-offs and the assumption of rational producer decision-making. They
provide additional information that improves the efficiency of estimation and helps to prevent counter-
intuitive results when simulating.
- 
(Jse of all prior information. Tlte time series data used are limited and its quality is variable across
countries. Therefore, as well as the time series data base, it is important to use all possible information
sources (previous literature, technical coefficients, information about the structure of the livestock
sector in each county) in a systematic way. This prior information is expressed in the form of
stochastic constraints and forms an input into the estimation process. In addition, constraints that
would be imposed anyway during simulation (such as the long-run relationship between dairy cows
and milk output, or between gazing and forage land and stock numbers) are incorporated into the
prior information used when estimating, so that the econometric estimates are consistent with these
relationships.
- 
possibilityfor data to ,,cotect" prior information on individual parameters. Prior information may
be of a rather general nature, or come from a study on just one country. Thus, data are allowed
to "shift" prior values when their signal is statistically significant.
7.2.2. Ovenîew of the model
The model is designed to simulate the impact of dairy and beef policy instruments on milk and beef
outputs, feed used as an input into milk and beef production, the stocks of dairy cows and beef
(suckler) cows, and the allocation of land to beef and dairy production (forage and grazing).
The model can simulate in two different policy settings: with milk supply constrained by quota, and
without any quota restrictions on milk supply. When milk supply is constrained by quota, milk price is
exogenously determined and it is assumed that milk production in each Member State equals the quota
limit in that Member State. When milk is not constrained by quota, the shadow milk supply functions
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determine milk production in each Member State, in conjunction with price, which is now
endogenous. To solve for milk supply and milk price, the shadow milk supply functions of each
Member State are aggregated to form an EU total milk supply function, which interacts with a demand
function at EU level. As a result of this interaction, an endogenous milk price is determined, along
with national supplies.
In the model, milk and beef outputs are determined in the current period, as a function of current
prices (or prices and milk quota levels when quotas are in force). The adjustment of the three quasi-
fixed factors (dairy cows, suckler cows and land) does not occur instantaneously. Instead, these factors
begin their adjustment with a one-year lag, and take several periods to adjust fully to a price or policy
change. Thus, the full impact of a price or policy change takes a number of periods to complete.
An overview of the model is given in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1. Schematic Overview of the Model
The theoretical model contains the following relationships
- ProJïtfunction.The profit function relates to the dairy and beef sector. It expresses the gross
margin (without direct payments) as a function of beef and feed prices, quasi-fixed factors and
milk output.
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
(MrLK QUOTA, MtLK PRTCE)
BEEF PRICE
FEED PRICE
YIELD GROWTH
ENDOGENOUS
PRODUCTION FACTORS
FEED INPUT
DAIRYCOWS
BEEF COWS
FORAGE I.AND AREA
ENDOGENOUS FINAL
OUTPUTS
(MtLK OUTPUT, MtLK PRICE)
BEEF OUTPUT
ENDOGENOUS
FINANCIAL VARIABLES
DIRECT PAYMENTS
TOTAL GROSS MARGIN
wrTH AND WTTHOUT DTRECT
PAYMENTS)
IMPACTS ON SPECIALIST
DAIRY FARMS
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- Beef and veal output supply. Beef and veal output supply is a function of current beef and feed
prices, current levels of quasi-fixed factors and milk output.
- Feed input demand. Feed input demand is a function of current beef and feed prices, current
levels of quasi-fixed factors and milk output.
The last two equations are derived directly from the profit function. One therefore finds the
same parameters in these last two functions as in the profit function. The three equations
(profit function, beef and veal output and feed input) form a mutually consistent set of
equations describing short-run profit maximisation. These three equations are estimated
jointly in order to allow restrictions on parameters that appeff in more than one equation.
- Mitk output (shadow price function). Milk output supply is a function of current milk price, current
beef and feed prices and current levels of quasi-fixed factors. This relationship is not directly
observable from past behaviour, because EU milk supply has been constrained by quotas since 1984
and has not been free to respond to price. The milk output supply function is based on the expression
for the shadow price of milk, which is derived by algebraic means from the profit function. This
derivation gives us those parameters of the milk supply function that describe the responsiveness of
milk supply to changes in milk price, to other prices and to quasi-fixed factors. To get the height
(position) of the function, it is calibrated using exogenous information about quota rents and structural
features of the milk-producing sector in each Member State.
- Dairy cow stock equation, suckler cow stock equation, Iand use equation. The long-run versions of
these three equations can also be derived by algebraic means from the profit function' These equations
share many of the parameters that appear in the profit function. 
'We assume that these quasi-fixed
factors need more than one period to adjust to price and policy changes. The adjustment equations for
these factors are dynamic, and embed the long-run expression (derived from the profit function). They
are therefore estimated empirically, preserving the links between the long-run parameters and the
corresponding parameters of the profit function.
- Accounting equations. kr addition to the above behavioural equations, there are a number of
accounting identities that are used to calculate direct payments, and gross margins with and without
direct payments. The direct payment equations calculate the total payments under the various headage
payment schemes. Each equation uses the payment rate for the relevant animal type, and the number
of animals of that type. The number of specific animals of each type is derived from the dairy and
suckler cow stock numbers with the appropriate lag. kr this way, the number of animals (calves, bulls,
sucper cows, etc.) qualifying for payments also adjusts under different policy scenarios, via the dairy
and suckler cow stock adjustments.
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- Aggregate demand for milk. This equation is not estimated, but is instead calibrated using an
extraneous estimate of the demand elasticity and the quantity of milk supplied in 2000. In the
simulations, this function is adjusted (height and elasticity) to reflect different exogenous assumptions
about aggregate demand conditions.
This completes the overview of the stucture of the model. It is useful to distinguish between the
model in two different modes: as a model for estimation (i.e. to be confronted with data in order to
estimate unknown parameters), and as a model for simulation. Table 7.1 summarises the "content" of
the model in each of these modes.
Table 7.1. composition of the model in estimation and simulation modes
(1) The column MSÆU denotes whether the equation is specified at the of each Member State, or at
aggegate EU level.
(2) { denotes that this equation forms part of the model in the corresponding mode.
(3) When quotas are in force, dairy cow adjustment follows yield, given quota (see paragraph 7.3.3).
Table 7.1 indicates that most equations occur in the model in both modes. There are, however, some
exceptions. For example, the milk supply response functions cannot be directly estimated, since past
Equation MS/
EU?
Estimation
mode
Simulation mode
With quotas With quotas Without
quotas
Profit function MS .l
Beefand veal output supply MS { ./ ./
Feed input demand MS ./ ./ {
Milk supply function
Milk supply = quota
Milk supply as function of price
MS
MS
./
./
Aggregate demand for milk EU ./
Dairy cow adjustment MS
"/ ({) ./
Suckler cow adjustment MS ./
"/ ./
Forage and, grazing land adjustment MS ./ ./ ./
Animals slaughtered MS ./ ./
Gross margin calculation MS ./ ./
Totals of various direct payments MS { ./
Impacts on specialist dairy farms MS
"/ "/
279
data do not yield any direct evidence on how producers respond to changes in the milk price'
Therefore, this equation cannot be directly estimated. Nonetheless, most of its parameters are
estimated econometrically in the profit function, from which it is derived. As explained, the aggregate
demand function uses assumed parameters and is calibrated on the situation in a given year. This
equation is necessary to "close" the model, and to allow a full solution when quotas are no longer in
force and milk price becomes fully endogenous. However, as the model is designed primarily to study
the detailed impacts of policy and market changes on the milk and beef producing sectors, the details
of the demand side of the market are not articulated in the model. Trends in consumption of raw milk
(due, for example, to rising income) or removal of a segment of the EU market (due, for example, to
the abolition ofexport subsidies for dairy products) are captured by horizontal shifts ofan appropriate
size in the aggregate demand for raw milk at EU level.
The profit function forms part of the model to be estimated. Estimating the profit function along with
the demand and supply functions improves the quality of the estimates, and ensures that all the
estimated parameters a mutually consistent in representing an integrated production sector. However,
it is not the estimated profit function that is used to calculate gross margins in the simulations, but
rather the more direct definition of gross margins as the sum of revenues from milk and beef
production, minus the cost of the variable input feed.
The observations in the previous two paragraphs explain the main asymmetries in Table 7.1. The
following section describes the structure of the model in algebraic form.
7.2.3. Description of the behavioural model
7.2.3.L Variable inputs and outputs
Economic decisions regarding dairy and beef production are modelled using a restricted profit
function framework. The normalized restricted profit fuùction is defined as:
n=.fo(p,z) (1)
where p is a 2x1 vector of variable netput prices (p,:normalised price of beef and veal,
p,=tormalised price of feed), z is a 5xl vector (2,=trend, zr:land (grazing and forage area),
zr=suckler cows, z4=daû cows, and zr=nilk output). Full definitions of these variables are
contained in the data paragtaph7.3.4.
Hotelling's Lemma yields the beef and veal output supply (q,) and feed input demand (q,) functions:
4, = f,(P,z) , i=1,2 Q)
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7. 2. 3. 2. Adjustment of quasi-fixed factors
The (conditional) shadow price functions for the quasifixed factors are given by:
+= g,(p,z)=-P'i, j :2,3,4&i
Rearranging these functions yields the equations for the optimal level of each of the quas!fixed
factors:
",="r(p'r,p,zrrr) (4)
where z,n is the vector of all quasi-fixed factors except z,
The adjustment equations are of the form:
zr,, =7urz],,-r+(l-îu,)z jr-r , j =2,3,4, where 0<Àj <l (5)
72.4. Policies that can be simulated with the model
A wide range of policies targeting the milk-producing sector can be analysed with the model. These
policies are summarised below.
- Supply control
- Changing levels of milk quota allocated to each Member State.
- Removal of milk quotas.
- Direct payments for milk production
- Payment per cow
- Payment per hectare.
- Payment per ton of quota.
Different assumptions are possible about producers' perceptions of these payments. They can be
depicted as fully coupled, totally decoupled or partially coupled. Various experiments can also be
performed regarding the profile over time of these payments; for example, they could be made
degressive (i.e., reducing over time).
(3)
- Milk price support
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- The effects of different levels of support price (linked to the intervention prices of butter and skim
milk powder via the intervention milk price equivalent and its relation to market prices) in the with-
quota scenarios.
- The effect of a floor price in the without-quota scenarios
In addition, simulations of changes in beef sector policy can be performed. In particular' we can
simulate the effect of changes in beef price, and changes in the various direct payments per head for
different types of beef animals. Given the interdependence of beef and dairy production, it is useful to
evaluate policy packages that affect both sectors simultaneously.
Finally, the effect of changes in the cereal price, insofar as they affect the price offeed, can also be
analysed. Not only are beef and milk output affected by feed price changes but so too is the amount of
feed used for dairy and beefproduction, and the allocation ofland to grazing and forage production'
Changes in the use of these policy instruments can be simulated, grving results year by year for each
Member State over a21-yeartime horizon. Of course, simulating over such a long time horizon, with
a model whose parameters are based on a data set that does not extend beyond the 1990s, cannot give
accwate forecasts of what will happen, in real time, if a given policy is adopted. These simulations
can, however, allow the comparison of dffirent policy alternatives in a realistic and consistent way,
and can explore the sensitivity of the sector to different types of policy instrument'
7.3. Specification and estimation of the model
This section deals with the technical specification of the model. In the first paragraph (7.3.1)' the
detailed algebraic structure of the model is presented. Paragraph 7.3.2 discusses the estimation method
used, known as "mixed estimation" because it combines information from sample data along with non-
sample information regarding likely values of the unknown parameters. Paragraph 7.3.3 explains the
type of non-sample information that was used, and how it was systematically assembled in a form that
could be processed by the mixed estimation technique. Paragraph 7.3.4 describes the sample data used
for estimation, and the data used to specifr the scenarios for the simulations. Paragraph 7.3.5 describes
the estimation sequence and the goodness-of-fit of the estimated models. Paragraph 7.3.6 explains how
the simulation results at sector level were tanslated into whole-farm gross margin changes for
specialist dairy farms. The rationale for these calculations is also explained'
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îE= &o *2o,0, *fgr"r.+àf.,,n,n,4à fp,"r,, *ff,r,ro,rol=l t=l
7.3.1. Parameterisation of the model
7.3.1.1. Profitfunction and netput equations
We assume a normalised quadratic functional form for the profit function:
(6)
with associated netput functions:
+ Zoup,+lT*zt, i=1,2j=t É=l (7)
Implicit in the short-run model are the shadow price relationships for the quasi-fixed factors and
rationed milk output (Moschini, 1988:320). These relationships are obtained by differentiating the
profit function with respect to the quasi-fixed factor (showing the amount by which profit would
change following a one-unit change in the level of the fixed factor). This defines (minus) the shadow
price of the quasi-fixed factor. Optimal adjustment of quasi-fixed factor would involve changing the
level of the quasi-fixed factor until its shadow price is equal to its market price (or its opportunity cost
to the farmer). In this frameworlç milk quota is teated analogous to the consfrained quasi-fixed
factors (Moschini, 1988). Therefore, implicit optimal levels of the quasi-fixed factors and milk output
can be obtained by solving:
c[q
P'=-P', , j:2,3,4,5dzi (8)
7.3.1.2. Milk supply response
Three different shadow price relationships for the constrained milk output (zr) can be obtained by
differentiating the profit function with respect to milk output and setting each in turn equal to minus
the shadow price of milk. The difference involves which other variables in the equation are assumed to
adjust when the farmer adjusts milk output.
anl
-lallfixed 
factors constant shows the change in profit when the quota constaint is relaxed by one unit,
az sl
without any adjustment in stock levels or land allocated to dairying. Only the variable input, feed, can
be adjusted in order to achieve an increase in milk supply.
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ldrro constant shows the change in profit when the quota constraint is relaxed by one unit and stock
az,l
levels adjust to optimal levels but land allocated to dairying remains fîxed. Thus, in addition to
changesinfeed,thereisalsorearrangementofstockinglevels'
Finally, f]r,*o-rvariable shows the change 
in profit when the quota constraint is relaxed by one
unit and stock levels and land allocated to dairying adjust to optimal levels'
The shadow milk supply functions corresponding to these different assumptions are, respectively:
zs=îtr(p',przç1) , zs=mr(P',P,2(t,t,s)) and zr=mr(P',P'z4,r,o'rr) (9)
where 
.i;l is a reduced vector of quasi-fixed factors (i.e. quasi-fixed factors i and i are no longer
included in the vector).
The corresponding supply responses have the following interpretatio *. H: shows the 
response of
milk output to a change in the shadow price when there is no adjustment in stock levels o' lund' 
ô*'
ôp"
shows the response of milk output to a change in the shadow price, when stock levels adjust but land
remains rr*ea. * shows the response of milk output to a change in the shadow 
price when stock
op-
levels and land adjust'
In the simulations, milk supply responds without any constraints on quasi-fixed factors, which are
allowed to adjust according to their adjustment equations. However, the conceptual differentiation
between these three',levels" of milk supply response is useful when defining the prior information for
key parameters in the sYstem'
According to the Le chatelier principle (chambers, 1988:145-147)' we expect the following:
ôm, a
ôp'
o*, a fut-ôp' ap'
(10)
ô'r 
,ho*, the milk supply response conditional on fixed levels of dairy cows, suckler cows and
ôp'
land. This implies a response consisting of a relatively costly upward deviation from trend yield, given
the existing number of dairy cows. It is therefore expected to be rather small'
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It is worth noting that the ô.,
ôp'
are all long-run responses, in the sense that they all assume full
adjustment of whichever variables are allowed to adjust. For exampl 
", 
Ayu- 
denotes the change in
ôp'
milk supply relative to a change in shadow milk price after stock levels have fully adjusted. Clearly,
the length of time required for full adjustment will depend on how quickly stock levels can adjust.
Rates of adjustment are discussed in the next paragraph.
The most constrained shadow milk response function (zr=ntr(p',p,z,o)) corresponding to this
speci{ication is given by:
142
"r=-;(pi+gr+lï'rzt+lT,sp) with Frr.0 (ll)},ss i=l i=l
It follows that
We can also show that:
Atn2 I
ôP" Fr, +ô
- 
ôm, 
-1ônd 
-:-:ôp' Br, +ô+<p
ôm, 
- 
-l
ôp" Frt (r2)
(13)
(14)
where ô and q can be expressed in terms of other parameters of the profit function, and expressions
involving quasifixed factors. With additional assumptions, these expressions can be expressed in
terms of milk yield and stocking rates for beef and dairy cows.
The constaints given in (3) imply:
o<ô<lp,l and o<q<lp,,l-o (15)
The objective of this decomposition of the milk supply response is to facilitate the choice of priors for
the parameters involved, and thereby to make sure that the consfiaint given by equation (10) is
incorporated into the estimated elasticities. This procedure is discussed in more detail in paragraph
7.3.3.
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7. 3. 1. 3. Quas i-fixed factors
The optimal levels of the quasi-fixed factors are:
,, =t(rr -u'-àBn'r -Er,o,) ' i:2'3'4 (16)
we assume that the quasi-fixed factors adjust to their optimal levels according to the partial
adjustmentmechanism 2,.,=?"12'1,,-r+(l-?",)2i,,-r.Thisgivesthefollowingadjustmentequations:
,r., = -*(- Pi,,-, +Fr l9rrzr,,-, *Frrzt,,-, *9ozzo,,-, * Frrzs,,-r1n[rzPt.,-' +'l"P'''-')+ (1-]")"''-' (17)
,r,,=-*çPi,,.+Pr*9,r2,,,-, *Lrrzz,,-t*9orzo.,-,*9rrzr,,-r*nlrtP,,,-'+T"P'''-')+(1-À')"''-' (1 8)
,r,, = -*(- Pl,,-t +90 * F,ozr,,-, 19rozr.,-, 19rozr.,-, * Lrozs,,-,4 TrqPr',-r + l 
'oP'''u)+(l -tuo)to''-' (1e)
Note that, in the above adjustment equations, all right-hand side variables have a one-period lag. This
solves the simultaneity problem present in the original system, and which facilitates estimation.
7.3.2, Estimation of the equation system by mixed estimation
Several complications have to be considered when estimating the model described in the previous
paragraph. First, within the estimation period lg73-lgg5, two different policy regimes operated.
Before 1984, there was no restriction on milk output, while from 1984 onward milk output is restricted
by quota. The simplest solution would be to estimate two separate models, i.e., the unrestricted supply
system for the first sub-period (a profit function model), and a restricted supply system for the second
sub-period (a cost function model).
However, due to the short time series relative to the number of parameters to be estimated, combining
both models but adding further assumptions would allow for more efficient information. If it is
assumed that the underlying production technology has not changed, there exists a direct relationship
between the restricted and unrestricted profit functions describing producer behaviour (Fulginiti and
perrin, 1993). Exploiting this linkage enables efficient estimation using information from both periods
to determine one set of parameters. The disadvantage of the latter approach is that one ends up with a
highly non-linear model.
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To avoid these complications, the final approach chosen here is more indirect. The reskicted profit
function and its derived netput functions are estimated for the whole sample period. Because the
quantity of milk has a mixed endogenous/exogenous character, in principle a simultaneous equations
estimator should be used. However, because Hausman tests in general rejected the endogeneity
hypothesis, non-simultaneous estimation was applied to all countries. r05
The short time series and poor quality of some of the data, together with the fact that some variables
show collinearity also made it difficult to obtain meaningful and significant parameters in all
equations. Given the importance of robust and sensible parameters in the simulation model, a solution
to this problem has to be found.
Following Jongeneel (2000), a mixed estimation procedure was applied, which allows sample and
non-sample information to be combined. The non-sample information consists of the usual (non-
stochastic) theoretical constraints (such as symmetry of the Hessian matrix, and homogeneity of
degree one in prices of the profit function) on the one hand, and other forms of prior information. The
other prior information, which is included by specifuing stochastic constraints, reflects prior ideas
regarding specific model coefficients, based on previous economic research (e.g., input and output
price elasticities estimated in other studies), as well as agronomic characteristics (e.g., feed conversion
characteristics, milk and beef yields per cow) regarding specific coefficients. Unlike the theoretical
restrictions, which are assumed to hold exactly, the prior parameter values are imposed in the form of
stochastic relationships to reflect a priori uncertainty about the validity of these values.
This paragraph explains how the prior information was incorporated into the estimation process. The
following paragraph explains how prior information was systematically assembled for most of the key
parameters.
Assume the behavioural model, consisting of the three equations (l), (2) and (3), may be written as
y=XB+u, wherey denotes a vector of endogenous variables (fl,q,qr), and Xrepresents a block
diagonal matrix of explanatory variables, with on its diagonal X t, X 2and X , respectively, where X,
denotes the matrix of explanatory variables associated with the Ëth equation in the system. Denoting
the number of time periods by T and the number of explanatory variables in X, by K,, X, has
dimensions(Tx/(r)andXisa(3TxK, +Kr+Kr)matrix. X, and X, matricesmayhavecommon
explanatory variables (e.9., X, 
- 
X r). B is the parameter vector which is defined as ( F,, Pr, Ê, ). The
105 Simultaneity was generally rejected, except for Belgium/Luxembourg (meat and feed), the United Kingdom
(meat) and the Netherlands (feed).
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p, and F, vectors may have common elements (e.g., cross-equation symmetry restrictions)' u is an
(3Tx1) vector (upur z, ) of disturbance terms. Adding the stochastic restrictions gives:
[r=[f)'.[;} "[i]=0, ^,1:)=[i ].) (20)
with p = pF+ v representing the stochastic restrictions. 
tou If there are \ pieces of prior information
there are \ stochastic restrictions. p is then a (Npxl) vector and P a (NpxK, + K, + K, ) matrix' The
uncertainty is reflected in the variances attached to the prior estimates, which are summarised in an
(N;x \) matrix 26. usually o (3Tx3T) is unknown and has to be estimatea (ô), before GLS can be
applied (cf. for example Judge et al, 1988:446). The (feasible) mixed estimator is:
I- ^-r 1t( ^'-r . )4 =l x'6-' x + P'v;' P I I 
"'ô v+ P'v;'P I 
(21)
'L l\ /
when, in addition, N non-stochastic restrictions of the form RF = r are imposed on this system (with
R (N,x K, + K, +K, ) and r a scalar of dimension N), a restricted mixed estimator b) can be derived
(Jongeneel, 2000: I 16):
b)=b,+(z'v^z\-'n'[n(z'v-'zf'À'f'Q-Rb,\ Q2)
with â, the mixed estimator as before, and:
,=(i) *=[ô o )[o vo)and
(23)
where z is amatrix of (3T+Nox K, + Kr+ K, ) and Y an (3T+Nox3T+No;' A routine for the mixed
estimator was written in the statistical package EVIEWS'
7. 3. 3. Prio r înform atio n
This paragraph describes how a comprehensive set of prior information was drawn up for the main
parameters in the model. Two guiding principles were used. First, it was important to maintain
consistency between the various elasticities in the system. To this end, very explicit expressions were
derived showing the decomposition of elasticities as weighted sums of more basic elasticities' These
tou Iq fo,. example, f = (t,0,0,...) and p : 0.5 this implies a prior estimate for the first element of the parameter
vector, say 0,r, of 0.5
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expressions made the linkages between the various elasticities in the model more transparent. Priors
for parameters were chosen so as to respect these relationships. Second, we aimed to incorporate all
relevant prior information (estimated elasticities found in the literature, knowledge about the structure
of the sector in each country, technological constraints and so on) in order to make the priors reflect
the characteristics of individual countries.
It is not possible in this paragraph to explain in detail how all the prior information used was obtained
and amalgamated. We illustrate the procedures with some examples.
First, we consider the equations for beef output supply and feed input demand (equations (2) and (3)).
Their general form is:
B = f (pu, pr ,DCS,BSS,LAND,TREND) e4)
F = g(pu,pt ,DCS,BSS,LAND,TREND) es)
with, as dependent variables, B beef output (q1), and F feed input (q2), and as explanatory variables,
beef and feed prices, stocks of dairy cows DCS (a) and suckler cows BSS (23), land (zà and a trend
variable (21). The notation used in this section has been changed to improve transparency.
7.3.3.1. Beefsupply
Beef output B is the sum of beef from dairy cow cullings (DC) and beef from slaughtered other
animals (BS) or B = DC +BS. ro7
The amount of meat produced from dairy or other animals is the product of the number of
slaughterings (NDC, NBS) of these animals and the average slaughtered weight ('WDC, WBS), or:
B=NDC*WDC + NB,S*WBS e6)
The own-price beef supply elasticity can derived as a weighted average of the elasticities of dairy and
other animals with respect to the price of beef as:
eoro =D9 *roo + #.rt1 e7)
Because DC is the product of NDC and WDC, the price elasticity of beef supplied from dairy origin
may be written as: tot
tot Not. that DC = f d( DCS ) and BS = f b( DCS, BSS ) .
tot To derive this (and the following) relationship(s), (constant) linear linkages between variables are assumed,
which make it possible to approximate partial derivatives by ratios of the averages of the concerned variables.
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"]t ='o|u + EoA, 
(28)
that is, as the sum of the elasticity of dairy cow slaughterings with respect to the price of beef and the
elasticity of the average dairy cow slaughter weight with respect to the beef price. 
ræ This linkage
makes it possible to distinguish between slaughterings and the associated herd adjustments, and
slaughter wei ght management.
As a consequence the own-price elasticity of beef output may now be decomposed as:
e1u =D9 *@olor+rrio) + !!*@o,irr+ e'Jà Q9)
Since beef from dairy cows has the character of a by-product, it is expected to be rather insensitive to
beef price changes (eo|or=eoJo, =0). The other elasticities are less easy to establish' If producers
perceive a beef price increase as perïnanent, they will probably react by temporarily reducing the
number of slaughterings in order to enlarge their herd and by that increasing future beef supply. If,
however, producers perceive a beef price increase as transitory, they are likely to increase cullings and
may even cull animals that have not yet achieved their optimal slaughter weight'
In an analogous way, the cross price elasticity of beef output with respect to the price of feed (input)
may be written as:
xI' =4*6(u +eo$")*ff-tr,,i , +e{,) (30)
The elasticity of beef output, B, with respect to the quantity of milk, M, is equal to:
*(e|o, +El,) * ff*{rf,,, +Elo,)eI= DCB
The elasticity of beef output with respect to the dairy cow stock (DCS) is equal to:
DC DCS ) DCSDCSNDC-DCS _t'B *(e +tB )
(3 1)
(32\
Assuming the influence of the dairy cow stock on the average slaughtering weights of both categories
(daû cows, other animals) is negligible, the elasticity relationship may be further simplified as:
c DCS9B
Dcs BsNDc*B
wBs+tDCS/vrs*(e8SB+wDc
DCS
/vas
!t6
=DC *,B
tt Cross product terms of partial derivatives are assumed to be small enough to neglect them'
290
(33)
where the latter elasticity reflects the competition (or complementarity)tto between dairy cow herds
and other animal herds (competition for land, forage, labour). After the introduction of milk quotas in
1984, competition at the margin between dairy and beef animals seems to have increased (suckler cow
numbers have increased for most countries since 1984). This becomes clearer after recognising that
effij may be replaced by the elasticity of the other beef animal stock (BSS) with respect to the dairy
cow stock (see the simplification from (32) to (33)), giving:
DCS
B
DCS
NDC
rl. g DCS
,ss (34)
.BS
B
+I
B
In an analogous way, the elasticity of beef output with respect to the other beef animal stock (BSS)
may be written as:
(3s)!st
Here again, the first right hand side elasticity reflects the competition between dairy and beef herds.
o8$eB
c IJINDvB
DC.il^
B
+-
DC.
-- 
a,
B
,ss BSDcs'B ,ssr'yas
Finally, the elasticity of beef output with respect to land is:
BSLIND
DCS
*, ?LANDe 
,ss (36)
7.3.3.2. Feed demand
Feed input F is the sum of feed used by dairy cows (FD) and feed used by beef animals (FB),
orF = FD+ FB .trl
The amount of feed demanded per animal category is the product of the stock of dairy and other
animals (DCS, BSS) and their corresponding feed intakes per animal (FID, FIB), or:
F = DCS* FID + BBS* FIB (37)
Because the dairy cow feed consumption (FD) is the product of DCS and FID, the input demand price
elasticity of feed for dairy cows may be written as:
pî (38)
B
t FD
It0 A distinction has to be made between specialised beef-producing countries and countries where dairying and
beef production are cornplementary.
I I I The irrplicit focus is on cereals, energy-rich and protein-rich feeds. Forage is not directly accounted for, but
is assumed to be taken up by the LAND variable in the model.
pI
FIDt+pfDCSs
29t
The own-price elasticity of feed input can derived as a weighted average of the elasticities of dairy and
other animals with respect to the price of feed as:
,{ =+.@oio + roi,) * #.o{, + t;i,) (3e)
or as the weighted sumt t' of the elasticity of dairy cow feed intake with respect to the price of feed and
the elasticity of the dairy cow stock with respect to the feed price, and the same elasticities with
respect to beef animals. This linkage makes it possible to distinguish between changes in feed intensity
per animal and the associated herd adjustments.
Analogously, the elasticity of feed input with respect to the beef price can be derived as:
,{ =#.te,!,o + 
"{à + !!*G'i, + eil,) (40)
where the dairy cow elastici ties @!o,e,]"r) are likely to be very small. Increasing beef prices (relative
to feed prices) is likely to increase feed consumption per animal. The effect of a beef price increase on
the stock of beef animals is ambiguous (see above).
The elasticity of beef feed input (F) with respect to the quantity of milk M is equal to:
"{ =+.(e'io + r'-r) + 9*@'i, + e'rÏr) (41)
The elasticity of feed intake per animal, e'lo,willbe the most important one in the (very) short run.
Next comes dairy cow herd adjustment, which may, depending on the degree of competition between
dairying and beef producing, spill-over to the beef herd (BSS)'
The elasticity of feed input with respect to the dairy cow stock (dary herd) DCS is equal to:
e?"=9.O?f; +r) + E DCSFIRS (42)t+*(e DCS ),ss
and with respect to the beef herd (BSS)
a 
'ss ("iË +e3'Â) + f-tr#, * U=FD *F (43)
112 It should be noted that there is no a priori reason why the weights FD/F and FB/F should correspond to the
weights DC/B and BS/B of the previous point.
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Both elasticities are likely to be roughly equal to, respectively, the shares of dairy cows and beef
animals in feed consumption, with a potential downward correction, again depending on the
complementarity or competition between dairy cow herds and other animal herds (competition for
land, forage, labour).
A similar decomposition can be made for the elasticity of feed demand with respect to land.
7. 3. 3. 3. Rationale for the elasticity decomp os ition
It turns out that a significant refinement in the determination of the priors (i.e., the prior values
assigned to parameters) can be achieved by exploiting the information about the shares that dairy cows
and suckler cows have, directly and indirectly, in total beef and veal output and in feed consumption.
The elasticities are decomposed as weighted sums of more basic elasticities, whose values can more
easily be assigned on the basis of biological or technological considerations, or using prior estimates
from the literature. With a few exceptions, these basic elasticities are likely to be rather homogeneous
across countries. At the same time, the weights used to combine them reflect country-specific
stuctural information (for example, the relative importance of dairy cows as a source of beef
production). These weights are obtained from the data base.
One exception to the assumed homogeneity of basic elasticities relates to the issue of complementarity
and competition between dairying and beef production. In a number of cases, this trade-off emerges as
an important parameter about which a judgement must be made on a country-by-country basis. From
simple time-series regressions, it appeared that 10 out of 15 Member States show a negative
correlation between dairy and suckler cow numbers. "' Countries with a positive correlation or non-
significant correlation are Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden. tta These estimated parameters for
each Member State were used where relevant in establishing the priors.
The priors were constructed in the form of elasticities. and then, since the equations are linear, were
hansformed into prior values for the parameters by adjusting them with appropriate ratios of sample
means.
7.3.3.4. Priors for other parameters
rr3 Regressing dairy cows on suckler cows for respectively the whole period (73-95) and the milk quota period
(84-95). Results are available from the authors upon request.
lla The suckler cow data for Sweden are of low quality, so these results should be treated cautiously.
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previous points 7 .3.3.1 and 7 .3 .3.2 illustrate in some detail how prior values were assembled for the
parameters cr,i; and y1 in equations (7). No priors are used for the parameters cr,,B, and F, i:1,2,
j--2,...,5.In this point, we give a brief description of the method whereby the prior values were
derived for the parameters F, for j,[ =2,...5 .
Unlike the parameters o,, andy* which appear in the netput functions and for which estimates appear
in the literature, the parameters 9y, (appearing in the profit function and in the optimal fixed-factor
equations) are more difficult to relate to observable technical coefficients or to previous research
results.
Our starting point is to assume a set of prior values for the three own-price conditional (i.e., no
adjustment of other quasi-fixed factors or milk) elasticities for land, suckler cows, and dairy cows, and
forthe elasticity of milkbased on equation (12) (i.e., no adjustment in quasi-fixed factors)' It should
be noted that these parameters must be non-positive because of the concavity of the profit function in
quasi-fixed factors.
Some prior information on the short-run milk supply response (-1l9rr) is available from the
literature. Thijssen (lggz)using a number of different approaches but focusing on the pre-quota period
(lg71-g2),obtained short-run elasticities in the range of 0.10-0.13 and long-run elasticities of 0.27 and
0.32. These elasticities correspond to the functions zs=ffit(P',P,z,n) and zs=tt\(P',P,zell,r)
respectively. Boots (1999: 65) who studied the Dutch dairy sector using a panel data set containing
9365 observations on 1961 farms for the period 1973174-1992/93, found milk supply elasticities of
0.26 and0.43 depending on the model specification. These elasticities already assume adjustments in
quasi-fixed factors, notably dairy cows, and therefore correspond to zr=mt(P',P,zp3.n,n)'
Comparing these two sets of estimates suggests that milk supply elasticities have remained rather
stable over time, at least in the Netherlands. They depend on production structure or technology
characteristics rather than on policy regimes.
Guyomard et al (1996: 214-215) analysed the French dairy sector using a cost function approach.
Their estimates are based on a sample of 1599 farms, taken from the FADN. Using the estimated
slope-parameter of the marginal cost function with respect to milk and multiplying this by the milk
price/milk quantity-ratio (evaluated at the reported sample means), gave a short-run (conshained) milk
supply elasticity of 1.67.10-3. For Finland, Kola (1991) obtained a supply elasticity of 0.5, which
seems to have a medium-run character and hence allows adjustments in quasi-fixed factors. These
estimates are rather consistent in suggesting that the most constrained shadow milk elasticity is under
0.2, and with adjustments in quasi-fixed factors, an elasticity of 0.5 or less.
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Since, when dairy cow numbers are fixed, milk supply increase has to come from an above-trend yield
increase, some differentiation based on per counbry yield levels might be considered. There is evidence
that cows with a relatively low yield level can more easily achieve an increase of, say, 5 per cent than
cows that are already producing at relatively high yield levels. rr5
Once a prior belief about the most constrained elasticity has been formed, this can be ûanslated into a
prior on the parameter Pss according to the relationship gss = -l leoli,r.(p^ lZr) with ej; denoting
the corresponding milk supply elasticity and p^and v, representing price and quantity of milk
evaluated at the relevant sample mean. Using the prior information about the short-run by assuming a
short-run supply elasticity of 0.10, implies that the prior value for B' is fîxed as- (1/0.1)( p, lZr) .
With respect to the elasticities involving some adjustment in quasi-fixed factors, the studies quoted
above show more variation. This is even more so when non-European studies are examined (see
below, paragraph 7.4.2).It is therefore diffrcult to specifu reliable a priori beliefs with respect to the
ratio of short- to medium-nm response.
From equations (17) to (19), we see that each coefficient B* is directly related to the elasticity of each
quasi-fixed factor with respect to its "price" since:
B- =++ s4)orr th
In the case of dairy cows, "price" has to be interpreted as input costs associated with dairy cows
(Boots, 1999: 56). For the Netherlands, Boots (1999:65) obtained own-price input demand elasticities
for dairy cows ranging from 
-0.3 to -0.5. We therefore base the value of Ê* on an assumed elasticity
of -0.4.
A similar reasoning for pr, (suckler cow equation) was also used. With respect to suckler cows no
reliable prior information was available. An own-price elasticity of -0.4 was also assumed here, and
was used to construct a prior value for Br..
Finally, an own-price (conditional) elasticity of demand for land of -0.1 was assumed, in order to
derive prior values for pr, .
t-tt 
*. suggests that low national yields not only reflect low genetic quality, but also indicate sub-optimal
feeding regimes.
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Next, in order to be able to use the expression in (2.40) to fix prior values for pp p3 and 9*, values
for the adjustment coefficients Ài are needed. These are assumed to be 1"2 =0.2, î4:0'6, and luq = 0'7 '
Itu This leads finally to a set of prior values for pp pg and Boo which are then inserted into stochastic
constraints, so that they may be modified by interaction with the data where necessary.
Having assigned priors forB' j=/, it is also useful to form some prior expectations for the
parameters Br,, i +l . We began by setting 9r, =9r, =0, on the gfounds that increasing milk
output will not affect optimal levels of land and suckler cow stocks directly but only indirectly via
dairy cow adjustments. This left four parameters to which priors must be assigned, namely
Fr,Fro,gro md por. These parameters can be expressed as functions of extraneous estimates for
stocking rates, "competition" between beef and dairy, and yield, on the one hand, and the parameters
Br,Frrand 0s. The parameters B1,0ro,Êr, and po, are all involved in the expressions ô and o'
which were defined in point 7.3.1.2. and for which inequality restrictions are also present. These
restrictions are also used to further constrain and improve the consistency of the corresponding
parameter estimates.
Ourprocedure for expressing these parameters (pr'Fro,Br and gnr) as functions of the own-price
response parameters (p22,F* and B* ) involves the assumption that milk yield and stocking rates are
following trends over time that are largely exogenous to price and policy developments. In the case of
milk yield, there is ample evidence that milk yields in the EU have been following a long-run trend
that has resisted movements in real prices and only momentarily faltered at the moment of introducing
milk quotas. However, we considered that further analysis was needed in order to support the
assumption that stocking rates are exogenous in the long run.
In order to obtain estimates for aggregate stocking densities, weights must be assigned to dairy and
sucper cows, and other grazing animals, in order to arrive estimate trends in total stocking densities.
In order to establish these weights, various technical information was used.
The daily feed input requirement for dairy cows (550 kg live weight), expressed in "feed unit milk"
(F1IM) can be approximate dby 4696 + 439.M + 0.7293.M2, where M stands for the daily yield in kg
(pR, 1980: 159). For a dairy cow with a yield of 4000kg/year the average daily intake is 9595 FUM,
which is more or less comparable to the requirement of a suckler cow (including pregnancy). The
tl6 These are the plausible parameters based on preliminary analysis, and are used in constructing the prior
values for other pàrameters. These values are used as stochastic priors for the parameters themselves during
estimation, so that data have been permitted to "correct" them before arriving at final estimates.
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roughage intake of high yielding dairy cows is estimated to be 2.5 kg dry matter of roughage per
100kg live weight. High yielding cows (550 kg live weight) have a potential calculated dry matter
roughage intake of 13.75 kg per day. In order to achieve the high yields often supplementary feeding
with compound feeds is necessary to satisfu the total energy (and protein) requirements. On average I
kg compound feed replaces 0.5 kg dry matter of roughage (PR, 1980: 160). tr7
Assuming grass has an average FUM value of 151 and 0.160 kg dry matter per kilogram of product
(PR, 1980: 165), a suckler cow needs an intake of 10.16 kg dry matter of roughage to satisfu its
complete (energy) requirement. The average milk yield in the EU15 in 1995 was estimated at 5279kg
(EU, 1999, T/328). To achieve this yield a dairy cow would need a roughage intake of about 12kg (dry
matter), without needing a compound feed supplement. The average forage and grazing requirement of
a suckler cow will therefore lie in between 0.7 and 0.9 that of a dairy cow.
As a proxy for the contribution to stocking density of other roughage using animals, the requirements
of sheep, the main other grazing animals category, is used as a basis. The FUM requirement of sheep
(ewes and lambs) is estimated to be on average 1300 FUM per day (PR, 1980, 153). Satis$ing this
need requires a daily dry matter intake of roughage of 1.3 kg. The weight for sheep is then equal to 0.1
times the weight of a dairy cow.
Using these weights and the livestock numbers over the period 1975-L996, the total stocking density
for EU15 has been rather constant at between 0.7 and 0.8 dairy cow equivalents per hectare of land
used for forage and grazing (see Figure 7.2).
l17 With small amounts of added compound feed (<3kg) replacement rates of about 0.3 and with high amounts of
added compound feed (>7kg) replacement rates ofabout 0.6 are found.
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Figure 7 .2. Evoltttion of stocking rates in EUl5
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Figure 7.2 shows the development of the stocking density over time for the 8U15, and the
contributions of the different animal categories to it. As can be seen it supports the assumption that the
long-run stocking density is rather stable. Table 7.16, in appendix l, shows significant differences in
stocking darsity over countries. The lowest densities are in keland and Spain, the highest in the
Netherlands and Denmark. Part of these differences can be traced back to differences in land quality,
climate and feeding systems. Except for Portugal, the stocking densities are fairly stable over time for
all Member States. ll8 Therefore, the stocking density relationship is a good candidate for a long-run
condition that should be satisfied.
With respect to the suckler cow stock equation, some prior ideas about the "competition" coeffrcient
between suckler and dairy cows were developed. Following the inhoduction of the milk quota in 1984'
the decline in the dairy cow stock was partly compensated by an increase in suckler cows. The avemge
substitution rate was 4 suckler cows for 10 dairy cows, while in more recent years the rate was close to
1 for 1 (European Commission, 1997: 10). In countries where dairy and suckler cow holding is very
specialised, an increase in dairy cow numbers due to quota enlargement or quota abolition, at first
sight, is likely to have little or no effect on suckler cow numbers (no intra-firm substitution). However,
if at the margin dairy and suckler cows are combined operations and/or firms can easily switch
t18 porhrgal shows an over time decline of stocking density in the period 1973-1984, with a stable stocking
density thereafter.
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between the two types of operation, changes in quota policy can induce a tade-off , or "competition"
effect.
Since the mid 1980s the number of holdings with dairy cows has declined by about 70Â per year, while
the number of holdings with suckler cows has increased by about 2%o per year. The empirical
observations can be summarised as implying that 
-l <ôzrf ôzn (= o) < 0 with an average value for the
EUlz in the post-quota period of about 
-0.4. Farm structure survey data was used to further
differentiate the prior information at country level. For each country, four types of farm operations are
distinguished, i.e., dairying, rearing and fattening, mixed dairying and rearing and fattening, and a
miscellaneous group, other mixed farming. Dairy farms are divided into specialised and mixed
dairying/rearing. We made assumptions about the competition parameter on each type of farm (for
example, o: -l for mixed dairyinglrearing farms, o= -0.3 for specialist dairy farms, o: -0.8 on mixed
livestock farms, o: 0 on specialist rearing and fattening farms). We then obtained a weighted average
of these basic assumed values using the share of dairy cows in on each type of farm as weights. This
provided a set of prior values for the competition parameter. There priors were then incorporated in
stochastic constaints, and used in the estimation of the suckler cow stock adjustment equation.
This point has given a non-exhaustive account of the way in which prior values were assigned to key
parameters in the system. These prior values were then incorporated in the estimating system in the
form of stochastic constraints, as described in paragraph7.3.2. Where there was more uncertainty
about a prior value, a larger variance was given to the corresponding stochastic element.
The following paragraph (7.3.4) describes the data used and its sources. The two final paragraphs of
this section (7.3.5 and 7.3.6) explains the estimation sequences and the quality of the results of the
econometric estimation.
7.3.4. Dota: Detïnitions and sources
The data used in the model come from the SPEL data base/Eurostat, FADN and other official sources.
Information regarding policy variables (institutional prices, direct payments) comes from the relevant
legislation in the Official Journal (OJ). Table 7.2 lists the data series used to obtain the econometric
estimates. Data was available for all Member States for the period 1973 to 1995. Figures for
Luxembourg are included with those of Belgium unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Table 7.3 gives the additional data used when using the model for simulation, for calculating effective
prices (see section 3.2).Data for parameterising the specialist dairy submodel comes from DG AGRI
(FADN). Monetary variables were available in national currencies or converted into national
currencies (e.g., direct payments) using relevant exchange rates.
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Table 7.Z.Data used for estimation
l. USPELU denotes a Eurostat series, available from the SPEL data base'
2. National currency.
3.Normalised by the price of other inputs, p3.
Label Description Units Source
Qt beefand veal outPut 1000 t SPEL'
q2 purchased feed inPut 1000 t SPEL
Qs other inputs SPEL
p1 or Po price ofbeefand veal output' n.c.tlt SPEL
Pz or P' price of feed input' n.c./t SPEL
Pr price of other inputs n.c./unit SPEL
fI Restricted profit
= P(lr- PzQz
1000 units of n.c. calculated
21 Trend 1973=1,...
22 Land 1000 ha SPEL
23 suckler cows 1000 animals SPEL
4 dairy cows 1000 animals SPEL
Z5 milk output 1000 t SPEL
Ps price of milk n.c./t. SPEL
v milkyield 1000kg/cow calculated
300
Table 7.3. Additional data used for simulation
Description Units Series Source
milk quota (2, ) 1000t 1984-2008 Eurostat
milkpremium Euro/t 2000-2008 OJ
national envelope
dairy
Million Euro 2000-2008 OJ
intervention price
butter
Euro/t 2000-2008 OJ
intervention price SMP Euro/t 2000-2008 OJ
farm gate equivalent
milkprice (MPE)
Euro/t 2000-2008 OJ
basic price beef Euro/t 2000-2008 OJ
suckler cow premium Euro/animal 2000-2008 OJ
additional suckler cow
premium
Euro/animal 2000-2008 OJ
special premium bulls Euro/animal 2000-2008 OJ
special premium steers Euro/animal 2000-2008 OJ
slaughter premium
calves
Euro/animal 2000-2008 OJ
slaughter premium
other animals
Euro/animal 2000-2008 OJ
slaughterings of calves,
bulls, steers, cows and
heifers
1000 animals 1988, 1996, lggg Eurostat;
Drôge (1991)
slaughter weights of
calves, bulls, steers,
cows and heifers
Kg/animal 1989, l996, lggg Eurostat;
Drôge (1991)
national envelope beef Million Euro 2000-2008 OJ
regional ceilings
suckler cow premiums,
special premiums,
slaughter premiums
1000 animals 2000-2008 OJ
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7.3.5. Estimation and results
The model consists of two subsystems:
- the short-run restricted profit function (equation (6)) with the associated beef and veal output and
feed input functions (equations (7));
- the stock-adjustment model for dairy cow and suckler cow stocks, and the land input (equations (17),
(1g) and (1g)). Disturbance terms are added to account for unobservable deviations of the empirical
model from the theoretical model.
The estimation sequence was as follows:
- the stock adjustment subsystem (17), (18) and (19) was estimated as a seemingly unrelated
regression system. During the estimation procedure, prior information was used for all coefficients
except for the intercepts and the ftend coefficients;
- the short-run restricted profit subsystem was estimated using the a set of priors consistent with those
used in the stock adjustment model;
- when necessary, the priors were adjusted and the estimation of the subsystems was repeated until the
estimates obtained for the same coefficients in both models convefge'
By adding the iterative step (step 3) in the estimation procedure, internal theoretical consistency of the
empirical subsystems is approximately guaranteed. Estimation was done separately for each EU
Member State. Both subsystems were estimated with data for the period 1973-1995 and using the
mixed estimation procedure explained in paragraph 7.3.z.hcases where some individual coefficients
had extreme values or inappropriate signs, the system was re-estimated using reduced variances on
stochastic restrictions on these individual coefficients in order to move the coefficient concerned
towards its prior value.
Since the price of beef in the land equation was in nearly all cases not significant and often had a
ïvrong sign, the coefficient was restricted to zero in the finally estimated version of the model'
The goodness-of-fit of the estimation is summarised in Table 7.4.
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Tabte 7.4. Goodness-of-fit 1R2; for the estimated equations
t. .R2 for the subsystem of tbree equations.
UK
0.97
0.97
0.96
0.87
45
s
0.96
0.97
0.94
0.94
56
FIN
0.97
0.99
0.92
0.86
53
P
0.99
0.71
0.88
0.98
59
A
0.97
0.73
0.64
0.77
41
l\L
0.95
0.98
0.91
0.92
42
I
0.99
0.9s
0.83
0.86
48
IRL
0.97
0.9s
0.98
0.97
45
F'
0.99
0.99
0.97
0.98
56
E
0.99
0.79
0.99
0.94
57
GR
0.97
0.88
0.77
0.2s
38
D
0.98
0.97
0.97
0.58
56
DK
0.97
0.9s
0.88
0.94
50
B&L
0.77
0.99
0.99
0.99
57
Equation
Profit functiont
Beef and veal supply
Feed demand
-l
J
Dairy cow stock adjustment
Suckler cow stock adjustment
Land adjustnent
Number of significant
coefficients (out of 71)
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7. 3. 6. Speciatist dairy farm submodel
In order to analyse the impacts of simulated policy changes at farm level, a representative specialist
dairy farm was constructed for each Member State. Using the farm accountancy data sample fot 1994,
estimates were made of the number of dairy and suckler cows held on the typical specialist dairy farms
(farm type 41). ttn It is assumed that the calculated shares lor 1994 could also be used for base year
2000. r20 All values are in Euro (constant prices of 2000). Details are given in Table 7.17 of appendix
1. The FADN data was used to estimate the shares of dairy cows and suckler cows kept on specialist
dairy farms. The shares of revenue from milk, beef and other enterprises (after deduction of any direct
income payments) were also calculated. r2r On the cost side, variable feed costs were deducted from
other variables costs, and other variable costs were calculated on a per cow basis.
It is assumed that during the simulation period the shares of total dairy and suckler cows that are held
on specialist dairy farms remain constant. The relationship between other revenues and the revenue
coming from dairy and beet and the variable non-feed cost per cow were used to calibrate "other
revenue" and "other variable costs" for the base year 2000. Thereafter, it is assumed that "other
revenue" remains independent of developments in the beef and dairy enterprises, whereas 25o/o of
other variable non-feed costs also remain independent. 
r22
Output from the simulation model is translated into gross margins for specialist dairy farms, using
these coefficients. For each simulated scenario, multiplying total simulated dairy and suckler cow
numbers for each year in the simulation period, by the specialist dairy farm shares yields the number
of dairy cows and suckler cows on the representative specialist dairy farm. There is assumed to be no
autonomous growth in the farm size. Therefore, all simulated changes (in gross margins, cow numbers
and so on) are due to the simulated policies. This implies that changes in cow numbers on the
specialist dairy farm move in parallel with those at aggregate sector level.
Using the number of dairy cows per farm, the average milk yield as simulated, beef & veal yield per
animal and prices, milk and beef/veal revenues are calculated. Beef and veal revenues are calculated as
ttn No duta on the number of specialist dairy farms for Austria, Finland and Sweden were available. The number
of specialised farms, and the shares of dairy cows and suckler cows hold on specialised farms are estimated to be
40,b.50, 0.20 (Austria);25,0.93,0.20 (Finland); 16, 0'88, 0.20 (Sweden) respectively.
tto Fo, the Netherlands, where data for l,gggl2}O} were available, the shares of various costs rvere reasonably in
line with the FADN 1994 datz.
t" Fo, Finland and Sweden, revenue (and cost) shares of Denmark were used, while for Austria the shares of
Portugal were applied.
t" Thi, is in line with the definition of a specialist dairy farm as having at least two thirds of its standard gross
margin coming from dairying.
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the revenues from culled (suckler) cows and their offspring. Direct payments as calculated by the
simulation model are also included on the revenue side of the calculation. Other variable costs are
calculated based on cow numbers, plus an autonomous component as explained above.
Clearly, many simpliffing assumptions have been made here. In particular, the assumption that dairy
and beef cows on the specialist dairy herd react proportionately with changes in livestock numbers at
sector level is debatable. It is arguable that dairy cow numbers on specialist dairy farms are less likely
to react to policy changes than on non-specialist farms, whereas suckler cow numbers are likely to
react more strongly if specialist dairy farmers perceive keeping specialised beef animals to be a more
marginal activity. These assumptions could be tested and possibly made more realistic with the benefit
of a detailed study using micro (ideally panel) data. However, it was beyond the scope of this research
to attempt such an analysis for all EU Member States.
The purpose of this exercise is to translate the sector level results into estimates of possible changes at
the level of identifiable farms. Gross margin, as calculated here for the specialist dairy farm,
recognises both other revenue (apart from milk and beef revenue) and other variable costs (as well as
feed costs). For the average specialist dairy farm, these other components are less sfrongly linked, or
not at all linked, to milk and beef activities. r23 with some of the more extreme scenarios, these
independent sources of revenue will help to dampen changes in gross margins as compared with the
sector level calculation, in which gross margin depends only on the two livestock enterprises and feed
costs. These two approaches to calculating gross margins, and their interpretations, are discussed in
paragraph7.4.5.
7.4. Policy simulations
7.4.1. Ovewiew
This section begins by discussing the issue of decoupled payments to farmers, and the reasons why
this issue matters in the current trade policy context. Although it is a purely technical question as to
whether a policy satisfies the criteria for a decoupled policy measure, it is an empirical question as to
whether producers perceive a particular measure to be decoupled and react to it as such. We do not
attempt to settle this question here, but rather we explain how the model developed in this research can
easily accommodate different degrees of perceived coupledness for the types of direct payments that
are becoming increasingly important for the CAP. If a direct payment creates no perceived incentive to
"' On uu"ruge,l0-15%o of gross revenue is independent of milk and beef in the base period. This is made up of
crop output (such as cereals, potatoes), intensive livestock (pigs) and a significant category of non-specified
other revenue.
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alter production levels, then we consider that the producer does not perceive it as coupled' However, if
he perceives it as an incentive to hold more of a productive asset that, in turn, leads to higher
production then it is at least partly perceived as coupled'
we also introduce the idea of the "effective price", which describes how the producer would calculate
his return per unit of output if he perceived direct payments as part of the price he receives for his
output. Introducing individual direct payments in a cumulative fashion into the effective price provides
a way of incorporating different degrees of coupledness into the price signal received by farmers' By
examining changes in effective prices that reflect all the Agenda 2000 reform measures, one can
assess to what extent the direct payments that were introduced or increased as part of that policy
package actually compensate producers for the price cuts'
Two different sets of simulations are reported in this section. Paragraph 7.4.3. looks at the impact of
Agenda 2000, under different assumptions about the degree of perceived coupledness of direct
payments and autonomous yield growth. Paragraph 7.4.4. reports the simulated impact of Agenda
2000 plus quota abolition in the year 2005. Sensitivity analyses are performed to assess the importance
of different assumptions about the gap between the current milk price and the minimum price that
farmers would accept to produce at current quota levels (i.e., the "shadow price"). Quota abolition is
simulated under two alternative assumptions about price formation: a25Yo fall in an exogenously fixed
price, and endogenous price formation whereby the price received by milk producers adjusts so as to
clear the market for raw milk. In the second caseo the intemal EU market approaches deregulation.
However, this is not a full market liberalisation scenario, as border measures affecting trade remain
unchanged.
Both paragraphs 7.4.3 and7.4.4begin by explaining how the model was adapted in order to simulate
convincingly in these two different policy settings.
In paragraph 7.4.5, some of the main results - already reported at the level of the aggregate beef and
dairy producing sector for EU15 - are translated into gross margin changes for specialist dairy farmers
in each Member State.
In this section, most results are given at aggregate EU level only. More detailed results for individual
countries can be found in appendix 2 (Agenda 2000 with quotas in place) and appendix 3 (Agenda
2000 with quota abolition in 2005).
It is important to recognise that the simulations presented in this section do not have the status of
forecasts in real time. For example, they do not account for the large loss in production capacity 
in the
United Kingdom in the last two months, due to foot and mouth conhol measures. Such events mean
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that model simulations such as those produced here will always lag behind reality, and be subject to
significant forecasting errors. Instead, the simulations presented here should be interpreted as
experiments conducted in a "controlled environment" that mimics as realistically as possible the key
features of the EU's milk and beef producing sector. The purpose of these experiments isto compare
different policy alternatives. Assuming that all simulations are similarly affected by any imperfections
in the model, the comparative results should still be robust and informative.
7.4.2. Modelling direct payments
7.4.2.1. The policy issue
The Agenda 2000 reforms, adopted in March 1999, continue the shift from price support to direct
payments that began with the 1992 MacSharry reform. The shift is reinforced for cereals and beef, and
introduced for the first time for dairy.
According to the classification of support in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, these
direct payments are "blue box" payments, i.e., payments linked to current production decisions
("coupled") but in the context of a supply-limiting policy. This last condition is satisfied by the cereals
and beef regimes because of the regional ceilings, and by the dairy regime because of the milk quota
restrictions. However, the empirical question arises: do producers perceive them as decoupled, and if
not, how much difference does it make to their response to the changed policy signals? Decoupling is
one of the criteria for a support measure to be eligible for the "green box", which is the category of
farm support that is not bound by commitments within the IWTO.
The potential impact of the EU's direct payments on agricultural supply depends on the degree to
which they are perceived as coupled, as well as on the sensitivity of supply with respect to these
payments. To analyse their impact, a two-stage decision making model of farmers behaviour is
proposed. In the short run, when farmers choose the optimal variable input mix, they are likely to react
largely to market price signals. However, when deciding on land allocation, acreage planted, dairy
cow herds, suckler cow herds and other beef animal stocks, direct payments are likely to play a role,
because direct payments are in most cases linked to base areas or herd numbers. In this second stage,
farmers thus no longer react only to actual prices prevailing in the market, but rather to effective
prices, which in addition to market conditions also reflect the impact of the direct payments. Since the
quasifixed factors (livestock numbers, land areas) are slower to adjust, this two-stage reaction
corresponds more or less to the immediate- and medium-run responses. This two-stage framework
allows us to investigate the effect of different degrees of perceived coupling.
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A second question arises: to what extent do the increased or new "compensatory" payments actually
compensate producers for the price reductions in Agenda 2000? In this paragraph, some calculations
are performed for the "t1pical" EU dairy, beef and veal enterprises in order to answer this question.
The impact of direct payments is incorporated into so-called effective prices. These effective prices
can then be used to analyse the impact of Agenda 2000 on the EU dairy and beef markets under
different assumptions about producers' perceptions of these payments. In point 7.4.2.2, the two-stage
decision problem of farmers is presented and the impact of coupled direct payments is illusfated and
measured in terms of an effective price signal framework. Point 7.4.2.3. provides the effective dairy
price signals under various degrees of assumed coupledness in Agenda 2000. Point 7.4.2.4 calculates
the effective price signals relevant for the beefsector'
7.4. 2.2. Supply behaviour
The decision to supply a certain quantity of output can be decomposed into a decision with respect to
the optimal level of quasi-fixed inputs used and a decision to determine the optimal mix of variable
input used. Figure 7.3 provides a simple graphical illushation with beef production as an example' The
output of beef is assumed to depend (among other things) on the price of beef as well as on the (quasi-
fixed) suckler cow herd. Now assume the policy maker announces that the beef price will be reduced,
but that the farmer's income loss will be partly compensated by a suckler cow premium. The beef price
decline frompo to pr can be decomposed into two effects. It induces a change in the variable input
mix for a given suckler cow herd and it also leads to an adjustment of the suckler cow herd.
Algebraically, the change in beef supply due to a beef price change may be written as:
dB AB ôB ASC
-=-+--dp ôp ôSC 0P
with the first right hand side term the direct effect and the second term the indirect effect.
(4s)
If the compensatory direct payment were decoupled, both the suckler cow herd and the variable input
mix would be adjusted based on the same beef price signal. The suckler cow herd would decline from
SCo to SC' and beef supply from B0 to Br. If a change in the suckler cow herd has any
consequences whatsoever for the number of suckler cow premiums a farmer receives, the direct
payment is coupled. In the case shown in Figure 7.3,the payment is coupled since it results in a supply
of B'rather than Bt, and therefore has an effect on production'
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tr'igure 7.3. The farmer's two-stage decision process
su price support
0p
effective
p
p pl
scl sc" sc o
suckler cows
long-run (stage 2)
S(SC 1 s(sce) s(sc0)
0p
B B" Bo Bo
beef
short-run (stage 1)
In deciding on the suckler cow herd, the farmer then not only takes the announced beef price decline
into account, but also the direct payments associated with the suckler cow herd level. Assume that
when taking this into account, the farmer reduces his suckler cow herd from 
^SCo to .SC" instead of to
^tCI. The price signal supporting this suckler cow herd level is the effective price level oûIærive, which
clearly differs from the prevailing market price p' .
As is shown in equation (45), the impact of a suckler cow herd change on beef output depends also on
the partial derivative AB / ASC, which is dependent on the production technology. If there is a direct
fixed relationship between the quasi-fixed input (suckler cows) and beef output, the effective price
reasoning could be directly applied to the short-run supply equation. Examples of this latter case are
land allocation with fixed crop yields (see Houck et al,1976) and dairy cow herd size with fixed milk
yields. If, however, the production technology allows for substitution (for example, between beef-
producing dairy cows and suckler cows), the effective price reasoning should be applied to the cow
herd equations only and not to the short-run supply relationships.
The difference between the announced market price for beef p' and the effective beef price depends
on the size of the direct payments as well as the degree to which farmers perceive them as coupled.
Although from a theoretical perspective direct payments are coupled as long as there is a link with a
current factor of production, what finally matters is whether the farmer as decision maker perceives
them as coupled. In other words, does the producer supply B" rather than Br? The EU's direct
payments are usually subject to regional ceilings based on past reference areas, production levels or
309
herd numbers. However, an individual farmer is only eligible for the direct payment if he currently
uses the inputs associated with these payments, and thus his stocking levels and hence current
production may well be influenced.
In the following points, effective prices are calculated for the Agenda 2000 policy changes in the dairy
and beef sectors. Because beef originates from several different enterprises, different farming practices
will be distinguished.
7.4.2.3. Poticy changes regarding dairy
The Agenda 2000 decision of 2l March includes the following measures with respect to the dairy
sector (see Re gulations EC 1 2 5 5 I 99 and ECl25 61 99):
- a llo/oprice cut for intervention butter and skimmed milk powder (SMP), introduced in three equal
steps over the marketing years 2005106-2007108;
- a quota increase of 2.4%o, of which part takes effect in 2000, whilst the rest is granted parallel with
the price reductions;
- a new milk premium increasing from 5.75 Euro/ton in (calendar year) 2005 to 17 .24 Euro/ton in
2008;
- a national envelope to make additional payments, either per unit of milk' or per hectare;
- extension of the dairy quota system till2008.
The calculation of effective prices for dairy can focus directly on milk output since there are no
compensatory payments linked to dairy cows. A complication, however, is that the price of raw milk
at farm gate level is derived from the prices for milk products. As is indicated above, the intervention
price cuts for butter and skim milk powder are partly compensated for by an increase in the dairy
quota and a system of direct aids, which, however, will be excluded from the effective price
calculation. producers will qualifu for the dairy premium, which is granted per holding and per ton of
original individual reference quantity (additional quota granted is not part ofthe base for receiving a
dairy premium). As a top-up to this, additional money is allocated to dairy by direct payments through
national envelopes.
Different effective price reductions perceived by farmers imply different degrees of coupling. Table
7.5 gives an indication of the consequences of the dairy policy change expressed in terms of
(effective) milk price reductions. The first three rows give the changes in the institutional prices (target
and intervention prices for butter and skimmed milk powder, sMP). Because the market is
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characterised by excess supply, instead of the target price, a derived price based on intervention prices
is used as a proxy of the price relevant to the primary sector. This price, the so-called intervention milk
price equivalent (IMPE) is calculated according to a standard formula (see EU Dairy Facts and
Figures, Tables 5 and 6 for the way of computation). r2a
Table 7.5. Calculated effective milk price reductions @uro/t)
The calculated IMPE will decline by approximately l7%o. This is the relevant price decline if farmers
perceive all compensating payments as completely decoupled. However, so far, all compensatory
payments are disregarded. If producers perceive the EU-financed milk premiums (attached to the
quota reference levels) to be coupled, the (effective) raw milk price reduction (again expressed in
IMPE terms) is only l1% (Table 7.5, row 6). Moreover, if the national envelope funds are fully paid as
an additional milk premium (paid on all milk), the effective price decline would be about 8% (see
Table 7.5, row 9). Countries are free to spend the national envelope funds in various ways, e.g., as
payments per hectare and/or as payments to farmers with specific characteristics. However, even if
countries decide to concentrate these payments on a small group of targeted farmers, in no case should
the amount paid (expressed per unit of milk) exceed the maximum allowed milk premium specified by
the Commission. The minimum effective raw milk price reduction, therefore, cannot be less than 2%o
(see Table 7.5, row 10, MPE(4)).
'24Forbutter90% of the indicated interventionprice wasused. Processing margins are estimated at255 Euro/t
and 240 Euro/t for butter and powder respectively.
2000-2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 %o change
2008/2000
"target milk price"
Butter (intervention price)
SMP (intervention price)
IMPE(l) (based on milk intervenrion)
EU financed milk premium
IMPE(2)=IMP(I)+milk
premium
Nat. Envelope'milk premium'
IMPE(3): IMPE(2) + nat.
envelope
Max. allowed milk premium
IMPE(4)='max. allowed
compensation'
309.80
3282.00
2055.20
284.t4
0.00
284.14
0.00
284.t4
0.00
284.t4
292.30
3l17.00
1952.40
268.28
5.75
274.03
5.75
274.03
13.90
282.t8
274.70
2953.80
1849.70
252.42
11.49
266.M
n.49
266.44
27.80
280.22
257.20
2789.70
t746.90
236.s6
17.24
2s8.92
17.24
2s8.92
41.70
278.26
257.20
2789.70
1746.90
236.56
t7.24
26t.t0
17.24
26t.10
4t.70
278.26
-17.0
-15.0
-15.0
-t6.7
-t0.7
-8.1
-2.1
3n
The calculations presented in Table 7.5 show that, starting from a price cut of I5%o in intervention
prices for both butter and skim milk powder, the effective price reduction could be only 8%,
depending on the extent to which producers perceive the accompanying direct payments to be coupled,
and how these payments are actually made. Indeed, if national envelope funds are paid to a sub group
of dairy farmers at the maximum allowable rate, for these farmers the effective price decrease would
be as little as 2o/o.
7.4.2.4. Policy changes regarding beef and veal
With respect to beef and veal, Agenda 2000 specifies (see RegulationBCl254/99):
- a beef price decline of 20%in two equal steps over the calendar year period 2000 to 2002;
- increased headage payments (suckler cow premium of 200 Euro, special premium of 2I0 (150) for
bulls (steers), and slaughter premium of 80 (50) Euro for adult animals (calves));
- a national envelope to make additional payments, payable per head and/or per hectare.
over the period 2000-2002, the basic beef price (equal to 80% of the intervention price and trigger
level for intervention) is decreased by 20o/o (see Table 7.6). The regime of compensatory direct
payments consists of a special premium for male bovine animals (bulls and steers), a suckler cow
premium, and a slaughter premium (differentiated for calves between 1-7 months and other animals
from the age of 8 months). In addition to the suckler cow premium presented in Table 7.6, Member
States may grant an additional suckler cow premium up to a maximum of 50 Euro per animal' This
premium is partly financed (24.15 Euro) by the EAGGF's Guarantee Section if the holdings are
located in specific areas, or completely financed if the share of suckler cows in a Member State's
cattle is at least 30oÂ, and if at least 30% of its male bovine animals slaughtered belong to
conformation classes S and E. r2s
l2s Assuming the male meat quality requirement is satisfied, according to the suckler cow share criterion and our
1999 estimaîes Belgiunr, Grùce, 
-Spain, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK would qualify for
completely financel premiums. It is uncertain whether the other Member States which have to finance the
ptr*io.by themselvàs will decide to grant this additional premiunr, and for what amount.
3t2
Table 7.6. Beef prices @uro/ton) and direct payments @uro/animal)
1999 2000 2001 2002-2008 7o change
2002n999
"basic price" (Euro/ton)
special premium (bull)
special premium (steer)
suckler cow premium
additional suckler cow premium
slaughter premium calves
slaughter premium others
2780
1,36
109
145
0
L6
27
2595
160
122
t63
50
17
27
2409
185
136
t82
50
33
53
2224
210
150
200
50
50
80
-20
+84
+41
+55
+50
+34
+53
Moreover, there was already a deseasonalisation premium (unchanged), aimed at encouraging farmers
who have steers to hold them through the winter months (mainly of interest to heland and the UK
(Northem heland)). Besides, producers receiving the special and/or suckler cow premium may qualiff
for an extensification payment, provided they satisfu the relevant stocking density criteria (an
additional 100 Euro per special premium and suckler cow premium, given that the stocking density on
the holding concerned is less than or equal to 1.4 livestock units). h this analysis, the extensification
payments are neglected because our focus is on market level or average representative farm level
rather than at individual farm level. The headage premiums are subject to a number of restrictions,
notably regional ceilings.
Since the slaughter premium ceilings are based on year 1995 and production has declined since then,
the corresponding regional ceiling is not likely to be binding. Regarding bulls and bullocks, the
average EU herd of male animals aged less than 1 year over the period 1996-1999 was 9.38 million
animals and showed a decrease of 4.4 per cent per annum. The average herd of male animals aged
between 1. and2 years was 6.87 million animals and showed a2.LoÂ annual decline. The total number
of male animals eligible for the special premium is 9.28 million animals. Conditional on the ceiling,
the premium is granted once in the life of a bull from the age of 9 months, or twice in the life of a steer
(first at the age of 9 months and then at the age of 2l months). It is assumed, therefore, that on average
the special premium can be received 1.25 times during an animal's lifetime. ttu Given the male
animals older than I year, the number of premiums can then be estimated as 1.25 times 6.87, which is
8.6 million, while there still remains 0.68 million premiums available for the cohort aged between 9
126 Based on the estimated bulVbullock herd composition, which suggests that about 25o/o of the herd is eligible
to receive the special premium twice in its lifetime
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and l1months. Given a normal age structure this is a low number. In other words, the current herds
appear to have the potential to overshoot the ceiling for special premiums'
The share of the total EU beef and veal output coming from bulls and bullocks varies between 45%
and s}o/oof total EU beef and veal output. cows and heifers account for another 40%, while the share
of calves is about 11% (see Table 7.18, appendix 1). These shares are rather stable over time. In terms
of number of slaughtered animals, the share of dairy cows in the total number of cows slaughtered is
estimated at11%.This is mainly due to differences in average lifetime of animals in dairy and suckler
cow herds. The average life of a dairy cow is estimated to be 4-5 years, and that of suckler cows at 5-7
years. Dairy cow culling is mainly based on optimal dairying considerations (aimed at low costs of
milk) and less or not at all on meat producing considerations. Because suckler cows have a higher
slaughter weight than dairy cows, the share in final cow meat production of suckler cows will be
higher than25oÂ.
In order to estimate the effective price decline resulting from the beef and veal policy adjustments,
some calculations have been made for suckler cow holdings and bull and bullock operations. Table 7 .7
presents the policy impact per suckler cow under various assumed degrees of perceived coupling'
First, it is assumed that the intervention price declin e of 20oÂ leads to an equivalent decline in the farm
gate price of meat. r27 The implicit technical coeffrcients (like number of calves raised per cow,
number of heifers kept per cow, assumed slaughter weights, replacement rate) of the typical suckler
cow operation presented in Table 7.7, are own estimates based on Heinrich and Kôgl (1992)' The
prices are plausible values selected from actual realisations in recent years (cf. for example Table
4.15.5.1 of European Commission, Iggg).In the calculations, a premium utilisation rate of 100 per
cent of the regional ceiling is assumed. Table 7.7 measures the effective price change in two ways: a)
as measured in (direct) revenue terms and b) also when accounting for related animal input cost
changes. It considers four alternatives with increasing degrees of perceived coupling (see columns of
Table 7.8). The following eight altematives resulted:
l) The impact when only the increased slaughter premiums are perceived as coupled: effective price
changes are 
-14.!%o and -12.5% respectively.
2) Same as 1) but also allowing for the increased (general) suckler cow premium: effective price
changes are 
-9.1oÂ and -:7.1oÂ respectively.
3) Same as 2) but now including the additional suckler cow premium Member States are allowed to
grant: effective price changes are 
-3.1o/o and4.6%o respectively.
t2t Thi, is a minimum estimate. Given a non-zero fixed processing margin, the price decline at farm gate level
would be greater.
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4) Same as 3) but including the additional payments coming from the national envelope fundsrzs:
effective price change s are 
-0. 8olo and + I .9oÂ respectively.
Table 7.7 does not present a gross margin analysis, because it excludes non-animal input costs. So it
does not take into account the feed cost price decline expected following the l5oÂ fall in cereal
intervention prices. In our simulations, the model would take the feed price adjustment directly into
account, rather than incorporate it into an effective output price.
The impact of the Agenda 2000 policy change on bull and bullock operations is illushated in Table
7.8. The calculation scheme is again based on Heinrich and Kôgl (1992), and takes into account
fattening practices in Germany, France and keland. A premium utilisation rate of 80% is used. It is
assumed that on average the special premium can be received 1.25 times during an animal's lifetime.
Likewise in Table 7.7 again the effective price changes are calculated in terms of the change in meat
revenue, and in terms of changed meat revenue corrected for expected changes in related animal input
costs. Table 7.8 shows the impact of the policy change on bull and bullock operations under four
different assumptions. First only the slaughter premium is perceived as coupled, to which
subsequently the special premiums and the national envelope payments are added. The national
envelope payment per kilogram is the same as for suckler cows (6 Euro/l0Okg). This resulted in the
following altematives:
1) The signals when only slaughter premiums are accounted for: effective price changes are 
-15.8 and
-14.8 respectively.
2) Same as 1) but including the change in special premium: effective price changes are 
-9.7% and, -
T.4Yorcspectively.
3) Same as 2) but including the additional payments coming from the national envelope fundsr2e:
effective price changes are 1.9%o and 
-5.2%o respectively.
The calculated effective price changes do not yet take into account changes in other input costs. If it is
assumed that the animals are fed with home-grown silage maize, supplemented with compound feed (a
usual practice), and assuming a constant calf grow-up cost of Euro 94, the effective revenue decline
(measured in gross margin terms) would be 
-l8oÂ, -5.4% and -!.7oÂ for scenarios 1, 2, and 3
respectively.
128 F,xpressing the national envelope funds in terms of an amount per kilogram of meat yields an amount of
roughly 6 Euro/l00kg.
'2e As before a national envelope payment of 6 Euro/l00kg meat is assumed.
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Comparing Tables 7.7 and7.8 shows that the effective price declines for suckler cows and bulls 
are
approximately of the same order in the case where only slaughter premiums are accounted 
for or it in
addition to this, the standard suckler cow premium and special premium are accounted for' combined'
the additional suckler cow premium Member States may grant to suckler cow operations and 
the
national envelope payments lead to nearly full compensation of the meat output price decline' with
respect to bulls, even when national envelope payments are taken into account' compensation 
is only
partial. However, bull/bullock operations are relatively more reliant on non-grass feed input' Taking
the approximated feed input cost change into account' more than 90%o of the meat price decline is
compensated (measured in gross margin terms). In the following, the over-all average effective price
changes in specialised meat production are approximated by a weighted average of the computed
effective price declines for suckler cows and bulls/bullocks. country-specific shares were used to
measure the relative importance in specialised meat production of suckler cows and bulls/bullocks'
Similar calculations have also been done for calves (not shown here). 
'When feed cost changes are
taken into account, as well as output price reductions and direct payment increases, there is a very
small increase in gross margin.
This paragraph has shown that, for the typical dairy or beef producer, the falls in ffictive price
resulting from the Agenda 2000 reforms may be much smaller than the announced price reductions 
if
the direct payments are perceived as coupled to ouFut or to livestock numbers' The question then
arises: how much difference does it make to outcomes? In our simulations we perform sensitivity
analyses to answer this question. Moreover, whether or not the direct payments are perceived as
having a production incentive, it is clear that they go some way, but not the whole distance, towards
compensating producers for the Agenda 2000 price cuts'
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+ nat. envelope payrnents
Euro/100k9 Euro % change
-20.0
-20.o
-0.8
-20.0
-20.0
-31.6
1.9
50.0 59.38
23.00
702.24
50.35
50.00
94.38
8.61
224.0
s3.0
50.0
176.0
53.0
987.96
328.0
50.0
68.0
61.50
-9.38
3.40
55.53
932.43
+national s.c.premium
Euro/100k9 Euro o/o change
-20.0
-20.0
-3.1
-20.0
-20.0
-31.6
-0.6
50.0 s9.38
224.0
53.0
50.0
176.0
53.0
702.24
50.35
50.00
94.38
8.61
9e1.96
328.0
50.0
68.0
61.50
-9.38
3.40
55.53
-eô5:45
without additional payments
Euro/l00k9 Euro %chanqe
-20.0
-20.o
-9.1
-20.0
-20.0
-31.6
-7.1
224.0
53.0
50.0
176.0
53.0
702.24
50.35
50.00
94.38
8.61
905.58
328.0
50.0
68.0
61.50
-9.38
3.40
55.53
850.06
quantities
before
Euro Eurc/s.c.
280.0
0.0
0.0
220.0
0.0
877.80
0.00
0.00
'117.98
0.00
995.78
410.0 76.88
0.0 0.00
85.0 4.25
81.13
914.6s
1.00
1.00
1.'t 9
0.95
0.95
1.00
0.16
0.16
0.19
0.19
0.05
Herdslze (1 suckter cow)
Premium utilization rate
Output
member state s.c. premium
national envelope
'calves'(330 kg)
slaughter premium
suckler cow premium
culled cows (330 kg)
slaughter premium
lnput
heifers
suckler @w premium
calves
Table 7.7. Poticy impacts per suckler cow under various assumptions
Prices are in Euro/l0Okg or Euro/animal (all premiums, input costs); Premiums are measnred in terms of changes w.r.t. base year 1999.
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Table 7.8. Policy signals per bulvbullock under various assumptions
Prices in Euro (animal Prices in Euro/kg liveweight); Premiums are meaôured in terms of changes w.r.t. base Yearl999
+ national envelope PaYmentsprices value % change
-20.00
-7.90
-20.00
-5.20
21.75
985.00
52.2'l
75.00
1.6
53.0
75.0
1133.96
4.0 180.00
-
953.96
+ special Premiumprices value % change
-20.00
-9.67
-20.00
-7.36
1.6
53.0
75.0
985.00
52.21
75.00
't1't2.21
4.0 180.00@
only including sl. Premiumprices value % change
-20.00
-15.76
-20.00
-14.81
1.6
53.0
985.00
52.2'l
0.00
-
't037.21
4.0 180.00
857.21
before
quantities Prices value
2.0
0.0
0.0
1231.25
0.00
0.00
1231.25
5.0 225.00
1006.25
1l
0.81
I
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
llerd (l bull'bullock)
Spec.pranium utiliz. rate
Output reveDue
National anvclope Payments
bull (625kg l'er;362.5kg sw)
slaughter subsidies
special premium
Revenue
Input costs
calves (45 kg)
Net revenue
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7.4.3. Simulations: Agenda 2000
7.4.3.1. Background
This paragraph analyses the policy impacts of Agenda 2000 on the EU's dairy/beef sector over the
period 2000-2010, on the assumption that quotas are maintained over the whole simulation horizon.
Agenda 2000 lowers intervention prices for butter and skimmed milk powder by l5%o, beef support
price by 20Yo, and cereals intervention prices by l5%. These reductions in price support are
compensated by a system of direct payments. Critical issues to be analysed are to what extent the
impact of the price changes is reduced if producers perceive the compensatory direct payments as
coupled, how much producers gain from the concurrent reductions in feed price and whether
autonomous yield growth improves or worsens producers'income situation within this policy context.
Sensitivity analysis is performed with respect to the degree with which farmers perceive direct
payments as coupled, and for two rates of autonomous dairy yield growth.
As described in the previous paragraph, farmers' decision-making has a two-stage structure. First,
farmers decide how much beef and veal output (and milk output if quotas are not binding) to produce
and how much feed to use, given prices actually prevailing in the market. Given these decisions, they
then decide how many dairy cows and suckler cows they are going to hold and how much land
(grazing and forage area) they will use. Since direct payments are linked to (suckler) cow numbers, it
is assumed that they will at least partly take the direct payments into account in the second-stage
(stocking) decisions. stock adjustment takes more than one period to complete.
Assuming typical suckler cow, calf fattening and beef fattening operations, an assessment was made in
the previous paragraph of the impact of the various premiums (slaughter premium, suckler cow
premium, male premium) and national envelopes on the effective prices if farmers perceive those
premiums as coupled. A summary table, indicating the effective price declines associated with
different degrees of perceived coupledness is given below. Table 7.9 suggests that when beef
producers perceive all direct payments (including the national envelopes) to be coupled, they perceive
the effective beef price decline as only 2.26% instead of theZ}%oannounced in Agenda 2000.
The "colrection for non-feed costs" reflects the change in effective price if the change in animal input
costs of beef and veal production are taken into account. When the output price of beef falls, the cost
of buying a replacement calf is also assumed to be lower.
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Table 7.9. Calculated effective price reductions (7o of original price)
Direct payments Perceived as coupled (cumulative) Effective price reduction 7o
Beefand veal
-14.86
-7.25
-5.17
-2.26
-t6.75
-10.68
-8.11
Slaughter premiums on all animals
Suckler cow premiums and special premiums
National enveloPe beef
.- :':, ':..
CorrectCd non-feed côsts
Dairy
farm gate level
National enveloPe dairY
The information shown in Table 7.9 is given at Member State level in Table 7.19, appendix 1. The
variations in the effective beef and veal price over Member States are due to differences in their beef
ouput composition (relative proportions of beef from suckler and dairy herds). The effective milk
price changes are derived from official EU butter and SMP intervention prices and are expressed in
terms of standardised milk. Therefore they show no variation over Member States. In the simulations,
intervention price changes are linearly linked to actual farm gate prices. Regional differences in farm
gate prices for milk and beef are accounted for by a fixed margin'
The simulation model used in this paragraph consists of the equations as described in Table 7.1,
section 7 .2. T\e model is calibrated to the base year 2000 and simulations reported here are done for
the period 2000-2010. When quotas are in force, milk supply is given simply as:
o 
- 
qq,a (46)ts 
- 
ts
The stock adjustment equations for suckler cows and land are as given in equations (17) and (18).
However, the adjustment equation for dairy cows follows a simpler reaction path than the one
specified in equation (19). This is because, with milk output constrained by quota, and a rather
inflexible relationship between milk output and dairy cows, farmers have little room for manoeuwe in
adjusting their dairy cow stock. Under quotas, dairy cow adjustment is given by:
,,.,=^^(+),_,*,r -î"0)20.,-, (47)
In all simulations in this and the following paragraph, if countries have rigid environmental constraints
(like the Netherlands) then an additional environmental stocking density constraint restricting the
intensity of dairying might become binding:
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7w 
=tw z 
-v- 4,t ' '' 2,t '!,t (48)
where r''* represents the maximum stocking density, and with the final number of dairy cows equal to
min(20,,,2ff).
To impose exogenous yield growth (rate g), equation (a7) is reformulated as:
',,,=^,(î),,.+ + (T-7u )z 0.,_, (4e)
The accounting equations in the model determine gross margins, numbers of animals slaughtered,
direct payments (including national envelopes), and aggregate quantities at EU level. Moreover, a
module is added to translate changes in aggregate variables to specialised dairy farms.
7.4.3.2. Agenda 2000 scenarios
The simulations depict the post-Agenda 2000 situation, with quotas maintained. The Agenda 2000
price reductions are phased in over three years as stipulated by the regulation. Sensitivity analysis with
respect to yield growth and feed price is performed. Some scenarios also explore the differences in
outcome depending on the degree to which direct payments are perceived as decoupled. If a direct
payment is perceived as coupled, the effective price decline instead of the announced output price
decline is used as the price signal in the stock adjustment equations (17) and (1g).
Three scenarios simulate Agenda 2000 with all direct payments perceived as decoupled:
- Sl0: Decoupled-scenario: beef price -2|%;milk price -L5%; feed price -llyo,no yield growth, direct
payments and national envelopes as planned;
- S10y: As scenario S10, but with 1.3%o p.a. yield milk yield growthr30;
- S10f: As S10 but with feed price -7.5% instead of -15%o.
A further group of scenarios considers the issue of coupling/decoupling. The scenarios differ with
respect to how far farmers perceive the direct premiums as coupled. In terms of the simulation model
this implies that different effective price signals (associated with different degrees of perceived
coupling) are fed into the stock adjustment model. The scenarios are conditional on a lS%o feed price
decline and zero autonomous milk yield. Beef price and milk prices (relevant for the beef & veal
tIJn. 
assumed milk yield growth is based on analysing long term tends in the EU and corresponds with the
yield growth assumed in the WATSIM tade policy simulations (see chapter 5).
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output and variable feed input equations) are as planned in Agenda 2000 (price of beef '20%o, price of
milk -15%). Since quotas are assumed to be binding there is no need to consider whether milk
premiums are perceived as coupled or not'
Four scenarios simulate Agenda 2000 with only some or all direct payments perceived as coupled:
- 511.1: Only slaughter premiums perceived as decoupled;
- S 1 1 .2: Slaughter premiums, suckler premiumst3r, and special premiums perceived as coupled;
- 511.3: Same as scenario 511.2, but now also with the national envelopes perceived as coupled;
- s11.4: Same as 511.3, but now also taking the (induced) changes in non-feed input costs into
account.
7.4.3.3. Simulation results: Agenda 2000
The simulation results are shown in Table 7.10. Tables with simulation results at Member state level
are provided in aPPendix 2.
Most rows in the table are self-explanatory. The gross margin variable shown in the last rows is
calculated as total revenues from milk production and beef production (from both the beef and dairy
enterprises), plus direct payments to both milk and beef, less feed costs' It could more properly be
called "margin over feed cost" and should not be interpreted as a whole-farm gross margin, still less 
as
an indicator of net income.
Due to the quota and the fixed yield relationship (see equation (a7) the dairy cow stock behaves the
same in all scenarios except s10y, in which a milk yield growth of 1.3%o p.a. was assumed' In scenario
Slgy, the dairy cow stock is 12 percentage points lower than in scenario S10. The yield growth
assumption has also a significant impact on the suckler cow stock due to suckler/dairy cow
competition. In scenario s10y, the suckler cow stock is 17.5 percentage points higher than in the
standard case S10. Looking at feed consumption, it appears that in scenario S10y the impact of lower
dairy cow numbers is dominant. Feed demand in scenario S10y is lowest, in spite of the same milk
output and the increased number of suckler cows as compared to scenario S10. As scenario S10f
shows, halving the feed price decline (from -15% to -7.5%) also halves the feed consumption increase
as compared with S10.
The sensitivity analysis regarding decoupling shows that the suckler cow stock increases with the
degree to which farmers perceive the direct payments as coupled. In the most extreme case (scenario
l3l Includes so-called additional suckler cow premium.
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511.4 with all direct payments including national envelopes perceived as coupled), the suckler cow
stock is about 12 percentage points higher than in the decoupled scenario S10. In scenario 511.4,
however, total beef output has still declined (-2.9%) by 2010 as compared with the base year. When
comparing scenarios 511.4 (showing the impact of beef price decline on suckler cow numbers and the
associated impact on meat production) and S10y (showing the impact of dairy cow decline on meat
production), it becomes evident that the contribution of the dairy stock to total beef output in the EU is
very important. A given percentage decline in dairy cow numbers results in a greater impact on beef
production than the same percentage decline in suckler cow numbers.
When comparing net revenues in 2010 with base year 2000, it appears that the compensation falls
short by about 7-8oÂ in all scenarios, without a large difference over the scenarios. hr the scenario
where the maximum extent of perceived coupling is assumed, the fall in net revenues is about 2.5
percentage points less than in the standard scenario Sl0.
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Table 7.10. Summary simulation results (at EU level)
Sll.l S11.2 S11'3 Sll.4S1O S10Y S10fVariable
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I
99
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00
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02.
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102.3
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100.0
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100.0
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102.4
100.0
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101.2
102.4
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7.4.4. Simulations: Agenda 2000 ptus quota abolition
7.4.4.L Background
The model used for simulating the quota abolition scenarios is summarised in the last column of Table
7.1 in section 7.2. Unlike the model used in the previous paragraph, after quota abolition, milk supply
adjusts according to the shadow milk supply function, given by:
I
"=-ù(P; +B'+à isP )T9*zo * à (s0)
As extensively discussed in section 7.3,the immediate short-run response of milk supply to milk price
as given in this equation, given the levels of the quasi-fîxed factors, is quite small. However, after one
period, as the cow numbers begin to adjust there is greater responsiveness of milk supply. The full
response extends over a number ofperiods, and depends also on prices for beefand feed.
Figure 7'4 shows a stylised picture of the market for milk under the quota regime. The underlying
shadow price function for milk depends on the dairy technology and the structure of the sector. It
shows how the marginal cost of supplying milk increases as the level of aggregate supply increases.
When a quota regime is in place, the quantity supplied no longer depends on the signal given by price.
As long as quota is binding, output is determined by the quota limit, and price is given independently.
Therefore, the particular combination of pl and q! that is observed no longer represents a point on
the supply curve. It is for this reason that, once quotas have been in place for some years, it is
impossible to estimate directly from observed price and quantity outcomes either the slope or the
height of the shadow milk supply function.
Our method for deriving the shadow milk supply function from the profit function gives reasonably
reliable information about the slope of the function, which is important for assessing changes in
output, in the post-quota environment, as price fluctuates. However, this method is considered less
reliable as regards fixing the height of the function at the quota level. This information is, however,
especially important for accurately predicting the extent of the first adjustments after quota abolition,
and the level of price that would be reached in the post-quota milk market if no intervention measures
are in place.
The difference between the pricepf and the shadow price at quoûa level, Oshactow , shown in Figure
7.4,is known as the quota rent. Information about the quota rent is needed to fix the position of the
shadow milk response function at the marginal point. Theoretically, the quota rent is the maximum
amount that the marginal producer (producer of the litre with the highest marginal cost) would be
willing to pay to purchase additional quota. Clearly, information from quota markets (purchase or
325
lease markets) would be useful in order to estimate the quota rent empirically. Now, the marginal
producer is unlikely to be a purchaser of quota. If he sells his quota, then the quota rent represents
(theoretically) the minimum price for which he would be willing to sell' Quota purchasers are likely to
be intra-marginal producers whose quota rent is larger than that of the marginal producer. According
to this argument, quota rents as estimated by prices in quota markets may over-state the quota rent at
the marginal Point.
Figure 7.4 gives the impression that there would be no expansion in supply if the post-quota market
price for milk happened to be equal to oshadow . This reasoning is in fact misleading. After years of
quotas, not all producers are producing at this same marginal cost, due to quota constraints on
individual producers. The rigidities of the quota scheme mean, especially in countries where the scope
for quota fansfer is limited, that there could be a wide dispersion of shadow milk price amongst
individual dairy producers within the same country. Many producers have succeeded in lowering their
costs significantly over the years but without matching their improved performance with acquisitions
of extra quota, which would force them to move along their marginal cost curves to a higher level' For
these producers, their marginal cost at their current quota level is well below Oshattow ' Therefore, if
quotas were abolished and the pice p'!"do" were imposed, these lower cost producers would still have
an incentive to expand from their current quota levels. If this puts downward pressure on price,
producers who are ,,marginal" at p;'*o" would cease production. This would lower the position of the
shadow milk supply function over the relevant output range'
Figure 7.4. The shadow price of milk and the milk quota
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Therefore, uncertainty about the shadow milk supply function can be characterised under different
headings:
- uncertainty about the responsiveness to price changes (slope ofthe function);
- uncertainty about the height of the function;
- uncertainty about changes in the height and slope of the function that would occur, after quota
abolition, due to producers'adjustments and re-structuring of dairy farming.
As already stated, we consider that our method gives reasonably reliable estimates of the slope of the
shadow supply function for the with-quota period. Regarding the current height of the function, we
have used counûry-specific information on quota prices (where availabler32), plus other information
(on herd size structure, production costs on specialist dairy farms, length of time quotas have been in
operation, the severity with which quotas have been applied) to make some crude subjective estimates
of each Member State's quota rent, as a percentage of the current milk price. These estimates were
formulated as follows. It was assumed that the (unweighted) average shadow price for milk in the EU
is currently 70Yo of the milk price. The distribution of individual countries milk shadow prices around
the EU average was then fixed, based on available information. However, these estimates have been
subjected to a sensitivity analysis, in order to investigate how important they are in determining the
simulation outcomes. These estimates are shown in the second line for each country in Table 7.1 l. kt
order to carry out sensitivity analyses, the average EU percentage was varied by 10 percentage points
above and below 70% (to 80% and 60%) andthe levels in Member States were varied proportionately
to maintain the relative differentials between individual Member States and the EU average.
Therefore, in all three lines of the table, it is assumed that the shadow price of milk is about ZZ%,25%
and' l4%o below the EU average in France, the Netherlands and the UK respectively, and about l7oÂ
above the EU average in Greece and Portugal. kr all other Member States, the shadow milk price is
assumed to lie within l2%o or less of the EU average. Clearly, these assumed differentials are quite
large and need further refinement.
A number of preliminary sensitivity analyses embodying various other assumptions were performed,
and the results were analysed. kr this report, we show results based on the three altematives given in
Table 7.11.
132 Information on quota rental and sales values was available for three countries: the Netherlands, Denmark and
the United Kingdonr" According to this information, the shadow price for dairy farmers participating in the quota
market was 50, 80 and 55% of the milk price in these three countries respectively.
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Table 7.11. Shadow price as percentage of milk price at quota level
Concerning the third source of uncertainty about the milk supply function in the post-quota period,
namely the likely changes in its position and slope that will result from restructuring stimulated by
quota abolition, no hypotheses of this process have been modelled' We assume in all simulations that
the shadow milk supply function remains fixed (conditional on the levels of quasi-fixed inputs, which
are themselves adjusting). Parameters in all equations are assumed to remain unchanged relative to the
pre-quota period.
Unlike the model used in the previous paragraph, dairy cow stocks adjust more freely according to
equation (19):
"r,, 
= -*@o * grozr',-, 19rozr,,-, * F,ozt,,-'*90'z'''-' * \ 
'tPr''-'+ T 'oP'''-t)+ 
(l 
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Again, to impose exogenous yield growth (rate g), equation (51) is reformulated as:
"r.,-- -*(rorFrozr,,-r 1Luzr.,-r*Lrozt,,.1LosZr',-trnlvPr',-r*',oO'.'.')'# 
+ (l-)uo)zo''-' (s2)
Again, the same set of accounting equations determine gross margins, direct payments (including
national envelopes), numbers of animals slaughtered and aggregate quantities at EU level. Results are
transposed to specialised dairy farms.
Finally, in order to find the order of magnitude by which milk prices will (have to) adjust when milk
output changes in the no-quota scenarios, we add an aggregate demand equation for milk (z!)' -fte
demand equation is specified (in constant elasticity form) as:
,?, =E,pii (s3)
328
with Ëo a constant and ef a (derived) demand elasticity (at farm gate level). Two elasticities, -0.15
and4.24, are used in the simulations.
The elasticity of 4.24 is the derived demand elasticity for milk when there are no constraints on
subsidised dairy exports. This elasticity is implicit in demand simulations by Bouamra-Mechemache
and Réquillart (cf. chapter 8) where it is assumed that export demands for dairy products are elastic.
The demand elasticity of -O.15 corresponds to situations where dairy exports are fixed at their WTO
limits, so that any increase in milk demand that occurs as price falls has to be due to expansion within
the EU market for dairy products. Since all our (no quota) scenarios involve significant increases in
milk production, domestic price always falls. We can therefore assume that the WTO export limits are
always binding, and thus the appropriate elasticity of demand is around-0.15.
Equation (53) is calibrated based on the indicated elasticity and the assumption that in base year 2000
the aggregated quantity demanded equals aggregated supply (excluding planned quota increase for
2000). with exogenous demand growth (at rate d), equation (53) becomes:
,i, =\opïÏ e+d)'. (54)
7.4.4. 2. Quota abolition scenarios
These scenarios begin by assuming the post-Agenda 2000 situation, with quotas maintained up to
2005. The Agenda 2000 price reductions are phased in over three years as stipulated by the regulation.
In 2005, quotas are abolished so that milk production is free to expand along the shadow milk supply
function. All Agenda 2000 direct payments continue to be paid as defined by the relevant regulations.
The scenarios include sensitivity analysis regarding different yield growth rates, differences in
assumed quota rents, and differences in demand assumptions. Unless stated otherwise, milk yield
growth is assumed to be zero. For the Netherlands, environmental conshaints are assumed to be
potentially restrictive (see equation (a8)) with s * = (l . l) s,=ro* .
The scenarios explored in this paragraph are summarised in Table 7.12. A standard scenario is chosen
in which it is assumed that milk yield is stable and that the average shadow price is 70yo of the actual
milk price (S20). Alternatively, an exogenous milk yield growth of 1.3% per annum (S20y), or
average shadow prices at 80Yo and 60Yo of the actual EU milk price level are assumed (520-80 and
520-60). The scenarios S20, S20y, 520-80 and 320-60 assume a fixed milk price decline of 25%.
The other scenarios reported here assume that the milk price is endogenous. Demand elasticities of -
0.15 or '0.24 arc assumed. The less elastic demand assumes that exports (estimated at l0%o of the milk
supplied in 2000) are fixed. This is a limiting case: WTO limits are assumed binding and there is no
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possible expansion in unsubsidised exports. The more elastic demand corresponds to the other limiting
case where there are no WTo constraints, and demand for EU dairy exports has an average elasticity
of -2.In two scenarios, notably S23 and 523y, a 50% reduction in exports from the 2000 level is
assumed.
In the scenarios with an endogenous milk price, equation (53) is included in the simulation model. For
scenarios with 1.3% dairy cow yield growth (S21y, S22y and S23y), autonomous demand growth of
1% (starting from base year 2000) is also assumed, as formalised in equation (54)'
Table 7.12. Summary of quota abolition scenarios
7.4.4.3. Simulation results: quota abolition
A summary of the second set of simulation results (quota abolition in 2005) is presented in Table 7.13.
Tables with results at Member State level are reported in appendix 3. Assuming that the average
shadow price in the EU is 70% of the current milk price, and that in 2005 the exogenous milk price
declines by 25% accompanied by quota abolition, scenario S20 shows that milk output will be 17.6%
higher in 2010 compared with 2000. The milk increase is due to a 15.30Â increase in dairy cows
combined with a 2.3%o increase in yield. To obtain this yield increase, the feed input per cow
increases, with total feed input increasing by 18.9%. The increase in dairy cows (and the beef price
decline introduced by Agenda 2000) causes a decline in suckler cow numbers by 27 'l% compared
Average EU shadow Price
70% of milk price in 2000
Yield growth is
}oÂp.a. l.3oÂP.a.
Demand growth is
O%oP.a. lYoP.a.
Average EU
shadow price
80% of milk
price in 2000
Yield growth:
0%p.a.
Average EU
shadow price
60% of milk
price in 2000
Yield growth:
0Yop.a.
Exogenous milk price
decline:25%o
s20 S20y s20-80 s20-60
Endogenous milkprice
decline 6sD = -0.15
s21 521y s21-80 s21-60
Endogenous milkprice
decline e? = -0.2q
s22 S22y
Endogenous milk price
decline ei : -g.tS
Dairy exports = 507o of
current WTO allowances
s23 523y
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with 2000. Beef output (-1.6%) is nearly the same as in the base year, but with lower output in the
years in between 2000 and 2010. Net revenue falls by about l8%.
As is shown in Table 7.27, appendix 3, for scenario S20, quota abolition has different impacts at
Member State level. Countries with a relatively low shadow price have an incentive to expand beyond
their (now abolished) quota limit, even when the actual milk price falls by 25%.lnparticular the UK,
France, the Netherlands and Germany expand shongly. Spain also shows a significant milk output
increase, but much of this is due to the initial quota increase of more than l0oÂ of its milk supply in
199912000. For the Netherlands, the environmental stocking density constraint is binding, and
ovemrles equation (a8) in the later years.
When a l.3oÂ autonomous milk yield growth is assumed (scenario S20y), milk output increases by an
additional 11.5 percentage points as compared with the zero autonomous yield growth scenario, S20.
Dairy cows increase modestly compared with scenario S20 (+2.7 percentage points), while feed input
increases more strongly (+3.6 percentage points). Scenarios 520-80 and 520-60 provide sensitivity
analysis on the assumed level of shadow prices. If the average shadow price is 80% of the EU milk
price in the base year, milk output increases by only 11olo compared to the base. If the average shadow
price is 60% of the base EU milk price (scenario 520-80), milk output is 38% higher in 2010
compared with 2000.
The S20* scenarios are unrealistic since they ignore the market constraint, which is relevant in the
actual situation. For example, for S20, when domestic demand (calculated by equation (53) is
subtracted from simulated supply, there is evidently an increasing excess supply over time. If the EU
wanted to dispose of this surplus by exporting it to the world market, exports (measured in milk
equivalents) would have to increase by about I33Yo in 2010 (i.e. exports more than double their
volume compared to 2000). S20* scenarios only consider the supply side without accounting for the
impact output changes will have on market prices. The subsequent scenarios (from S21 to S23y) all
take into account the missing market constraint. In scenario S21, the output increase nearly halves as
compared with scenario S20. Five Member States, notably Belgium, Italy, Austria, Finland and
Sweden, show a milk output fall relative to 2000, albeit a limited one.
It is noteworthy that in all the quota abolition scenarios, the dairy herd expands at the expense of the
suckler cow herd. r33 Yet beef production hardly declines, as the dairy herd substitutes for specialist
beef animals as a source of beef carcasses.
133 Note that in a few countries, notably Germany and the Netherlands, the suckler cow herd (which is relatively
small already in the base year) is prevented from going to zero in the simulations.
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Table 7.13 also permits a comparison of the different assumptions regarding the size of the quota rent'
Comparing S20-g0 and 520-60 (scenarios in which milk price is fixed rather than market determined),
we see when the quota rent is higher (i.e. lower shadow price of milk relative to the pre-abolition milk
price), quota abolition leads to shonger substitution of dairy cows for beef cows and a smaller
reduction in gross margins. This is because the price of milk in these scenarios is fixed above its
market clearing level, and milk production is more profitable at this fixed price the lower the
underlying shadow price is. The strong increase in the quantity of milk produced at this supported
price helps to moderate the effect of the 25%o price reduction.
Table 7.13. Simulation results quota abolition (at EU-15 level)
Comparing the scenarios 521-80 and 521-60, where price is endogenous and falls to clear the market'
we find an opposite result. The higher the quota rent (i.e. the lower the shadow price), the smaller the
increase in milk production and the smaller the knock-on effect on suckler cows, but the greater the
fall in gross margins. This occurs because the lower shadow price exerts a shonger incentive to
ilcrease production, but to oloar the market price has to fall very steeply' Of coursc, this price fall both
moderates the milk production increase and also has a heavy impact on the gross margin, despite the
contribution of direct PaYments.
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S23y522yS21y 521-80 521-60S2o S20y S20'80 520-60Variable yeat
60.0
99.5
94.9
93.7
93.8 97
100.6
101.2
112.2
1't6.9
98.7
99.5
1æ.0
101.1
103.8
104.8
100.0
88.9
83.0
81.7
100.6
101.2
103.9
'!c/..4
100.0
99.5
106.2
110.8
100.0
90.6
83.9
78.5
't03.0
105.0
107.3
'to7.7
100.0
98.9
98.7
98.9
100.0
93.2
58.3
57.2
99.5
94.4
96.1
103.0
102.6
110.0
99.5
94.4
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99.
100.0
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100.0
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90.6
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72.2
100.0
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sg.'l
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53.4
100.0
101.1
't08.3
111.4
100.0
88.9
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101.2
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111.2
99.5
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100.0
99.5
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't14.7
100.0
90.6
81.2
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100.6
101.2
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102.6
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115.4
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100.0
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88.9
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'100.6
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99.5
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138.0
99.5
94.4
103.0
102.6
120.6
129.5
100.0
99.5
108.9
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As Table 7.14 shows, the output increase that occurs in the scenarios with a fixed price is shongly held
back by a strong milk price decline when milk price becomes endogenous and the market is forced to
balance. The price fall is 75%o greater in 52l (44%) compared with S20 (-25%).If autonomous milk
yield growth of 1.3% is allowed for (scenario 52ly), the milk price declines by nearly 50%.
Not surprisingly, compared with the S20* scenarios, which assume a fixed 25oÂ pnce decline, the
endogenous price scenarios predict a much lower "gross margin", about 40yo lower than in the base
year. Comparing scenarios S22 and S22y with scenarios S21 and S2ly provides some sensitivity
analyses with respect to the demand elasticity.
Table 7.14. Milk price changes, endogenous price scenarios (percentage change from 2000)
year S20 S20y 520-80 s20-60 521 S2ly S2l-80 s2l-60 522 S22y S23 S23y
2000
2005
2008
2010
0.0
-25.0
-25.0
-25.0
0.0
-25.0
-25.0
-25.0
0.0
-25.0
-25.0
-25.0
0.0
-25.0
-2s.0
-25.0
0.0
-30.9
-40.6
44.0
0.0
-17.8
-37.0
-47.7
0.0
-25.8
-34.4
-37.7
0.0
-36.s
-49.t
-54.3
0.0
-25.2
-35.3
-39.3
0.0
-14.5
-31.7
41.8
0.0
40.7
45.2
-46.9
0.0
-28.3
41.9
-50.0
When demand is more elastic (elasticity equal to 
-0.24 instead of -{.15), milk output increases by a
further 3.3 percentage points (522). When there is also yield growth, the increase in dairy cow
numbers (S22y) nearly fully offsets the suckler cow decline, and beef & veal output in 2010 is nearly
the same as in 2000. With both these scenarios, milk price declines less and output increases more
than in the "inelastic" demand scenarios. Gross margin is also higher. However, the milk price still has
to decline by about 40%in order to clear the market.
Comparing scenarios SZl,522 and S23 with their counterparts S2Iy, S22y and S23y (which assume
both yield growth and demand growth), we see that in 2005 the price fall is less in the with-growth
scenario than in the corresponding without-growth scenario. This is because output expansion, on the
supply side, has been held back by quotas, whereas demand has grown by l% each year from the
beginning of the simulation period. However, once quotas are removed the faster yield growth soon
outstrips the growth in demand, so that by 2010 and the price fall in the with-growth scenarios exceeds
that in the without-growth scenarios.
As already mentioned, a total demand elasticity of 4.24 corresponds to a situation where there are no
consfaints on subsidised exports. In reality, subsidised exports are constained by the Uruguay Round
commitments. When it is assumed that dairy exports are reduced by half (5.5 million tons milk
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equivalents less), milk output increases by only 4Yo compared with the base year. The output increase
halves when comparing it to the same scenario (see S21) without the 50% reduction in export
allowances. Assuming a 50%o reduction in exports and l3oÂ autonomous milk yield growth (scenario
S23y) leads to an output increase of nearly 4 percentage points less but with a further 2 percentage
point price decrease, as compared with scenario 52ly'
7.4.5. Impact of scenarios on specialist dairyforms
The decline in gross margin shown in the tables above and in the appendix summarises the results to
dairying and beef an d veal production, taken together. It is interesting, however, to compare scenarios
S10, S20 and S21 with respect to their impact on specialist dairy farm.s in the Member States. The
gross margins shown in most of the tables, including Table 7.13, correspond to revenue earned only
from milk and beef/veal. It is more properly a "margin over feed cost" for these enterprises, since feed
is the only variable input whose cost has been deducted. The interest of this gross margin calculation is
that the definition is clear, and it is a useful indicator for comparing changes across different scenarios.
The fact that it does not compound too many effects makes it useful as a comparative measure.
paragraph 7.3.6 explained the simple methodology underlying the translation of sectoral production-
based gross margins to farm-based gross margins, which recognise other sources of revenue and other
variable costs apart from feed. The gross margin changes for the representative specialist dairy farm in
each Member State that are presented in Table 7.15 have been calculated using this methodology.
The information in these tables can be compared with the country-specific changes in production-
defined "gross margins" (margin over feed costs) shown in the corresponding appendix tables. For all
scenarios and all Member States, the farmJevel gross margin reduction is smaller than the measured
reduction in margin over feed costs. In scenario S21 (quota abolition, endogenous prices), the
reduction in specialist dairy farm gross margins is about 8-15 percentage points smaller than the
reduction in the milk and beef margin over feed costs. Although these figures are indicative only, they
act as a reminder that the "gross margin" calculation shown in most of the tables ignores other farm
enterprises and their changes probably over-estimate the changes in whole-farm gross margins.
Having said this, it should also be bome in mind that additional items on the cost side, which must be
deducted before arriving at a net income figure, tend to be relatively fixed in the short to medium term.
Therefore, the whole-farm gross margin estimates shown in Table 7.15 may well under-estimate the
full impact of these different scenarios on specialist dairy farmers' incomes.
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Gountry B DK D GR E FR IRL
Scenario Sl0
Scenario S20
Scenario 521
-3.4 -5.2 -3.4 -3.6 -2.2 4.4 -8.0
-10.3 -6.1 -3.2 -t2.s -12.4 -0.2 -11.5
-35.9 -31.1 -28.0 -32.2 -33.6 -25.5 _33.4
Gountry IT NIL A P F'IN s UK
Scenario S10
Scenario S20
Scenario 52l
-1.7 -3.0 -3.7 -1.4 4.0 4.3 -1.9
2.r
-30.6
-10.5 2.5 -12.4 -3.7 -13.1 -12.4
-31.9 -23.7 -3t.4 -22.8 -35.2 -3s.7
Table 7.15. Gross margins on specialist dairy farms (percentage changes comparing 2010 with 2000)
7.5. Discussion and conclusions
7.5.1. Technical discussion of model simulations
Before simulating the scenarios of interest, the model was tested in various ways in order to evaluate
its performance as a tool for simulation. In particular, we wanted to check that simulation results under
a wide range of assumed scenarios would satisfr certain plausibility checks: technologically and
biologically feasible relationships between animal numbers and animal outputs, feasible stocking rates
and economically plausible implicit long-run elasticities. It was especially important to check that
simulation results for individual Member States did not imply reactions that were beyond their
production capacity in the medium term.
All our checks were satisfied, at the level of individual Member States and for the EU as a whole,
confirming that the system does indeed represent the iapacities and trade-offs of the dairy-beef sector
in a realistic way.
All the simulated scenarios began with Agenda2000, starting with its implementation for beef and
cereals in 2000/2001, and supplemented by dairy in2005/6.In this report, we show simulation results
only up to 2010. However, given the highly dynamic nature of the model, adjustment was not fully
complete by 2010. For some scenarios, a small but significant part of the adjustment continued up to
about 2014. The adjustment lags explicitly concern the adjustments to quasi-fixed factors. However,
since it is these factors - particularly dairy and beef cow stocks - that drive the system, their gradual
adjustment means that variable inputs and outputs (milk, beel feed use) are also adjusting with a long
lag.
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In particular, the tabulated simulation results show relatively little movement in land allocation. Since
land is the quasi-fixed factor that reacts most slowly in the model, one might wrongly conclude that
the small movement registered up to 2010 is the result of very slow adjustment, and that further
significant adjustment can be expected beyond 2010. In fact, this small response is largely due to the
low (although statistically significant) responsiveness of the land adjustment equation to price signals,
and to the fact that movements in dairy and beef cow numbers tend to offset each other to some extent.
Thus, there is no delayed land "explosion" in years beyond 2010. Given the stability of land allocated
to dairy and beef in past years, this should not be surprising'
In the endogenous price scenarios, the fact that the market for raw milk is modelled at EU level rather
than at the level of individual Member States calls for some comment. The role of the aggregate
demand function is to "close" the model, and to allow realistic solutions in which quantity produced
and market price interact to reach a mutually consistent solution compatible with market balance,
taking domestic and export demand into account. It is true that there are currently and historically
considerable differences between member countries in the producer price of millq with highest prices
observed in Italy and lowest prices in the highly competitive milk producing countries of the North
(the Netherlands, Belgium, France). It is, however, debatable whether national milk markets would
remain so segmented after quota abolition. As long as national quotas and strong quota-induced links
with particul ar dairy companies exist, the possibilities for cross-border trade in raw milk have been
rather limited, although intra-Union trade in dairy products has increased very strongly. The extent to
which increased cross-border trade in raw milk would tend to equalise producer prices (after taking
account of transport costs) if quotas are removed is unknown. Studies of price transmission for freely
haded agricultural products in the European Union have given mixed results (Palaskas and Crowe,
1996; Zanias, 1992). In summary, then, it has been impossible to test this feature of the model
empirically, although we believe it to be a reasonable approximation of the way the market is likely to
work in a future post-quota period.
7.5.2. Discussion of sensîtivity analyses
In this section, we discuss the results of sensitivity analyses concerning decoupling, autonomous yield
growth and the magnitude of the quota rents.
7.5.2.1. Decoupling
The main result here is that the extent to which direct payments are perceived as decoupled does not
have a major impact on aggregate market outcomes. Comparing the scenarios in which a minimum
(S10) and maximum (511.4) degree of perceived coupledness are assumed, we find that the more
coupled the package of payments is perceived to be, the more beef animals are held (dairy cows are
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implicitly constained by the milk quota constraint in these scenarios). By 2010, the fall in suckler
cows relative to 2000 is about 6% when payments are viewed as coupled, rather than over lTYo when
they are not. Feed input and land allocation increase more or less proportionately to non-dairy beef
production, but the fall in gross margin for the beefldairy sector as a whole is less by only about 2
percentage points (relative to the base year). Similarly, the impact on total beef production is of a
smaller order of magnitude (fall of 3% rather than about 7%).
Scenario 511.1, which assumes that only slaughterpremiums are perceived as coupled to output, is
perhaps the most realistic. In this scenario, we find that the impact on suckler cow numbers, after 10
years, is still relatively small (a decline from the base year of a little more than l4Yo ruther than over
l7%). Of course, the impact of this difference on beef production is much smaller, due to the fact that
such a significant proportion of beef comes from the dairy herd which, in these simulations, is
implicitly conshained by quota.
7.5.2.2. Yield growth
The simulations in section 7.4 analyse Agenda 2000 with and without the maintenance of quotas
under two different assumptions about yield growth: zero yield growth and autonomous yield growth
at the rate of 1.3% per year beginning in the base year. In the quota-abolition simulations where yield
is increasing, we also assume 1olo annual growth in demand for raw milk. Comparing the different
yield assumptions with quotas maintained (Sl0 and S10y), we find that when yield is hending, there is
significant substitution of suckler cows for dairy cows as quota commitments can be met by
progressively fewer dairy cows. The net effect of these two movements on beef production is
relatively small.
When quota is abolished, and price is endogenous, the relevant scenarios to compare are S2l and
S21y. With yield growth, the expansion in the dairy herd is substantially greater than with no yield
growth, and the increase in milk production, relative to 2000, is more than doubled. Beef output is a
little higher, as is feed use. Surprisingly, the impact on gross margin is small. Although a larger
quantity of milk is being produced, milk price is lower. The stabilising effect on gross margin changes
of beef revenue is apparent in the comparison between these two scenarios.
This analysis indicates that, whether one is interested in marketed outputs or agricultural incomes, it is
important to analyse the effect of milk yield changes in a model that also represents the interaction
between dairy and beef animal populations, and the contribution of beef to the incomes of dairy
producers.
337
7.5.2.3. Quota rents
We have analysed the sensitivity of the model to different assumptions about quota rents under two
different policy settings: quota abolition with milk price exogenously supported (compare 520-60 and
S20-g0), and quota abolition with milk price endogenously determined (compare 521-60 and 521-80).
In the first situation, when rents are higher (i.e., the shadow price for milk is lower, indicating lower-
cost production at the margin), the expansion in dairy cow numbers and milk production following
quota abolition is much greater than when rents are lower. Feed use is also much greater, and the fall
in gross margins significantly smaller (a fall ofjust under 7olo, compared with 2000, rather than over
zl%).These results appear to confirm the idea that the more efficient milk production is at the margin,
the better able milk producers will be able to cope with quota abolition.
However, such a conclusion is misleading. These two scenarios assume that milk price is still
supported. The level of support (25% less than in the base year) represents a price decline that might
be considered politically acceptable but it is not sufficient to ensure market balance, even with the
EU's current exporting opportunities. Underlying the simulation results for 520-60 and 520-80, is a
growing market imbalance that is not sustainable in the medium term.
When price becomes endogenous so as to clear the market, comparison between scenarios 521-60 and
S21-g0 shows that stronger price falls occur in the high rent simulation: lower-cost producers have a
greater incentive to expand but this works against them by driving price down lower. The implication
is that, the higher the quota rents observed now, the greater has been the effect of the quota scheme
over the past 15 years in holding back restructuring in the sector. The fall in gross margin of over 460/o
by 2010 that is shown for the S2l-60 scenario suggests that, the closer EU producers are now to world
market production costs, the more urgent and substantial would be the restructuring of production
capacity (into a smaller number of much larger production units) if the milk-producing sector were
completely dere gulated.
7. 5. 3. P olicy co nclusions
From the 19 scenarios analysed, the following general conclusions can be drawn:
r' The proposed dairy policy reform in Agenda 2000 (milk price decline of l5o/o with limited quota
enlargement: milk output +2.4yo and compensatory payments) is successful in curbing output
growth and maintaining farm incomes at levels comparable to those of the base year.
/ Abolishing quota, but at the same time maintaining the existing CMO by guaranteeing a fixed
price, albeitz|% lower than at present, will lead to a significant output increase, in particular
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when yield growth continues to follow its past hend. This does not look like a sustainable policy
option, and will result in growing market imbalance.
r' Quota abolition with market-determined prices is likely to lead to a milk output increase of more
than 25o/o (allowing for exogenous yield growth and demand growth of I.3% and lo/o per year
respectively) with an accompanying milk price fall of 40Yo or more. We stress that the simulated
price decline balances the internal market, given that border protection for dairy products and
subsidised export arrangements are maintained unchanged. The price decline has disastous
impacts on the gross margin (revenue plus direct payments minus feed costs) of the dairy-beef
sector. Even when the compensatory direct payments of Agenda 2000 are assumed to continue
when quotas are removed, gross margin falls by roughly 40%.
r' The calculated impacts on the whole-farm gross margins of specialist dairy farms are somewhat
smaller than those predicted for the dairy-beef sectors as a whole (these calculations take into
account other sources ofrevenue from farming).
r' The output increase following quota abolition would lead, in the absence of any export limits, to a
significant increase in the EU's exportable surplus.
r' If theex-farmgatemilkpricedeclinesbyanorderof magnitude of 4}Yo,theEUpricelevelis
coming closer to world market price levels and there may be some scope for increasing
unsubsidised exports of dairy products (Agra Europe, 2001, A/1).
'/ When a 50o/o decrease in export volumes is assumed, relative to the level of exports in 2000, there
is additional pressure on intemal price and a further reduction in milk ouput. This scenario would
correspond to a reduction of 50% or more in the EU's bindings on subsidised dairy products.
r' Agenda 2000, with or without quota abolition, leads to stabilisation, or even a slight reduction, in
the EU's beef and veal output.
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Table 7.17. Gross margin calculations for specialist dairy farms in the base yearr 2000
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Table 7.18. Meat composition at Member State level
comment Although here separately mentioned, in the model simulations Luxembourg is jointly with Belgium teated as one country- For the uK the value of zero is because
beef from animals older than 30 months cannot enter the human food chain in the llK due to BSE problems.
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Table 7.19. Effective prices when direct payments are perceived as coupled (calculated at Member State level)
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Simulation results: Agenda 2000
Table 7.20. Simulation results scenario S10
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Table 7.21. Simulation results scenario Sl0y
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88.8
85.8
100.0
98.1
91.1
90.7
100.1
100.1
101
101
91
89.
99.
87
85.6
97
100.
91
1
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
104.6
109.2
109.2
109.2
104.5
108.9
108.9
108.9
102.9
105.7
105.7
105.7
99.0
89.7
79.7
73.7
100.1
93.3
87.2
83.8
101.5
98.7
96.9
95.7
100.5
98.7
100.0
100.3
101
97
96.
100.0
98.5
97.5
97.1
100.0
100.1
100.0
99.9
1
100.0
99.3
92.7
95.5
100.0
95.7
92.1
93.5
Variable
q beef & veal
stock dairy
stock suckler
gross margin
q milk
q feed
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20't0
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
345
Table 7.2?. Simutation results scenario S10f
100.0
101.2
102.3
102.4
100.0
89.0
84.5
83.2
100.6
101.2
102.4
102.4
99.4
95.2
93.7
93.1
101.7
102.4
103.2
103.2
100.0
99.4
98.9
98.8
100.0
97.4
91.7
91.3
FINP S UK EU-15ITNLASP FR IRLB DK GER GR
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
91.6
85.1
83.7
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.2
93.7
90.6
89.3
100.2
98.8
99.5
99.2
100.0
97.6
95.7
95.2
100.0
103.1
95.8
96.0
100.0
100.0
't01.2
101.4
100.0
79.6
74.4
73.5
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
99.1
94.3
93.9
93.9
100.7
101.3
102.7
102.8
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
76.3
55.4
44.5
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.1
94.7
93.1
91.4
100.6
100.6
101.7
101.4
100.0
99.6
99.7
99.8
100.0
109.0
109.2
109.2
100.0
92.6
92.3
92.4
104.6
109.2
109.2
109.2
99.7
103.3
102.6
't02.7
104.2
107.3
107.0
107.0
100.0
108.6
108.9
108.9
100.0
88.8
88.0
88.s
104.5
108.9
108.9
108.9
100.3
93.2
90.7
91.2
104.7
108.2
107.9
108.0
100.0
100.0
99.8
99.8
100.0
100.0
101.3
10'1.4
100.0
92.6
91.5
91.7
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
99.5
94.2
93.9
94.0
102.9
102.7
103.4
103.3
100.0
99.1
99.1
99.2
100.0
102.8
102.8
102.8
100.0
82.7
72.7
69.2
101.4
102.8
102.8
102.8
99.5
94.3
89.2
87.3
100.3
101.3
103.2
104.0
100.0
99.1
97.3
96.7
100.0
96.4
88.7
86.7
100.0
105.5
105.7
105.7
100.0
93.9
93.6
94.2
102.9
105.7
105.7
105.7
98.9
100.0
99.9
100.1
102.9
109.3
109.7
109.7
100.0
98.5
92.7
91.1
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
50.8
11.7
11.7
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.2
95.7
93.7
93.7
100.4
100.5
102.',|
102.2
100.0
98.7
97.3
97.1
100.0
96.3
90.7
92.1
100.0
100.0
101.0
10'1.2
100.0
62.7
36.4
20.6
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.3
99.1
91.3
86.0
82.8
100.7
100.2
100.9
100.6
100.0
99.3
98.1
97.6
100.0
94.6
87.2
84.5
100.0
100.0
101.6
101.8
100.0
87.2
73.9
67.2
100.0
100.0
101.8
101.8
98.9
92.2
85.8
82.2
100.6
100.3
101.8
101.6
100.0
98.6
95.7
94.2
100.0
98.4
90.8
88.7
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
73.9
60.1
51.9
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.4
96.5
96.9
96.6
99.8
98.0
98.4
97.9
100.0
99.3
99.3
s9.4
100.0
98.8
94.1
92.1
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
92.3
87.9
86.2
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100
100.1
101
101
100
100.0
97.9
92.8
92.8
100.0
97.5
91.8
90.8
100.0
104.6
95.9
92.0
100.0
96.5
88.9
90.5
100.0
9ô.0
92.2
93.0
100.0
97.1
95.8
94.9
101.3
101.8
103.6
103.8
100.0
97.8
95.6
94.9
100.0 1
99.2
93.8
92.6
100.0
98.5
98.3
98.4
100.0
100.3
100.3
100.3
100.0
100.3
100.3
100.4
100.1
100.1
101
101
99
99
99.
97
97
91
Variable
gross margin
q beef & veal
stock ddry
stock suckler
q feed
q milk
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20'lo
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
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Table 7.23. Simulation results scenario S11.1
100.0
101.2
102.3
102.4
100.0
90.6
86.4
85.8
100.6
101.2
102.4
102.4
99.5
95.9
94.4
94.1
103.0
105.5
106.4
106.4
100.0
99.1
98.5
98.4
100.0
98.3
92.8
92.4
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.2
101.4
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
109.0
109.2
109.2
100.0
108.6
108.9
108.9
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.4
100.0
't02.8
102.8
102.8
100.0
105.5
105.7
105.7
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.0
101.2
100.0
100.0
101.6
101.8
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
100.1
101.5
101.6
100.0
90.9
83.1
83.0
100.0
78.2
71.7
70.9
100.0
78.7
58.7
48.7
100.0
92.7
92.6
92.8
100.0
91.3
91.0
92.2
100.0
93.8
93.1
94.0
100.0
85.7
77.6
75.2
100.0
95.1
95.3
96.5
100.0
50.5
11.7
11.7
100.0
70.0
44.2
28.9
100.0
89.4
75.9
68.9
100.0
76.3
62.2
55.4
100.0
92.7
86.7
u.4
100.0
91.6
88.2
88.0
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.s
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
104.6
109.2
109.2
109.2
104.5
108.9
108.9
108.9
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
101.4
102.8
102.8
102.8
102.9
105.7
105.7
105.7
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.3
100.0
100.0
101.8
101.8
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.1
100.1
101.6
101.6
99.5
93.7
89.2
88.6
99.2
93.9
93.1
93.1
99.2
., 95.1
93.6
92.0
100.1
104.2
103.5
103.7
100.6
96.0
94.2
95.4
99.7
95.2
95.1
95.5
99.7
95.6
91.3
90.0
98.9
100.3
100.3
100.6
99.3
95.6
93.3
93.3
99.1
92.5
87.5
84.3
99.0
92.9
86.4
82.6
99.6
97.0
97.4
97.1
100.1
97.2
94.8
93.5
99.7
96.1
94.7
94.4
101.1
101.0
101.6
't01.8
101.5
102.9
104.4
104.s
101.4
102.2
103.3
103.1
105.1
109.2
108.9
109.0
105.6
110.4
110.3
110.5
106.8
111.3
112.0
1't2.2
100.9
102.1
103.7
104.3
103.7
111.0
111.4
111.5
100.9
101.7
103.4
103.5
101.5
102.1
102.9
102.6
101.4
102.2
103.8
103.7
100.5
99.9
100.3
99.9
103.4
106.6
108.8
109.2
101.2
100.8
101.9
102.0
100.0
96.0
93.2
92.7
100.0
97.3
97.0
97.1
100.0
99.4
99.5
99.6
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.3
100.0
99.9
99.8
99.9
100.0
98.6
98.6
98.8
100.0
99.2
97.7
97.2
100.0
100.4
100.4
100.5
100.0
97.8
96.0
95.8
100.0
99.1
97.7
97.1
100.0
97.7
94.1
92.3
100.0
98.7
98.6
98.8
100.0
96.0
92.5
91.3
100.0
98.3
96.9
96.6
100.0
103.6
95.6
96.2
100.0
98.0
92.8
92.9
100.0
98.3
92.6
91.7
100.0
105.2
96.6
92.7
100.0
100.2
93.3
94.7
100.0
96.6
92.9
93.8
100.0
97.s
90.4
88.6
100.0
100.3
94.7
93.1
100.0
96.8
91.1
92.5
100.0
9s.8
88.5
85.8
100.0
101.7
94.1
91.9
100.0
99.2
94.5
92.5
100.0
99.3
93.4
92.4
100.0
99.1
92
91
.9
.7
Variable year
stock dairy 2000
2004
2008
2010
stock suckler 2000
2004
2008
2010
q milk 2000
2004
2008
2010
q beef & veal 2000
2004
2008
2010
q feed 2000
200/i
2008
2010
land 2000
2004
2008
2010
gross margin 2000
2004
2008
2010
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Table 7.24. Simulation results scenario 511.2
100.0
101.2
102.3
102.4
100.0
94.2
91.1
90.8
100.6
101.2
102.4
't02.4
99.5
97.1
96.2
95.9
103.0
105.9
106.8
106.9
100.0
99.2
98.8
98.8
100.0
99.0
93.7
93.2
Country
NL PA FIN S UK EU.15SP FR IRL ITB DK GER GR
100.0
100.0
't01.4
101.5
100.0
93.1
86.2
86.5
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.5
94.7
90.8
90.3
101.1
101.5
102.1
102.3
100.0
96.3
93.8
93.4
100.0
104.3
96.6
97.2
100.0
100.0
101.2
10'1.4
100.0
84.3
78.6
78.0
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
99.2
94.8
94.3
94.3
101.5
103.0
104.5
104.6
100.0
97.4
97.2
97.3
100.0
98.3
93.2
93.2
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
87.0
7',t.7
62.7
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.2
95.9
95.3
93.9
10't.4
102.4
103.6
103.4
100.0
99.5
99.6
99.7
100.0
98.7
93.4
92.3
100.0
109.0
109.2
109.2
100.0
93.0
92.8
93.0
104.6
109.2
109.2
109.2
100.1
104.4
103.7
103.9
105.1
109.2
109.0
109.0
100.0
100.3
100.3
100.3
100.0
105.2
9ô.6
92.7
100.0
108.6
108.9
108.9
100.0
95.2
95.5
96.8
104.5
108.9
108.9
108.9
100.6
99.4
98.8
100.1
105.6
111.0
11 1.0
111.2
100.0
100.1
100.2
100.3
100.0
102.8
96.7
97.5
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.4
100.0
9ô.3
95.7
96.6
100.0
100.0
101.4
10'1.4
99.7
96.5
96.6
97.',|
106.8
112.1
't12.8
113.1
100.0
98.7
98.8
98.9
100.0
97.3
93.7
94.4
100.0
102.8
102.8
102.8
100.0
91.3
86.8
85.8
101.4
102.8
102.8
102.8
99.7
97.4
95.0
94.3
100.9
101.6
102.5
102.8
100.0
99.6
98.8
98.5
100.0
98.8
92.9
91.0
100.0
105.5
105.7
105.7
100.0
96.8
97.0
98.2
102.9
105.7
105.7
105.7
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
62.8
11.7
11.7
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.3
96.1
93.7
93.4
100.9
'101.7
103.4
103.5
100.0
97.9
9ô.3
9s.9
100.0
97.1
91.3
92.5
100.0
100.0
101.0
10'1.2
100.0
83.7
il.6
52.0
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.3
99.1
94.7
91.6
89.0
100.0
100.0
101.6
101.8
100.0
93.3
83.2
77.6
100.0
100.0
101.8
101.8
99.0
94.2
89.6
86.6
101.4
102.4
104.3
104.2
100.0
97.8
94.9
93.4
100.0
103.2
97.5
95.4
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
85.5
73.4
66.8
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.6
97.4
98.0
97.7
100.5
100.3
100.8
100.4
100.0
98.7
98.7
98.8
100.0
99.3
94.7
92.6
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
95.3
89.9
87.8
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.1
97.9
96.0
94.7
103.4
106.8
109.0
109.3
100.0
96.2
93.0
92.0
100.0
99.6
93.9
92.7
00.1
1
1
,|
1
98.9
100.6
100.7
101.0
1
92
100.1
100.1
01
01
101
101
01
01
02.
98
97
97.1
99.
97.1
96.1
103.7
111.1
111.5
111.6
100.0
100.4
100.5
100.5
100.0
100.5
95.0
93.3
101.5
102.5
103.5
103.4
1
1
1
1
100.0
99.2
98.2
97.8
100.0
96.9
90.4
87.5
100.
93
92
q beef & veal
gross margln
stock suckler
stock dairy
q milk
q feed
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20't0
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
Variable
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Table 7.25. Simulation results scenario 511.3
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.2
101.4
100.0
100.0
10't.4
101.5
100.0
109.0
109.2
109.2
100.0
108.6
108.9
108.9
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.4
100.0
102.8
102.8
102.8
100.0
105.5
105.7
105.7
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.0
101.2
100.0
100.0
101.6
101.8
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.s
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
100.1
101.5
101.6
100.0
93.8
87.1
87.5
100.0
8s.8
80.4
79.8
100.0
89.2
75.0
66.3
100.0
93.1
92.9
93.1
100.0
96.2
96.6
97.9
100.0
97.0
96.5
97.4
100.0
92.7
89.1
88.4
100.0
97.2
97.5
98.7
100.0
67.1
'11.7
11.7
100.0
87.3
70.1
58.1
'100.0
94.6
85.5
80.3
100.0
87.8
76.1
69.6
100.0
95.9
90.7
88.7
100.0
96.2
93.7
93.8
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
104.6
109.2
109.2
109.2
104.5
108.9
108.9
108.9
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
101.4
102.8
102.8
102.8
102.9
105.7
105.7
105.7
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.3
100.0
100.0
101.8
101.8
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.1
100.1
101.6
101.6
99.5
94.9
91.2
90.8
99.2
95.0
94.5
94.6
99.2
96.2
95.7
94.4
100.1
104.4
103.8
103.9
100.6
100.3
99.9
101.2
99.7
96.8
97.0
97.5
99.7
97.9
95.9
95.4
98.9
100.7
100.8
101.1
99.3
96.3
94.1
93.4
99.1
95.3
92.7
90.3
99.0
94.7
90.6
87.9
99.6
97.5
98.1
97.9
100.1
98.1
96.3
95.1
99.7
97.4
96.7
96.5
101.1
101.6
102.3
102.5
101.5
103.0
104.5
104.6
101.4
102.4
103.7
103.5
105.1
109.2
109.0
109.0
105.6
111.2
111.2
111.4
106.8
112.3
113.1
113.3
100.9
101.5
102.2
102.4
103.7
111.2
111.6
111.7
100.9
101.8
103.4
103.5
101.5
102.7
103.7
103.6
101.4
't02.5
104.4
104.4
100.5
100.4
100.9
100.5
103.4
106.8
109.0
109.3
101.2
101.6
102.9
103.1
100.0
96.3
94.0
93.6
100.0
97.4
97.2
97.3
100.0
99.5
99.7
99.8
100.0
100.3
100.3
100.3
100.0
100.1
100.3
100.4
100.0
98.7
98.8
99.0
100.0
99.7
99.0
98.8
100.0
100.4
100.5
100.6
100.0
98.0
96.4
96.0
100.0
99.2
98.3
98.0
100.0
97.9
95.1
93.7
100.0
98.7
98.7
98.9
100.0
96.2
93.1
92.1
100.0
98.5
97.4
97.2
100.0
104.5
96.9
97.5
100.0
98.4
93.3
93.3
100.0
98.8
93.ô
92.5
100.0
105.3
96.6
92.8
100.0
103.5
97.6
98.2
100.0
97.6
94.0
94.6
100.0
99.1
93.5
91.6
100.0
100.6
95.0
93.4
100.0
97.1
91.4
92.6
100.0
97.1
91.0
88.0
100.0
103.7
98.6
96.s
100.0
99.3
94.7
92.7
100.0
99.6
94.0
92.8
100.0
99.6
93.6
92.6
Variable year
stock dairy 2000
2004
2008
2010
stock suckler 2000
2004
2008
2010
q milk 2000
2004
2008
2010
q beef & veal 2000
2004
2008
2010
q feed 2000
2004
2008
2010
land 2000
2004
2008
2010
gross margin 2000
2004
2008
2010
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Table 7.26. Simulation results scenario 511.4
100.0
101.2
102.3
102.4
100.0
96.6
94.1
93.9
100.6
101.2
102.4
't02.4
99.5
97.8
97.3
97.1
103.0
106.2
107.2
107.2
100.0
99.3
99.0
99.0
100.0
99.4
94.3
93.7
P FIN S UK EU-15FR IRL IT NL AGR SPB DK GER
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
94.7
88.4
88.9
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.5
95.3
91.9
91.6
100.0
100.0
101.2
101.4
100.0
88.0
82.9
82.3
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
99.2
95.3
94.9
95.0
101.5
103.1
104.5
104.6
100.0
97.4
97.3
97.4
100.0
98.5
93.5
93.4
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
92.1
79.5
71.2
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.2
96.5
96.3
95.0
101.4
102.5
103.8
103.6
100.0
99.s
99.7
99.8
100.0
99.0
93.9
92.7
100.0
109.0
109.2
109.2
100.0
93.2
93.0
s3.2
104.6
109.2
109.2
109.2
100.1
104.5
103.9
104.0
105.1
109.3
109.0
109.1
100.0
100.3
100.3
100.3
100.0
105.3
96.7
92.8
100.0
108.6
108.9
108.9
100.0
97.6
98.2
99.5
104.5
108.9
108.9
108.9
100.6
101.5
101.5
102.9
105.6
111.4
111.4
't11.7
100.0
100.2
100.4
100.5
100.0
104.4
98.8
99.1
100.0
100.0
101.3
10'1.4
100.0
98.0
97.6
98.5
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.4
99.7
97.4
97.6
98.1
106.8
112.6
113.4
113.7
100.0
98.8
98.9
99.1
100.0
97.9
94.3
s4.9
100.0
102.8
102.8
102.8
100.0
94.6
92.2
92.1
101.4
102.8
102.8
102.8
99.7
98.5
97.1
96.9
100.9
101.3
101.8
101.9
100.0
99.8
99.4
99.2
100.0
99.5
94.4
92.5
100.0
105.5
105.7
105.7
100.0
97.8
98.1
99.4
102.9
105.7
105.7
105.7
98.9
100.8
100.9
101.2
103.7
111.2
111.6
1't1.7
100.0
100.5
100.5
100.6
100.0
100.7
95.1
93.5
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
100.0
101.0
10't.2
100.0
92.4
77.7
66.7
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.3
99.1
96.2
94.2
92.0
101.5
102.8
104.0
103.9
100.0
99.3
98.5
98.2
100.0
97.6
91.7
88.7
100.0
100.0
101.6
101.8
100.0
96.4
88.9
u.4
100.0
100.0
101.8
101.8
99.0
95.3
92.1
89.7
101.4
102.6
104.6
104.ô
100.0
97.9
95.4
94.3
100.0
104.4
100.2
98.2
100.0
100.0
101.3
101.5
100.0
91.0
79.9
73.4
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
99.6
97.6
98.3
98.1
100.5
100.5
101.0
100.7
100.0
98.7
98.7
98.9
100.0
99.4
94.8
92.7
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.5
100.0
96.8
91.8
89.9
00.1
1
1
1
1
01
01
100.0
73.7
18.7
't1.7
100.0
98.0
96.6
96.1
1
100.0
100.0
101.5
10'1.5
99.3
96.5
94.7
93.5
100.9
101.8
103.5
103.5
100.0
100.0
101.5
101.5
100.1
100.1
101
101
100.1
98.3
96.6
95.5
103.4
106.9
109.1
109.3
101
101
100.0
96.3
93.3
92.3
100.0
99.7
94.1
92.9
97
1
100.0
99.
92.
1
99.
97
97
97
101.1
10'1.7
102.5
102.7
100.0
96.4
94.2
93.9
100.0
104.8
97.4
98.0
97
97
100.0
97.3
9',1.7
92.6
q beef & veal
gross margin
stock suckler
stock dairy
q milk
q feed
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
Variable
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Simulation results: Agenda 2000 plus quota abolition
Table 7.27. Simulation results scenario S20
Country Country
NLB DK GER GR SP FR IRL IT A P FIN S UK EU-15
100.0
101.1
109.9
115,3
100.0
88.9
77.8
72.9
100.6
101.2
113.4
117.6
99.5
94.9
96.8
98.4
103.0
105.0
115.7
118.9
100.0
98.9
99.3
100.3
100.0
93.2
79.3
81.7
100.0
99.9
't02.5
105.0
100.0
98.0
103.8
109.3
100.0
99.9
108.6
115.2
100.0
110.2
113.1
114.4
100.0
111.9
118.1
118.9
't00.0
99.2
111.4
121.8
100.0
102.5
106.8
108.8
100.0
101.6
100.8
100.8
100.0
100.3
114.7
117.4
100.0
100.1
101.3
101.9
100.0
100.5
106.1
108.5
100.0
100.1
101.0
101.4
100.0
98.0
99.6
100.4
100.0
102.5
120.6
129.6
100.0
90.1
80.0
74.5
100.0
77.7
&[.6
57.2
100.0
76.1
13.4
2.8
100.0
93.0
89.8
89.1
100.0
88.6
86.9
88.0
100.0
93.2
85.3
77.2
100.0
83.6
69.2
63.0
100.0
95.2
96.0
97.4
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
100.0
60.9
26.7
8.8
100.0
86.2
68.3
59.0
100.0
69.0
55.2
51.0
100.0
93.2
87.3
84.9
100.0
88.9
81.2
79.8
100.0
100.0
105.0
107.5
100.0
100.0
108.5
113.7
100.0
100.0
112.8
118.1
104.6
109.2
108.7
109.6
104.5
108.9
112.4
112.8
100.0
100.0
116.6
123.9
101.4
102.8
110.0
111.7
102.9
105.7
105.3
105.2
100.0
100.0
121.',|
123.7
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.8
100.0
100.0
110.5
112.6
100.0
100.0
101.4
101.6
100.0
100.0
102.4
103.1
100.1
100.1
122.0
128.3
99.5
92.6
88.5
87.9
99.2
91.9
94.6
98.4
99.2
94.4
96.3
97.5
100.1
105.9
105.9
106.7
100.6
94.6
92.8
94.0
99.7
94.1
97.5
100.1
99.7
94.8
90.6
88.8
98.9
97.1
96.4
96.7
99.3
95.3
106.1
109.6
99.1
90.8
84.5
81.0
99.0
92.1
86.0
82.4
99.6
96.7
96.6
96.7
100.1
95.5
93.5
92.8
99.7
96.7
104.6
109.7
101.1
100.5
104.2
106.2
101.5
102.5
1 11.5
117.4
101.4
102.1
113.9
119.0
105.1
109.3
108.4
109.1
105.6
110.2
114.2
114.9
106.8
110.8
120.6
123.6
100.9
102.2
1't0.1
112.5
103.7
108.4
107.2
107.1
100.9
101.6
127.4
130.6
101.5
101.8
102.6
102.6
101.4
102.0
113.4
11s.6
100.5
99.5
99.8
99.7
103.4
106.3
109.4
110.3
101.2
100.5
121.9
128.1
100.0
9s.8
92.9
92.6
100.0
96.8
96.9
98.0
100.0
99.3
100.6
102.4
100.0
100.2
100.4
100.4
100.0
99.8
100.3
100.s
100.0
98.3
99.5
101.3
100.0
98.9
97.4
96.9
100.0
100.1
99.9
99.9
100.0
97.8
98.5
100.9
100.0
99.0
97.5
96.8
100.0
97.6
94.4
93.2
100.0
98.7
98.6
98.7
100.0
95.9
92.6
91.5
100.0
98.4
99.2
101.7
100.0
%.el
83.01
87.21
100.0
89.7
72.2
72.5
100.0
94.6
79.9
83.5
100.0
95.0
80.6
83.5
100.0
100.9
80.1
80.7
100.0
92.1
68.7
69.3
100.0
90.5
81.0
85.4
100.0
92.2
77.6
77.3
100.0
92.7
73.4
73.6
100.0
94.0
87.2
89.5
100.0
91.8
71.9
70.8
100.0
90.5
56.4
53.7
100.0
96.1
76.7
76.8
100.0
95.7
76.6
76.8
Variable vear
stock dairy 2000
2004
2008
2010
stock suckler 2000
2004
2008
2010
q milk 2000
2004
2008
2010
q beef & veal 2000
2004
2008
2010
q feed 2000
2004
2008
2010
land 2000
2004
2008
2010
gross mar$n 2000
2004
2008
2010
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Table 7.28. Simulation results scenario S20y
100.0
99.5
108.9
118.0
100.0
90.6
81.9
73.0
100.6
101.2
118.6
129.1
99.5
94.4
97.7
101.1
103.0
102.6
115.4
122.5
100.0
98.8
98.9
100.3
100.0
93.5
82.8
88.5
P FIN S UK EU-15ITNLASP FR IRLDK GER GR
100.0
97.9
98.0
101.7
100.0
93.2
91.0
86.ô
100.0
100.0
105.8
1',t2.6
99.5
92.7
90.4
91.8
100.0
95.6
92.5
92.4
100.0
90.3
74.2
77.0
100.0
96.6
103.9
115.2
100.0
79.6
66.1
52.2
100.0
100.0
114.3
129.0
99.2
90.9
94.9
103.2
100.0
96.6
96.6
98.4
100.0
94.6
83.4
93.2
100.0
97.9
105.8
115.5
100.0
87.6
49.8
2.8
100.0
100.0
116.5
127.9
99.2
93.7
98.1
99.5
101.4
99.7
112.2
120.7
100.0
99.0
100.0
101.9
100.0
95.2
83.8
89.9
100.0
108.4
112.4
117.8
100.0
94.0
91.2
88.3
104.6
'tog.2
113.9
121.0
100.1
104.7
106.4
110.5
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.4
100.0
100.8
83.2
87.9
100.0
110.5
118.4
122.1
100.0
88.8
87.0
87.6
104.5
108.9
118.5
123.4
100.6
94.4
93.0
94.6
105.6
107.3
114.2
118.0
100.0
99.7
100.1
100.6
100.0
93.4
72.6
74.7
100.0
97.4
109.7
124.2
100.0
94.4
87.6
77.1
100.0
100.0
't2't.5
135.7
99.7
93.6
97.9
102.1
106.8
109.4
120.7
't26.6
100.0
98.1
99.0
101.2
100.0
90.6
83.8
92.0
100.0
100.8
105.9
111.7
100.0
85.0
71.6
63.0
101.4
102.8
't14.9
123.5
99.7
94.3
91.1
90.9
100.9
100.1
109.0
115.4
100.0
98.7
97.2
97.0
100.0
92.2
80.1
83.2
100.0
100.4
102.6
107.1
100.0
95.6
96.1
96.0
102.9
105.7
111.8
117.4
98.9
96.2
97.9
101.6
103.7
105.2
108.1
114.3
100.0
99.9
99.9
100.3
100.0
93.4
77.5
80.3
100.0
100.3
114.9
117.6
100.0
98.7
100.1
103.7
100.0
70.3
51.3
19.6
100.0
99.1
104.9
109.2
100.0
86.8
69.3
58.9
100.0
100.0
115.2
122.4
99.0
91.5
85.7
82.8
10'1.4
99.1
112.2
118.1
100.0
97.4
93.6
92.3
100.0
92.6
61.3
60.2
100.0
98.6
101.2
105.2
100.0
81.7
71.1
38.7
100.0
100.0
106.9
112.2
99.6
95.6
97.8
100.7
100.5
98.6
100.8
102.1
100.0
98.4
98.3
99.0
100.0
96.0
80.2
u.1
100.0
96.6
99.7
103.9
100.0
94.5
88.6
83.5
100.0
100.0
108.0
114.8
100.1
94.6
94.1
95.6
103.4
104.2
109.7
114.4
100.0
95.7
s2.2
91.4
100.0
95.6
80.0
84.3
136.
100
11
101
97
122
135.0
101
1
87
101
't21
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
100.0
100.0
127.7
133.9
99.3
95.3
106.4
109.8
100.9
98.7
127.6
132.5
100.0
97.8
98.7
101.1
100.0
94.4
91.0
95.0
100.0
100.0
106.1
111.2
81
77
100.1
100.1
1
1
99.
96.0
105.2
101.1
98.8
102.1
106.9
101.5
99.9
111.4
124.8
105.1
107.0
108.1
112.5
99.1
90.6
88.3
86.6
101.5
99.1
102.O
105.7
100.0
98.8
97.1
96.6
100.0
92.1
76.0
77.5
Variable
q beef & veal
gross margin
stock strkler
stock ddry
q milk
q feed
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20'to
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
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Table 7.29. Simulation results scenario 520-80
100.0
99.9
97.8
93.7
100.0
98.0
100.6
103.1
100.0
99.9
105.9
111.2
100.0
110.2
110.8
110.4
100.0
111.9
116.6
117.0
100.0
99.2
107.0
113.4
100.0
102.5
104.0
104.0
100.0
101.6
98.3
97.3
100.0
100.3
113.6
116.6
100.0
100.1
99.4
98.3
100.0
100.5
104.8
106.5
100.0
100.1
97.9
96.9
100.0
98.0
96.8
96.5
100.0
102.5
116.7
123.7
100.0
90.1
86.6
94.0
100.0
77.7
68.3
&1.9
100.0
76.1
28.1
2.8
100.0
93.0
91.0
91.5
100.0
88.6
87.1
88.3
100.0
93.2
88.0
83.4
100.0
83.6
71.2
67.2
100.0
95.2
96.7
98.6
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
100.0
60.9
37.6
36.1
100.0
86.2
68.8
59.9
100.0
69.0
77.8
94.9
100.0
93.2
89.4
88.s
100.0
88.9
82.2
81.1
100.0
100.0
98.4
94.2
100.0
100.0
103.7
106.1
100.0
100.0
108.5
1',t2.8
104.6
109.2
105.4
105.2
104.5
108.9
110.0
110.2
100.0
100.0
110.8
115.3
101.4
102.8
105.4
105.5
102.9
105.7
102.1
101.5
100.0
100.0
117.5
120.4
100.0
100.0
98.9
98.3
100.0
100.0
107.7
109.2
100.0
100.0
97.0
96.4
100.0
100.0
97.5
97.2
100.1
100.1
116.S
121.7
99.5
92.6
87.5
87.2
99.2
91.9
92.1
93.7
99.2
94.4
94.9
94.0
100.1
105.9
104.1
104.0
100.6
94.6
92.5
93.7
99.7
94.1
96.0
97.9
99.7
94.8
89.6
87.5
98.9
97.1
94.5
94.2
99.3
95.3
105.0
108.5
99.1
90.8
83.9
81.7
99.0
92.1
85.4
81.6
99.6
96.7
94.2
93.9
100.1
95.5
91.6
90.5
99.7
96.7
102.5
106.4
101.1
100.5
98.9
96.7
101.5
102.5
106.4
109.1
10't.4
102.1
109.8
113.5
105.1
109.3
105.6
105.5
105.6
110.2
111.7
112.1
106.8
110.8
117.2
119.2
100.9
102.2
106.5
107.3
103.7
108.4
102.9
101.6
100.9
101.6
122.7
126.8
101.5
101.8
99.8
98.8
101.4
102.0
110.2
111.7
100.5
99.5
98.0
98.4
103.4
106.3
105.2
105.4
101.2
100.5
116.8
121.6
100.0
95.8
92.4
91.4
100.0
96.8
96.5
97.0
100.0
99.3
100.2
101.3
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.3
100.0
99.8
100.2
100.4
100.0
98.3
99.0
100.2
100.0
98.9
97.2
96.5
100.0
100.1
99.7
99.7
100.0
97.8
97.7
100.2
100.0
99.0
97.3
96.4
100.0
97.6
94.3
92.7
100.0
98.7
98.1
97.8
100.0
95.9
92.3
90.9
100.0
98.4
98.8
100.7
100.0
89.7
69.8
68.2
100.0
94.6
76.8
78.4
100.0
95.0
78.2
80.0
100.0
100.9
78.0
77.8
100.0
92.1
68.3
68.9
100.0
90.5
78.0
80.8
100.0
s2.2
75.4
74.5
100.0
92.7
72.2
72.2
100.0
94.0
85.5
87.7
100.0
91.8
70.7
69.7
100.0
90.5
56.4
53.6
100.0
96.1
73.6
73.1
100.0
95.7
73.4
73.O
100.0
94.9
80.5
83.7
Variable year
stock dairy 2000
2004
2008
2010
stock suckler 2000
2004
2008
2010
q milk 2000
2004
2008
2010
q beef & veal 2000
2004
2008
2010
q feed 2000
2004
2008
2010
land 2000
2004
2008
2010
gross margin 2000
2004
2008
2010
3s3
Table 7.30. Simulation results scenario 520-60
100.0
99.5
113.0
125.1
100.0
90.6
78.1
67.2
100.6
101.2
124.9
138.0
99.5
94.4
99.7
104.0
103.0
102.6
120.6
129.5
100.0
98.8
99.3
101.2
100.0
93.5
86.0
93.2
FR IRL IT NL A PB FIN S UK EU-15DK GER GR SP
100.0
97.9
104.4
117.6
100.0
93.2
82.0
s9.8
100.0
100.0
115.3
132.6
99.5
92.7
91.8
93.0
101.1
98.8
'109.2
120.5
100.0
95.6
93.1
94.0
100.0
90.3
77.7
83.9
100.0
96.6
108.3
124.1
100.0
79.6
61.2
41.6
100.0
100.0
121.2
140.5
99.2
90.9
98.3
109.8
100.0
97.9
109.5
121.6
100.0
87.6
29.9
2.8
100.0
100.0
122.6
136.3
99.2
93.7
100.0
103.2
101.4
99.7
117.7
128.4
100.0
99.0
100.6
103.3
100.0
95.2
87.2
95.0
100.0
108.4
115.5
123.4
100.0
94.0
89.6
85.1
104.6
109.2
118.5
127.5
100.1
104.7
108.9
114.3
105.1
107.0
111.8
117.6
100.0
100.2
100.4
100.6
100.0
110.5
120.4
124.8
100.0
97.4
115.7
135.9
100.0
94.4
83.9
68.6
100.0
100.0
129.8
148.5
99.7
93.ô
99.9
105.2
106.8
109.4
125.3
132.8
100.0
98.1
99.7
102.8
100.0
90.6
88.1
98.9
100.0
100.8
109.7
118.4
100.0
85.0
68.9
57.1
101.4
't02.8
121.4
132.9
99.7
94.3
92.6
92.9
100.9
100.1
113.9
122.6
100.0
98.7
97.5
97.5
100.0
92.2
83.2
87.6
100.0
100.4
106.0
111.9
100.0
95.6
95.2
94.4
102.9
105.7
116.4
122.8
98.9
9ô.2
100.5
105.1
103.7
105.2
113.9
122.0
100.0
99.9
100.1
100.7
't00.0
93.4
79.3
82.4
100.0
100.3
115.3
118.0
100.0
3ô.0
11.7
11.7
100.0
100.0
131.7
137.9
99.3
95.3
107.0
110.3
100.9
98.7
131.9
136.8
100.0
97.8
99.1
101.4
100.0
94.4
92.8
96.8
100.0
98.7
102.7
108.6
100.0
70.3
36.7
7.8
100.0
100.0
109.6
1't6.4
99.1
90.6
89.1
85.8
100.0
99.1
106.8
112.0
100.0
86.8
68.7
s7.5
100.0
100.0
119.2
127.5
99.0
91.5
86.5
84.0
101.4
99.1
116.5
123.5
100.0
97.4
93.9
92.9
100.0
92.6
61.6
60.6
100.0
98.6
105.4
111.5
100.0
81.7
40.6
7.8
100.0
100.0
113.0
119.9
99.6
95.6
101.2
104.8
100.5
98.6
103.2
104.0
100.0
98.4
98.9
't00.2
100.0
96.0
84.5
89.5
100.0
96.6
103.5
109.4
100.0
94.5
85.8
78.5
100.0
100.0
115.0
123.7
100.1
94.6
96.8
99.0
103.4
104.2
115.4
12't.3
100.0
95.7
92.5
92.',|
100.0
9s.6
84.6
90.0
101
127
100.1
100.1
145.1
100.0
76.1
1
100.0
88.8
86.7
87.3
104.5
108.9
121.9
127.2
100.6
94.4
93.3
95.0
105.6
107.3
117.6
121.7
100.0
99.7
100.2
100.8
'l
153.
1
99.
96
08.
'l
1
1
101.5
99.9
118.3
136.6
101.5
99.1
105.7
111.0
101
97
129.
144.1
100
100
95.4
91
102.1
100.0
96.6
97.2
99.8
100.0
94.6
87.8
100.9
100.0
100.8
86.1
92.1
100.0
93.4
73.2
75.4
100.0
98.8
97.3
97.2
100.0
92.1
77.6
79.2
q beef & veal
gross margin
stock suckler
stock dairy
q milk
q feed
land
2000
2004
2008
20'to
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20't0
Variable
354
Table 7.31. Simulation results scenario S21
Country Country
NLB DK GER GR SP FR IRL IT A P FIN S UK EU.15
100.0
101.1
106.7
108.8
100.0
88.9
80.4
78.0
100.6
101.2
107.3
108.2
99.s
94.9
95.0
95.1
103.0
105.0
110.3
110.8
100.0
98.9
99.0
99.5
100.0
93.2
63.5
61.0
100.0
99.9
98.0
92.1
100.0
98.0
100.5
101.5
100.0
99.9
105.8
109.9
100.0
110.2
110.7
109.1
100.0
111.9
116.4
116.0
100.0
99.2
106.9
111.2
100.0
102.5
103.8
102.4
100.0
101.6
98.0
95.7
100.0
100.3
113.4
116.7
100.0
100.1
99.3
97.4
100.0
100.5
104.6
105.6
100.0
100.1
97.6
95.0
100.0
98.0
96.5
94.7
100.0
102.5
1't6.4
121.4
100.0
90.1
85.9
95.5
100.0
77.7
67.9
66.2
100.0
76.1
26.5
2.8
100.0
93.0
90.9
92.0
100.0
88.6
87.1
88.4
100.0
93.2
87.9
84.5
100.0
83.6
71.0
68.0
100.0
95.2
96.6
98.9
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
100.0
60.9
36.0
39.1
100.0
86.2
68.8
60.1
100.0
69.0
75.1
104.1
100.0
93.2
89.2
89.4
100.0
88.9
82.1
81.5
100.0
100.0
97.2
90.s
100.0
100.0
102.5
102.8
100.0
100.0
107.'l
109.6
104.6
109.2
104.3
102.6
104.5
108.9
108.8
107.9
100.0
100.0
108.9
110.9
101.4
102.8
103.9
101.9
102.9
105.7
't00.7
98.8
100.0
100.0
115.7
117.9
100.0
100.0
98.0
96.3
100.0
100.0
106.4
106.8
100.0
100.0
95.2
92.7
100.0
100.0
95.6
93.1
100.1
100.1
115.0
117.6
99.5
92.6
87.0
86.2
99.2
91.9
91.9
92.5
99.2
94.4
94.4
92.8
100.1
105.9
103.8
102.8
100.6
94.6
92.4
93.5
99.7
94.1
95.7
96.8
99.7
94.8
89.3
86.7
98.9
97.1
94.3
92.9
99.3
95.3
104.9
108.6
99.1
90.8
83.4
80.9
99.0
92.1
85.3
81.1
99.6
96.7
93.6
92.1
100.1
95.5
91.2
89.1
99.7
96.7
102.2
105.1
101.1
100.5
97.6
93.3
101.5
102.5
105.2
105.7
101.4
102.1
108.4
110.3
105.1
109.3
104.6
103.3
105.6
110.2
110.5
109.9
106.8
110.8
115.7
116.3
100.9
102.2
105.4
104.7
103.7
108.4
101.9
98.4
100.9
101.6
120.8
124.0
101.5
101.8
98.9
96.7
101.4
102.0
108.9
109.0
100.5
99.5
97.0
96.6
103.4
106.3
103.6
101.9
101.2
100.5
115.0
117.5
100.0
95.8
92.5
91.3
100.0
96.8
96.6
96.9
100.0
99.3
100.2
101.1
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.3
100.0
99.8
100.2
100.4
100.0
98.3
99.0
100.0
100.0
98.9
97.2
96.4
100.0
100.1
99.8
99.6
100.0
97.8
97.8
100.3
100.0
99.0
97.3
96.3
100.0
97.6
94.3
92.7
100.0
98.7
98.1
97.6
100.0
95.9
92.4
90.9
100.0
98.4
98.9
100.6
100.0
89.7
59.1
55.2
100.0
94.6
63.4
60.9
100.0
95.0
63.4
60.7
100.0
100.9
65.0
61.5
100.0
92.1
u.2
51.6
100.0
90.5
65.1
63.7
100.0
92.2
65.1
61.3
100.0
92.7
60.4
57.6
100.0
94.0
71.1
69.9
100.0
91.8
59.1
55.3
100.0
90.5
37.5
30.4
100.0
96.1
60.4
56.3
100.0
95.7
60.3
56.2
100.0
94.9
41.0
62.2
Variable year
stock dairy 2000
2004
2008
2010
stock suckler 2000
2004
2008
2010
q milk 2000
2004
2008
2010
q beef & veal 2000
2004
2008
2010
q feed 2000
2004
2008
20'10
land 2000
2004
2008
2010
gross margin 2000
2004
2008
2010
35s
Table 732. Simulation results scenario S21y
100.0
99.5
108.8
114.7
100.0
90.6
8',1.2
74.3
100.6
101.2
115.5
120.7
99.5
94.4
97.2
98.9
103.0
102.6
't12.7
't15.4
100.0
98.8
99.0
100.1
100.0
93.5
70.7
63.4
P FIN S UK EU.15FR IRL IT NL AGR SPB DK GER
100.0
97.9
98.4
s8.5
100.0
93.2
89.3
89.0
100.0
100.0
103.6
103.9
99.5
92.7
89.5
89.5
101.1
98.8
99.6
99.4
100.0
95.6
92.6
92.1
100.0
90.3
65.0
57.8
100.0
96.6
103.9
112.0
100.0
97.9
105.7
112.6
100.0
87.6
45.8
2.8
100.0
100.0
113.5
1't9.8
99.2
93.7
97.2
9ô.9
101.4
99.7
109.4
113.4
100.0
99.0
100.0
101.5
100.0
95.2
70.7
62.5
100.0
108.4
112.2
115.1
100.0
94.0
90.9
89.3
104.6
109.2
111.6
114.7
100.1
104.7
105.8
107.9
105.1
107.0
106.2
107.5
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.4
100.0
100.8
7't.8
64.4
100.0
110.5
118.1
120.O
100.0
88.8
86.9
87.9
104.5
108.9
116.0
117.9
100.6
94.4
92.8
94.'l
105.6
107.3
111.9
112.7
100.0
99.7
100.2
100.5
100.0
93.4
60.6
51.7
100.0
97.4
109.6
119.7
100.0
94.4
87.1
79.1
100.0
100.0
't17.8
125.2
99.7
93.6
97.2
99.8
106.8
109.4
1',t7.9
119.8
100.0
98.1
99.1
100.9
100.0
90.6
72.1
66.8
100.0
100.8
105.6
108.4
100.0
85.0
71.2
621.5
101.4
102.8
111.9
114.9
99.7
94.3
90.7
89.3
100.9
100.1
107.1
109.3
100.0
98.7
97.3
96.9
100.0
92.2
70.8
63.8
100.0
100.4
102.1
103.6
100.0
95.6
95.9
96.6
102.9
105.7
109.1
110.5
98.9
96.2
97.5
98.8
103.7
105.2
106.2
107.4
100.0
99.9
99.9
100.1
100.0
93.4
67.0
59.6
100.0
100.3
115.1
117.8
100.0
98.7
100.0
101.7
100.0
70.3
47.5
24.7
100.0
100.0
104.2
106.3
99.1
90.6
87.4
84.8
101.5
99.1
100.3
101.0
100.0
98.8
97.2
96.5
100.0
92.1
65.8
57.4
100.0
99.1
104.7
107.5
100.0
86.8
69.2
59.3
100.0
98.6
100.7
101.2
100.0
81.7
&1.6
55.9
100.0
100.0
103.1
103.0
99.6
9s.6
96.9
96.8
100.5
98.6
99.0
98.1
100.0
98.4
98.4
98.6
100.0
96.0
67.8
58.9
100.0
96.6
99.2
100.0
100.0
94.5
88.0
85.2
100.0
100.0
104.2
104.7
100.1
94.ô
93.4
92.6
103.4
104.2
106.6
106.3
100.0
95.7
92.3
91.2
100.0
95.6
67.7
58.9
100.0
101
't21
131
100.0
100.1
100.1
125.
99.7
1
1 10.
97
11
125.
98.3
101.
100.
73.1
100.0
79.6
65.1
54.7
100.0
100.0
112.0
121.'l
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
99.2
90.9
94.7
100.5
100.0
100.0
124.6
127.5
99.3
95.3
106.7
110.1
100.9
98.7
124.3
't25.9
100.0
97.8
98.9
101.3
100.0
94.4
78.6
70.7
100.0
100.0
't12.8
116.5
99.0
91.5
85.4
81.8
101.4
99.1
109.7
111.9
100.0
97.4
93.7
92.2
100.0
92.6
45.8
29.8
101
101.5
99.9
109.2
117.3
100.0
96.6
96.7
98.2
100.0
94.6
71.5
bb.o
q beef & veal
gross margln
stock suckler
stock dairy
q milk
q feed
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20'lo
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
Variable
356
Table 7.33. Simulation results scenario 521-80
100.0
99.9
96.2
88.3
100.0
98.0
99.3
99.6
100.0
99.9
104.8
108.3
100.0
110.2
109.8
108.0
100.0
111.9
115.9
115.5
100.0
99.2
105.3
108.6
100.0
102.5
102.8
101.0
100.0
101.6
97.2
94.8
100.0
100.3
111.0
115.9
100.0
100.1
98.6
96.3
100.0
100.5
104.2
105.1
100.0
100.1
96.6
93.8
100.0
98.0
95.6
93.7
100.0
102.5
115.1
119.7
100.0
90.1
88.5
102.2
100.0
77.7
69.3
68.7
100.0
76.1
32.2
2.8
100.0
93.0
91.4
92.7
100.0
88.6
87.2
88.5
100.0
93.2
88.9
86.5
100.0
83.6
71.8
69.4
100.0
9s.2
96.9
99.2
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
100.0
60.9
40.3
48.3
100.0
86.2
69.0
60.5
100.0
69.0
83.9
117.9
100.0
93.2
90.0
90.5
100.0
88.9
82.4
81.9
100.0
100.0
95.0
86.5
100.0
100.0
101.0
100.7
100.0
100.0
105.8
108.0
104.6
109.2
103.3
101.5
104.5
108.9
108.2
107.5
100.0
100.0
107.2
108.7
101.4
102.8
102.6
100.4
't02.9
105.7
99.8
98.0
100.0
100.0
112.8
't 16.8
100.0
100.0
97.3
95.4
100.0
100.0
105.7
106.0
100.0
100.0
94.0
91.6
100.0
100.0
94.2
91.8
100.1
100.1
1 13.
116.1
99.s
92.6
86.8
86.1
99.2
91.9
91.0
91.0
s9.2
94.4
94.1
92.7
100.1
105.9
103.2
102.0
100.6
94.6
92.3
93.4
99.7
94.1
95.2
96.2
99.7
94.8
89.0
86.4
98.9
97.1
93.6
92.2
99.3
95.3
102.6
107.7
99.1
90.8
83.3
81.3
99.0
92.1
85.1
80.9
99.6
96.7
92.9
91.5
100.1
95.5
90.6
88.5
99.
96.
101.,
104."
101.1
100.5
96.0
90.5
101.5
'102.5
103.6
103.4
101.4
102.1
107.2
108.9
105.1
109.3
103.9
102.4
105.6
110.2
109.8
109.3
106.8
110.8
114.8
115.3
100.9
102.2
104.3
103.3
103.7
108.4
100.5
97.1
100.9
101.6
117.3
122.6
101.5
101.8
98.1
95.8
101.4
102.O
108.0
108.2
100.5
99.5
96.6
96.5
103.4
106.3
102.4
100.9
101.2
100.t
113.t
116.(
100.0
95.8
92.3
90.9
100.0
96.8
96.4
96.5
100.0
99.3
100.0
100.8
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.3
100.0
99.8
100.2
100.3
100.0
98.3
98.9
99.6
100.0
98.9
97.1
96.3
100.0
100.1
99.7
99.5
100.0
97.8
97.5
99.6
100.0
99.0
97.3
96.2
100.0
97.6
94.2
92.5
100.0
98.7
97.9
97.3
100.0
95.9
92.3
90.7
100.(
98.2
98.{
100.:
100.0
89.7
62.6
58.1
100.0
94.6
67.6
41.8
100.0
95.0
68.4
6s.9
100.0
100.9
69.4
65.8
100.0
92.1
59.7
57.3
100.0
90.s
69.2
67.7
100.0
92.2
68.4
41.6
100.0
92.7
64.6
61.9
100.0
94.0
74.8
74.9
100.0
91.8
63.3
59.7
100.0
90.5
45.1
38.2
100.0
96.1
æ.4
60.3
100.0
95.7
el.3
60.2
100.(
94.(
69.7
68.1
Variable væt
stock dairy 2000
2004
2008
2010
stock suckler 2000
2004
2008
2010
q milk 2000
2004
2008
2010
q beef & veal 2000
2004
2008
2010
q feed 2000
2004
2008
2010
land 2000
2004
2008
2010
gross margin 2000
2004
2008
2010
357
Table 734. Simulation results scenario 521-60
100.0
101.1
108.3
111.4
100.0
88.9
79.0
76.2
100.6
101.2
109.6
111.2
99.5
94.9
95.8
96.4
103.0
105.0
112.4
113.6
100.0
98.9
99.1
99.9
100.0
93.2
57.1
53.4
100.0
99.9
99.6
94.9
100.0
90.1
83.3
89.8
100.0
100.0
98.8
92.9
99.5
92.6
87.0
85.8
101.1
100.5
98.7
94.6
100.0
95.8
92.6
91.6
100.0
98.0
101.5
102.7
100.0
77.7
66.4
64.4
100.0
100.0
103.4
103.4
99.2
91.9
92.7
93.3
101.5
102.5
106.3
106.5
100.0
96.8
96.8
97.2
100.0
94.6
57.0
52.9
100.0
99.2
108.7
114.7
100.0
93.2
86.6
81.9
100.0
102.5
104.7
103.2
100.0
83.6
70.2
67.0
101.4
't02.8
104.7
102.0
99.7
94.8
89.6
86.8
100.9
102.2
106.1
104.9
100.0
98.9
97.3
96.5
100.0
92.2
60.1
55.1
100.0
101.6
98.7
96.0
100.0
95.2
96.4
98.6
102.9
105.7
101.1
98.4
98.9
97.1
94.8
93.0
103.7
108.4
102.8
98.5
100.0
100.1
99.8
99.6
100.0
92.7
il.3
50.2
100.0
100.3
114.3
117.2
100.0
36.0
11.7
1'.|.7
100.0
100.0
116.5
117.6
99.3
95.3
105.8
109.2
100.9
101.6
122.0
123.7
100.0
97.8
98.2
100.7
100.0
94.0
64.2
61.0
100.0
100.1
99.9
98.1
100.0
60.9
31.4
31.6
100.0
100.0
98.3
96.3
99.1
90.8
83.4
80.2
101.5
101.8
99.3
96.8
100.0
99.0
97.4
96.4
100.0
91.8
53.1
47.9
100.0
100.5
105.0
105.8
100.0
86.2
68.5
59.9
100.0
100.0
106.7
106.5
99.0
92.1
85.4
81.2
101.4
102.0
109.3
108.8
100.0
97.6
94.4
92.8
100.0
100.1
98.4
95.5
100.0
69.0
6ô.1
94.3
100.0
100.0
95.6
92.3
99.6
96.7
94.2
92.1
100.5
99.5
97.'l
96.1
100.0
98.7
98.3
97.7
100.0
96.1
54.1
48.4
100.0
98.0
97.2
95.0
100.0
93.2
88.4
88.7
100.0
100.0
96.2
92.7
100.1
95.5
91.6
89.1
103.4
106.3
104.2
101.5
100.0
95.9
92.5
91.0
100.0
95.7
il.1
48.4
02.5100.099.9
107.3
112.4
100.0
110.2
111.4
109.7
100.0
111.9
116.8
116.1
1
,|
1
100.0
76.1
18.5
2.8
100.0
100.0
109.7
113.4
99.2
94.4
95.2
95.0
101.4
102.1
110.9
114.2
100.0
99.3
100.5
101.7
100.0
95.0
56.7
52.7
100.0
93.0
90.5
91.4
104.6
109.2
104.8
102.6
100.1
105.9
104.2
103.0
105.1
109.3
105.0
103.2
100.0
100.2
100.4
100.3
100.0
100.9
58.6
53.6
100.0
88.6
87.1
88.4
104.5
108.9
108.9
107.5
100.6
94.6
92.5
93.4
105.6
110.2
110.7
109.5
100.0
100.0
111.3
114.5
99.7
94.1
96.2
97.7
106.8
110.8
117.0
118.1
100.0
98.3
99.3
100.5
100.0
90.5
59.4
56.8
130.1
100.
79.
100.1
100.1
122.4
129.1
101.2
88
81
99.
96.
04.
10.1
,|
1
128.
98.4
100.0
99.8
100.2
100.4
100.0
89.7
53.9
49.1
100.0
92.1
46.5
42.6
100.0
90.5
27.1
18.0
101
94.
57
54
1
ANL
CountryCountry P FIN S UK EU-15SP FR IRL ITB DK GER GRVariable
q beef & veal
gross margin
stock dairy
stock sr.rckler
q feed
q milk
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20't0
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20'to
2000
2004
2008
2010
358
Table 7.35. Simulation results scenario S22
100.0
101.1
108.5
111.6
100.0
88.9
78.7
75.5
100.6
101.2
109.9
1't1.5
99.s
91.9
95.9
96.4
103.0
105.0
112.6
113.5
100.0
98.9
99.2
99.9
100.0
93.2
68.9
66.4
FINP S UK EU-15FR IRL IT NL ADK GER GR SP
100.0
99.9
100.7
98.6
100.0
90.1
82.0
84.2
100.0
100.0
101.0
98.1
99.5
92.6
87.5
86.5
101.1
100.5
100.6
98.7
100.0
98.0
102.4
105.1
100.0
77.7
65.7
61.8
100.0
100.0
105.2
107.0
99.2
91.9
93.4
95.1
101.5
102.5
108.1
110.3
100.0
94.6
69.3
67.1
100.0
99.9
107.3
112.1
100.0
76.1
17.7
2.8
100.0
100.0
109.5
112.4
., 99.2
94.4
95.2
94.8
100.0
99.3
100.5
101.7
100.0
110.2
1',t2.0
111.4
100.0
93.0
90.2
90.6
100.1
105.9
104.8
104.3
100.0
1 11.9
117.3
117.0
100.0
88.6
87.0
88.2
100.0
99.2
109.4
116.0
100.0
93.2
86.2
80.9
100.0
100.0
112.2
115.7
106.8
110.8
117.6
118.7
100.0
98.3
99.3
100.6
100.0
90.s
70.7
69.5
100.0
100.3
114.5
117.3
100.0
100.0
118.1
119.8
99.3
95.3
't06.0
109.4
100.9
101.6
124.0
126.1
100.0
97.8
98.4
100.8
100.0
94.0
76.8
74.9
100.0
100.1
100.4
99.4
100.0
60.9
29.5
23.3
100.0
100.0
99.4
98.2
99.1
90.8
83.7
80.4
101.5
101.8
100.5
98.8
100.0
99.0
97.4
96.5
100.0
91.8
63.4
59.0
100.0
100.5
105.4
106.8
100.0
86.2
68.4
59.6
100.0
97.6
94.4
92.9
100.0
90.5
43.7
35.9
100.0
100.1
99.4
97.5
100.0
69.0
61.6
78.8
100.0
100.0
97.6
95.5
99.6
96.7
95.0
93.7
100.0
98.7
98.4
98.1
100.0
96.1
66.0
61.s
11
124.
100.0
1
1
100.1
100.1
118
121
96.
,|
107
101.2
100.0
102.5
105.5
105.1
100.0
101.6
99.5
97.6
100.0
98.0
98.1
96.9
100.0
83.6
69.8
65.6
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
101.4
102.8
106.5
105.4
99.7
94.8
89.9
87.5
100.9
102.2
107.5
107.5
100.0
98.9
97.3
96.6
100.0
92.2
69.4
65.4
100.0
95.2
96.2
98.2
102.9
105.7
102.5
100.7
98.9
97.1
95.4
94.3
103.7
108.4
104.3
101.5
100.0
100.1
99.9
99.7
100.0
92.7
64.8
61.5
100.0
93.2
87.9
87.4
100.0
100.0
98.4
96.3
100.1
95.5
92.3
90.4
103.4
106.3
106.0
104.6
117
121
81
80.
104.6
109.2
106.1
105.0
104.5
108.9
110.1
109.3
100.0
100.0
108.0
108.6
100.6
94.6
92.6
93.6
99.7
94.1
96.s
98.1
99.0
92.1
85.6
81.6
99.
101.4
102.1
110.7
113.3
105.1
109.3
106.2
105.2
105.6
110.2
1 11.9
111.3
101.4
102.0
110.7
111.1
100.5
99.5
98.0
97.3
1
100.0
95.8
92.8
91.9
100.0
96.8
96.8
97.5
100.0
100.2
100.4
100.4
100.0
99.8
100.2
100.s
100.0
92.1
59.0
55.9
100.0
95.9
92.5
91.2
99.1
101
100.0
70.
100.0
89.7
63.7
59.8
100.0
95.0
69.3
66.5
100.0
100.9
70.2
66.5
100.0
95.7
65.9
61.4
Variable
q beef & veal
stock dairy
stock suckler
gross margin
q milk
q feed
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
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Table 736. Simulation results scenario S22y
100.0
99.5
110.1
117.4
100.0
90.6
80.0
72.2
100.6
101.2
117.9
124.3
99.5
94.4
97.9
99.9
103.0
102.6
114.7
118.3
100.0
98.8
99.1
100.4
100.0
93.5
76.4
70.3
GR SP FR IRL IT P FIN S UK EU-15ANL
Country
B DK GER
100.0
97.9
100.5
104.0
100.0
93.2
86.5
79.9
100.0
9ô.6
105.3
115.2
100.0
79.6
63.6
51.0
100.0
100.0
114.5
125.5
99.2
90.9
95.9
102.9
101.5
99.9
111.7
121.8
100.0
96.6
96.9
98.7
100.0
94.6
77.6
74.6
100.0
97.9
106.9
115.1
100.0
108.4
113.3
117.2
100.0
94.0
90.4
88.1
104.6
109.2
113.3
117.4
100.1
104.7
106.7
109.4
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.5
100.0
100.8
77.2
70.9
100.0
110.5
118.8
121.1
100.0
88.8
86.9
87.7
104.5
108.9
117.4
119.6
100.6
94.4
93.0
94.3
105.6
107.3
113.3
't14.4
100.0
99.7
100.2
100.6
100.0
93.4
65.8
57.4
100.0
97.4
111.6
124.O
100.0
94.4
85.9
76.'l
100.0
100.0
120.9
130.2
99.7
93.6
98.0
101.1
106.8
109.4
119.7
122.4
100.0
98.1
99.3
101.5
100.0
100.8
106.9
110.9
100.0
100.4
103.3
105.5
100.0
95.6
95.6
96.0
102.9
105.7
110.9
'l'12.9
98.9
96.2
98.4
100.3
103.7
105.2
108.3
110.5
100.0
100.3
115.3
117.9
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
100.0
100.0
't26.2
129.4
99.3
95.3
106.9
110.2
100.9
98.7
126.0
127.8
100.0
97.8
99.0
101.3
100.0
94.4
u.'l
76.9
100.0
98.7
100.9
103.5
100.0
70.3
43.1
12.0
100.0
99.1
105.3
108.6
100.0
86.8
69.0
58.8
'100.0
100.0
114.3
118.6
99.0
91.5
85.8
82.3
101.4
99.1
111.4
1'14.2
100.0
97.4
93.8
92.5
100.0
92.6
52.6
37.3
100.0
98.6
102.1
103.6
100.0
81.7
55.2
34.3
100.0
100.0
105.5
106.3
99.6
95.6
98.1
98.5
100.5
98.6
100.0
99.0
100.0
98.4
98.6
99.0
100.0
96.0
73.7
65.7
100.0
96.6
100.5
102.2
100.0
94.5
87.1
83.4
100.0
100.0
106.9
108.5
100.1
94.6
94.4
94.0
103.4
104.2
108.8
109.3
100.0
95.7
92.4
91.5
100.0
95.6
73.7
65.7
01
23
1
1
1
1
100.0
85.0
70.3
62.4
'101.4
102.8
114.4
118.7
99.7
94.3
91.2
90.1
100.9
100.1
108.9
112.2
100.0
98.7
97.4
97.0
100.0
92.2
75.3
69.2
1100.0
87.6
39.7
2.8 78.2
100.0
100.0
106.9
't11.2
100.0
100.0
115.8
123.5
99.2
93.7
97.9
97.7
101.4
99.7
111.5
116.6
100.0
99.0
100.2
102.0
100.0
95.2
76.9
69.9
100.0
100.0
105.5
108.4
100.1
100.1
138.1
99.
I
11
99.5
92.7
90.0
90.1
100.0
95.6
92.8
92.6
100.0
90.3
69.7
63.6
99.1
90.6
87.8
84.6
101.1
98.8
102.2
104.5
105.1
107.0
107.6
109.6
101.5
99.1
't01.7
103.1
01
97
1
1
1
100.0
99.9
100.0
100.3
100.0
93.4
71.8
&+.9
100.0
98.8
97.2
96.7
100.0
92.1
70.4
62.5
22.0
1
99.1
102.',|
1
80.1
74.
100.0
90.6
78.0
74.O
Variable
q beef & veal
gross margin
stock dairy
stock suckler
q milk
q feed
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20'to
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
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Table 7.37. Simulation results scenario S23
100.0
99.9
93.9
83.3
100.0
98.0
97.8
97.0
100.0
99.9
103.5
106.3
100.0
110.2
108.7
106.4
100.0
111.9
115.3
114.9
100.0
99.2
103.2
105.3
100.0
102.5
101.5
99.2
100.0
101.6
96.0
93.7
100.0
100.3
107.8
112.0
100.0
100.1
97.8
94.9
100.0
100.5
103.6
104.4
100.0
100.1
95.2
92.2
100.0
98.0
94.3
92.4
100.0
102.5
113.3
117.6
100.0
90.1
91.9
111.1
100.0
77.7
71.2
72.0
100.0
76.1
39.8
9.0
100.0
93.0
92.0
93.7
100.0
88.6
87.3
88.6
100.0
93.2
90.3
89.2
100.0
83.6
72.8
71.2
100.0
95.2
97.3
99.7
100.0
36.0
11.7
11.7
100.0
60.9
46.0
60.s
100.0
86.2
69.2
60.9
100.0
69.0
95.7
136.4
100.0
93.2
91.0
92.0
100.0
88.9
82.9
82.4
100.0
100.0
92.2
81.2
100.0
100.0
99.0
98.0
100.0
100.0
104.2
106.1
104.6
109.2
102.1
100.2
104.5
108.9
107.4
106.9
100.0
100.0
105.0
105.9
101.4
102.8
100.9
98.5
102.9
105.7
98.7
97.1
100.0
100.0
109.0
112.7
100.0
100.0
96.4
94.4
100.0
100.0
'1o4.7
105.1
100.0
100.0
92.5
90.3
100.0
100.0
92.4
90.3
100.1
100.1
111.7
't14.i
99.5
92.6
86.5
86.1
99.2
91.9
89.9
89.2
99.2
94.4
93.5
92.5
100.1
105.9
102.4
101.1
100.6
94.6
92.2
93.3
99.7
94.1
94.6
95.5
99.7
94.8
88.6
86.0
98.9
97.1
92.8
91.4
99.3
95.3
99.5
103.8
99.1
90.8
83.2
81.9
99.0
92.1
84.8
80.6
99.6
96.7
91.8
90.7
100.1
95.5
89.7
87.8
99.i
96.i
100.5
103.C
101.1
100.5
93.9
87.0
101.5
102.5
101.5
100.4
101.4
't02.1
105.7
107.1
105.1
109.3
102.9
101.4
105.6
110.2
109.0
108.7
106.8
110.8
113.6
114.1
100.9
102.2
102.9
101.7
103.7
108.4
98.8
95.4
100.9
101.6
112.7
117.4
101.5
101.8
97.1
94.6
101.4
102.O
106.9
107.2
100.5
99.5
96.0
96.4
103.4
106.3
100.9
99.6
101.2
100.5
111.ê
114.2
100.0
95.8
92.1
90.4
100.0
96.8
96.2
96.1
100.0
99.3
99.8
100.4
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.2
100.0
99.8
100.1
100.3
100.0
98.3
98.6
99.2
100.0
98.9
97.0
96.2
100.0
100.1
99.6
99.4
100.0
97.8
97.0
98.3
100.0
99.0
97.2
96.0
100.0
97.6
94.1
92.3
100.0
98.7
97.7
96.9
100.0
95.9
92.1
90.4
100.0
98.4
98.6
99.8
100.0
89.7
55.1
51.9
100.0
94.6
58.0
56.1
100.0
95.0
58.1
56.9
100.0
100.9
60.3
58.0
100.0
92.1
50.1
49.1
100.0
90.5
60.1
59.4
100.0
92.2
61.2
58.4
100.0
92.7
56.s
55.2
100.0
94.0
63.7
64.5
100.0
91.8
55.4
53.3
100.0
90.5
32.2
27.2
100.0
96.1
55.3
52.7
100.0
95.7
55.2
52.7
100.0
94.9
58.2
57.9
Variable yeal
stock dairy 2000
2004
2008
2010
stock suckler 2000
2004
2008
2010
q milk 2000
2004
2008
2010
q beef & veal 2000
2004
2008
2010
q feed 2000
2004
2008
2010
land 2000
2004
2008
2010
gross margin 2000
2004
2008
2010
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Table 7.38. Simulation results scenario S23y
100.0
99.5
106.2
110.8
100.0
90.6
83.9
78.5
100.6
10't.2
't12.2
116.9
99.5
94.4
96.1
97.8
103.0
102.6
110.0
112.6
100.0
98.8
98.7
99.5
100.0
93.5
65.0
60.0
Country
B S UK EU-15P FINSP FR IRL ITDK GER GR NLA
100.0
97.9
94.1
88.9
100.0
93.2
95.6
105.9
100.0
100.0
98.0
93.0
99.5
92.7
88.9
89.3
100.0
95.6
92.1
91.1
100.0
90.3
60.2
*.4
100.0
96.6
101.0
107.0
100.0
79.6
68.6
61.0
100.0
100.0
108.1
115.5
99.2
90.9
92.5
96.9
100.0
96.6
96.3
97.3
100.0
94.6
65.1
61.7
100.0
97.9
103.3
108.7
100.0
87.6
59.7
12.4
99.2
93.7
96.2
96.5
101.4
99.7
106.6
110.1
100.0
99.0
99.6
100.7
100.0
95.2
64.6
59.0
100.0
108.4
110.2
112.2
100.0
94.0
92.0
91.2
104.6
't09.2
109.2
't12.0
100.1
104.7
104.3
106.0
105.1
107.0
104.3
105.5
100.0
100.2
100.3
100.3
100.0
100.8
66.3
61.1
100.0
110.5
116.9
118.8
100.0
97.4
105.7
113.3
100.0
94.4
8S.7
84.2
100.0
100.0
113.4
119.5
99.7
93.6
96.1
98.4
106.8
109.4
115.6
117.5
100.0
98.1
98.7
100.0
100.0
90.6
66.2
62.5
100.0
100.8
103.1
104.9
100.0
85.0
73.0
67.9
101.4
102.8
108.5
111.0
99.7
94.3
89.9
88.5
100.9
100.1
104.4
106.2
100.0
100.4
100.0
'101.4
100.0
95.6
96.6
97.5
102.9
105.7
106.9
108.8
98.9
96.2
95.9
97.2
103.7
105.2
103.0
104.2
100.0
99.9
99.8
99.9
100.0
93.4
62.5
57.3
100.0
100.3
114.7
117.5
100.0
98.7
98.4
99.0
100.0
70.3
58.1
47.7
100.0
100.0
102.4
104.2
99.1
90.6
87.1
85.8
101.5
99.1
98.3
98.8
100.0
98.8
97.0
96.2
100.0
92.1
61.5
55.ô
100.0
99.1
103.6
106.1
100.0
8ô.8
69.7
60.1
100.0
100.0
110.8
't14.7
99.0
91.5
84.9
81.3
101.4
99.1
107.6
110.0
100.0
97.4
93.5
91.9
100.0
92.6
39.7
26.9
100.0
98.6
98.1
98.1
100.0
81.7
86.1
90.7
100.0
100.0
100.1
100.4
99.6
95.6
95.0
95.2
100.5
98.6
97.9
97.9
100.0
98.4
97.9
97.9
100.0
96.0
61.9
55.5
100.0
96.6
96.8
97.5
100.0
94.5
89.9
88.0
100.0
100.0
100.6
101.ô
100.1
94.6
91.8
I't.2
103.4
104.2
103.8
103.9
100.0
95.7
92.1
90.8
100.0
95.6
6'1.7
55.5
1
101
't17
127
1
100.1
100.1
99.7
96.0
1
100.0
100.0
110.3
116.0
104.5
108.9
114.5
116.8
100.0
88.8
87.1
88.0
100.6
94.4
92.6
94.0
100.0
99.7
100.1
100.4
100.0
93.4
55.9
49.4
100.0
36.0
11.7
1't.7
81
79
121
100.0
100.0
122.8
126.5
99.3
95.3
't06.2
109.6
100.9
98.7
't22.4
124.8
100.0
97.8
98.6
101.0
100.0
94.4
73.3
68.1
101
97
115.8
122.1
1
101.1
98.8
95.7
92.5
101.5
99.9
105.3
111.6
105.6
107.3
110.4
111.6
100.0
98.7
97.1
96.6
1
100
1
61
100.0
92.2
66.2
60.9
Variable
q beef & veal
gross margin
stock suckler
stock dairy
q feed
q milk
land
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
2010
2000
2004
2008
20'to
2000
200/.
2008
2010
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8. A SPATIAL EQTNLIBRIUM MODEL OF TIIE EU's DAIRY II\IDUSTRY
Agenda 2000 and beyond: Impact of alternative reforms of the Common Market Organisation
for milk and dairy products
Zbon Bouamra-Mechemache and Vincent Réquillart
Partner 7: INRA-ESR, Toulouse
8.1. Introduction
The objective of this part of the project (i.e., subtask2.2) was to develop a tool for simulating policy
reforms in the dairy indusûy, with an emphasis on the milk-processing sector, of the European Union.
Over the last few decades, agricultural policy has had a major impact in the European Union (EU). hr
particular, the EU dairy sector has been greatly influenced by EU policy. With a general objective of
increasing farm income, EU dairy policy is rather complex and involves the use of many policy
instruments. It includes a price support program (implemented through government purchases) for
butter and skim milk powder, import taxes and export subsidies that have been in place since the
1960's. It also includes production quotas since 1984, as well as a lowering of tade barriers following
the Uruguay Round hade negotiations in the 1990's. More recently, the Berlin accord set the stage for
some reform of the EU dairy policy. Current and future World Trade Organisation (WTO)
negotiations suggest further reforms contributing to a greater integration of the EU dairy sector in the
world dairy markets.
Since Oskam (1989), there has been few studies focusing on the impact of recent changes in the EU
dairy policy (e.g., Benjamin, Gohin and Guyomard, 1999; Bouamra-Mechemache and Réquillart,
1999, 2000). These studies have investigated the economic and welfare effects of various EU dairy
policy reforms. However, conducting such analyses raises significant challenges. First, the dairy sector
is a multi-product indusbry, where farm milk is used to produce a variety of differentiated products
(e.g., fluid milk, cheese, butter, etc.). With each product being different in terms of storability and
market characteristics, this indicates a need for a disaggregated analysis of the dairy sector that would
caphue the role of its differentiated markets. This is reinforced by the fact that many dairy policy
instruments are specific to a particular market (e.g., price support programs for butter and skim milk
powder). Second, the allocation of milk to the production of dairy products requires a good
understanding of the dairy processing technology (see Chavas, Cox and Jesse, 1998). Of special
interest are its implications for the determination of milk and dairy market prices. Third, there are
significant differences in production and consumption across states in the EU dairy industry. This
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suggests a need to develop an analysis of EU policy reforms that reflects the regional heterogeneity
within the EU dairy sector. For example, this would provide useful information on the spatial
distribution of welfare effects across regions'
Given these complex issues, previous researches usually rely on simplifuing assumptions' often' the
regional differences in production and consumption within the EU are ignored and analysis is carried
out at a coarse level of commodity aggregation that does not match well some of the EU domestic and
trade policy instruments actually in force. As well, these previous analyses are generally limited to a
subset of policy instruments (e.g., production quota and export subsidies). This suggests a need for a
more refined analysis of dairy policy reforms in at least three directions: 1/ capturing the regional
heterogeneity of the EU dairy sector; 2/ improving our understanding of the interactions between the
various differentiated dairy markets and EU domestic and hade policy instruments; and 3l trying to
anticipate how future changes in dairy policy could affect the EU dairy sector'
This part of the project develops a spatial equilibrium model of the EU dairy industry for analysing
and assessing the economic and welfare effects of EU dairy policy reforms' The proposed model is
based on a spatial market equilibrium framework in the context of a vertical multi-market sector. The
modelling of the processing technology relies on allocation of milk components (milk fat and protein)
among dairy commodities under a Leontief technology. This provides a framework to investigate
commodity prices as well as the shadow prices of the implicit milk components. After incorporating
relevant policy instruments, the model solves for milk and dairy commodity prices, productions,
consumptions and trade among regions. The model is then used to investigate the economic and
welfare impacts of several EU policy scenarios, including the Berlin accord and alternative trade
liberalisation schemes. The results provide useful information on the effects of EU policy reform on
the efficiency and distribution of welfare across European countries.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed spatial model of the EU dairy
industry. Section 3 reports and discusses simulation results. Section 4 concludes and draws some
policy recommendations.
8.2. The spatial model of the EU dairy industry
The proposed model is a spatial model of resource allocation in the European Union dairy sector' This
section reports the main characteristics of this model. It is described in further details in appendix 1.
The dairy sector is modelled as a vertical structure that includes the supply of milk, the processing of
milk into final products and the demand for dairy products. The model considers two agricultural
products, and ten final products (butter, skim milk powder (SMP), whole milk powder' condensed
milk, fluid milk, fresh products, casein, hard and semi-hard cheese, processed cheese, other cheese)'
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The EU is divided into nine regions to account for the differences in relative competitiveness of the
different EU regions and to better analyse the effects of policy changes on regions' relative
competitive positions. The model also considers a "rest of the world" in order to depict tade in dairy
products between EU regions and third countries and to better analyse the effects of changes in hade
policy instruments (such as export refunds and import tariffs for example).
The main instruments of the Common Market Organisation (CMO) for milk and dairy products are
explicitly modelled. This includes milk production quotas, intervention prices (SMP, butter), ceiling
quantities for public intervention, consumption subsidies (SMP, butter), production subsidies (casein),
export refunds, import tariffs and tariff-rate quotas. The model also takes into account the Uruguay
Round commitments in terms of subsidised exports and in terms of market access (current access,
minimum access).
For a given policy scenario, the model determines the price and the production of milk and dairy
products in the different considered EU regions and at the EU aggregate level. It also solves for the
domestic consumption (subsidised and unsubsidised) as well as EU stocks, exports and imports of
each dairy product. Finally, the model provides the impacts of policy scenarios on EU farmers'
income, on EU taxpayer costs (exports, consumption subsidies, direct transfers) and on EU welfare.
Given its structure, the model allows for analysing a great variety of EU dairy policy reforms,
including milk quota removal, change in export subsidies as well as in domestic consumption
subsidies, changes in the subsidised exports commitments, changes in the minimum and/or current
access commitments, etc.
The model is static. It allows for comparisons of the effects of policy scenarios ceteris paribrzs. All the
results are presented in terms of changes relative to a reference scenario (index base 100 for the
reference scenario). It is assumed that adjustments are completed instantaneously. Elasticities used
reflect rather long-term than short term adjustment.
As the model is designed to analyse the impacts of policy scenarios that are sustainable in the long
term, we generally assume no public purchase. A policy resulting in public intervention purchases
would not be sustainable in the long term since it would lead to accumulation of public stocls. In such
a case, further adjustments would be required (such as decreases in intervention prices for example).
Tables 8.1 to 8.3 summarise the model's exogenous and endogenous variables as well as parameters.
Policy instruments that are explicitly represented in the model are reported as well. Values assigned to
demand and supply elasticities and adopted assumptions regarding the initial levels of the unit quota
rents are summarised in appendix 2.
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Table 8.1. Variables and parameters relating to raw milk
* Exogenous when milk quotas are in Endogenous when the quotas are
Table 8.2. Variables and parameters relating to final dairy products
Policy Instruments
set by the modeller
CommentsStatus of the
variable
Raw Milk (9 EU regions)
YES
YES
Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis
Decoupled or coupled
Parameter
Exogenous
Exogenous
Exogenous
Exogenous
Endogenous
Exogenous;
Endogenous*
Endogenous
Supply function
SuPPIY elasticitY
hritial quota rents
Composition of milk
Quotas
Direct payments
Farm price
Milkproduction
Price of milk components
Policy Instruments
set by the modeller
CommentsStatus of the
variable
Final Products (9 EU regions)
YES
YES
YES
YES
10 products;
Sensitivity analysis
Butter, SMP;
Sensitivity analysis
10 products;
no difference across regions
(except for fluid milk)
10 products;
calibrated
-. Butter, SMP
Butter, SMP
Butter, SMP
Casein
Butter, SMP
10 products
10 products
10 products
Parameters
Parameters
Parameters
Exogenous
Exogenous;
Exogenous
Exogenous;
endogenous*
Exogenous;
endogenous*
Endogenous
Endogenous
Endogenous
Endogenous
Unsubsidised demand functions
Demand elasticities
Subsidised demand functions
Demand elasticities
Technical processing coeffi cients
Intervention prices
Ceilings on public intervention
purchase
Consumption subsidies
Production subsidies
Commodity prices
Commodity production
Commodity consumption (subsidised
antl ursubsidised)
Public intervention purchase
Processing costs
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Intra Trade (10 products, 9
regions)
Transportation costs
Trade Flows
Exogenous
Endogenous
Table 8.2. cont.
* consumption and subsidies can be endogenously adjusted. In case, we assume that
subsidised price of the good remains stable. For example, a one Euro decrease (increase) in the price ofbutter
induces a one Euro decrease (increase) in the subsidy
Table 8.3. Variables and parameters relating to external trade
Export subsidies can be endogenously adjusted. In that case, we assume that the subsidised price ofthe good
remains stable. For example, a one Euro decrease (increase) in the price ofbutter induces a one Euro decrease(increase) in its export subsidy. They can also be adjusted in order to be consistent with a decrease in the
intervention prices.
8.3. Policy simulations
8.3.1. Detinition of simulated scenartos
8.3.L|. The reference scenarto
The reference scenario represents a hypothetic al year2000 situation defined as follows. The model is
calibrated on 1995 data. Then supply and demand conditions are shifted:
EU-ROW Trade (10 products) Status of the
variable
Comments Policy Instruments
set by the modeller
Transportation costs
ROW supply function
Supply elasticity
ROW demand functions
Demand elasticities
UR subsidised export ceilings
(quantities and expenditures)
UR import access commitments
Export subsidies
Import tariffs
World prices
EU Exports
EU Imports
Exogenous
Parameter
Parameters
Exogenous
Exogenous
Exogenous;
endogenous'
Exogenous
Endogenous
Endogenous
Endogenous
4 categories ofproducts: Butter,
SMP, cheese, others
Butter, SMP, cheese
YES
YES
YES
YES
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- Milk supply: level of quotas defined for 2000; quota rents for 2000 estimated from quota market data
and simulation works from the literature'
- EU demands: shifted from 1995 to 2000 according to annual trends in consumption (from European
Commission work, CAP reports, etc.).
- No public intervention.
- World markets: average situation 1996-99'
- Uruguay Round commitments: subsidised exports and minimum and current access for imports'
- 
production/consumption subsidies: values for the year 2000.
- Export subsidies: equal to the differences between EU and world prices (theoretical consistency)'
8.3.1.2. Policy reform scenarios
Seven policy scenarios are defined. In order to simpliff the presentation of these scenarios' an
abbreviation is associated to each policy instrument. Then, a number, 
u0", ulu o1"2" is associated to
each abbreviation according to whether the corresponding policy instrument is, respectively,
',unchanged,,, ,'changed" or "removed". Scenarios thus rely on the following alternatives for the
various considered policy instruments:
- Milk quotas (e): Berlin agreement i.s., +2.4oÂ increase in average but country specific, with respect
to the reference scenario (Ql); Removed (Q2); decreased by '2.4% in each EU region (Q-1)'
- Direct payment, as defined in the Berlin agreement (DP): they are considered as fully decoupled; no
directpayment (DPo), direct payment as decided in Berlin (DPl).
- Intervention prices: no stocks.
- Domestic subsidies @): adjusted in order to maintain the subsidised price constant (Dl) with respect
to the reference scenario; removed (D2).
- Export commitments (JR): unchanged (URO) with respect to Uruguay Round commitments; further
36% and2loÂ aûsin, respectively, the value and the volume of subsidised exports, with respect to the
reference scenario.
- Export subsidies (E): unchanged (E0); adjusted on the basis of a -l5oÂ decrease in intervention
prices with respect to the reference scenario (El); cut by 50% (Elbis); removed (E2)'
- lmport access (t): unchanged (I0); doubled with respect to thc rcfcrcncc scenorio (I1).
- Import tariffs (IT): unchanged (IT0), further -360Â cutwith respect to the reference scenario (IT1).
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Then, the seven policy scenarios are defined as follows
- 51: I'Berlin" scenario includes an increase in milk quotas (Q1), a direct payment to producers
(DPl), a decrease in the export subsidies (Et) as well as in the domestic subsidies (Dl) corresponding
to a 
-lSYo decrease in intervention prices. UR export and import commitments remain unchanged
(IT0, URO and I0) relative to the reference run.
- 52: "Berlin WTO" scenario is defined as the "Berlin" scenario except that further restrictions on
subsidised exports commitments (uRl) and further increase in import access commitments (Il) are
assumed.
- 53: "Quota off' scenario is defined as the "Berlin" scenario except that we assume that milk quotas
are removed (Q2).
- 54: "Quota off WTO" scenario is defined as the "Berlin WTO" scenario except that we assume
that milk quotas are removed (Q2).
- 55: "Quota off Liberalisationff scenario assume quota removal (Q2), removal of export and
domestic subsidies (E2 and D2), doubled import access (Il) unchanged import tariffs (IT0), direct
payment to producers at the level decided in the Berlin agreement (Dpl).
- 56: 
'f Cut Subsidies" scenario involves domestic and export subsidy removal (D2 and E2) and a
direct payment to producers at the level decided in the Berlin agreement (DPl). While no change in
quota levels (Q0) neither in uR import commitments (I0 and IT0) are assumed.
- 57: 'fCut Subsidies and Decreased Quotas" scenârio is defined as the "Cut Subsidies" scenario
except that milk quotas are decreasedby -2.4% (Q-l) and there is no direct payment to producers
(DPO).
As previously explained, we assume that public intervention is not allowed. In other words, we let
SMP and butter prices be adjusted as required by market equilibrium conditions without any public
purchases.
8.3.2. Simulation results
Tables 8.5 to 8.8 summarise the simulation results relating to the EU milk and dairy markets, obtained
for the reference run and the 7 above described policy scenarios. Table 8.4, which reports for each
dairy product the shares of subsidised uses as well as the levels of the corresponding consumption or
export subsidies observed at the EU aggregate level observed in 1998, helps for understanding the
simulation results.
Indeed, Table 8.4 shows that a substantial share of the EU use of butter, SMP and WMP strongly
depends on subsidies. First, 2/3 of the EU WMP production is exported with large export refunds
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(45% of the EU price). Second, around 40% of the EU SMP production is used for subsidised
consumption (animal feeding) while 15% is exported. Corresponding subsidies represent between 35
to 40%of the EU price. Third, as for milk powders, butter use in the EU heavily depends on subsidies.
On the contary, only 6%o of the EU cheese production (excluding processed cheese) is exported, the
remaining being used for unsubsidised domestic consumption. Moreover, the corresponding value of
export subsidies is relatively small (31% in average). In the same way, liquid milk (and fresh products)
is mainly used for unsubsidised domestic consumption. These figures suggest that in policy reform
simulations, the levels ofproduction of butter, SMP and WMP will greatly depend on the assumptions
made in terms of changes in the levels of subsidies while it will not be the case for the production of
other dairy products.
Table 8.4. Shares of subsidised uses and levels of corresponding subsidies in the EU for the
different dairy products (1998)
* Exceptprocessed cheese; ** Depending on cheese types; source: ZMP
Subsidies (in % of EU price)Share of uses (%)
Consumption ExportExportsSubsidised
Consumption
Unsubsidised
consumption
57
4l
45
8
10
31**
9.6
15.5
63.1
26.6
22.9
6.4
32
35
26.9
42.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
63.3
42.1
36.9
73.4
77.1
93.6
100
Butter
SMP
\MMP
Concentated Milk
Processed cheese
Cheese*
Fluidmilk
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Reference S1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
Milk
Fluid MiIk
Butter
SMP
Fresh Products
WholeMilkPowder
Condensed MiIk
Casein
Soft blue Fresh Cheese
Hard Semi Hard Cheese
Processed Cheese
1r3796
3 1039
1593
1065
7676
1046
1,341
105
3248
3179
520
101.8
100.7
101.7
100.5
100.4
98.s
106.0
112.6
102.6
r03.4
103.5
101.5
t0t.2
99.7
88.2
100.4
t02.9
107.r
t34.3
104.0
102.4
103.9
104.3
10r.5
105.6
101.3
100.6
107.9
109.3
137.1
104.5
106.3
105.6
t02.9
101.6
102.2
90.3
100.6
108.1
r09.7
r44.2
r04.7
104.1
104.8
99.4
101.5
95.0
83.9
100.7
79.1
110.6
116.8
105.0
104.4
106.3
99.5
r01.3
95.8
87.5
100.5
75.1
108.5
113.2
r04.4
105.3
t06.2
97.3
100.9
92.1
81.4
100.3
68.7
105.4
106.6
103.3
r03.2
104.7
Table 8.5. Impact of policy reform scenarios on the EU production of milk and dairy products
Units: 1000 tonnes for reference scenario, indexes (base 100 for the reference) for other scenarios
Table 8.6.Impact of policy reform scenarios on the EU prices of milk and dairy products
Units: Euroslkg for the reference scenario, indexes (base 100 for the reference) for other scenarios.
Reference s1 s2 s3 s4 S5 S6 s7
Mitk
Fluid MiIk
Butter
SMP
tr'resh Products
Whole MiIk Powder
Condensed Milk
Casein
Soft blue Fresh Cheese
Hard Semi Hard Cheese
Processed Cheese
0.273
0.473
2.875
1.882
1.927
2.501
1.556
7.979
2.906
3.791
4.984
86.5
94.4
88.3
88.7
97.0
88.0
96.3
93.8
95.4
93.0
96.3
79.6
91.1
85.7
77.5
95.8
83.2
94.0
87.6
92.9
88.7
94.6
74.7
88.8
85.4
76.3
95.1
81.3
92.8
86.9
92.0
87.4
94.0
73.9
88.5
83.9
73.0
94.9
80.5
92.6
85.1
9r.6
86.4
93.7
7t.9
88.9
69.3
75.6
93.6
68.4
92.1
86.s
91.1
86.1
92.0
76.7
90.4
76.0
77.1
94.6
69.9
93.2
87.4
92.1
88.6
93.3
83.0
93.1
81 I
180.
96.0
72.4
95.0
89.1
94.1
91.5
9s.0
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Reference s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
Fluid Milk
Butter
SMP
Fresh Products
\ilhole Milk Powder
Condensed Milk
Casein
Soft blue Fresh Cheese
Hard Semi Hard Cheese
Processed Cheese
30786
t470
955
7602
501
1535
136
3196
2947
430
100.6
t04.2
100.6
100.3
103.8
102.8
99.9
t02.5
103.7
102.0
101.0
106.2
101.6
100.5
105.4
104.5
107.0
103.8
105.9
t02.9
101.3
106.5
101.4
100.6
106.0
105.5
108.1
104.3
r06.6
t03.2
101.3
107.6
101.5
100.6
t06.2
105.7
110.7
104.5
107.1
103.4
101.3
I 18.8
98.0
100.7
110.0
106.0
108.7
104.8
107.3
t04.3
101.1
tt3.7
96.8
100.6
109.5
105.1
r07.4
r04.2
106.0
103.6
100.8
109.8
94.2
100.5
108.7
103.8
t04.9
103.1
t04.4
t02.7
Table 8.7. Impact of policy reform scenarios on the EU consumption of dairy products
Units: 1000 tonnes for the reference scenario, indexes (base 100 for the reference) for other scenarios.
Table 8.8.Impact of policy reform scenarios on milk component shadow prices
Reference s1 s2 S3 S4 ss s6 s7
Fat
Protein
3.233
4.957
87.4
87.7
85.3
77.8
84.3
70.4
83.4
69.7
68.9
78.0
75.2
8r.2
81.1
86.9
Units: Euroslkg for the reference scenario, indexes (base 100 for the reference ) for other scenarios.
In scenarios S I and 52, quotas are increased and export refunds are decreased. This leads to a decrease
in the price of raw milk by -15 to -20%o. Due to processing and dishibution costs, which remain
roughly constant, the decreases in the prices ofprocessed products are proportionally lower (cf. Table
g.6). As in some countries, quotas are no longer binding, the EU total milk production increases less
than the quota change (1.5 to 1.8% vs 2.4%). Except for casein, the productions of final dairy products
show small increases (cf. Table 8.5).
In scenarios 53 and 54, the increase in production following the quota removal causes a large decrease
in the raw milk p.;,ce (-24 to -25%). Note that because aggregate demand is rather inelastic, the
increase in production remains small (3 to 4oÂ), but induces alarge decrease in the price of milk.
Increases in production ofthe different processed dairy products is rather equally distributed (except
for casein). As in scenario 52, the EU SMP production decreases in 54 because Uruguay Round
commitments in terms of subsidised exports are binding and constraint EU exports (while this is not
the case for butter).
Scenarios 55 and 56 differ in their respective assumptions on the import side and on quotas. The levels
of EU production of milk and dairy products are nevertheless very similar in both scenarios. In
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scenario 56, quotas remain in force but consumption and export subsidies are removed and market
access is doubled. Hence, quotas are no longer binding and the EU milk production slightly decreases
with respect to the reference run (-0.5%, cf. Table 8.5). In scenario 55, quotas are removed and one
expects the EU milk production to increase. However, this scenario also assumes subsidy removal and
thus induces a large decrease in the EU price of milk (nearly 30oÂ, cf. Table 8.6). This price decrease
finally induce a slight decrease in milk production (-0.6%). The observed difference in milk price
change between scenarios 55 and 56 is essentially due to the impact of increasing imports in scenario
55. As export subsidies are cut, the EU productions and prices of WMP, SMP and, in a lower extent,
of butter decrease substantially. On the conhary, productions of other dairy products increase in
response to the increase in demand generated by the decrease in corresponding prices.
Finally in scenario 57, as compared with scenario 56, the price of raw milk decreases less (-17%
instead of -23%) in response to the decrease in production. Now the quotas are binding in all countries
and the decrease in the quota levels implies an increase in the quota rent. As compared to scenario 56,
prices of dairy products are higher. Conversely, their production levels are lower, especially for SMP,
butter and WMP.
Tables 8.9 and 8.10 reports the simulation results relating to EU dairy hade, obtained for the reference
and the 7 considered policy reform scenarios.
Table 8.9. rmpact of policy reform scenarios on EU exports of dairy products
Reference S1 S2 s3 S4 s5 s6 s7
Fluid Milk
Butter
SMP
Fresh Products
Whole Milk Powder
Condensed Milk
Casein
Soft blue Fresh Cheese
Hard Semi Ifard Cheese
Processed Cheese
266
269
273
74
581
304
43
53
321
95
I11.5
86.6
100.0
t06.7
93.8
r06.0
119.3
109.9
100.0
110.1
l l9.l
96.4
73.4
94.3
100.3
98.4
138.1
115.5
98.1
t14.7
128.7
97.9
100.0
100.8
108.7
101.4
r40.4
118.3
101.4
1t6.6
r29.0
103.5
81.8
97.5
108.7
101.9
145.9
119.1
103.7
t17.5
127.9
0.0
69.t
99.7
53.0
103.1
108.5
120.3
1,04.6
121.8
t2r.3
0.0
62.3
92.2
46.4
100.3
105.6
tt7.3
98.2
118.0
117.3
0.0
47.6
86.5
35.6
96.2
100.4
112.8
90.9
113.4
Units: 1000 tonnes for the reference scenario, indexes (base 100 for the reference) for other scenarios.
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Reference s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
Fluid Milk
Butter
SMP
F'resh Products
Whole Milk Powder
Condensed Milk
Casein
Soft blue Fresh Cheese
Ilard Semi Hard Cheese
I
lProcessed Cheese
I
12
87
68
2
6
485
74
2
89
8
92.8
100.0
100.0
96.8
73.7
96.r
92.9
104.3
99.8
101.4
88.1
200.0
200.0
95.8
63.0
93.8
86.1
237.9
201.0
180.7
86.4
100.0
100.0
95.2
58.8
92.5
8s.2
t07.7
99.6
103.2
86.4
200.0
200.0
95.2
57.0
92.2
83.2
239.1
200.9
181.3
88.9
200.0
200.0
93.9
32.r
9t.7
96.9
239.2
201.0
180.1
89.6
100.0
100.0
94.6
35.4
93.0
97.9
106.6
99.7
101.8
94.7
100.0
100.0
96.1
40.8
94.7
99.8
104.9
99.8
101.3
Tabte 8.10.Impact of policy reform scenarios on EU imports of dairy products
Units: 1000 tonnes for the reference scenario, indexes (base 100 for the reference) for other scenarios.
In scenarios 52 and 54, Uruguay Round commitments on subsidised exports are more restrictive than
in other scenarios. Then, the EU SMP exports decrease to the corresponding commitment ceiling level
(cf. Table 8.9). The decrease in subsidised exports of cheese is compensated by an increase in
unsubsidised exports in response to the decrease in EU prices. The decrease in the subsidised exports
of "other products" causes a decrease in the exports of fresh products while WMP exports remain
roughly stable
When export subsidies are cut (scenarios S5, 56 and S7), butter is no longer exported by the EU while
exports of sMP as well as wMP are significantly reduced (cf. Table 8.9).
Tables g.l1 and g.l2 report the simulation results in terms of welfare in the EU, obtained for the
reference and the 7 considered policy reform scenarios.
Table 8.11. Impact of policy reform scenarios on EU producero taxpayer and consumer surplus
and welfare (millions Euros, Scenarios Sl to 57: absolute variation relative to the reference scenario)
È Change in wclfatc assuming that opportunity costs public funds oro zero. Hence direct payments not
induce any welfare cost.
** Change in welfare assuming that opportunity costs of public funds are equal to 0.2. Then direct payments
induce a welfare cost of 0.2 Euro per Euro of direct payment'
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s7s4 s5 s6S2 s3Reference S1
-5820
-813
7258
1069
906
4351
-989
6050
988
790
-5379
191 1
M90
1073
1455
4905
-1 823
5860
46
4lt
-5172
-1579
6213
212
-104
-r234
-2080
3280
246
-170
-3421
-1600
5089
478
158
r8127
-t731
Producers
Taxpayers
Consumer
EU welfare (1)*
EU welfare (2)**
Reference S1 S2 s3 s4 s5 S6 s7
Taxpayer costs
Tariff
Export subsidies
Domestic subsidies
Direct payments
t73t
-247
1460
519
0
38t2
-241
935
218
2900
3332
4r2
767
77
2900
3554
-235
830
59
2900
33 10
4t0
801
19
2900
2544
-356
0
0
2900
272t
-t79
0
0
2900
-r80
-180
0
0
0
Table 8.12. Impact of policy reform scenarios on EU taxpayer costs (millions Euros)
All scenarios lead to dramatic changes in the distribution of surpluses in the EU. Producer surplus
decreases (from -1.2 billion Euros in scenario 51 to up to -5.8 billion Euros in scenario 55) and
consumer surplus increases (from 3.3 billion Euros in scenario Sl to up to 7.3 billion Euros in scenario
55, cf. Table 8.11) in all scenarios. In all scenarios, but scenario 57, taxpayers experience surplus
losses but the magnitudes of these losses vary significantly across scenarios. In particular, Table 8.11
suggests that taxpayers' losses are sensitive to the adopted assumption regarding consumption and
export subsidies. Indeed scenarios 55 and 56, which assume that all these subsidies are removed both
lead to the lowest loss for EU taxpayers (around -0.9 billion Euros as compared 
-1.6 to 2.1 in other
scenarios).
Except for scenario 53, all scenarios are welfare increasing for the EU, scenario 37 being the most
welfare enhancing. Comparing scenarios 51, S2, 53, S4 on the one hand and scenarios 55, 56, 57 on
the other hand, one sees that the removal of consumption and export subsidies is particularly welfare
increasing for the EU. This is essentially due to the large country effect resulting from the removal of
export subsidies. An "artificial" increase in EU exports (i.e., generated by an export subsidy) causes a
decrease in world prices because EU is a major exporter on the world dairy markets. Conversely a
reduction in EU exports increases EU welfare because world market prices increase. Scenario 53
illustrates the negative welfare impact of an increase in production while keeping constant price
distortions. Scenario 37 is the most appealing in terms of welfare essentially because, as compared to
scenario 56, the milk quotas are still in force and contribute to limit the decrease in the price of milk.
As a result, taxpayers costs decrease (cf. table 8.12) so that taxpayers benefit from a surplus gain in
this scenario. A substantial share of the policy cost is shifted on consumers but, as the aggregate
demand for milk is rather inelastic, the exûa surplus loss for consumers (as compared to scenario 56)
is limited. In such a sifuation, the production quota instrument appears as a rather "efficient" way to
hansfer surplus from consumers to producers.
Finally, Table 8.12 indicates that direct payments to producers account for the largest share of EU
taxpayers costs. Note that in the first definition of welfare, a fransfer from taxpayer to producer is
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Reference s1 S2 s3 s4 S5 s6 S7
FluidMilk
Butter
SMP
tr'resh Products
WholeMilkPowder
Condensed Milk
Soft blue Fresh Cheese
Hard Semi llard Cheese
Cheese
0.583
t.267
1.379
1.897
t.512
t.525
7.t90
2.989
3.4r3
s.092
95.3
107.9
100.0
98.3
t02.3
97.4
93.1
9s.8
100.0
96.4
92.2
t02.r
107.5
101.4
99.9
100.7
86.3
93.4
100.9
94.7
88.3
101.2
100.0
99.8
96.7
99.4
85.5
92.2
99.4
94.1
88. I
98.0
105.1
100.6
96.7
99.2
83.s
91.8
98.3
93.7
88.6
158.5
108.7
100.1
tr7.6
98.7
97.0
91.3
97.9
92.2
91.3
158.5
110.6
t02.0
120.1
99.9
98.0
92.6
100.8
93.5
92.9
158.5
tt4.7
103.4
T24.7
101.6
99.8
94.5
104.1
95.2
neutral since there is no opportunity cost of public funds and direct payments are assumed to be fully
decoupled.
Table 8.13. Impact of poticy reform scenarios on the world prices of dairy products
Units:Euros/kg for the reference scenario, (base 100 the for other scenarios.
Changes in the EU dairy policy affect the world prices of "basic" dairy commodities (butter, SMP and
WMp). This point is illustrated by the comparing, in Table 8.13, of the world price changes induced
by scenarios Sl to 54 on the one hand and by scenario 55 to 57 on the other hand'
Tables g.14 and g.15 summarise the results in terms of milk production and price for the various
considered EU regions, obtained for the reference and the 7 policy reform scenarios.
Table g.14. Impact of policy reform scenarios on milk production in the various considered EU
regions
Units: 1000 tonnes
S7S5 S6s3 s4s2Reference S1
97.5
97.5
97.5
97.5
97.7
97.6
97.6
94.3
97.6
99.5
111.0
100.7
100.3
r07.4
114.5
9r,7
100.9
101.7 95.7
95.6
108.0
97.1
98.4
105.1
109.3
90.3
99.1
100.0
99.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
9t.9
100.0
00.01
1 00.0
103.9
100.4
112.2
102.0
t02.3
108.3
115.8
92.3
101.7
101.6
101.6
101.5
101.6
105.1
102.0
101.5
93.s
101.5
23040
3267
10765
29442
10641
19290
4465
7255
5629
101.6
101.6
101.5
101.6
106.3
102.0
101.5
96.6
101.5
Belgium & Luxembourg
Germany & Austria
United Kingdom & Ireland
Spain & Portugal
Sweden & Finland
taly & Greece
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the reference indexes (base 100 for reference) for scenanos.
Reference s1 S2 s3 s4 S5 s6 s7
f,'rance
Belgium & Luxembourg
Netherlands
Germany & Austria
Italy & Greece
United Kingdom & Ireland
Denmark
Spain & Portugal
Sweden & Finland
0.26t
0.279
0.297
0.270
0.288
0.270
0.299
0.220
0.320
85.7
85.5
86.3
8s.8
87.8
8s.6
86.5
92.6
87.4
78.2
78.4
79.1
78.3
81.4
78.3
79.9
90.6
81.2
75.4
74.9
69.r
76.0
79.9
68.3
68.0
89.8
79.0
74.3
74.3
68.3
75.0
78.8
67.7
67.4
89.5
78.6
7r.4
71.4
66.4
72.3
77.8
66.2
65.3
88.5
77.6
73.8
74.0
76.6
74.7
81.3
7s.9
75.5
89.6
80.3
79.8
79.8
83.r
8t.2
86.4
83.8
81.6
91.1
88.1
Table 8.15. Impact of policy reform scenarios on the price of milk in the various EU regions
Units: Euroslkg for the reference scenario, indexes (base 100 for the reference for other scenarios.
For a given scenario, changes in the price of raw milk in the various EU regions are relatively
homogenous as long as quotas and subsidies are maintained. They are slightly more differentiated
within scenarios assuming the removal of one or both these types of instruments. In those cases,
observed differences mainly reflect the initial levels of quotas rents characterising each region: the less
competitive regions register lower decrease in the price of milk than the one experienced by the most
competitive regions. The case of Spain and Portugal is specific because the milk quotas are not
binding for these countries in the reference scenario. Thus, in all scenarios, the decrease in the price of
milk is lower in this region compared to the other EU regions.
When milk quotas are removed the change in milk production is region specific. For example, in
scenario 54, some regions experience increases in their production level while other ones register
decreases. Increasing production in some regions reflects their capacity (due to their initial quota rent
level) to expand production despite the accompanying price decrease. When quotas are active, changes
in production are more uniformly distributed among regions.
8.4. Conclusion and policy recommendations
The analysis performed with this model is a comparative static analysis which means that the results
provide the impact of policy scenarios ceteris paribus.It is also implicit that the new equilibrium is
reached instantaneously. Therefore, results indicate in which direction EU milk and dairy markets
adjust to policy changes, but no information is given on the path of adjustment between the initial and
the equilibrium.
377
The main conclusions and policy recommendations that can be drawn from our analysis may be
synthesised as follows:
i) Due to both the inelasticity of EU demand and the Uruguay Round constraints on exports, an 1%o
increase in EU milk production induces a 4Yo decrease in milk price.
ii) EU cheese, fresh products, liquid milk and condensed milk production increase in all considered
policy reform scenarios. This is due to the increase in the domestic consumption of these products that
follows the decrease in their prices. Conversely, the impacts of policy reform scenarios on EU butter,
SMp and whole milk powder production depend closd on the level of subsidies (domestic and/or
export subsidies). The production of these products decreases when subsidies are significantly
reduced.
iii) The decrease in subsidised exports has a positive impact on world prices'
iv) Larger increases in welfare occur when the EU cuts its export subsidies and domestic subsidies.
This conclusion is reinforced when the opporhrnity costs of public funds are taken into account.
v) Removing quotas without changing intemal price support leads to an important decrease in EU
welfare.
vi) Under full liberalisation, the EU milkproduction does not increase. It roughly remains constant'
vii) Because aggregate demand for milk is rather inelastic, the quota instrument is an effrcient
instrument for redistributive purpose. When opportunity cost are taken into account, they appear to be
more effrcient than direct payments in order to redistribute surplus to producers. In a long term
perspective, keeping EU milk price at high level (relatively to milk prices in other countries) could
lead some firms to locate their productions in other countries (only for products which can be easily
traded).
378
APPENDIX 1.
description of the spatial Equilibrium model with component Allocation
In order to analyse the impact of policy reforms in the EU dairy sector, a spatial equilibrium model for
a vertical sector has been developed. The model involves .I regions and two sets of commodities:
primary commodities and processed commodities. The primary commodities are not consumer goods,
they are used exclusively as inputs in the production of processed commodities. Each region is a
potential producer of the primary commodities, and a potential producer as well as a potential
consumer of the processed commodities. Also, each region can fade both primary and processed
commodities with any other region. The corresponding competitive spatial market equilibrium can be
analysed by developing a market equilibrium model of resource allocation and trade over the ,/
regions.
Let N be the number of primary commodities. w; denotes the quantity produced of the zù primary
commodity in region i, and x;, is the derived demand for the nù primary commodity used as an input in
the production of the processed commodities in region i, (n: l, ..., N, i: l, ..., J).LetKbe the number
of processed commodities. y,1 denotes the production level of the Éth processed commodity in region i,
andzizistheconsumptionleveloftheÉûcommodityinregion i,(k:1,...,K,i:!,...,J).
The allocation decisions are illushated in Figure 8.1. The production of the processed commodities (y)
is influenced by the production technology transforming .x into./, and by the interregional trade in the
primary commodities. Consumption of the processed commodities z is influenced by corresponding
productiony and by the interregional hade in the processed commodities. Denote by Tu,> 0 the export
of the nû primary commodity from region i to regionT. Similarly, denote by t;ip20 the export of the &ft
processed commodity from region i to regionj. Using this notation, Tiin2 0 is the quantity of the nfr
primary commodity that is both produced and used in the production of the processed commodities
within the ift region (i.e., not exported to other regions). And t;,.i > 0 is the quantity of the Èû processed
commodity that is both produced and consumed in the iû region. See Figure 8.1.
The production of the processed commodities y involves basic components that are an integral part of
the primary commodities and that are "rearranged" and allocated among processed commodities.
Assume that the Nprimary commodities involve ,S components. In region i,let ain denote the quantity
of the sth component per unit of derived demand of the nth primary commodity x;r. And let bp" denote
the quantity of the sth component per unit of production of the /cth processed commodity. Under a
Leontief technology, the transformation of the primary inputs x into the processed inputs y in region i
must satisfr:
s (1)
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XL, yir b6 < X[, x;n a;n" i = l, ..., J; s = l,
Equation (l) ensures that the allocation of component s in region i is balanced. It corresponds to a
linear Lancasterian model where each commodity exhibits fixed proportions, but where the
components are perfect substitutes in their allocation among commodities (see Lancaster, l97l).
Besides the processing of the S components, the production of processed commodities (/ir, ' " lix)
from (r7, ..., r;v) in region i also involves labour and capital inputs, which are provided at cost Gi'
Denote the associated cost function by G'(yi" "' !iK' xît' "" xiu)'where &'lfui*> 0 ('t = 1' " " K)' and
ôGilôxi^< 0 (n = l, ...,1/), for all i = l, "', J'
The frade flow constraints across reglons are:
w;n > Ej=1Ti;n
(2a)
Ej=, T;in 2 xin
(2b)
y,* > Ej=, ti:r (2c)
xf=, !n 2 zit
In any region, these equations guarantee that exports plus domestic use cannot be larger than domestic
production, and that domestic consumption cannot exceed domestic production plus imports' This
holds for primary commodities (equations (2a) and (2b)) as well as for processed commodities
(equations (2c) and (2d)).
Denote by D;(zx, ...2ifl thetotal benefit of consumers in region i, and by si(wfu ..., wfi the production
cost in region i. Assume that D;(z;1, ...2yç) is a convex function and that Si(wi,, "" wiru) is a concave
function. Under competitive markets, let the price of the kth processed commodity in the iù region be
pitd: ôDi/ô26 stating that price is equal to consumers'marginal benefit. similarly, let the price of the
nû primary commodity in the ith region b. pr'= ôS/ôwin, stating that price is equal to marginal cost.
Also, let Ciln>-}be the unit cost of transporting the nth primary commodity from region i to regioni,
with Ciin = 0, and cy*21be the unit cost of transporting the ftù processed commodity from region i to
regionj, with c;;1= 0.
(2d)
As a basis for representing resource allocation, consider the following optimisation problem:
MôXy,x,y,z3,t { Er=, [D;(z;1, ...2;ç) - Si(wi,, ..., wi*)] - Xtr Gt(ytt, " ', YiK, Xit, "', XiN)
- Et, >i=, xf='Ti;' Ci;" - Et, >j=, >f='t;;1cs)
subjectto: equations (1) and (2a)'(2d),w) 0, x > 0,y )0,2>-0, T > 0, t> 0
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(3)
The objective function in (3) can be interpreted as a quasi-welfare function. It is equal to Xf=, [Di - Si],
the sum of producer and consumer surpluses across all regions; minus Xt, Gu the total cost of labour
and capital in the processing sector; minus [Xt, >i=, x]=,Ti;" C6 + Xf=, Ej=, xl,tiir ciirl, the total cost
of fransportation. The solution to (3) can be shown to generate a competitive resource allocation (see
Chavas, Cox and Jesse, 1998). The Lagrange multipliers associated with (2a)-(2d) represent market
prices, while the Lagrange multipliers associated with (1) give the shadow prices of the components of
the primary commodities. By incorporating components allocation both across commodities and
regions, this competitive market equilibrium framework extends the interregional competitive model
proposed by Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and Judge (1971). The paper of Bouamra-Mechemache
et al. (2001) shows how this framework can be modified to incorporate the EU dairy policy
instruments so as to represent distorted competitive market equilibrium under alternative policy
scenarios relevant to the European dairy indusûry.
Figure 8.1. The allocation process of primary and processed commodities
+
win
production ofprimary
commodity n in region i
Tgn, lin
hade of primary commodity n
between regions i and j
Xin
utilization of primary
commodity n in region i x;n': utilization of primarycommodity n' in region i
yjr' : production of processed
commodity k' in region iYit'
production of processed
commodity k in region i
ti;u tlir
trade of processed commodity
k between regions i and j
zit<
consumption of processed
commodity k in region i
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APPENDIX 2.
Assumptions on supply and demand elasticities and on initial quota rents
Table 8.16. Supply elasticities for milk in each European union region
Table 8.17. Demand elasticities for each dairy product
Supply elasticitY
France 1.50
Belgium & Luxembourg 1.00
Netherlands 1.00
Germany & Austria 1.00
Italy & Greece 1.50
United Kingdom & Ireland 1.00
Denmark 1.50
Spain & Portugal 1.50
Sweden & Finland 1.50
Elasticity of demand
-0.125Ftuid Milk
-0.4
-1.0
Butter
Unsubsidised demand
Subsidised demand
-0.2
-1.0
SMP
Unsubsidised demand
Subsidised demand
-0.125Fresh Products
-0.4WholeMilkPowder
-0.8Condensed Milk
-1.0Casein*
-0.6Soft blue Fresh Cheese
-0.6Hard Semi Hard Cheese
-0.6Processed Cheese
The of casein is
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Table 8.18. Unit quota rent in proportion of the milk price for each European Union region
Unit quota rent
France 35%
Belgium & Luxembourg 35%
Netherlands 45%
Germany & Austria 35%
Italy & Greece 30%
United Kingdom & Ireland 4s%
Denmark 4s%
Spain & Portugal 30%
Sweden & Finland 30%
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9 . ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF'BEEF'PRODUCING SECTORS IN MAIN EU MEMBER
STATES
Agenda 2000 and Beyond: Impact of reforms of the Common Market Organisation for beef
Yves Le Roux
Partner l: INRA-ESR, Rennes
9.1. Introduction
The objective of this part of the project (i.e., subtask2.3) was to develop a tool for simulating policy
reform in the beef and veal sectors of the European Union. In order to provide an assessment of the
impact of such policy reforms, at the national level and at the European level, sectoral econometric
models have been developed. Changes in these beef and veal sectors are induced by the market
conditions, and by policies. These policies may apply directly on these sectors, or they may affect
related sectors. A fair representation of the beef and veal sectors must include these main
determinants, and simultaneously the dynamic interactions among categories of animals, that is the
demographic structure of the cattle and the associated biological constraints.
National models are developed for the main European beef and veal producers, i.e., France, Germany,
United-Kingdom and Italy. These models are founded on a generic approach which aims to a good
coverage of relevant variables and which specifies stock and flow variables with an explicit account
for biological limits.
The objective is to account for the demographic stucture of bovine production and for the impacts of
economic variables (mainly prices) and agricultural policy variables (intervention price, headage
premiums, milk quotas) on production. In other words, beef supply steadily depends on the bovine
demographic characteristics: one of the concerns is here to take into account how economic or policy
changes affect this (dynamic) link. The approach can be summarised as an inventory approach to
model the livestock sector, which accounts for behavioural relationships to finally determine meat
supply and trade. The model is made of a set of behavioural and biological relationships.
This approach requires a disaggregation of the livestock into categories of animals (calves for
slaughtering, calves for breeding, adult male/female animals over I year, over 2 yearc, etc.) and a
disaggregation ofthe net production (slaughterings ofcalves, bulls, steers, heifers, cows).
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For each national model, parameters which link the variables of interest (calf crop, livestock addition,
slaughtering rate, etc.) are assumed to be dependent on economic or policy variables (which will be
the control variables of the model during the simulation step). But these parameters must also enforce
biological constraints, which first implies to build a dynamic set of relationships between these
variables. ln that prospect, a particular attention is paid to the specification of the various variable
rates. Most of them are specified as logistic functions. All the parameters of the model (except the
biological upper limits which are fixed according to empirical observations and to common
knowledge) are estimated using econometric techniques applied to time series data.
Models can be used to simulate a baseline scenario (including the "Agenda 2000" reform measures)
and scenarios of decrease in the number and/or the level of premiums'
More generally, the dynamic characteristics of each model allows for computing dynamic elasticities
of main endogenous variables with respect to control variables, such as policy variables' An
illustration may be completed through the assessment of the effect of the number of beef premiums
granted on net Production.
In the following section, a brief presentation of the methodology used and the data set built is given. In
section 3, the main quantitative results, among the main countries which have been modelled, are
presented. Section 4 reports and discusses simulation results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
9.2. National models of beef and veal sectors: Structure and main characteristics
For each main producing EU Member State (France, Germany, United-Kingdom, Italy) a complete
model of the bovine sector is specified and estimated. Each national model simultaneously accounts
for the demographic structure of bovine production and for the impacts of economic variables (mainly
prices) and agricultural policy variables (intervention price, headage premiums, milk quotas) on
production. The whole system is perfectly balanced over time, that is, the herd of one category of
animals at the beginning of one period is necessarily equal to the sum of all possible utilisations during
the period (slaughtering, net export, or herd replacement). This explicit intertemporal balance is at the
core of the model functionning. r3a
Three subsets of relationships are defined for calves, female animals aged one year and over, and male
animals aged one year and over. For each category, the herd at the beginning of one period is intended
to be slaughtered, bred, or (net) exported during the period. These arbitrations apply to sub-categories
t3a This is not always the case in models of animal markets. See, for example, Lianos and Katrinidis (1993)
where the link befween inventories and slaughterings do not insure the dynamic balance between supply and
utilisations.
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such as heifers, suckler cows and dairy cows for female animals, and bulls and steers for male animals.
For each of these sub-categories, net production is determined at each period with respect to biological
possibilities, which leads to the total net production.
The complete structure of the model is provided in appendix 1.
9. 2. I. Demographic structure: An illustration
As an illusfation, calves bom during year t (BICA) are a proportion cct of the female herd at the end
of the year t-1, (FEHEbr) where cc, is the calf crop: BICAT= cct .FEHEt-t
These born calves are then allocated into calves for slaughtering, calves for breeding and net exports
of lives calves (the latter can be derived from the former). Thus:
CASLT= csl1. BlcAtwhere CASLtare calves for slaughtering and SLCAT: slr,. CAsltwhere SLCA,are
the slaughterings of calves (net production of veal is derived through the average slaughter weight).
CAB& = cbr, . BICAT where CAB& is the herd of calves for breeding, which itself is allocated into
males and females, through the relationships MCAH,: mall. CAB&and FCAH,= (l 
- 
mal) . CAB&,
where MCAHT and FCAH, are respectively the herds of male and female calves for breeding.
These herds determine the herds of adult male and female animals the year after, and consequently
slaughtering of each kind of animal through similar arbitration rates. For example, the herd of adult
males is defined as:
MAHET: y, MCAH,-I * mrrt(MAH&-t 
-XLMA:+ MLMA) where nMAtandMLMA,are exports and
imports of live adult male animals, respectively . y , is the share of the male adult cattle which comes
from the herd of calves for breeding and mrr, is the rate of replacement of the male adult cattle.
Slaughterings and net production can be easily derived, and allocated into bulls and steers.
A similar process is written for adult female animals, which leads to net productions of heifers and
cows, and then to the total net production of beef.
9.2.2. Impacts of economic and policy vuriables
It is assumed that each arbitration is a function of economic and policy variables. Hence, all the
various tates (cc,, csl6 slr,, cbr,, mel,, f ,, mrr6 etc.) which link the different variables are specified as
functions of economic and policy variables. To ensure that these rates do not exceed realistic limits
which are imposed by biological constraints, they are modelled as logistic functions of explanatory
variables (for a similar way to deal with biological limits, see Fabiosa and Qi, 1998). Such a
specification allows for setting an upper limit to each of these rates.
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For any variable rate y,,the specification is: y, = #+ e, where: y* is the upper limit chosen for
y6 X,is a vector of explanatory variables, p is a vector of parameters, and e, is an error term' The
upper limit is fixed before estimation, and its value is determined according to empirical observations
on the concerned rate over the sample, and according to common knowledge.
The effect orr lt of one variable of Xr is of the sign of the corresponding parameter of p. The
elasticity of y, with respect to a variable .r,, of X, (which is assumed to be affected by a parameter
0,) is given by: Er,,*n =F, rn (1 -fl. This elasticity can be computed for any sample point, or
generally for the sample mean point. Note that this elasticity only measures the instantaneous effect of
xit on !,, ceteris paribus. Actually, it does not take into account the simultaneous characteristic of
the model: for example ) xi, may appear as an explanatory variable in another relationship which
explains a variable which explains y, too. Moreover, this kind of direct or indirect effect may occur at
time t, or between two consecutive periods. The previous elasticity only offers partial information,
limited to the comparison among effects inside only one relationship. Therefore it is necessary to
compute dynamic multipliers which take into account both direct and indirect effects of each
exogenous variable on one endogenous variable. Due to the expression of the key rates which link
these variables in terms of logistic functions, the complete model is highly nonlinear, and a linear
approximation would be hardly hactable. Thus, these dynamic multipliers and the associated
elasticities must be approximated through simulation methods.
Estimation of relationships where these variable rates appear finally lead to the slaughterings
expressed in heads for each category of animals (calves, heifers, cows, bulls and steers). Relationships
which define the average slaughter weights are then estimated in the same manner (the average
slaughter weight for each kind of animal is modelled as a logistic function of explanatory variables,
such as the lagged weight reflecting biological constraint, and the price of animal feedingstuffs).
Finally, the net productions expressed in carcass weight equivalent are obtained as the product of
slaughterings by the average slaughter weight.
producer prices are endogenous in the model, and they are the only variables which are expressed in
linear form. prices for calves and for adult cattle are taken into consideration. The real producer price
indexes are expressed as a function ofthe real intervention price and ofthe excess supply. For both
categories, the excess supply is defined as the difference between net production and domestic
consumption, which is assumed to be exogenous.
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For the other relationships, the main explicative variables are these real price indexes and the
agricultural policy variables, which are exogenous. These are essentially: the total amount of male
premiums granted, differentiated whether it is the first or the second payment, and accordingly to bulls
and steers, the total amount of suckler cow premiums granted, and the national milk quota level.
Exogenous variables also include imports of live animals for calves, heifers, cows and steers.
This leads to a set of endogenous variables and equations, among which some are identities (see the
list in Table 9.1, which corresponds to the French model).
Table 9.1. The set of endogenous variables (example of the French beef model)
Dependent
variable
Identities
Calves
BICAl Births of calves
CAHEI Total herd of calves at the end of year t
€
CASLI Herd of calves for slaushterine
SLCAT Number of calves
CABRI Herd of calves for
MCAHT Herd of male calves for breeding
FCAHI Herd of female calves for
€
CASAI Herd of calves for slaughtering still alive at the end of the year I
€
n cAl Exports of live calves
€
CASWT Calf average slaughter weight
NPI/Et Net production of veal
IPCA t Index ofproducer price ofcalves
Female animals older than one
HEHEI Herd of heifers
x,HEt Exports of heifers
nvLHEl Net exports of heifers
€
SLHEI Numter of heifers slaughtered
HASWI
NPHEI Net production of heifers
DAHEI Herd of dairy cows
SUHET Herd of suckler cows
SLCOI Number of cows slaughtered
coaswt Cqw average slaughter weight
NPCOT Net of cows
Male animals older than one
MAHE, Herd of male adult animals (over than I year)
SLMAI Number of male adult animals slaughtered
SLXMBUT Number of male adult animals slaughtered and net exported
SLSTl Number of steers
WLMACt Net of male adult animals
€
SLBUT Number of bulls
€
BUASWI Bull a
STASW, Steer
NPBUT Net of bulls
NPSTI Net of steers
NPACI Net of adult cattle
€
IPCT, Index of of adult cattle
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9.2.3. The data used
All equations of the four national models are estimated econometrically. Required data are national
times series data for all endogenous and exogenous variables of the model (mainly, herds'
slaughterings, net productions, hade, prices, policy instruments, etc" " for each category of animals)'
The completed database is made up of aggregate annual data mainly issued from the Newcronos-
Eurostat database, from 1973 to 1998.
9.3. Estimation results
Direct estimation results, that is equation by equation, are presented first. Then, the main dynamic
multipliers that can be computed are commented'
9.3.1. Direct estimatîon results
Detailed estimation results are reported in appendix 3 for each country and for each category of
animals. This paragraph summarises the main findings'
9.3.1.1. Calf croP models
In all countries, the calfcrop depends significantly on the expected real producer price ofcalves' But,
as indicated by Table 9.2, the magnitude of obtained elasticities (calculated at the sample mean)
differs across countries.
Table 9.2. Elasticities of the calf crop with respect to the real price of calves
The allocation of calves born during year t among slaughtering and breeding herds is (nearly) always
significantly dependent on the total amount of first payments of male premiums. This variable has a
negative effect on the choice in favour of slaughtering but a positive one in favour of breeding'
However elasticities (only evaluated here at the concerned equation level) reflect different sensitivities
across countries.
Table 9.3. Elasticities of allocation in favour of slaughtering or breeding relative to the total
amount of first payments of male premiums
France Germany Italy United-Kingdom
0.38 0.21 0.94 0.08
tr'rance Germany Italy United-Kingdom
Slaughtering herd -0 11 -0.20 -0.06 -1.05
Breeding herd 0.10 0.03 0.05
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The various values of these elasticities do not seem to be related to the national orientation of calf
production, which is balanced between slaughtering and breeding in France and in Italy, but which is
mainly in favour of breeding in Germany, and especially in the UK.
The rate of slaughtering determines which proportion of the herd of calves devoted to slaughtering is
effectively slaughtered during the year l. Due to the biological seasonality of births of calves, this rate
is nearly the same for each counûry, about 75%o. The expected real price of calves has generally a
negative effect on this rate (elasticity of 
-0.34 for France and, 4.22 for the UK), reflecting the
expectation of a continuation of a price change: for example, an increase in the calf price will
encourage delaying slaughtering. But an inverse effect is observed in Italy: the elasticity of the
slaughtering rate to the calf price is 0.77, showing the interest to immediately benefit of an increase in
this price.
The calf average slaughter weight is also different among countries, according to their main
orientations of production. This average slaughter weight is very low (about 40kg cwer3s) in the UK,
but this country does not breed calves to be slaughtered as calves, but for breeding. This average
weight is higher for the other countries: about 110 to 115kg cwe in France and in Germany, and nearly
140kg in Italy. The elasticity of the slaughter rate to the real price of animal feed is also quite different
among countries: this elasticity is 
-0.25 in France and -0.16 in Italy, but about -{.08 in Germany.
Finally, the net production of calves is indirectly dependent on all these variables, through the rate of
slaughtering and the average slaughter weight. The total effects will be analysed further.
9.3.1.2. Models offemale animals older than one year
Rates of replacement and rates of slaughtering of adult animals are also significantly dependent on
price effects, but not always with the same sign (see appendix 3). For example the average elasticity of
the rate of replacement of the heifer herd (that is the proportion of heifers which remain heifers the
following year) with respect to the expected real price of adult cattle is -{.1 in Germany, showing the
interest not to delay slaughtering of heifers in case of an increase in price, but this elasticity is equal to
0.1 for Italy and 0.4 for the UK, showing the reverse effect.
Similar apparent contradictions can be observed for some other rates, for which interpretation of direct
elasticities must be made cautiously (in the sense that they are evaluated within only one estimated
equation, without taking into account possible indirect effects through other variables). These opposite
r35
cwe : carcass weight equivalent.
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effects may be only apparent, and only the further computation of total effects are conclusive in some
cases.
For the cow herd, it is generally found that the milk quota has a positive effect on the dairy herd, that
the suckler cow premium has sometimes a positive effect on the suckler herd, and that there is a
substitution effect between dairy and suckler herds'
Effects on cow slaughterings are just derived from effects on cow herds, due to the low importance of
trade for these categories of animals, for all countries'
9.3.1.3. Models of male animals older than oneyear
Effects of prices and policy variables on endogenous variables are more homogenous across countries
in the case of adult male animals than for adult female animals. For example, the herd of adult male
animals is assumed to be made up of: a proportion y, of the herd of male calves for breeding, and a
proportion mrrl ofthe adult male animals which were yet present the previous year. The rate 1 is
always positively dependent on: the total amount of the first payments of male premium (tap-spmal)'
and/or the expected real producer price of adult cattle é*),-,). On the other hand, the rate of adult"ipsdp"'
male replacement mn, isalways positively dependent on: the total amount of the second payments of
male premium (tap_spma2), and/or the expected real producer price of adult cattle (see Table 9.4)'
Table 9.4. Effects of prices and policy variables on adult cattle
Effects on the total slaughterings of male adult cattle are derived from effects on inventories. Specific
effects on bull and steer slaughterings, respectively, may be influenced by premiums granted to these
categories of animals. The effect of the total premiums granted either to bulls or to steers on the rate of
slaughtering is always negative (see Table 9.5). That reflects the opportunity of capitalising rather than
slaughtering the cattle in case of an increase in the total amount of these premiums (which can be due
to an increase in the number of premiums, or in the unitary level). Note that this effect is always very
small for bulls, but more important for steers.
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Effects on Tt lIlI!
of tap_spma1, é*),-,,pgdp tap_spma2, (i4),-,tpgdp
France + + + +
Germany + + +
Italy + + +
United-Kingdom + +
Table 9.5. Elasticities of the rate of slaughtering of bulls and steers with respect to the total
amount of premiums granted to these animals
bulls steers
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
-0.01
-0.02
-0.01
-0.46
-0.60
-1.18
Generally, the average slaughter weights of all animals are significantly affected by a positive time
trend effect (through a positive effect of the lagged slaughter weight) and by a negative effect of the
price of animal feed. However, elasticities of the slaughter weights to this price are not very large (see
Table 9.6).
Table 9.6. Short-run elasticities of average slaughter weights with respect to the real price of
animal feed
Real indexes of producer prices are modelled as linear functions of the real intervention price,
expressed in national currency, and of the excess supply. These indexes are positively correlated with
the intervention price, and negatively dependent on the excess supply (calculated as the difference
between the net production and the domestic consumption). Elasticities of producer prices to the
intervention price, in real terms, are reported in Table 9.7.
Table 9.7. Elasticities of real producer prices to the real intervention price
Heifers Cows Bulls Steers
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
-0.08
-0.08
-0.09
-0.05
-0.06
-0.04
-0.05
-0.1I
-0.06
-0.12
-0.06
-0.10
-0.10
-0.0r
Calves Adult cattle
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kinsdom
t.L2
1.09
0.73
0.97
0.s9
0.85
t.47
r.29
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9. 3.2. Dynamic elasticities
Conhary to previous direct elasticities which are calculated ceteris partbus, multpliers and dynamic
elasticities take into account all direct and indirect simultaneous and over time effects, within the
whole model, of a given exogenous variable on a given endogenous variable. Therefore' their
interpretation is more explicit. It is theoretically possible to compute dynamic elasticities of key
variables of the model (such as cattle or net productions) to any exogenous variable of the model (such
as the number of premiums granted, the unitary level of one premium, the milk quota, the intervention
price,etc.).Whenthemodelislinearoftheform:Y,=AY,-,+fox,+f,X,-,,wherelristhevectorof
endogenous variables and X,the vector of exogenous variables, then the matrix of impact multipliers is
fo . The effect at t*n of an exogenous shock in I is measured by the matrix of interim multipliers of
order n: INTER, = AINTER,_|=A',-t (r, +Æ.), while the matrix of total multipliers (i.e.,INTER,
with n + oo) is TOTAL :' (1-,4)-'G. + f,) . Matrices of dynamic elasticities can then be derived
from these multipliers (whether impact, interim or total) by multiplying each term (g,k) of any matrix
bu X , ,where s = 0,1, ... oo (elasticities are generally computed at the sample mean point).
' Y"''*''
Here, the model is not linear, because of the logistic specification of numerous relationships, but also
because ofthe fact that net production variables are the product oftwo other endogenous variables, the
average slaughter weight and the slaughterings expressed in number of heads. Due to these
nonlinearities, an analytic determination of these dynamic elasticities is not easily tractable. Thus, a
simulation method was preferred. The adopted method may be described as follows.
First a reference baseline projection is simulated on the period 2000-2010. The values of (exogenous)
policy variables (unitary premiums, intervention price, milk quota) are those decided within the
Agenda 2000 final decisions until 2002 (200512006 for the milk quota). r3u They are assumed to
remain unchanged after this date. Nevertheless, the numbers of premiums (i.e., the number of first and
second payments for the male premium and the number of suckler cow premiums) are known only
until 1999. Thus, they are assumed to remain at their observed 1999 level over the whole projection
period. Changes in beef and veal consumption in the four considered countries are based on the
assumption that per capita consumption goes on decreasing according to past observed trends. This
assumption results in the per capita consumption levels reported in Table 9.8 for 2000 and 2010. To
t3u Not* that new policy instruments (such as the implementation of an aid scheme for private storage from2002
on, which will take ou"i fro- intervention, or the introduction of a slaughter premium), or instruments which are
noi int odo.rd in the model (such as the extensification premium), are not taken into account in neither the
baseline projectioq nor the scenario of changes in the number of premiums. This ceteris paribus condition
makes the computation of the dynamic elasticities reliable.
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Beef Veal
2000 2010 2000 2010
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
22.4
13.8
20.4
15.3
20.9
10.3
18.5
11.0
4.8
t.2
3.8
0.1
4.2
t.2
3.5
0.1
approximate the total consumption, the population is assumed to keep on increasing in France and in
the United-Kingdom, but decreasing in Germany and Italy (FAO assumptions).
Table 9.8. Beef and veal assumed per capita consumption levels (Kdhead)
Other exogenous variables (price of animal feed, price index of gross domestic product, and imports of
live animals except bulls) are assumed to remain stable relative to the recent period.
The second step consists of making a variantial scenario involving a shock on one chosen exogenous
variable in the first year of the simulation period (all other exogenous variables remaining unchanged
relatively to the baseline scenario). A shock of l% is applied to this variable in the first year, and this
number recovers its initial level the following years. t" Then, year after year, changes in every
endogenous variable can be compared to baseline scenario levels, and can be expressed in terms of
elasticities.
This exercise is carried out for the following key exogenous variables:
- the number of male premiums,
- the number of suckler cow premiums
- the level of the intervention price.
Effects are mainly observed on cattle (for the various categories), net productions, and prices
9.3.2.1. Elasticities to the number of male premiums
In all countries, the instantaneous effect (measured by the short-run or impact elasticity) of the number
of male premiums is positive on net production of veal and negative, but nearly nil, on net production
137 The purpose here is not to assess the effect of a sustained change in an exogenous variable, such as the
number of premiums for example, which would actually be the real consequence of a policy reforrr! but to
compute elasticities of key variables to the number of premiums. In this airq it is necessary that the number of
premiums recovers its previous level, after the shock.
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of beef (cf. Table 9.9). t" The long-run (or cumulative) elasticites remain negative for the net
production of veal in all countries except France, where the long-run effect is zero. More importantly,
the long-run elasticity of the net production of beef to the number of male premiums is positive and
about 0.4 for France and Germany, but nearly zero for Italy and the United-Kingdom. This suggest
that in the four countries, the number of male premiums has relatively low effects on the net
production ofbeef.
Table 9.9. Elasticities of the net production of beef and veal with respect to the number of male
premiums
In all countries, the instantaneous effect of the number of male premiums on cattle is zero for both
calves and adult cattle (cf. Table 9.10). The long-run elasticity of calf herd is positive in all countries
but ltaly. The long-run elasticities of adult cattle are logically of the same sign than the long-run
elasticities of the net production of beef. The value is exactly the same for France (0.40)' but lower in
Germany (0.23 as compared to 0.45 for the long-run elasticity of beef net production).
Table 9.10. Elasticities of herds with respect to the number of male premiums
The elasticities of producer prices to the number of male premiums generally reflect the effects of
these premiums on net productions. For example, in France and Germany, the impact elasticities of the
net production of veal with respect to the number of male premiums are negative. Meanwhile, the
138 As regards to net production of veal, the elasticities estimated for UK must be considered with caution due to
the very low production of veal in this counÇ.
395
Veal Beef
Impact Long-run Impact Long-run
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
-0.25
-0.41
-0.19
-1.68
0.00
-0.19
-0.35
-1.66
-0.03
0.05
-0.02
-0.00
0.40
0.45
-0.08
0.06
Calves Adult cattle
Impact Long-run Impact Long-run
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
0.05
0.03
-0.03
0.01
0.45
0.25
-0.18
0.07
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.40
0.23
-0.16
0.06
corresponding elasticities for the producer prices of veal are positive. One notes the same converse
relationship for long-run elasticities, still for France and Germany. They are positive for net
production of beef and negative for the beef producer prices. Table 9.11 shows that the long-run
elasticities of the producer prices of both veal and beef are nearly nil for Italy and the UK. These
results suggest that, for example, a decrease in the number of male premiums will induce a slight
increase in the producer prices of beef and veal in France and Germany, but will have nearly no effect
on these prices in ltaly and the UK.
Table 9.11. Elasticities of the producer prices of beef and veal with respect to the number of
male premiums
These global effects may recover contrasted, and sometimes opposite effects, according to the
categories of animals. For example, In France, the long-run elasticity of the net production of beef to
the number of male premiums is 0.4. In fact, this elasticity is 0.71 for net production of bull meat, 0.66
for heifers, 0.35 for cows, but the effect is negative on steer production, with an elasticity of 
-1.0.
9.3.2.2. Elasticities to the number of suckler cow premiums
A shock applied to the number of suckler cow premiums has effects on productions, prices, and herds,
but only some years after this shock has been implemented. Instantaneous effects are always nearly
zero. The long-run elasticities of net production are positive for both veal and beef (cf. Table g.l2).In
tum, the corresponding elasticities of producer prices are negative. However, effects on prices are
rather low, and sometimes nearly zero (cf. Table 9.14).
Long-run elasticities of calf herd and adult cattle to the number of suckler cow premiums are generally
very close to those relative to net production of veal and beef. Globally, elasticities of net production
of veal and beef and of cattle are not very large, except in Germany. Note that the direct elasticity of
suckler herds to the number of suckler cow premiums is about 1.5 in Italy (but the suckler herd
accounts for only 20oÂ of the total cow herd in Italy), 0.7 in Germany, only 0.3 in France and zero in
the UK.
Veal Beef
Impact Long-run Impact Long-run
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
0.35
0.17
0.00
0.03
-0.03
0.09
0.00
0.03
0.03
-0.03
0.01
0.00
-0.46
-0.25
0.07
-0.06
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Veal Beef
Impaet Long-run Impact Long-run
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.t7
0.50
0.29
0.11
-0.07
-0.00
-0.03
0.00
0.12
0.35
0.09
0.07
Table 9.12. Elasticities of the net production of beef and veal to the number of suckler cow
premiums
Tabte 9.13. Elasticities of herds to the number of sucler cow premiums
Table 9.14. Etasticities of producer prices of beef and veal with respect to the number of suckler
cow premiums
9.3.2.3. Elasticities to the intervention price
Instantaneous elasticities ofthe producer prices ofbeefand veal to the intervention price (expressed in
national currencies) are naturally close to those which are directly derived from the estimated beef and
veal price equations (due to the linear form of these equations, and because the intervention price
appears only in these price equations). They indicate that generally a shock in the intervention price is
nearly entirely hansmitted to the producer prices of veal and beef at the same period (cf' Table 9. l5).
Due to lagged effects on production, the corresponding long-run elasticities are lower. Furthermore, in
the case of France, the long-run elasticity of the beef price to the intervention price is negative: the
Calves Adult cattle
Impact Long-run Impact Long-run
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.50
0.25
0.17
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.22
0.52
0.27
0.16
Veal Beef
Impact Long-run Impact Long-run
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.25
-0.17
-0.00
-0.00
0.07
0.00
0.02
0.00
-0.16
-0.17
-0.08
-0.14
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effect is positive in the first year, but this positive effect is compensated by negative effects in the
following years. This is due to the fact that the expected producer price has negative effects on adult
male slaughterings, which are higher in France than in other countries. These negative effects
overcompensate the positive effects induced by the cattle increase. Finally, the total compensation of
the instantaneous positive effect occurs after about ten years. Moreover the computation of cumulative
effects on a longer period leads to a negative long-run elasticity.
Table 9.15. Elasticities of the producer prices of beef and veal with respect to the intervention
price
A change in the intervention price affects the net production of beef and veal and cattle only during the
years following the shock. The main reason is that the intervention price first affects the producer
prices, which, in turn, modift all producers'decisions with a time lag. In all countries, the long-run
elasticities of the net production of veal with respect to the intervention price are positive (cf. Table
9.16). They are close to one in Germany, Italy and the UK, but only 0.6 for France. The long-run
elasticities of the net production of beef are positive in all countries too. They are higher in France
(0.7) and Germany (1.0) than in Italy and the U.K. (0.2 to 0.3). Similar effects on calf and adult cattle
are observed, but elasticities are more homogeneous across countries: except for the UK, the
elasticities of calf herds are about 0.6 to 0.8 in all countries, while elasticities of adult cattle are about
0.7 (cf. Table 9.17).
Table 9.16. Elasticities of the net production of beef and veal with respect to the intervention
price
Veal Beef
Impact Long-run Impact Long-run
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
0.96
1.00
0.68
I.OB
0.1I
0.70
0.68
r.07
0.61
0.95
0.82
1.79
-0.r6
0.42
0.64
1.48
Veal Beef
Impact Long-run Impact Long-run
tr'rance
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.58
0.83
0.81
1.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.67
1.00
0.20
0.30
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Calves Adult cattle
Impact Long-run Impact Long-run
tr'rance
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.69
0.83
0.55
0.35
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.6s
0.73
0.75
0.34
Table 9.17. Elasticities of herds to the intervention price
Finally, it appears that the intervention price has more significant effects on the various endogenous
variables than the number of premiums granted. For example in France, the long-run elasticity of the
net production of beef to the intervention price is 0.65, while the long-run elasticities of this variable
with respect to the number of male premiums and to the number of suckler cow premiums are,
respectively, only 0.4 and 0.12. Similar conclusions can be made for the other countries, even if in
some cases the respective elasticities have very low values'
9.4. Policy simulations
The national models have been used to simulate two basic policy scenarios' The first one is the
baseline scenario. As this baseline scenario includes the policy changes adopted within the Agenda
2000 reform, it allows to analyse the impacts of this reform on the considered national beef and veal
sectors. The second scenario focuses on one key instrument of the beef and veal CMO: the headage
payment system. In order to shed some light on the potential impacts of restricting the current
premium scheme (through a decrease in the various ceilings currently in force, such as the number of
eligible animals or the intensity ceiling for example), this second scenario assumes a-20oÂ decrease in
the number of premiums granted to farmers.
9,4.1. The haseline scenarto: The impacts of the Agenda 2000 reform
The baseline scenario relies on the same hypotheses than the one adopted for computing the dynamic
elasticities. Hencen globally, this scenario consists in the application of the Agenda 2000 final
decisions from 2000 to 2002 and a continuation of this policy afterwards (i.e., untill 2010). For
example, the levels of the unitary premiums decided in the Agenda 2000 reform are applied from 2000
to 2010 since they are assumed unchanged after the reform is implemented. A similar assumption is
adopted regarding the number of premiums granted. For each country and each category of animals,
they are assumed to remain at their 1999 until the end of the projection period (i.e.' 2010).
For the aggregated four countries (which account for about 60 to 65Yo of the EU15 beef and veal
production), this baseline scenario induces first a significant increase in the beefproduction until 2003,
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then a decrease until 2010 (-3.9%). These converse movements result in a slight increase over the l0
years projection horizon (+2.4%). For veal production, the baseline scenario leads to a significant
decrease until 2003 (-9.9%), and then a relative stability resulting in a -I0.7o/odecrease over the whole
period.
Figure 9'l' The impacts of the baseline scenario on beef and veal production at the four
countries aggregated level
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The baseline scenario induces differentiated changes in the four considered countries. For bee{, France
and UK experience an increase in production over the projection period. This increase is about +4yo in
France and +43yo in the UK (but it concerns a less important quantity). These increases are roughly
compensated by an important decrease in Germany (-Ig.8%).The adjustment of veal production over
the projection period is negative for all countries, but with different magnitudes: -9.6% in France, -
27 s% and Germany, and'S.lYo in Italy (net production of veal is nearly zero inthe UK).
9'4'2' The restrictive premium scheme scenario: The impacts of a 
-20% decrease in the numher of
premiams granted
The resfictive premium scheme scenario rely on the same assumptions than the baseline scenario
except the one relating to the number of premiums granted. In the baseline scenario, the numbers of
the various premiums granted to farmers are assumed to remain unchanged with respect to their 1999
observed levels, over the whole projection period. This concerns the number of first and second
payments of the male premium and the number of annual payments of the suckler cow premium. The
restrictive premium scheme scenario assumes a -20Yo decrease in the total number of premiums
granted (the number of first and second payments for male animals, and the number of suckler cow
premiums) during the first year of the simulation period. Note that in this scenario the change in the
number of premiums is maintained all over the simulation period. National models provide the effects
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of this policy change on all endogenous variables (cattle, net producton, prices)' In this paragraph' we
report and discuss the simulated effects on net productions only because they give a synthetic 
picture
of the overall induced adjustments within the national supplying beef and veal sectors
Computed dynamic elasticities, particularly of net productions with respect to the number 
of premiums
granted, already suggested that this policy instrument has a low impact on beef and veal supply in 
the
four considered countries. The simulation results of the restrictive premium scheme scenario 
confirms
this conclusion. The effects of this scenario on net production of beef and veal, relative 
to the baseline
scenario, are reported in table 9.18'
Table 9.18. The effects o1 a -20o/o decrease in the number of premiums granted on net
production ofbeef and veal (relative to the baseline scenario)
n.s.: no significant
simulation results show that even a drastic reduction in the number of premiums has nearly no effect
on the net production of veal at the aggregate level. \\e -20Yo decrease in the number of premiums
induces a decrease in the net production of beef, but, at the aggregate level, this decrease remains
relatively limited (_1.5% until 2003 and -5.3oÂ over the whole projection period). The decrease
observed at the aggregate level results mainly from slightly more important decreases experienced in
France and Germany (-s.3% and -9.5oÂ,respectively), Italy and the uK being nearly no affected by
the policy change.
The policy change that is simulated in this scenario is a cut-off in the number of all premiums' Effects
are differentiated among countries, but also among categories of animals' This last finding indicates
that a change in the awarding of premiums may have more significant consequences if it is targeted on
specific categories of animals. However, such targeted changes would probably induce cross effects
among categories of animals, such that impacts on targeted categories of animal could be partially
compensated by effects on other categories of animals'
Finally, one of the main findings of the present study, either through the computation of dynamic
elasticities or through the analysis of the impacts of policy reform scenarios, is that direct payment
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Net production of veal Net production ofbeef
2003 2010 2003 2010
France
Germany
Italy
United-Kingdom
+4.3%
+10.2%
+3.5%
n.s.
-0.8%
+3.0%
+1.8o/o
n.s.
-1.4%
-4.3%
+0.4%
+0.1%
-8.3%
-9.s%
-0.2%
-1.8%
Total +4.4% +a3lùÂ -1.5% -S.3Vo
such as the beef premium scheme in force in the CMO for beef and veal are rather decoupled in the
sense that they induce relatively low effects on production.
9.5. Conclusion and policy recommendations
A complete model of the beef and veal producing sector has been estimated for the four major
producing Member States. Each model focuses on the effects of economic and agricultural policy
variables on behavioural and biological relationships. Such models may be used to make simulations
of policy changes in the beef sector, that is mainly, of changes in direct aids (both unitary premiums
and the number of premiums granted), in milk quotas, or in the intervention price.
To assess the effects of such policy changes, the dynamic elasticities of the main endogenous variables
(cattle, production, and prices) with respect to the policy variables are computed through a simulation
method. They show, for example, that the number of premiums granted has no sizeable effects on net
productions of beef and veal, but that effects of the intervention price are more significant.
Then, an issue which is addressed here is the assessment of a more resfictive awarding of direct aids
through a cut-off in the number of premiums granted. Simulation results suggest that a change in the
number of premiums granted does not have a sizeable effect on net productions of beef and veal,
although impacts on herds and net productions vary across the various categories of animals and
among countries. A change in the number of male premiums has an incidence only on beef production,
not on veal production, but this effect is relatively limited.
Responses of the main European producing countries to policy changes are not homogenous. But,
generally and naturally, effects observed at the aggregate level are close to the ones observed in
France, which is the first producing Member State for both veal and beef.
One of the main results that can be drawn on our analysis is that the number of premiums (that is
essentially the density ceilings) is not an efficient instrument for regulating the EU supply of beef and
veal. Therefore, in order to affect significantly the beef and veal supply, the number of premiums
should not be used alone, but in conjunction with other policy instruments.
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APPENDIX 1.
Structure of the national models
The sfucture of the French model is presented. some slight differences may occur for models of other
countries. In this case, they are mentioned in appendix 3 when presenting the estimation results'
Names of endogenous variables are given in Table 9'l'
Calves
BICA t= cct(HEHE ,-1+ COHE ç)
CASL t= csl1. BICA I
CABR 1= cbrs. BICA t
SLCA t= slr,. CASLT
MCAH t = malt. CABR t
FCAH t = CABR t- MCAH t
fl,CA t= BICA t+ MLCA t- CAHE t- 1.02. SLCA t+ CASA u
CAHE t= CABR t+ CASL t- SLCA t
CASA t= CASL t- SLCA,
Bovine female animals older than I vear
HEHE s = FCAH ç1 + hrrt. HEHE br
(SLHE t+ n'HE t- MLHE ,) =hsx1. HEHE bl
SLHE 1= hsll. ( SLHE t + fl'HE t- MLHE )
DAHE, = Q - hn - hsx,). HEHE,-t. æ. 
dhn,.DAHE,-,
s(lHE, = Q - hn - hsx,\ HEHE,-t. ffi* thn,.s(JHE ,-,
SLCO ,= (1 - dhrr).DAHE ,-, + (1-shrr).SUHE ïl
Bovine male animals older than I vear
MAHET = yt .MCAH,-1 * mrrl (MAHE ù -$'ILMA )
SLMA, = (1 - Tt).MCAH rt + (l - mrr).( MAHE,+ MLCA t-NLMA t)
SLMA,= SLBU, + Sr,tf 
'
SLBU t+ XVLMA 1= buslxl. MAHE Fr
Sf,SI , = sts[. MAHE ït
SLBU t= bus\. ( SLBU t+ XVLMA )
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Net nroduction of veal and adult cattle
NPVE 1: cesw1. SLCA t
NPHE ,= hasw,.SLHE
NPCO,=coasw1.SLCO,
Snecification of the kev variables of the model
The various rates
where:
NPBU r = buasw,.SLBU
NPST t: staswl.SlST ,
NPAÇ = NPHfi + NPCO, + NPBUT +NPST.
y = { cc, csl, cbr, slr, mal, hrr,læx,Itsl, dhrr, shrr, T , fiTr, buslx, bosl, bust }
y*
v. 
--To.1+exp(-X,fl '
y* is the upper limit choosen fory,,
X,is a vector of explanatory variables
p is a vector of parameters,
a, is an error term.
The average slaughter weights
Calves:
Heifers:
Cows
Bulls:
Steers
indexes of producer prices
casw+
CASIç. =-+ €
' I+exp(-X,B) '
- hasw*hasw. = ---_--r-_- * t
' I + ecpl- X,p) t
coasw+
COASW. = 
------_-- 
f t.
' I + expl- X,p) t
. buasw*DUASW.=------=*6
' I + expl- X,p) '
stasw*
S|ASW. = 
--_---'- 
* 6.
' I + expl- X,p) '
Calves (ffi),=x, f *e,
(ffi),=x, Êie,Adult cattle:
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APPENDIX 2.
List of the exogenous variables
ipgdp,
ipfeed,
tap_spma|,
tap spma2t
tap_bu1
tap stt
tdp_scpt
milk,
intpl
Price index of gross domestic product (1990=100)
Animal feed price index
Total amount of the first payment of the special premium for male
animals (bulls and steers)
Total amount of the second payment of the special premium for male
animals (bulls and steers)
Total amount of the special premium for bulls
Total amount of the special premium for steers
Total amount of suckler cow premiums
Milk quota (assumed equal to the milk collected, before 1984)
Nominal intervantion Price
Each variable "total amount of premiums" (tap-*) is the product of the number of premiums granted
by the unitary level of the Premium.
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APPEIIDIX3.
Estimation results
FRANCE
(t-statistics are provided in parenthesis)
Constant -2.926
(-2.84)
1.794
(5.3e)( ) t-l
Table 9.19. Estimation results for the calf model
0.518
(15.5)
1.235
(3.72)
-1.594
(-2.t4)
1.607
(3.60)(Pl),-,tpgdp
milk,
tpc4
ipsdp
nilk,-1
tap spmal 
,
CCLSWpl
1.039
(20.8)
0.538.10{
(6.41)
1.280
(1.04)
-1.083
(-2.84)
0.474.104
(1.18)
Average slaughter
weight
(casw* =i,30)
0.519
(0.13)
0.036
(1.44)
-2.032
(-2.2e)
0.102.10'3
(3.t7)
-0.334.10{
(-5.e3)
,ipfeed,(:---T-lr-l
ry8ap
R,
DW
0.87
1.15
Table 9.20. Estimation results for heifers for slaughtering and export
xt bsx,
(bsx'=0.3)
Constant
milkl
tap_scpl
3.745
(2.80)
-0.614,104
(-1.s8)
-0.383.10{
(-3.6r)
-1.268
(-2.81)
Rz :0.40
DW: t.97
Calf crop
(cc* =0.7) slaughtering
(csf =0.75)
Slaughtering
rate
(slr* =0.95)
Calves for Calves for
breeding
(cbr*=0.75)
Male calves
for breeding
(mal* =0.50)
0.59
1.48
0.65
0.81
0.61
0.91
0.70
1.07
0.46
1.76
( ip"t \
Itotdo ),-,
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Table 9.21. Estimation results for the rates of cow replacement
X dairy herd
dhrr,
(dhrr*=0.9)
suckler herd
shrr,
(shrr+ =0.9
Constant
milk, 
-milk,-,
DAHE, 
- 
DAHE,-I
1.745
(25.03)
0.240.104
(1.8e)
2.086
(17.02)
R2 = 0.14
DW:1.75
-0.123.10'2
(-2.1l)
R2 = 0.17
DW =2.19
Table 9.22. Estimation results for the heifer and cow average slaughter weights
X,
Constant
haswç1
Heifers
(hasw*:370)
xt
Constant
COASWl-1
Cows
(coasw* =350)
-8.704
(-1e.38)
0.035
(24.1)
R2-0.96
DW:1,96
(ipfua\
\ tpsdp ),
-3.126
(-3.3s)
0.019
(7.24)
-0.456
(-1.e0)
R2=0.97
DW=0.80
Table 9.23. Estimation results for the herd of adult males
xt /t
T* =0.55
,nrrt
rnrr+ =l
Constant -3.756
(-1.40)
tup-spmal, 0.221J0-s
(1.73)
0.060
(0.0e)
tap 
_spma2, 0.317.10-6(0.5e)
4.584 0.404(l.ee) (1.04)
R2:0.96 Dl4r=2.14
RMSE:3.23%
(ip*\
\tpcdo ),-,
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Table 9'24. Estimation results for the rates of slaughtering (plus export for bulls) of adult males
(nlLMAt = X-MA,- MLMA) (assume K,ST, = MLST, = 0 =) nrLMAt = fr.8(J1_ MLBU)
(SLXMBU. = fr{LMA1+ SLBU)
n'BUtand MLBU,arerespectivery acports and imports of buils,
XLST and MLST, are respectively exports and imports of steers
SLXMBV: busk1. (MCAHt-r + MAHET_)
SLS|1= stsl1. (MAHE'_)
SLB\= SLMAT-SLST.
n{LMAt= SLXMBU,- SLBUT
xt
( ipct \
l,ordo ),-,
( ipct \
lipsdp ),-,
Constant
tap 
_bu,
xt
Constant
buasw,_,
Bulls
(busk*=l.1
1.033
(2.7e)
-0.199.10-7
(-0.10)
-1.429
(-5. le)
Bulls
(buasw+ =550)
-0.687
(-1.74)
0.479.rc'2
(5.55)
-0.301
(4.35)
R2:0.96
DI'y-1.33
xt
Constant
tap 
_st,
X,
Constant
stasw,_r
Steers
(stsl.:0.9)
1.467
(2.01)
-0.227J0-5
(-7.87)
-0.715
(-1.e4)
-0.113.10-2
(-3.1e)
=0,82
-0.94
Dll=0.90 DW:1.52
Table 9.25. Estimation results for the bull and steer average slaughter weights
slbu,_,
( ipf"ra\
\,ordo ),
Steers
(stasw+:550)
-0.7t9
(-1.3s)
0.489.10-2
(4.27)
-0.274
(-3.r3)
R2=0.96
Dll=1.69
408
Table 9.26. Estimation results for the real indexes of producer prices (national currencies)
Calves Adult cattle
Constant
Real intervention Price
expressed in national
currency
Excess supply
-0.229
(-0.ee)
0.431.10-3
(5.22)
-0.501.10t
(-4.37)
0.276
(1.62)
0.245.10-3
(2.86)
-0.556.10'3
(-8.16)
R2 = 0.88
DW = 1.56
R2 = 0.98
DW =2.40
409
GERMAIYY
(t-statistics are provided in parenthesis 
- 
for nearly all relationships, a dummy variable equal to I in I 991 and zero otherwise
is introduced to take into account the German reunification, but the conesponding coefficients are not reported here)
Table 9.27. Estimation results for the calf model
Average slaughter
weight
(casw+=130)
Constant
-3.910
(-2.3s)
rJ!!!-t\. , ,t-ltpgdp
tapjscp,
tap_spmal 
,
CdS14p1
,ipfeed ,t-:--;-/r-t
rygap
0.056
(4.es)
-0.194
(-0.57)
RT
DIiV
0.81
t.54
Table 9.28. Estimation results for heifer catûe (hehe)
HEH& = rd/b,. FCAHtt + hrrt. HEHET-I
xt rd/b,
(rdfc*=9.961
hrr,
(hrr+ =0.4)
Constant 2.349
(re.0)
-0.920
(-8.e1)
1.t73
(10.4)
-0.267
(-3.2s)
( ip"o\
lipsdp ),-,
( iptt \
lipsdp ),-,
Rz :0.97
Dn- 1.55
R2 = 0.82
DlIr = 0.85
Calf crop
(cc+:0.85)
Calvesfor Slaughtering
0.75
Male calves
for breeding
(mal+=0.50)
0.336
(2.44)
0.978
(8.48)
3.495
(37.e)
-0.692J0'5
(4.58)
-0.248.10'5
(-3.66)
o.9t7JO6
(2.36)
0.91
1.04
0.39
t.t4
0.21
1.25
0.63
0.90
Calves for
breeding
(cbr*: I.)
1.853
(25.0)
rate
(fixed)
slaughtering
(csl+ =0.2)
t.294
(e.e7)
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Table 9.29. Estimation results for heifers for slaughtering and export
SLHET + XLHET 
- 
MLH&: bs4 . FCAHil + fi. HEHEpI
X, bsx,
(bsx* =1.3) (Ë 0.4)P,
Constant -3.955
(-14.8)
0.969
(3.1 1)
-1.203
(-5.07)
( ip"t \
l,oroo ),-,
1.405
(7.01)
R' :0.92
DW: t.49
Rz = 0.59
DW:1.14
Table 9.30. Estimation results for heifer slaughtering
SLHE, = hsl1. 6LH& + )(I'HE: - MLHE)
xt hsl,
(hsl*:1.1
Constant 2.233
(3.62)
( ipct \
l,oroo ),-,
0.837
(1.54)
Rz = 0.22
DW: 0.4i
Table 9.31. Estimation results for the rates of cow replacement
X, dairy herd
dhrrt
(dhrf =1.)
suckler herd
shrr,
*=1.)
Canstant
milk, 
-milk,-,
tap jscpt
0.873
(2s.4)
0.230.10'3
(8.80)
1.006
(6.08)
-0.304.10-3
(-r.64)
0.381.10-6
(0.14)
R2 = 0.24
DW=1.65
R2 = 0.14
DW=1.75
4lr
Table 9.32. Estimation results for the heifer and cow average slaughter weights
xt
Constant
haswr-1
Heifers
(hasw+:300)
-0.683
(-0.33)
0.013
(1.82)
-0.541
(-2.87)
R2=0.84
DW:2,01
xt
Constant
COAsWç1
Cows
(coasw+ =300)
-2.383
(-0.62)
0.022
(1.6e)
-0.743
(-3.se)
R2=0.81
DW:2.32
(ipfua\
l,otdo ),
( ipfna\
Itoroo 1,
Table 9.33. Estimation results for the herd of adult males
x1 /t
l* :0.8
lnrrt
mrf+ =0.2
tap 
_spmal,
tap 
_spma2,
Constant 0.858
(23.8)
0.467.rc'6
(2.36)
-0.178
(-0.80)
0.612.10-5
(2.73)
0.175(t.t2)
R2:0.57
DII-1.56
( ip"t \
\Çgap),-,
R2=0.78
DI(=L2I
Table 9.34. Estimation results for the rates of slaughtering (plus export for bulls) of adult males
(mLMh = )AMfu- MLMA) (assume fl,57, = MLST, = 0 =) mLMAt: X,B(J1- MLBU)
(SLXMBU. = X'{LMA, + SLBU)
n'Bq and MLBU, are respectively exports and irnports of bulrs,
n S\ and MLST, are respectively exports and imports of steers
SLXMB\ = buslx,. (MCAHt-t + MAHET_)
SLSTT= stsl1. (MCAH.4 + MAHET-)
SLBV= SLMA'-SLST.
mLM{ = SLXMBU, _ SLMAT+ SZS?î
4t2
( ipct \
\,ordo ), ,
xl
Constant
tap 
_bu,
Bulls
(buslx*:1.)
0.925
(8.22)
-0.224.rc'6
(-1.17)
-0.179
(-2.48)
Bulls
(buasw+:370)
4.015
(-r.80)
0.021
(3.68)
-0,469
(-1.80)
R2:0.92
DW:2.06
xt
Constant
tap 
_stt
slbu
xt
Constant
staswFl
Steers
(stsl+:0.9)
4.855
(4.13)
-0.446J04
(-s.48)
-0.165.10-2
(-3.41)
Steers
(stasw*:360)
r-l
:0.69 :0.64
Dll=1.73 Dl4/:0.71
Table 9.35. Est'mation results for the bull and steer average slaughter weights
X
Constant
buasw,_,
0.526
(0.2s)
0.806.10-2
(1.41)
-0.684
(-2.26)(ip1ua\
l,rtdo ),
(apa\
[t rdo ),
R2:0.58
Dll-0.87
Table 9.36. Estimation results for the real indexes of producer prices (national currencies)
Calves Adult cattle
Constant
Real intervention price
expressed in national
currency
Excess supply
-0.296
(-1.45)
0.140.10-2
(e.36)
-0.563.10-2
(-1.83)
0.070
(0.38)
0.110.10-2
(3.s8)
-o.27gJO'3
(-3.s4)
p 0.38
(1.47)
0.92
(10.8)
R2 :0.92
DW = I.7I
R2 :0.99
DW :2.32
4t3
ITALY
(t-statistics are provided in parenthesis)
Calf crop
(cc* =0.7)
Constant 2.654
(1.70)
3.15
(1.02)
Table 9.37. Estimation results for the calf model
Table 9.38. Estimation results for heifer catfle (hehe)
HEH&= rdfc,. FCAHil + hrrt. HEHET_I
xt
/ tpca \(:---;/r-r
tpgdp
, ipct ,t---,-/r-r
rygap
tap spmal,
4.3t1
(-2.41)
hrr,
(hn+=0.5)
Average slaughter
weight
(casw+ =150)
4.186
(6.70)
-1.689
(-2.97)
0.41
2.27
,ipfeed,(:-, Jr-ltpgqp
R,
Drv
rdfc,
(rdfc*=11
Constant -1.220
(-0.85)
3.4t4
(2.63)
0.662
(4.38)
0.213
(0.e5)
( iprt \
lt*do),-,
R' :0.37
Dll = LI5
R' = 0.16
DW:2.67
Calves for
slaughtering
(csl* =0.7)
Slaughtering
(slr+ =0.95)
rate
Calves for
breeding
(cbr*=1.)
Male calves
for breeding
(mal*=0.51)
1.412
(12.4) 2.090(3.ee)
-0.394.10'8
(-1.87)
0.151.10-7
(1.5s)
0.486
(0.61)
3.250
(2.06)
-2.t84
(-2.42)
1.642
(1.18)
-5.360
(-1.e4)
4.973
(3.15)
0.60
1.28
0.37
1.03
0.35
1.29
0.59
1.59
0. l8
0.79
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Table 9.39. Estimation results for heifer slaughtering(slhe)
SLHET = 11 - rdfc) . FCAHç1 +6t. HEHEg + MLHET
(all heifer imports are assumed to be slaughtered the sarneyear, and XLHfi= 0)
xt 6,(f =0.5)
Constant 2.419
(2.83)
-0.200.10-7
(-4.13)
-1.036
(-2.21)
tap 
_scpt
R'z :0.58
DW:1.83
Table 9.40. Estimation results for the rates of cow replacement
( ipct \
l,oroo ),-,
DAHET -- (t 
- 
t o 
- 
a,). nnun,-r.ffi+ dhn,.DAHE,-,
suHEt =Q - hrr - d,). unun,-r.W+ sht,.s(JHE,-,
X, dairy herd
(dhrr)
suckler herd
(shrr)
(dhrr*=0.9) (shw* =0.9)
/ 
'Pca \\. . ,lt-ltpgdp
milk, 
-milk,-,
Constant 2.039
(27.8)
1.171
(3.43)
0.732
(2.7s)
-0.205.10'2
-2.00)
0.152.10-3
(0.e3)
DAHE, 
- 
DAHE,-I
= 0.12
DW =0.55
R2:0.42
DW= 1.65
4t5
SLCO ,= (1 - dhrr).DAHE ,-, + (l-shrr)'SUHE Fl
Table 9.41. Estmation results for the heifer and cow average slaughter weights
X,
Constant
hasw,_,
Heifers
(hasw+=270)
-1.434
(-1.70)
0.018
(s.62)
-0.571
(-5.62)
R2=0.93
DIY=1.15
X,
Constant
coaswt_l
coaswF2
Cows
(coasw+ =270)
( ipT""a\
l,prdp ),
( ipf"ea\
ltpsdp ),
t.441
(0.48)
0.013
(1.28)
-0.794.rc'z
(-r.43)
-0.312
(-2.27)
R2-0.46
DtIt:1.61
Table 9.42. Estimation resurts for the herd of adurt mares
MAH& = vmat, (MCAH.4 + MNLBU) * ftûrt. MAHET_'
(MNLBU1 = MLBU,- )n BU) (assume X,BU.=Q and fl.STs = MLST, = Q)
X.BUtand MLBU,are respectively aeports and imports of bulls,
mST and MLST, are respectively exports and imports of steers
xt vma, nltTt
(vma+=0.6) (mrr+:0.5)
-1.960
(-5.3s)
Constant 0.216
(4.2e)
tap 
-spma\r 0.202.10'8(1.75)
tap 
_spmal,
+
tap 
_spma2,
0.678.10-8
(2.4e)
0.529
(2.45)
R2=0.26
DW:1.1s
( ipct \
Itoroo ),-,
R2-0.20
Dll=0.62
4t6
Table 9.43. Estimation results for the bull slaughterings (slhu)
SLB\= buslt. (MCAHç: + MAHEtt + MNLBU)
xt busl,
(busl*:0.8)
Constant 2.186
(3e.e)
-0.263.10'8
(-1.83)tap _bu,
R2=0.29
DtV:0.98
SLMAT= Q-vma) . (MCAHbt + MNLBU) + (1 -mrr).MAHEil
Slaughterings of steers : SLSTI= SLMAT- SLBUT
Table 9.44. Estimation results for the bull and steer average slaughter weights
X
Constant
buasw,-,
Bulls
ftuasw*=350)
-0.811
(-0.76)
0.011
(3.67)
-0.613
(-4.13)
xt
Constant
staswFl
Steers
(stasw*:350)
(ipfua\
\,ordo ),
(ipfua\
\tord, ),
0.238
(0.20)
0.446J0'2
(1.12)
-0.040
(-0.33)
92 :0.09
DW:],04 DW=1.66
Table 9.45. Estimation results for the real indexes of producer prices (national currencies)
Calves Adult cattle
Constant
Real intervention Price
expressed in national
currency
Excess supply -0.274.rc4
(-0.03)
-0.529.10-3
(-2.s6\
0.267
(1.s6)
0.123.10-5
(4.88)
0.043
(0.re)
0.137.10r
(2.8s)
p 0.09
(0.26)
0.83
(13.0)
R2:0,79
DW:1.97
R2 :0.98
DW =2.28
4r7
t]I[ITED-KINGDOM
(t-statistics are provided in parenthesis)
Table 9.46. Estimation results for the calf model
Average slaughter
weight
(casw+=60)
-4.985
(-2.e6)
Constant
, ipca ,\;--:,tr_rtpgdp
, ipct ,(l-;/r-r
rygap
tap spmal,
tapjtcpt
,ipfeed,t:---;-/r-t
tpgap
CASWç1
milk,
R2
DW
1.278
(s.72)
0.470
(2.s7)
0.22
-0.667
(-2.et) -1.751(4.53)
-0.585
(-1.73)
2.889
(6.65)
-0.195.104
(4.3e)
Table 9.47. Estimation results for heifer cattle (hehe)
x, hrr,
(hrr. 
-0.45)
Constant -0.449
(-r.e4)
1.228
(6.34)
R2 = 0.63
DIï = L93
0.058
(4.3e)
0.232.rc'3
(r.e3)
0.63
0.60
2.06
( ipa\
lipgap ),-,
Calf crop
(cc*=0.6)
Calvesfor Slaughtering
slaughtering
(csl+:0.15) (slr+=1.)
rate
Calves for
breeding
(cbr* = I)
Male calves
for breeding
(mal*=0.51)
2.447(tt.7\ 3.14t(23.2)
0.986.10-5
(2.81)
-0.657.10-5
(-3.4e)
0.45
0.47
0.73
l.t7
0.34
0.84
0.34
0.s0
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Table 9.48. Estimation results for heifer slaughtering(slhe)
SLH& = 6t.( HEHEI4 + MLHET- n'HE)
xr 6,
(t=0.5)
Constant
milkl-milk1-1
2.862
(8.0e)
-0.351.10'3
(-2.22)
-1.446
(-4.es)
( ip"t \
\ipsdp ),-,
Rz - 0.63
Dll= 1.91
Table 9.49. Estimaûon results for the râtes of cow replacement
DAHE t = Q - hrr - a,) unnn,-r. W + dhrr,.DAHE,-,, t_l
suHE t = Q - hrr - d,\ nznn,-r. ffi + shrr,.suHE,-,
X dairy herd
(dhrr)
(dhrr* =0.9)
suckler herd
(sho)
(shrr* =0.9)
Constant
milk, 
-milk,-,
DAHE, 
- 
DAHEFI
2.245
(30.7)
0.120.10-3
(0.70)
2.s09
(11.e)
-0.548.10'
(-2.37)
R2 = 0.20
DW= 1.37
R2 = 0.02
DW =2.17
SLCO ,= (1 - dhrr).DAHE 
'-, 
+ (1-shrr).SUHE Èl
4t9
Table 9.50. Estimation results for the heifer and cow average slaughter weights
xt
Constant
hasw,-,
Heifers
(hasw+:280) Cows(coasw+=290)X
( Dfe"a\
ltpsdp ),
(ipfua\
ltpsdp ),
-?.289
(-3.47)
0.041
(s.e3)
-0.381
(-r.03)
Constant
coaswFl
-5.320
(-2.1e\
0.032
(3.77)
-0.466
(-1.22)
R2=0.91
DûI/=0.90
R2:0.51
DIT-2.43
Table 9.51. Estimatlon resurts for the herd of adult mares
MAH\ = ys. MCAH,_1 * mrrt.( MAHE.T 
- 
ÛILMA)
n MAt = fr.8U1+ fl,STt
MLM{=MLBUI+MLST.
(Û'{LMA = fr.Mfu- MLMA) (assume K-B(J, =0 and K.ST, = MLST, = 0 =) nILMAt = _ MLBU)
-n'BLIt and MLBU, are respectively arports and imports of bulls,
n Sn and MLST, are respectively exports and imports of steers
xt
Yt
rf=0.9)
fltt
(nrr+=0.4)
( ip"t \
lipgap ),-,
Constant 0.346
(1.0)
0.916
(3.21)
R2=0.46
Dllt=0.78
0.122
(0.63)
0.366
(2.28)
R2=0.20
DW:I.63
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Table 9.52. Estimation results for the bull slaughterings (sls{,)
xt slst, / (mcah,-1 * maheç1 - xnlma)
(stsl+:0.7)
Constant 0.784
(17.0)
-0.929.10-s
(-5.05)tap _stt
Rt:0.60
DW:0.79
SLM{= (|-vma) . (MCAHù + MNLBU) + (l-mrr).MAHEu
-> Slaughterings of bulls : SLBUT= SLMAT- SLSTT
Table 9.53. Estimation results for the bull and steer average slaughter weights
xt Bulls xt Steers(stasw+:350)(buasw*:350)
Constant
bu.asw,-,
-2.778
(-3.20)
0.016
(s.80)
-0.324
(-2.81)
Constant
stasw,-,
-5.602
(-r4.2)
0.025
(1e.1)
(ipfna\
Itordo ),
R':0.69
DW:1,98
:0.94
DW:1,24
Table 9.54. Estimation results for the real indexes of producer prices (national currencies)
Calves Adult cattle
Constant
Real intervention price
expressed in national
curÎency
Excess supply
-0.015
(-0.04)
0.388.10'2
(2.84)
-0.369
(-3.07)
0.520.10'
(12.s)
-0.013
(-0.40)
-0.293.10'3
(-1.8s)
P 0.44(2.28)
0.s0
(3.78)
R2 = 0.51
DW :1.28
R2 = 0.96
DW =2.19
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10 - A SOFT\ryARE FOR DEPICTING TIIE REGIONAL MARKET OF AI\ APPELLATION
OF ORIGIN
The Common Market Organisation for wine: A shift from price support policy to quality
support policy
what are the rights to supply regulations for subsidiary organisations?
Eric Giraud-Héraud, Jacques Laye and Hervé Tanguy
Partner 2: INRA-ESR, Grignon
10.1. Introduction
With an average of 60Yo of the production and consumption, 70Yo of imports and 83Yo of exports for
45% of cultivated land surface, the European Union dominates the world wine-producing sector. Its
ultimate production surpasses 12 billion Euro, 2 billion of which come from markets outside of the
European Community. However, since 1975-1976,the cultivated surface area of vineyards in Europe
has been constantly decreasing due to European measures taken by the Common Market Organisation
(CMO) limiting new plantations and giving bonuses for stopping production permanently. The surface
area has thus slipped from 4.5 million hectares to 3.4 million between t976 and 1996 and production
from 210 million hl to 155 million hl.
The CMO wine-producing indusûry is, without a doubt, the most complex regulation of any of the
coÏnmon agricultural policy to the extent that it not only covers classical questions regarding each
CMO (prices, intervention, exchanges etc.), but also other more specific questions pertaining to the
wine sector (oenology practices, and details relating to production and marketing). The new regulation
(rule (CE) n" 1493/1999) proposes freezing plantation rights with a distribution of aid towards high
added value operations (a policy favouring quality). Important directives have been taken concerning
market techniques (rule no L622/2000) and the explicit integration of the VQPRD into the CMO (rule
nol607/200). From the point of view of market techniques we observed a relative simplification of
intervention methods on the table wine market with the suppression of the orientation price and the
reduction of the distillation system ( particularly by the elimination of required distillation).
However, on the economic level, the point which seems to us the most determining in the end is that
the new CMO in Title IV enlarges the role of producer organisations and sectoral organisations. The
objective of the organisations whose decisions most often become compulsory, now no longer limits
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itself to a policy of product advertising and sharing Research and Development. It concerns among
other things intervening more and more explicitly on the business level through a regulation of the
supply in order to maintain a qualitative level of the products which correspond mostly to an
appellation of origin. Article 41 of Title rv of the cMo makes the provision that the producer
organisations and sectoral organisations can define the marketing rules dealing with the regulation of
supply when they are first put on the market (the stocking and staggered distribution of the products)
insofar as there would not be an excessive blockage at harvest or price fixing even as an indication.
Nevertheless, the fact that the decisions of the subsidiary organisations have been made obligatory
requires a constant reminder from the point of view of the risks involved with a compulsory co-
ordination of marketable quantities. Indeed, this interference with free commerce could appear
dangerous from a public interest point of view and it is necessary to examine whether the measures
taken conform to EC rulings which are based on the interests of producers and marketers as well as
those of consumers. Thus, in a series of cases dealing with mandatory financing of French inter-
professionals, the European Court of Justice considered the said financing compatible with European
law as long as their activity is itself compatible with the right of competition.
Recent studies (Giraud-Héraud et al, 1998) show theoretically the formal connection which exists
between the appellations of origin and the regulation of supply on a decenhalised level. They make the
consequences generated for consumers (arbihation of quality-price) clear and give the economic
arguments which justify a system of appellation of origin based on an entry barrier for producers
which does not come from the appellation region'
on the empirical level, we set forth in the study a mathematical formalisation which permits
quantiffing the gains and losses related to the respect of a co-ordination mechanism for the launching
of products of wine production. Our study gives an evaluation of marketed quantities as well as an
evaluation of the average quality of the products of a region of appellation of origin and within the
framework of uncertain annual production. An economic assessment provides a quantified appraisal of
the role played by sectoral organisations which act as a docal monopoly> (hence the higher prices for
the consumer due to a scarcity of goods) in order to improve the average quality of wines on the
market.
Implementing computer software enables us to quantifu the effects on actual data of such a policy on
the producers' surplus and on consumers. The essential information for carrying out this economic
assessment is the specific characteristics of a vineyard at the supply level (production capacity in
relation to plantation rights, storing capacity and putting the production in reserve' etc.) and at the
demand level (size of the market and the possibility of valorisation with consumers) by explicitly
considering the structural characteristics connected to the variations of quality and quantity of the
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wine-growing region being considered. Moreover the simulations take into account the effect of
competition from other wines from different regions than the wine-growing region under study, but
which can serve as replacement wines in the eyes of the consumer.
In section 2, we present the rulings which deal with the sectoral organisations. Section 3 describes the
principles of supply regulations of sectoral organisations and deals with modelling as such. Section 4
describes simulated scenarios and synthesised obtained simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
10.2. Regulation and quality reserve
Within the framework of Title IV, the new CMO acknowledges the sectoral organisations. In
particular, Atticle 42 1.(c ) recognises as inter-professional organisations any individual who
undertakes, in one or more regions of the EU, several of the following actions, in recognition of
consumer interests:
(ii) contribution to a better co-ordination of the launching of products especially by research and
market studies;
(iv) intensification of the importance of production potentia;
(v) information and research necessary for the orientation of production towards products which are
more adapted to market requirements and to the tastes and expectations of consumers, especially in
matters of quality and environmental protection;
(vii) Adiustment of methods and instruments to improve product quality at all stages of production, of
wine processing and marketing.
However, in accordance with Article 42,the Member States recognise the organisations on condition:
2.(e) that they do not affect the elficient operation of the market organisation and do not have in their
activities those mentioned in Article 43 paragraph L
And in particular withdraw recognition if:
a. k ) 6i) the inter-professional organisation infringes on one or another ofthe prohibitions stated in
Article 43, paragraph I, without prejudice of the other sanctions incurred elsewhere in application or
national legislation.
Article 43.1 is a derogation of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome for actions taken by organisations
which do not have for a purpose:
(a) to allow whateverform of partitioning of the market within the EU;
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(b) to create discrimination or to eliminate competition for a substantial part of the products in
question;
(c) To create unnecessary distortions in competition to reach the objectives of common agricultural
p olicy followed by inter-profes sional action'
If we examine these considerations any regulatory measure should be the object of a study to
determine its impact from the point of view of competition policy.
In this context the establishment of a qualitative reserve by subsidiary organisations constitutes the
instrument for regulating the preferential offer which allows a decentralised management of the
supply. The need, which is felt more and more, to provide too much choice in marketed quality wines
each year is concomitant with a need for regulation of marketed quantities and therefore of an artificial
rise in prices for consumers. on the strictly economic level, it might be necessary to "gauge" the
quantity to be marketed each year in order to best adapt the offer to the demand of consumers'
concerning non-vintage wines, the creation of a qualitative reserve can go as far as allowing the
collection of several vintage wines to optimise the average qualitative level of marketed wines'
In that case, the creation of a qualitative reserve in a production pool might not meet conditions 
(a), (b)
and (c), cited above, even if most of the major European vineyards today plan to improve the
possibilities of strategic supply conffol with this system. The oldest examples we can give for the
management of a qualitative reserve are certainly those for Porto wine in Portugal and Champagne in
France, for which a system of "freezing and unfreezing" established by the "conseil Interprofessionel
des vins de Champagne,, has existed for a long time. This example will serve as the basic reference in
our model.
10.3. A simulation model
We simulate the commercialisation of a wine-growing region by supposing that we find ourselves in a
situation where a sectoral organisation imposes its shategic decisions on the other actors in the sector
with the objective of optimising the calculated profit. We suppose nevertheless' that there is
competition on the market from various other wines in terms of quality. customer demand is
concerned with the price of the product, but also with its quality, taken under its economic aspect as a
parameter positively affecting the willingness of the consumer to pay. considering the competitive
environment in which the vineyard finds itself, the quality of the competing wines on the market is
assumed to be the best response to the ùyerage quantity yield for the region under consideration'
The exogenous variables which are considered for characterising the potential supply of the vineyard
are as follows:
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the size of the vineyard in relation to obtained planting rights;
the agronomic output which, multiplied by the vineyard size corresponds to the actual quantity
produced;
- the objective quality ofthe grapes here represented by the degree ofalcohol content in relation to
the acidity of the variety of vine which is used;
- a maximum production (authorised production of appellation or buffer depending on the text),
beyond which the quantities must be done away with. Cultural practices are also limited insofar as
they only relay the means of distribution of the reserves on the quantity and the quality;
- an available wine production corresponding to the volume of grapes that each wine grower is
actually authorised to make into wine, multiplied by the percentage of wine obtained from processed
glapes;
- a maxlmum reserve guaranteeing that an excessively high proportion of previous yields does not
diminish the quality of the reserve;
- the quantity and the quality of wine placed on the market by the competing vineyard;
- the additional cost of production caused by producing high quality wine;
- a constant multiplier of the cost of the divergence from the targeted average quality.
Disregarding climate conditions, agronomic yields depend on numerous factors: the variety of grapes,
the age of the vineyard; its location, the planting methods, the cultivation practices, etc. Generally
speaking, beyond a certain point, high production is obtained to the detriment of wine quality. For the
exogenous fixed conditions in particular of the vineyard (i.e., in a ceteris paribus reasoning), there is
an inverse relation between control of production and official natural alcohol content which measures
the quality of the gapes. Production therefore has a double outcome: quantitative and qualitative.
However, when all these factors are established and the harvest is the fruit of a favourable climate,
quality most often accompanies quantity as observed ex-post. This phenomenon is even more
noticeable when we are dealing with a northern vineyard. h this case, the favourable conditions for
the growth of the vines are also those which permit the good ripening of the grapes.
10.3.1. The reference situation: Free marketing
We consider the situation where the sectoral organisation is not authorised to dictate the instructions
for the wine reserves of the wine-growers. In this situation the dominant individual shategy consists in
putting all available quantities on the market. Indeed, the individual wine reserves has, as it were, no
effect on the average quality of the wine that is noticeable on the market to the consumer and no affect
426
on the sales price. In the event that it is impossible to have a co-ordination fumished by an
organisation, individual decisions for stocking would end in the loss of profit for the wine grower'
10.3,2. Regulation of suPPlY
We examine a simplified regulation process where the decision of the marketed quantity constitutes
the only shategic variable for the organisation. This variable represents the only possible reaction to
the quantity and quality ofthe grapes in regard to the reserves'
The agronomic production for the year i defines a yield a, of gapes of quality k, which coincides
with the quantities present in the reserve obtained from the preceding campaign x,-1 . Thus knowing
the parameters a, and k, which he is informed of at the beginning of the campaign, the wine grower
can know the situation of his stock in quantity X , and in quality È, . It is in relation to this situation
that the wine gtower will take his decision for drawing z, which after wine making will be sold to
traders. Thus:
di,ki 
-> X, rk, + u,
di*trkr*t è X i*l rkr*t è ili*t
.t
It concerns a problem of decision making in the presence of incertitude. The quantity put in the reserve
depends solely on the situation of the preceding reserve, on the decision for the preceding drawing and
on the quantity harvested during the campaign. The situation of the reserve therefore only depends on
the past via the preceding campaign:
Xi*r=Xi-uitdr*t
Under these conditions, the quality of the reserve, the average being weighed by the quantities of the
qualities ofthe preceding reserve and ofthe current harvest, depends only on the preceding situation:
ki*t =
k,(x, 
-u,) I kialdial
Xi 
-ui rdi*t
The issue of the situations of the reserve of the form (Xn ,Kr)r.r) constitutes therefore a
markovian process.
J
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The problem of optimal control which confronts the wine grower at date i = 0 is the following:
knowing the laws that random variables d and fr follow, what is the optimal strategy which will
allow the maximum hope of in between time profit?
The first objective of the model is to optimise the stock decisions in the qualitative reserve and to
distribute on the market, in relation to the situation of the stock, that is to say, the quantity from the
qualitative reserve obtained from the preceding campaign mixed with the new harvest. The wine
grower maximises his between time profit:
r=Ë (p, 
- 
"r)a, - q,"(*u*(r, - k*, ,o)Y
I
,=0 (t+ t")'*l
The expression e(max@, 
-k*t,Of ,or..rponds to a unitary variance cost in relation to the quality
reference of the vineyard. If the quality put on the market is superior to krr. this cost is null. If, on the
contrary, the vineyard was only able to obtain an inferior quality we consider that it can withstand the
cost of recapturing the market.
The second objective is, knowing the optimal stock decisions (complementary to marketing decisions),
to compare this situation to that of the free marketing for which the individual strategy of each wine
grower consists in putting the totality of available quantities on the market each year.
10.3.3, The demand side
Concerning the demand model on the final market, we consider the heterogeneous tastes of the
consumers for the quality of the supplied goods. Strictly speaking, each consumer is characterised by a
taste d for quality, uniformly distributed * h,Al where d ,"pr.r"nts the heterogeneity of the
consumers' tastes. We denote f(e)=#*V,rl the density of distibution of the consumers
regarding tastes.
The consumption of a unit of good of quality Ë at price p leads to a utility 0 k, the surplus of a
consumer of type 0 beinggiven as:
s(e,n,p)=ek-p
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The consumer g buys the good only if it procures him a positive surplus. If we consider two types of
wine sold on the market, one standard quality wine noted as k9 (considered here as a substitute for the
consumer) and a higher quality wine denoted fr1 only the t+ ,01 ttgmtnt of the market is covered''ko
The consumers buying standard ko quality are dispersed over the interval t?,11, those who preferko
the higher quality k1 on @ ,el, where â .o.r.rpottds to a consumer indifferent between the two
qualities offered @ =ffi).
We deduce the demand for each of the two products in relation to the size of the market M speciffing
the number of consumers or more precisely here the maximum demand for the goods under
consideration, expressed in millions of bottles.
Qo = M h-rrt tot =YrF -?tKoeko
Qt=M Êrrtyt=ffre-At
By inverting this system we obtain the prices of the two types of wine:
e*o
M
(M 
-qo-q)Po
0t- M
If we consider the market price as being directly determined by the quality marketed, the overall
consumer surplus is measured bY:
w, = M f^ Sre,k,p)f (0 )ae =-f,rk, qî +koqî + 2koQo 8r )
ko
Pt =0k (koQo+ktet)
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10.3.4. Optimal decision on drawing
Let E be the whole situation of the reserve in quantity and quality: (X 
, ,k,) e E
with x e F = {0 ,...,x ^*\ and k e{o ,. ..,k^*l the nurnber of possible situations is
lr l= (x^u*+l)(K,"* +1).
Let l7 be the control area. u e F corresponds to the quantity drawn so that it can be made into wine
The long term profit (with 2 > 0 the discount rate) to be maximised is written as:
ArgmaxE{l
Arg min t {i, ;F(c -n, ( x,,k,,u, Dlx6 = x,ko - ft }
;rr^n,( xn,k,,t't,)lxo = x,ko = 111n=0
where s is a strategy, that is, an application of E within F , which in each situation (x,h) includes
a control u .We note C by raising the profits.
This problem of dynamic planning is resolved by the Howard algorithm, which rests on the following
result:
Proposition l, For (x,h) e E , in noting uû the unique solution of:
minu.o {(M' - ( I + ).) Id )vr,o + (C -f1s( x,h,u))} = g
So:
Vx,h = min, E{l
n=0
of:
The principle of the Howard algorithm is to set up any strategy s4, to include a vector ar6, solution
(M' 
- 
(I + X) I d)wo + (C 
-lIs(x ,h , u)) = 0
For the controls z corresponding to the strategy s6.
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The following stage of the algorithm is to include with w0 a new strategy:
s1 .' x € E 
-> u e argmin,u{(M' -( I + )')Id )wo ),,n * (C -l[o( xha)}
V/e then return to the first stage. We show that this iteration converges towards a unique optimal
*
strategy s
10.3.5. The develoPed software
Drawn on the previous modelling principles, the developed software allows, thanks to the Howard
algorithm, to obtain the optimal strategy in relation to the reserves, for any vineyard. It requires as
inputs:
- a maximum reserve x^ * and a precision Lx in such a way so that
X e {0, LX,z^X,...,X."*} i
- an integer Aft corresponding to the number of times that we divide the differences in the quality of
1
grapes ï=,2\;
2
- the mean ( â ) and the standard deviation ( oo ) of the quality index for gapes;
- the size of the market M;
- the heterogeneity of consumers'tastes d.
- the quantity qs andthe quality ko of the competing vineyard;
- the additional costs (c, ) of the vineyard under study;
- a constant multiplier 6' of the cost difference in relation to the reference quality.
- the rate of current value .X. > 0 .
10.3.5.1. The law of agronomic performances
The random process studied is a Markov chain. Since we only consider a finished number of
situations, it is necessary to hansform continuous laws into discrete laws. Let's assume that the
agronomic performances follow a normal law such as:
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_h-"L
2otI
.fo(a) =
-o
^f 
2xoo
We define for each a e D e.f (a) = {0,...,X_.*}
P[a=doJ= f"(a )
Z **t fo(a, )
We check thoroughly that ) aieDef fa Pfa = aof =l
10.3.5.2. The law of grape quality
Since the quality Æ of the reserve is a result of a measurement, it does not belong to a discrete unity of
qualities. It is therefore necessary to consider the probability for fr to belong to an interval concemed
with planned situations.
The given ÀÈ defines a certain number of quality indexes. We indicate Def (k) all of these
reference qualities and ô the actual step between these qualities. The result is a division of the
1
interval t=;21. Let's assume that:
2
VkoeDef(k),F(kù= ( )
ri.o"f <n.fr(ki)
For any r .lirlwe assume:
P[k e
PTK
Plk
€
F (12)
612
w, -t ,no *X
-1 I 6c l- 
-J-- -'2'2 2
))rg.Drî(k) = F(ko)6
12-I,2r=#
Therefore, we will consider a uniform law for each interval of the division ,I,rr. We also verifr that
it indeed conesponds to a law ofprobability.
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10.3.5.3. The transition matrix
we consider (x,h) + (y,l) the transition of the situation (x,h) to the situation (y,l)' we associate
an element of the precept bur. nlEl . As such (x,h) cottesponds to element es' T1',e transition
matrix for a fixed confrol u e F is a square matrix of size lrl . rnur we will have to consider lFl
transition matrixes. The coefftcient corresponding to column c = êyt and to line / = e* of M" is"
((M'))u" = Pl(xi*r, ki*r)=ODl (x,,k,)=(x'h) |
An order is acceptable only if it does not exceed the available level of the reserve. Thus for the lines of
the matrix Mu such as u) X,we set the order at u=X.In other words, the whole reserve is
drawn. The following situation will only depend therefore on random variables d and F (harvested
quantty and grape quality).'We obtain:
Pl(x i*r,k,*r) = (y,Dl (x,,k,) = (s,h))= Pla = yl'flk = ll
In this way we form the (a + 1) , first lines of the matrix
If u < X owe have the formula:
plxi*r 
= !,ki*t ett -f,,t +f,llx, = x,ki = hf
6 6(t )y - h(x-u) (l )y-h(x-u)+-
= Pldia = y - x + ulPlkt*t.l 2
2
y 
- 
)c+u y-)c+u
Concerning the side effects, we consider that any quantity which leads to a situation which surpasses
the maximum reserve must be eliminated. The probability of an outcome of a situation which achieves
the maximum of the reserve is therefore the sum of the probabilities of creation of the situations of
which the quantity surpasses this maximum reserve.
Finally, we will suppose that for the harvests which lead to a surplus of the maximum reserve' a
substitution of the quantities of the reserve by the quantities of the harvest is possible.
10.j.5.4. The basic structure of the sofnuare
Starting from a reference situation, we change different parameters in order to create new situations'
For each one of them a series of agricultural performances and grape quality are randomly given so as
to know the average results reached by freezing.
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For each situation we examine three values for the multiplier constant from the margin cost to the
reference quality.
Using the Howard algorithm on each of the 15 scenarios, we obtain the control matrixes: for a quality
and a quantity in the reserve, an optimal drawing directive corresponds.
Once implemented in the conhol panel, the data and the control matrix are used over a period of 20
years in relation to the operations which are allowed: freezing or competition.
In order to obtain statistical results, 20 series produce agronomic output and grape qualities according
to the appropriate rules.
For each of the 15 scenarios we supply:
- the directives laid down by the software;
: the reôripitulations of the applications;
- an evaluation of the results year by year, with the means, sums and standard deviations for the period
and percentage variations obtained through the freezing mechanism;
- graphs of the different variables to be analysed;
- a recapitulation of the results obtained after 10 experiments with the same data as well as their
averages.
The outlines studied are not exhaustive, but represent the type of analysis which can be undertaken
thanks to the tool which has been developed.
10.4. Simulation of a Northern vineyard
10.4.1. The reference situation
'We 
consider the following as a reference situation which is characteristic of a Northern region:
- as with the example of Champagne, the agronomic production follows a normal cenfral law with a
270 million bottles mean and a 100 million bottles standard deviation;
- the average quality of the wine (Ër, = 50), reached by normalisation of the heterogeneity of the
consumers 1e = t 1 is affected by a vintage factor corresponding to the quality of the grapes for the
year. This grape quality is centred on I and has a standard deviation of 0.2;
- the size ofthe vineyard is 30 000 hectares.
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- the maximum authorised production established by INAO is 13000 kgftta, which corresponds to 330
million bottles.
- the maximum reserve (X-"*) is 445 million bottlesr3e;
- the size of the market is estimated at 1000 bottles;
- we assume that the additional cost of production is nil c, = Q
- we will vary the constant a.
- the discount rate is 5% (1= 0,05).
Based on this reference situation we will change different parameters in order to create new situations.
For each of them we will generate a random series of agronomic performances and grape quality in
order to know the average results obtained by freezing. Indeed, the improvement of results by the
freezing method depends, of course, on the series of agronomic performances and the quality of grapes
which determine a given situation of the qualitative reserve'
An unfavourable configuration is one where the reserves succeed each other in such a way that the
establishment of a qualitative reserve becomes difficult. It is particularly the case when only one good
harvest is isolated among bad harvests, almost completely drawn from the following campaign, it does
not allow the acceptable phasing of subsequent reserves. However, we will notice that in this situation,
the drawing strategy adopted by the algorithm leans towards competitive shategy'
10.4.2, The simulated scenartos
Four scenarios are simulated:
- The "double reserve" scenario differs from the reference situation by the storage capacity, which is
doubled (i.e., 890 million bottles).
- The "meridian" scenario corresponds to the case of a vineyard which would have the same
characteristics as the reference vineyard except the standard deviation of the quantity harvested.
Indeed, the more stable climate of meridian vineyards leads to less random harvests. Here, the
standard deviation is divided by two.
l3e A maximum capacity of the qualitative reserve avoids having too many old vintage wines which would
diminish the qualiry of the reserve. We will accept here a reserve of a maximum of half a harvest after drawing
(in millions of bottles) stockmax:330 + ll5:445.
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- The "southern" scenario differs from the previous "meridian" scenario by the standard deviation of
the grape quality, which is divided by two.
- The "excess costs" scenario allows us to examine the impact on the reference vineyard of a 5 Francs
additional unitary cost of quality production.
For each of these scenarios we consider three different values of the multiplier constant from the
variable cost to the reference quality.
By using the Howard algorithm on each of these 15 scenarios, we obtain control matrixes: for a quality
and a quantity in the reserve there is a corresponding control for maximum drawing.
Once established in the confrol panel, the information and the control matrix are valid over a period of
20 years according to the operations allowed: freezing or competition.
In order to obtain statistical results, 20 series, which follow appropriate laws, produce agroiromic
performances and grape qualities.
I 0.4.3. Simulution results
All simulation results are presented and discussed in details in Laye (2000). In general, results may be
synthesised in five points:
ii)
When it is possible to regulate the quantity supplied on the market through the reserve
management, supply decreases leading to an increase in the price of wine (for example, the
"double reserve" scenario leads to an average +7.49% increase in the price of wine with
respect to the reference scenario).
This price effect is, partly or totally, compensated by an increase in the average quality offered
to consumers (the quality effect being greater as the bottling increases). Nevertheless, the most
remarkable phenomenon is the smoothing of the quality in the course of time. Indeed, the
decrease in the standard deviation of quality offered to consumes reaches 45.5% in the
"double reserve" scenario with respect to the reference situation.
iii) As a result, the surplus of consumers does not decrease significantly (-1,.5%) due to the
regulation of supply. We can, however, note that here the consumer is not aware very much of
the smoothing of the quality, which influences this counter-performance.
Finally, the possibility of supply regulation through the reserve management improves the
strategic marketing capacity of producers. This possibility has a sizeable effect on the
smoothing of the average quality of wines offered to consumers. Hence, the producers' and
i)
iv)
436
v)
the consumers' surplus may be improved in certain cases by the subsidiary organisation
relative to the competitive situation'
Lastly, one may notice that obtained results are rather sensitive to the assumed characteristics
of the considered vineyard, particularly those relating to the variability of both harvested
production and quality of vintage wines'
10.5. Conclusion: CMO-WTO compatibility
One of the main features of the wine-growing and wine making Common Market Organisation,
established from the year lggg,is that it marks the replacement of a price support policy by a quality
support policy. Such a shift in policy allows the maintenance of the EU wine CMO budget
expenditures (which accounts for less than3%oof the FEoGA guaranteed budget' 
too For these reasons
it seems unlikely that the quality support policy provided by the new wine cMo be challenged during
the ongoing multilateral WTO negotiations, even more so since the control of plantation rights can be
perceived as a distortion of competition acting in favour of third countries. 
lat
Under these conditions, the biggest stumbling block between the orientations of the new CMO and the
negotiations lead by the wro remains undoubtedly that of standardisation of the products with two
types of design in the background: on the one side, a general standardisation of the codex alimentarius
and, on the other side, a specific standardisation in the sector represented by the directives of the
Office Intemational de la Vigne et du Vin (OfV). h the first case, we are only concerned about human
health to define the wine product. In the second case, we are concerned about the agricultural origin of
the product and we consider wine as the product procured from the natural fermentation of the grape
(consequently, corrective oenological practices are necessarily limited). Thus, may we consider that
the cMo belongs rather to the second category, in asserting the VQPRD system'
The agreement on the aspects of intellectual property rights opens the way to a multilateral protection
of geographic indications. However, if these agleements provide for setting up a register of geographic
indications in the wine and spirits sector, a wide divergence of interpretations exits as to the use of this
register. The European Union considers that it should be a priority instrument exercised on every
member state of the WTO, where American and especially Japanese positions aim at establishing a
simple informative list.
t4o As a comparison, grains account for lgVo of the FEOGA guaranteed budget.
t.t Ho*.u., a great number of trade barriers still exist (customs rights, importation quotas,-discriminatory excise
taxes, importation monopolies, etc.), which could be put on the table- In this study' we do not deal with these
aspects mainly because they relate to inter-European rather thanmultilateral hade concerns and because they do
noi directly relate to the new wine CMO (see Arnaud et al', 2001)'
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A contrario, the WTO within the framework of the health and plant health agreements recognises the
suitability of the codex alimentarius who are exclusively concerned with matters of health and
therefore more interested in the decrease of alcohol content. to' Thus, the present directions of the
WTO are very far removed from the directives of the OIV (see Hanin et al., 2000) which are based on
a recognition of regions and on the restraints of production (determination of the production zone and
production requirements) characteristic of appellations of origin. hr the same way, these directions are
likely to establish new arrangements for the wine production of the CMO, which could be inconsistent
with international legislation.
Furthermore, at the regional and local level wine growing is a determining factor in agricultural and
economic operations and can account for over 30o/o of agncultural end production (50% in the case of
Languedoc-Roussillon). There are, in addition, very different realities from one member state to
another, not only concerning the size of the vineyard, but also the degree of specialisation of the
operation and of the type of wines produced. These factors require the decentralisation of the
:egulation procedures at the producer organisations and subsidiary organisations level, towards which
the new CMO is heading. For example, in France, most of the AOC regions benefit from an inter-
professional organisation, officially recognised by the state, which is associated with appellation
syndicates. These organisations bring together the different professional structures representing a
branch in view of assuring the management and development of wine production with the necessary
financial means. On the economic level these organisations; although limited by AOC regulations,
managed by the INAO (concerning supervision of supply, via limiting the regions and overseeing the
performance) today constitute the heart of the system with a better and better supervision of the
quantities placed on the market (this procedure is also used in a good number of Italian, Spanish and
Portuguese vineyards).
The non-recognition of appellations of origin at the international level would challenge the role of the
subsidiary organisations in the long run, which really means reconsidering the orientation of the wine
CMO. It is also necessary to confirm or to indicate the weakness of the basis, on the economic level,
of this European orientation.
ll'?,1 aescrintion of the stakes of multilateral negotiations for the wine growing sector can be found in Dubos(2000): "L'organisation mondiale du commerce prépare I'Europe viticole de deriain", Cahiers de I'Observatoire
des Conjonctures Vinicoles Européen, nol.
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11 - ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FOOD SAFETY AND QUALTTY STANDARDS ON
EU-US TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD PRODUCTS
Spencer Henson and Nicole Lux
Partner 4: University of Reading, Centre for Food Economics Research (CeFER)
11.1. Introduction
The objective of this part of the project (i.e., task 3) was to assess the impact of current food quality
and safety standards on EU-US trade in agricultural and food products. The analysis reported in this
chapter focuses more specifically on the impact of US food quality and safety standards on EU
agricultural and food exports to the US.
Section 2 provides the background of the analysis and a thorough review of literature on technical
measures. This literature review successively addresses the questions of the classification of technical
measures, their effects on trade and the available methods for measuring these trade effects. Finally,
existing studies that have attempted to measure the effects of technical measures in the context of trade
in agricultural and food products are reviewed.
The literature review suggests that there are four basic approaches commonly used to evaluate the
trade impact of technical measures: frequency/inventory-based measures; price-comparison measures
(or tariff equivalent estimates); compliance-cost measures; quantity-type measures. Thus, the impact
of US standards on EU agricultural and food exports to the US is analysed combining the first three
approaches. Sections 3, 4 and 5 each propose an assessment of the impact of US standards on EU
exports to the US according to, respectively, the frequency/inventory approach, the price-comparison
approach and the compliance-cost approach. In addition, complementary to previous assessments,
section 6 provides an analysis of US detentions of EU agricultural and food exports.
Finally, section 7 concludes and draws some policy recommendations.
11.2. Technical barriers to trade
11,2.1. Background
In recent years there has been heightened interest in the impact of technical barriers to trade on exports
of agricultural and food products. Technical baniers to trade are measures that restrict imports of
products that fail to meet safety, quality or environmental standards. Concern about the impact of
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technical barriers to trade has mirrored the global proliferation of these measures over time,
particularly in developed countries. This is evident from the number of notifications of technical
measures to GATTMTO over the period 1981-00 (Figure 11.1). Furtherrnore, it is more widely
recognised that technical measures can act, either explicitly or implicitly, as barriers to trade in a
similar manner to tariffs and quantitative restrictions (Laird and Yeat, 1990; Vogel, 1995; Sykes,
1 9es).
Figure 11.1. Notifications of technical measures to GATT/WTO, 1981-99
Source: Henson et al. (2000)
Considerable efforts have been made to develop methods through which the extent of trade covered by
non-tariff measures and/or their frequency of application can be quantified (Laird and Yeats, 1990;
Laird, lgg7\. Such efforts are, however, fraught with difficulties because of the number and range of
measures applied and the rate atwhich incidence changes over time. Furthermore, data is required at a
high level of disaggregation as many non-tariff measures, and in particular technical measures such as
food safety and quality requirements, are highly product-specific.
Not withstanding these problems, a number of studies indicate that non-tariff measures are widely
applied to agricultural and food products in high-income countries, and increasingly low- and middle-
income countries also (Ndayisenga and Kinsey, 1994; Thilmany and Barrett', 1997; Hillman, 1997).
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Furthermore, over time the nature of these measures has changed with a decline in the incidence of
quantitative restrictions and the increased incidence of technical measures such as sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) and quality requirements. Moreover, an increasing proportion of agricultural and
food products are simultaneously subject to more than one non-tariff measure.
Although it is recognised that technical barriers are a serious impediment to trade in agricultural and
food products, economists have found it difficult to asses and/or measure their effects on frade flows.
This reflects the multiple forms that technical barriers can take, ranging from outright import bans,
product and process standards to labelling requirements, and their highly product-specific nature.
Furthermore, individual products are typically subject to a range of technical measures, the individual
impact of which is difficult to measure.
1L2.2, Technical barriers to trade: Delinition and classification
The definition of technical barriers to trade adopted here is that of Roberts and De Kremer (lgg7)
"Standards governing the sale of products into national markets, which have as
theit primafacie objective the correction of market inefficiencies stemming from
externalities associated with the production, dishibution and consumption of
these products".
These measures aim to prevent the entry into national markets of products that fail to meet pre-
specified standards. In this context, "standards" are technical specifications relating to characteristics
of products and/or the manner in which they are produced. ra3 Equivalent measures may or may not be
applied to domestic products, depending on their relative characteristics and the rislcs that pre,
specified standards will be violated.
A variety of policy instruments can be employed by govemments to correct (real or perceived) market
failures. Our interest here is in those measures that are applied to imports (Figure 11.2). Three broad
categories of measures are usually applied (Roberts et al., 1999). Firstly, import bans prohibit the
entry of a product entirely, from a particular country/region or at a specific time of the year. These are
most widely applied to products that pose a great risk to human, plant or animal health and where
alternative methods of control are technically or economically infeasible. Secondly, technical
specifications define technical requirements that products must satisfu in order to be permitted entry.
These can encompass the characteristics of the product itselt the process by which it is produced
la3 Although the term "standard" is often employed to refer to non-mandatory measures (indeed this is the
language of the TBT Agreement), in this context it refers to all forms of tlchnical speàification whether
mandatory or non-mandatory.
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and/or the manner in which it is packaged. Predefined methods of conformity assessment are specified
to determine whether the product is in compliance and can be permitted to enter. Thirdly, information
measures require certain information to be disclosed on the product label and/or control the claims that
can be made about the characteristics of the product'
Figure 11.2. Classification of technical barriers to trade
Source: Roberts (1998); Roberts et al. (1999)
Technical barriers to trade are applied to address a wide range ofsocietal interests, notably protecting
the economic interests of suppliers (agricultural producers, food processors, etc.), the health and
economic interests of food consumers, and the natural environment (Figure 11.3) (Roberts et al.,
1999). For each of these objectives a distinction can be made between measures associated with risks
to human, plant or animal health or the environment, or other societal objectives, for example
protecting the economic interests of consumers. A similar distinction is applied to determine measures
covered by the SPS and TBT Agreements within the WTO'
Figure 11.3. ClassifÏcation of technical barriers to trade by objective:
Source: Roberts et al. (1999)
Technical measures also differ in the extent to which they discriminate between domestic and
imported products. Non-discriminatory measures are applied equally to domestic and imported
products, although differences may remain in the manner in which conformity assessment is
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Natural Environment
Protection of natural environment
from harmful non-indigenous species
Environmental conservation
undertaken. r{ Discriminatory measures apply additional and/or qualitatively different requirements to
imported products. Furthermore, measures can be applied to all imports regardless of source or
discriminate between individual exporting countries. The extent to which technical measures
discriminate between products according to source is an important factor influencing the impact on
trade, both in terms of total trade flows and flows between particular countries.
Whereas much of the concern about the impact of SPS standards on trade has concentrated on
mandatory government requirements, there is growing awareness that voluntary standards can also
impede hade. Firstly, compliance with established voluntary standards might be essential because
consumers require compatibility with complementary products or services (for example plastic
containers and microwave ovens). Secondly, voluntary standards may be closely related to consumer
preferences (for example safety marks that are seen by consumers as an essential guarantee of
minimum product quality). Thirdly, voluntary standards may be considered crucial for compliance
with mandatory standards (for example ISO 9000 as a means to satisfu the requirements of food safety
regulations). If such standards are so widely applied that they become defacto mandatory, there may
in practice be little choice but for foreign suppliers to comply.
In addition to the standards associated with technical barriers to trade, the methods applied to assess
conformity can also discriminate between domestic suppliers and exporters, often explicitly by
applying additional or different methods of conformity assessment to imports. For example, imports
are frequently subject to inspection at the border, whilst domestic producers are not subject to an
equivalent process of positive release.
11.2.3. understanding the impact of technical messures on trade
The trade impacts of technical barriers to hade can be conveniently grouped into three categories. All
of these can be observed and represented in the simple classification detailed above:
- Prohibit hade by imposing an import ban or by prohibitively increasing production and marketing
costs
- Divert trade from one ûading partner to another by laying down requirements that discriminate
across potential supplies.
- Reduce overall trade flows by increasing costs or raise barriers for all potential suppliers.
laa Imported products may be subject to border inspection, whereas no comparable system of inspection is
applied to domestic products.
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Economists have faced significant problems conceptualising and, to an even greater extent, measunng
the impact of technical barriers to trade. This reflects the number and detailed nature of technical
measures applied to agricultural and food products. Furthermore, the impact of technical barriers'
unlike tariffs, is indirect through the costs of compliance that exporters face and these must be
separated out from the other additional costs associated with trade, including the effects of traditional
barriers such as tariffs.
To fully understand the impact of technical barriers to trade requires detailed knowledge of the
standards and conformity assessment procedures that are applied, the manner in which individual
suppliers comply with these requirements and the associated costs. This suggests that investigation of
the impact of technical barriers to trade needs to be undertaken at the level of the individual suppliers'
At the same time, however, there is a need to generate general conclusions about the impact of
technical barriers to ffade on trade flows by applying a more general model. This is the objective of
this paragraPh.
A number of previous studies have applied a simple small-country model within a static partial
equilibrium framework to analyse the impact of technical barriers to trade (see for example Krissoff
and Calvin, 1997; Sumner and Lee,|997;Thilmany and Barrett, 1997; Roberts et al',2000)' Importers
are required to comply with specified technical requirements, compliance with which imposes
additional costs, increasing the supply price above the world market price in a similar manner to a
tariff. This so-called "tariff equivalent" will be equal to the costs of compliance and, provided
estimates of supply and demand elasticities are available, it is possible to estimate the impact on trade
volumes.
An example is provided in Figure 11.4, in which a technical measure is applied unilaterally to all
exports by a single importer. Prior to the imposition of the measure, domestic producers face the world
price (P,/y) and the quantity imported is Qy (equal to Qn- Q5)' Implementation of the measure imposes
costs of compliance equal to Cyx on exporters, increasing the price to Pe7 * Cvx and reducing imports
to Qv'.
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Pw * Cvx
Figure 11.4. Simple model of impact of technical barriers to trade - importer side:
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From the exporter's perspective, what matters is who bears the costs of compliance? This depends on
the ability of the exporter to avoid the costs of compliance by diverting trade to other markets that do
not apply the measure. The alternative scenarios are summarised in Figure 1 1.5 (Roberts et al., 1999)'
In the case of a measure applied by a single importer, exporters will switch to alternative markets and,
although individual suppliers that have built up a market in the country concerned may be adversely
affected, the overall impact will be negligible. If the measure is applied against the exporter by all, or a
significant number, of importing countries, howevet, the scope to switch markets is constrained and
the exporter will bear some or all of the costs of compliance. hr this case the exporter will supply at
the world price (Py7) but in effect will receive a price of Pyy - cyx (Figure I 1.6).
The foregoing discussion assumes the importer is a "small country". If this assumption is relaxed
and/or all importing countries apply the considered measure the "small countn/" assumption will be
violated and the world market price will shift. In this way, the costs of compliance with the technical
measure will be distributed between importers and exporters according to the responsiveness of the
supply and demand schedules.
Figure 11.5. Incidence of costs of compliance with technical barriers to trade
Source: Roberts et al. (1 9ee)
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Figure 11.6. Simpte model of impact of technical barriers to trade - exporter side
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Figure 11.7. Impact of technical measure applied to both exporters and domestic suppliers
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Figure 11.8.Impact of differences in compliance costs between individual exporters
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11.2.4. Measuring the impact of technical measures on trade
In practice, estimating the trade effects of non-tariff measures (NIMs) is difficult. Firstly, the complex
and diverse effects detailed above can be difficult to disentangle and differ at the level of both
individual suppliers and countries. Secondly, it may be difficult to separate out the effects of other
factors from the impact of NTMs. Thirdly, products may be subject to a multitude of NTMs that differ
in their nature and effects on trade'
Generally, four basic approaches to the estimation of the magnitude of NTMs are applied (see for
example Deardorff and Stem, 1997; Laird, 1997; Hilman, 1991). Maskus et al. (2000) provides a
review of the application of these methods to technical measures. These are discussed in turn below.
1 1 . 2. 4. t . Frequency/invent ory-based measures
From data on the incidence of NTMs it is possible to construct frequency-based measures of the
occwïence of NTMs (Deardorff and Stern, 1997;Laftd,1997). Such measures may be unweighted, or
weighted by volume/value of imports or production. The most widely used data for this purpose is
derived from TINCTAD's Database on Trade Conhol Measures.
Two measures are commonly calculated. The Trade Coverage Ratio (TCR) C;, estimates the
percentage of nade subject to NTMs, in total or of a particular type, for an exporting country j at a
particular level of product aggregation:
[Tn.r-I
"=1ffi).o
where Di is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a technical measure is applied and zero
otherwise; Vi is the value of imports of tariff line i; t is the year of measurement of the technical
measure and T is the year of the import weights.
A key problem with this measure, however, is the endogeneity of the import value weights. For
example, if an NTM is so restrictive that it precludes all imports of item i from country j, the weight V
will be zero (Laird, lggT). Consequently the TRC is downward-biased. Furthermore, the TRC does
not indicate the extent to which NTMs reduce the value of imports of the affected items, thus reducing
the weight of restricted items in the total value of a country's imports.
An alternative measure that overcomes the problem of endogeneity of the import value weights is the
frequency index (FI) F.;1:
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where Di is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a technical measure is applied and zero
otherwise; M; is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there are imports from the exporting
country j and zero otherwise; t is the year of measurement of the technical measure and T is the year of
the import weights.
The FI does not reflect the relative weight of the affected products and, as a consequence, does not
give any indication of the importance of NTMs to an exporter overall, or between export items.
I I . 2.4. 2. Price-comparison measures
An altemative and more informative approach for assessing the impact of NTMs is to measure the
impact on the domestic price of a good subject to NTMs in comparison to some reference price. Once
the impact of other factors on domestic price have been taken into account, for example tariffs and
transport costs, such a comparison provides some indication of the net effects of NTMs that are
present in a market (Deardorff and Stern, 1997).
This approach generally involves measurement of the extent to which the domestic border price of the
imported good exceeds the price paid by domestic importers to foreign exporters, inclusive of
transport costs and any tariffs applied by the country concerned (Baldwin, 1991). This measure is
termed a "tariff equivalent" because under conditions of perfect competition, an ad-valorem tariff at
this rate would create the same wedge between the domestic and import prices. Tariff equivalents can
be estimated in two ways (Moroz,1985). Firstly, by observing the world price of the imported product
and the domestic price at which it is sold, taking account of marketing margins, hansport costs and
tariffs. Secondly, using data on changes in marketed quantities due to the imposition of a technical
barrier to hade and estimating the impact on prices using demand and supply elastiticies.
To date, the price-comparison approach has been most widely applied in studies that have attempted to
estimate the costs of compliance with technical measures and express it as a "ûariff-rate equivalent"
(Baldwin, 1991; Baldwin, 1970; Roningen and Yeats, 1976; Calvin and Krissoff, 1998). A number of
these studies have employed partial equilibrium frameworks to separate out the impact of technical
measures from other factors (for a review see Maskus et a1.,2Q00). For example, Paarlberg and Lee
(1998) study the impact of US protection against imports from countries with food and mouth disease
(FMD) and, more specifically, the optimal tariff to maximise social welfare. This approach, however,
is dependent on the ability to isolate the impact of technical measures from other influences on market
prices. In the case of products that are subject to numerous and complex technical requirements and
other market-based influences, this can be problematic.
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I 1. 2.4. 3. QuantitY-tYPe measures
Given that the imposition of NTMs acts to shift the import demand curve for a product, measurement
of the impact of the measure can focus on import quantities rather than prices. Indeed, it has been
argued that a quantity measure is preferable to a price-comparison measure given that it is the impact
of NTMs on traded quantities that is our primary interest (Jager and Lanjouw,1977)' However, unlike
the price-comparison approach, there is a lack of any direct measure of the impact of NTMs - whilst it
is possible to observe the quantity of a product imported there is no reference quantity against which
to make a comParison.
The most widely applied approach to measure the quantity effects of NTMs uses cross-commodity or
cross-country regression models to determine the impact of various determinants on trade, including
NTMs. The aim is to identify the level of trade in the absence of the applied NTMs and to compale
this to the level of trade that actually occurred'
The most widely applied framework is the gravity model, which has been developed to investigate the
magnitude of trade flows between countries. For example, Swann et al. (1996) and Moenius (1999)
explore the impact of a country's stock of voluntary standards on the value of trade flows. Likewise'
Otsuki et al. (2000) employ a gravity model to estimate the impact of new EU legislation on aflatoxins
in cerealso dried fruit and nuts on exports from nine African counffies (see below)'
1 1.2.4.4. Compliance cost-based measure
The compliance cost approach aims to quantify the impact of NTMs on the import price directly
through estimation of costs of compliance given the specific requirements imposed on importers' This
involves identification ofthe specific changes and procedures businesses are required to undertake to
comply with technical measures (Henson, 1997).This typically consists of two stages:
- Adaptation of the production processes and/or the final product to facilitate compliance with the
specified standard.
- 
production and supply of the product complying with the specified standard and compliance with
conformity assessment procedures.
Stage one of this process is associated with non-recurring costs of compliance - one-off expenditure
required to achieve compliance with the standard and thus facilitate entry to the market' This will
determine the ability and/or willingness of exporters to comply with the specified standard and supply
the export market. Stage two is associated with recurring costs of compliance - additional production
and other supply costs required to supply product that is in compliance and to demonstrate compliance
has been achieved. This will determine the extent to which exporters that are able to comply face
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measures that increase their costs over and above those of domestic suppliers (Figure I 1.9) (Josling,
1994;FAO, 1995)
The costs of compliance with the specified technical measure are estimated on a case-by-case basis
using actual or reported cost data. Whereas the direct approach is demanding in its data requirements
and more costly to undertake, the results are generally more reliable and can be related back to the
characteristics of particular standards and conformity assessment procedures, indicating which has the
greatest impact on market price.
Figure 11.9. Recurring costs of compliance with technical measures
The foregoing discussion suggests that the impact of non-tariff measures on market price is dependent
on the magnifude of the associated costs of compliance. In turn, costs of compliance are influenced by
the availability of resources at both the firm and national levels. Thus, suppliers in two exporting
counFies that face the same technical measure may have different costs of compliance according to
the availability of compliance resources such as basic infrastructure (for example laboratories,
research institutes, nature of the marketing chain, etc.). Likewise, individual firms within one
exporting counfry may have different costs of compliance according to how well they are endowed
with compliance resources (for example laboratories, human capital, production facilities, etc.). Thus
the costs of compliance with technical measures and the consequent impact on market price can be
conceptualised in terms of a mahix of country- and firm-specific compliance costs (Figure 1 1.10).
Compliance costs Compliance costs
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Figure 11.10. Matrix of costs of compliance with non-tariff measures:
Domestic
Supplier
Exporter I Exporter II Exporter III Exporter W
Market I
Market II
Market Itr
MarketIV
MarketV
Because of the resource-intensity of this approach, there are relatively few published studies that
estimate compliance costs directly. Exceptions, however, include Cato (1998) and Saqib (1999)' For
example, cato (1998) assesses the impact of EU hygiene standards on the Bangladeshi shrimp sector'
over the period August to December 1997, exports of frozen shrimps from Bangladesh were banned
by the European Commission because of concerns about hygiene standards in processing facilities and
the efficiency of controls undertaken by Bangladeshi govemment inspectors' It is estimated that the
loss of export revenue as a result of this ban was $14.6 million. Furthermore, the costs of upgrading
sanitary conditions in the frozen shrimp industry to satisfy the EU's hygiene requirements over the
period lggT-ggis estimated to have been $17.6 million; an average expenditure per plant of $239,630'
11,2.5. Legitimacy of non'tariff measures
The question of whether non-tariff measures are justified depends on the specific nature of the
measure, its objectives and the potential impact on trade. In the case of SPS measures, for example'
this is essentially a scientific issue - does the measure address a real risk to human, animal or 
plant
health? In the context of international hade, clear pre-defined standards are required to judge
legitimacy and well-structured and transparent procedures for settling disputes. One example, which is
very relevant to agricultural and food markets is the justification of measures under the SPS
Agreement. This Agreement essentially requires nation states, when challenged, to justifu the SPS
measures they apply and demonstrate that any trade effects are proportionate'
There are two approaches through which sPS measures can be justifîed (Figure 11'11)' Firstly'
through the adoption of international standards, in particular those of Codex Alimentarius, OIE and
IPPC, which are automatically assumed to comply with the provisions of the Agreement' Secondly'
through an assessment of the risks to human, animal or plant health addressed by the measure' Given
that many countries choose to adopt different/higher standards than those specified by the international
standards-setting organisations, risk assessment is a key element of the discipline laid down by the
Agreement.
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The WTO has clearly defined procedures for dispute settlement that can be invoked once bilateral
negotiations between hading partners have failed. However, it is evident that, because of the great
resource costs involved, dispute settlement is only pursued as a last resort and when there is sufficient
economic and/or political impetus. In the case of the SPS Agreement, for example, only three cases
have been pursued through the dispute settlement procedures since 1995, although all of these went
through to the Appelate Body.
Figure 11.11. Assessment of SPS measures under the SPS Agreement
Source: Hooker and Caswell (1999)
11,2.6. The impact of technical barrters to trade: Empiricat evidence
There is a paucity of studies that assess the trade and other impacts of technical measures, particularly
in the context of food and agricultural product exports. Of those studies that have been undertaken, the
vast majority has attempted to quantiû/ the impact on agricultural and food exports from the United
States. A number of key studies are reviewed briefly below.
Roberts and De Kremer (1997) and Thornsbury et al. (1998) report the result of a survey of USDA
personnel in 132 countries that aims to identify "questionable" technical measures that threaten,
constrain or prevent US exports of agricultural and food products. These measures are classified
according to the typology detailed in Figures ll.2 and 11.3 (Roberts et al., 1999) (Table l1.l). The
estimated total impact of these measures on US exports of agricultural products in 1996 is $4907
million (Table 1). Of this, 90 per cent is due to SPS measures. The impact of food safety standards in
particular is estimated to have been around $2,288 million (Table I 1.2).
SPS Measure
Based on Intemational Standard?
Yes No
Minimum Trade Impact? Valid Risk Assessment?
Yes No Minimal Trade Impact? No
Legitimate Illegirimate Yes No Illegitimate
Legitimate Illegitimate
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Total Bans 12 56 3 1 0 0 0 72
Partial Bans 0 2l 0 0 0 0 0 2l
Input Standards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Process Standards 32 78 I 15 0 0 0 t26
Product Standards 26 33 0 13 0 0 0 72
Packaging
Standards
1 0 0 2 5 0 0 8
Label
Requirements
2 2 2 7 0 1 0 l4
Controls on
Voluntary Claims
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 I
Non-Classifiable 3 20 0 0 0 0 2 25
Total 76 2t0 6 39 5 1 2 339
Table 11.1. Technical barriers to US agricultural and food exportso 1996
Source: Roberts et al. (l ee9)
Table 11.2. SPS standards impeding agri-food exports from the united states, 1996
Regulatory Goal Number of Barriers
-Estimated TradeImpact
($ million)
Average Trade
Impact per Barrier
($ million)
Plant health
260
2s16.79
t7.02
Animal health 868.82
Food safety 2288.00
Natural environment 0.51
Total 4424.73
Note: Sum of estimated trade impact for individual regulatory goals maY exceed overall hade impact for SPS
measures because individual measures may have multiple regulatory
Source: Thornsbury et al. (1998)
goals.
calvin and Krisoff (1998) assess the impact of phytosanitary standards on us imports of apples into
Japan, South Korea and Mexico over the period lggillgi to 1995196. The impact of phytosanitary
standards is estimated to be equivalent to a tariff rate of up to 58 per cent. Further, the analysis
suggests that harmonising phyosanitary standards in these countries to those of the United States
would have increased apple imports by $205 million in 1994195 and $280 million in 1995196'
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Paarlberg and Lee (1998) examine the impact of US protection against imports from countries with
food and mouth disease (FMD) and, more specifically, the optimal tariff to maximise social welfare. A
partial equilibrium framework is applied to US beef imports, with nations categorised according to
whether they are FMD-free or not. Patterns of tariffs with and without the risk of FMD infection are
compared and found to be highly sensitive to the risk presented by imports and the assumed loss of
output given an outbreak.
Orden and Romano (1996) model the effects of imported pests on domestic production and apply it to
a US ban on imports of avocados from Mexico. The welfare effects of removing the ban involve a
hade-off between reductions in the consumer price and the potential resource costs of producing
avocados domestically given the risk of pest infestation.
Xia and Weyerbrock (1998) examine the impact of an EU ban on poultry exports from the United
States inhoduced in 1997 and the welfare implications of proposed mandatory product treatment
requirements. The ban has a minor impact, even if other exporters do not satisfy the gap left by US
exports, because US exports of poultry prior to the ban were very small. The proposed mandatory
product treatment requirements are found to lead to an increase in the EU poultry price and a welfare
loss, unless consumer demand expands significantly in response to the introduction of these
requirements.
Orden et al. (2000) employ a partial equilibrium model of world trade in poultry to explore the impact
of sanitary requirements. In a market where a distinction is made between low- and high-value
poultry, arbitrage opportunities can be created. Furthermore, the impact of these requirements depends
on how widely they are applied across competing exporters.
Henson and Loader (1999) survey exporters of dairy products in the United States, Germany and the
United Kingdom in an attempt to quantify the impact of food safety and other technical requirements
in export competitiveness. These requirements are found to have a significant impact on certain types
of exporters, in particular smaller companies and those involved with specialised and/or packaged
products.
Otsuki et al. (2000) use a gravity-equation model to assess the impact of new EU standards for
aflatoxins on exports of cereals, dried fruits and nuts from nine African countries. It is estimated that
these standards will decrease African exports by 64 percent, equivalent to $670 million/annum.
A broad indication of the impact of SPS requirements on exports of agricultural and food products is
provided by data on rejections following border inspection in export markets. At the current time,
these data are only systematically collected and publicly available for the United States (Table ll.3).
4s7
tot Over the period June 1996 to June 1997, there were over 1,100 detentions of imports from Europe'
The main reasons were suspected infringements of regulations on low-acid canned foods and product
labelling.ra6
Table 11.3. Number of contraventions cited for US Food and Drug Administration import
detentions, June 1996 to June 1997
Reason for
Contraventlon
Afrlca Latin
Amerlca and
the
Caribbean
Europe Asia Total
Food additives 2
(0.7%)
57
(r.s%\
69
(s.8%)
426
(7.4%\
554
(s.0%)
Pesticide residues 0
(0.0%)
821
(2r.t%)
20
(r.7%\
23
(0.4%)
864
(7.7%)
Heavy metals 1
(0.3%)
426
(t0.9%)
26
(2.2%)
84
(r5%)
537
(4.8%\
Mould r9
rc3%\
475
(r2.2%)
27
(2.3%)
49
(0.8%)
570
(s.r%)
Microbiological
contamination (4
1
I
25
.3%)
246
rcs%\
1s9
1]'3.4%',)
895
(1s.s%)
1,425
(r2.8%)
Decomposition 9
0.0%\
206
6.3%\
7
$.6%',,
668
fir5%)
890
(8.0%)
Filth 54(r7.8%\
1,253
82.2%\
17s
/1.4.8%\
2,037
Gs.2%)
3,519
(3r5%)
Low acid canned
foods
4
0.3%')
t42
G.6%)
425
$s.9%\
829
/1^4.3%\
1 ,400
( 1 2.5o/o)
Labelling 38(r25%)
201
(s.2%\
237
(20.0%)
622
(10.8%)
1,098
o.8%'l
Other 51
/16.8%\
68
(r.7%)
39
0.3%)
151
Q.6%')
309
Q.8%)
Total 303
(100%)
3,895
(100%)
1,184
(100%)
5,784
(100%)
1 1,166
(100%)
Source: FAO (1999)
These studies indicate that technical measures can have a significant and complex impact on trade
flows and welfare in both importing and exporting countries. However, given their limited coverage'
they present a rather partial view of the impact of technical measures. Furthermore, they throw little
light on the degree to which technical measures impact upon EU exports of agricultural and food
products in particular. This is the subject of the following sections.
los These data are published by the uS Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) and cover all food products
except meat and Poultry.
ta6 These data must be treated with care when comparing between regions and/or individual countries. Clearly,
the level of rejections will reflect the overall volumé of trade. Furthermore these data take no account of product
that is eventuâlly imported after further testing and/or following treatment to bring it into compliance with US
SPS requirements.
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11.3. Frequency of us technical measures on agricurtural and food products
Frequency-based measures attempt to estimate the number of technical measures applied by type
across product categories. These measures typically make use of inventories of non-tariff measures,
including technical measures, which detail the number and type of measure applied by tariff line. The
most comprehensive is UNCTAD's Database on Trade Control Measures.
Frequency-based measures are employed in two ways. Firstly, to provide a simple measure of the
frequency with which technical measures are applied by product, preferably according to defined tariff
lines. Secondly, to measure the extent to which trade flows are covered by technical measures. kr the
latter case both the Trade Coverage Ratio (TCR) and Frequency Index (FI) are calculated.
Frequency-based measures have a number of limitations that must be borne in mind when interpreting
the results. These include:
- Little or no distinction is made between technical measures according to their likely impact on hade.
As such, therefore, the impact on trade is assumed to be a simple additive function of the number of
measures applied. Furthermore, frequency-based measures do not provide any information on the
deterrent effects that technical measures might have on the pricing and/or quantity decisions of foreign
exporters.
- The reliability of frequency-based measures is reliant on the availability of a comprehensive database
of technical measures that includes all of the substantive measures applied.
- The manner in which technical measures are categorised and the level and type of aggregation can
differ between countries. This can cause problems in comparing the frequency and/or trade coverage
of technical measures between countries and over time.
kt this part of the project, two altemative analyses of the frequency of technical measures were
undertaken for EU exports of agricultural and food products to the United States. Firstly, an inventory
of technical measures was compiled for both the United States and EU to permit comparison of the
number and types of measure applied. Secondly, the frequency of technical measures by tariff line
(HS-02) was undertaken using data from UNCTAD's Database on Trade Control Measures.
In both cases legislation applicable to agricultural and food products was identified and the associated
measures categorised according to:
- regulatory measure;
- regulatory objective;
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- product (according to HS-02 tariff line)
In the case of both regulatory measure and objective, the taxonomy developed by Roberts et al. (1999)
was employed, as described in section 1 1.2. This is detailed once again in Figure 1 1.9, which provides
examples as illustration.
11.3.1. The inventory database: A comparïson of EU and US regulatory proftles
To identiff technical measures applied in the United States and EU, a review was undertaken of the
relevant official publications. In the case of the United States this was the Code of Federal Regulation
and in the case of the EU, the Official Journal of the European Communities. The reliability of the
resultant database was tested through a process of repeat classification. This was undertaken by two
individuals (without consultation) on a random sample of 5 percent of the identified regulations. The
level of agreement between the two individuals was 860/o, indicating a high level of reliability.
A total of 825 govemmental regulations and standards laying down requirements for imports of
agricultural and food products were identified, 534 for the United States and 291 for the European
Union (Table 11.4). In the case of the US, the products most subject to technical measures are edible
vegetables, roots and tubers, edible fruits and nuts, dairy products, eggs and honey and meat and
edible meat offal. In the EU, the products most subject to technical measures are meat and edible offal,
dairy products, eggs and honey, edible fruits and nuts, edible vegetables, roots and tubers, and fruit,
vegetable and nut PreParations.
Many agricultural and food products are simultaneously subject to multiple technical measures. Whilst
it cannot be assumed that the trade effects of technical measures increase in direct proportion to the
number of measures applied, it is reasonable to assume that the burden of compliance will increase.
Figure 11.10 reports the proportion of tariff lines subject to multiple technical measufes in the US as
an example. Only 27 percent of tariff lines to which technical measures are applied are subject to only
one measure. Around 67 percent of such tariff lines are subject to two measures and around 9 percent
are subject to three or more.
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f igure 11.9. Classification of technical measures with examples
measurs ', measures
'r :: : f'99{ safety
,1 Co4mercial
' 
Conservation Quality attribute Compatibilityhealth
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Mandatory
dimensions for
wholesale and/or
retail containers
to facilitate
handling/transpor
tation in
marketing
channels
N.A.
Ban on imports of products
proscribed by state religion
or inferior breeds or
varieties
Animal welfare measures
Measures that regulate size,
appeafturce and other
attributes of agricultural
products
Regulations that prohibit
misleading or fraudulent
packaging
Measures that mandate
labels that indicate
nutritional profile or
whether the product
contains bio-engineered
ingrediarts
Ban or seasonal ban on
imports that threaten
global stock of
endangered species
Required harvesting
techniques for imports of
renewable resource-based
products
Measures that require
harvested product to reach
a certain size to prevent
depletion ofnatural
resource stock
Requirernent that
packaging materials are
biodegradable
Mandatory ecolabels
Ban or regional ban to minimise
risk ofintroduction ofpests or
diseases that threaten native flora or
fauna
Ban on imports bioengineered
products because of potential risks
to native flora and fauna
Standards that establish threshold
levels for presence ofdisease-
causing organisms that threaten
indigenous species
Sealed container requiremants for
imported products to minimise
probability of introduction of
harmful non-indigenous species
Required labelling for safe handling
of bio-engineered commodities and
products so that they are not
distributed outside circumscribed
marketing channels
Ban (may be only seasonal) on
imports to exclude or minimise
risk of introduction of
quarantine pests and diseases
Required treatmants for
products to prevent introduction
of quarantine pests in
production areas
Standards that establish
threshold levels for presence of
disease-causing organisms that
threaten crops or livestock
Sealed container requirernents
for imported products to
minimise probability of
infestation of production areas
Required labelling of individual
iterns ofproduce or containers
to minimise probability of
infestation of production areas
by illegally transhipped imports
Ban on imports of
individual varieties
or species of
ingestible products
harmful to human
health
Measures that require
specific
time/temperature
regimes for imported
foods
Measures that specifr
maximum residue
levels for specified
pesticides on
horticultural products
Specifications for
packaging
technology that
minimise probability
of microbial
contamination
Requirements for
labels that indicate
safe handling
procedures or
whether product
poses risks for
sensitive sub-
populations
Bans
Process
standards
Product
standards
Packaging
standards
I^abelling
requirements
Source: Roberts et al (1999)
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Table 11.4. Regulations laying down requirements for imports of agricultural and food products
in the US and EU
HS-2
Code
Product USA EU
1 animals J 22
2 and edible meat offal 45 45
3 molluscs etc. 1l 15
4 Dairy products, eggs and honeY 55 40
5 of animal 2 4
6 ve flowers etc.
n 10
7 roots and tubers r97 28
8 ble fruits and nuts 132 32
9 tea and 2 6
10 Sereals 9 8
11 of the m1 industries etc 1 6
12 seeds 6 3
13 Gums, resins etc. 2 1
T4 VC 0 0
15 Animal and vegetable oils and fats 1 2
16 of meat and fish 6 7
2r7 and 11
18 and cocoa 2 )
19 Cereal preparations 5 6
20 and nut 35 26
21 1 0
22 and vine 1 24
and waste from food 0 223
Total 534 291
Figure 11.10. Number of technical measures applied by the United States per tariff line
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Figure 11'll and Tables 11.5 and 11.6 provide a breakdo\À/n of technical measures applied to
agricultural and food products in the EU and US by objective. kr the US, 67 percent of measures have
the quality of agricultural and food products as their objective 
- 
many of these are quality standards
for agricultural products, for example fruit and vegetables. In the EU, the main objective of technical
measures applied to agricultural and food products is the protection of human health, accounting for
47 percent of all of the measures applied.
Figure 11.11. Distribution of technical measures by objective
Table 11.5. Distribution of technicar measures by objective in the us
100%
90o/o
80%
7 0o/o
60%
50o/o
40o/o
30%
20o/o
70o/o
0%
U CompatibiJity
I Quality
! Environment
flPlant Health
lAnimai Health
U Human Health
EUUSA
Type of
Measure
Human
Health
Animal
Health
Plant
Health
Environme
nt
Quality Compatibili
ty
Total
Ban 25% 6% 45% 25% 0% 0% t00%
Package 30% 0% 26% 22% t7% 5% t00%
Process 60% 2% 6% 4% 26% 2% 100%
Product r0% t% 7% t% 8t% 0% t00%
Label 10/t /o I O/L /O 4% 3% 74% l1 % t00%
Other 0% 0% 60% 40% 0% 0% t00%
Total r7% ao/L/O 8% 3% 67% 3% 100%
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Table 11.6. Distribution of technical measures by objective in the EU
Type of
Measure
Human
Health
Anlmal
Health
Plant Health Envlronment Quality CompatibilitY Total
Ban 57% 29% t4% 0% 0% 0% t00%
Package 45% 3% 0% 0% 29% 24%
t00%
Process 52% 28% 0% 0% r6% 4% t00%
Product 40% r6% s% 3% 3r% 5o/o t00%
Label 29% 0% 0% r% s0% 20% r00%
Other 0% 0% 0% t00% 0% 0% 100%
Total 42% t5% 3% t% 30% rc% 100%
Figure ll .12 andTables 1 1 .7 and 1 1 .8 provide a breakdown of technical measures in the EU and US by fype
of measure. The most trade distortive measures are total or partial bans, which prohibit trade outright' Bans
are applied very infrequently in both the EU and us, although do account for a signifïcant proportion of
those measures applied for the protection of plant and animal health and the environment in the US'
In the case oftechnical specification s, ceteris paribus, process standards are generally regarded as potentially
more trade distortive than packaging and product standards because costs of compliance tend to be higher'
packaging and product standards specify the characteristics ofthe end product but permit suppliers to adopt
the most cost efficient process to comply with these requirements. Furthermore, process standards may
conflict with prevailing systems of production and marketing in exporting countries, particularly in the case
of low and middle-income countries (Henson et al., 2000). In general, process standards are applied more
frequently in the us than the EU. For example, 56 per cent of technical measures in the us are process
standards, compared to 2l percent in the EU. The predominant type of measure applied in the EU is product
standards, which account for 55 percent of all measures applied.
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Table 11.7. Distribution of technical measures by measure in the us
Type of
Measure
IIuman
Health
Animal
Health
Plant
Health
Environme
nt
Quality Compatibili
ty
Total
Ban 3% t3% t2% l5% 0% 0% t%
Package 5% 0% 10% t9% 1% 4% ao/L/O
Process 51% 2s% t0% t5% 5% r0% 20%
Product 31% 49% 53% 23% 67% 4% s6%
Label r0% t3% t2% 20% 27% 82% 20%
Other 0% 0% 3% 8% 0% 0% r%
Total t00% 100% 100% t00% 100% t00% rc0%
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Type of
,'Measure
Iluman
Health
Animal
Ilealth
Plant
Health
Environme
nt
Quatty Compâtrbill Total
Ban 2% 3% 7% 0% 0% t%
Package 8% t% 0% 0% 7% 2t% 4%
Process 26% 38% 0% 0% rt% 9% 26%
Product s3% 58o/o 93% 83% s7% 35% 60%
Label 11 % 0% 0% r6% 25o/o 35% 8%
Other 0% 0% 0% 1% 0o/o 0% t%
Total 100% 100% 100% r00% t00% l00o/o 100%
Table 11.8. Distribution of technical measures by measure in the EU
Tables ll.9 and 11.10 report the distribution of technical measures applied to agricultural and food
products by HS-2 tariff line and the type of measure applied. The nurnber of measures exceeds the
number of regulations reported in Table 11.4 because any one regulation may speciff a number of
technical measures. However, these data are broadly compatible to those in Table 11.4 in terms of the
products that are most subject to technical measures. Products most subject to technical measures in
the case of the US, and thus of particularly interest to the current study, are:
- edible vegetables, roots and tubers;
- edible fruit and nuts;
- meat and edible meat offal;
- dairy products, eggs and honeY.
Likewise, products that are most subject to technical measures in the case of the EU are:
- meat and edible meat offal;
- dairy products, eggs and honeY;
- edible fruit and nuts;
- fruit, vegetable and nut preparations;
- edible vegetables, roots and tubers.
This analysis, based on the regulatory database, suggests that technical measures potentially have a
greater impact on trade in the case of agricultural and food exports to the US than the EU' Firstly,
technical measures are more frequently applied in the US. Secondly, the US apply potentially more
trade distortive measures, namely product bans and process standards.
466
Table 11.9. Technical measures for agricultural and food products by form of instrument in the United States
TOTAL
8
65
2t
56
2
I2
242
193
2
l1
I
8
2
0
I
6
1 3
2
5
36
I
I
0
688
Other
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
Labelling
2
6
I0
I
0
I
58
50
0
2
0
2
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
135
Product
0
I 1
1
33
0
1
t49
123
2
7
0
4
0
0
0
2
7
2
5
34
I
I
0
383
6
40
1 0
20
2
3
32
16
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
4
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
L4t
0
5
0
2
0
2
3
0
0
2
I
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I 7
Ban
0
3
0
0
0
4
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
Product
ve animals
and edible meat offal
molluscs etc.
and
of animal
ve flowers eûc.
roots and tubers
Edible fruits and nuts
tea and
Products of the milling indusfries (starch, gluten etc.)
resrns etc.
Animal and vegetable oils and fats
Preparations of meat and fish
Sugar and sugar confectionery
and cocoa
Fruit, veggtable and nut preparations
Other preparations
Beverages, spirits a4d vinegar
Residues and waste from food industry
HS-2
Code
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
ll
I2
13
I4
I5
1 6
I 7
l8
I 9
20
2 I
22
23
Total
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Table ll.l0. Technical measures for agricultural and food products by form of instrument in the European Union
TOTAL
34
68
24
62
5
20
33
38
14
18
I0
6
1
0
4
t2
J
4
1 2
38
0
28
2
436
Other
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
Labelling
0
3
0
4
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
13
0
t2
0
36
Process Product
I 9
34
1 6
31
3
8
30
33
6
1 5
6
4
1
0
4
8
I
2
8
22
0
1 I
0
262
11
28
8
23)
t2
3
4
3
3
4
2
0
0
0
4
I
I
4
1
0
I
0
115
2
2
0
4
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
2
0
4
0
I7
, Ban
2
I
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
013 resins etc.
t4 0
oils and fats 015 and
16 of meat and fish 0
0L7 and
18 and cocoa 0
019
20 and nut 0
02l
22 and 0
and waste from food 023
Total 4
ProductIIS-2
Code
I animals
2 and edible meat offal
molluscs etc.3
4 and
of animal5
6 flowers etc.
roots and tubers7
8 fruits and nuts
9 tea and
10
industries etc.l1 of the
t2
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11.3.2. Thefrequenqt of technical measures by tariff tine (HS-02) using the UNCTAD,s Database
As discussed above, a second source of data on technical measures applied to agricultural and food
products by the US and EU was used: the UNCTAD's database on Trade Control Measures. For both
the US and EU these data are available at the HS-6 level, although for the purposes of the current
analysis these were aggregated to the HS-2level.
Table I 1.1 1 reports the proportion of tariff lines that are subject to technical measures at the HS-2
level. This provides a broad indication of the coverage of technical measures by product type. In the
case of the EU, technical measures have the greatest coverage in the case of cereals, products of the
millings industries, dairy products, eggs and honey, and cereal preparations. In the US, products with
the greatest coverage of technical measures are cereals, preparations of meat and fïsh, cereal
preparations, fish, crustaceans and molluscs, dairy products, eggs and honey, live animals and fruit,
vegetable and nut preparations. The coverage of technical measures across virtually all products is
greater in the US than the EU.
Table l1.ll.Incidence of technical measures in European Union and United States
IIS Code Product o/o oftarilflines ,,:'
European
Union
United
1 ve animals t7 94
2 Meat and edible meat offal 54 84
3 molluscs etc. 82 97
4 and 7l 96
5 Other of animal 0 r00
6 ve flowers etc. 0 86
7 roots and tubers l6 98
8 Edible fruits and nuts 20 93
9 tea and 0 t4
10 Cereals 100 100
l1 of the mil industries 8l 0
L2 seeds 9 4t
t3 Gums, lesins etc. 8 17
t4 Other veeetable 0 0
t5 Animal and oils and fats 9 9l6 of meat and fish 8 100
t7 68 ll
18 Cocoa and cocoa 0 0l9 Cereal preparations 7t 100
20 Fruit, vegetable and nut preparations t8 93
2t Other preparations 6 89
22 and t6 60
23 Residues and waste from food 46 0
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 0 0
TOTAL 25 65
Source: UNCTAD
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Table 11.12 reports the number of technical measures applied to agricultural and food products 
in the
us by type, as classified in the database. The predominant types of measure are testing, inspection 
or
quarantine requirements to protect human health and product characteristic requirements for human
health protection. Table 11.13 provides comparable data for the EU' The predominant types of
measure, based on a different system of classification, are prior surveillance, authorisation to protect
wildlife, and prohibition for human health protection. These data thus provide a very different picture
to the regulatory database in terms of the objectives and types of measure applied by the US and EU'
This illustrates the problems of obtaining reliable data on technical measures' given the number and
various types of measure applied and lack of a consistent system of classification'
Table ll.l2.Technical measures applied to agricultural and food products in the us by type
Source: UNCTAD
Table 11.13. Technical measures applied to agricultural and food products in EU by type
Source: UNCTAD
Number of
'Measures
27human lifeto
47Authorisation to animal health 322Authorisation to health 67wildlifeto
829
characteristics for human health
28
characteristics health
4Product characteristics to control abuse
59
27human healthto
60
27human healthto
922human healthtoor
47animal healthtoor
35healthtoor
2501
Number of
Measures
878
surveillance
4licence
238to wildlife
3Authorisation to control abuse
8Prohibition
155for human health
3
uirements
99
characteristics for human health
100Labe human healthto
3
1494TOTAL
and
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Tables 11.14 and 11.15 report the dishibution of US and EU technical measures by tariff line at the
HS-2 level. Tariff lines to which technical measures are most frequently applied in the US are dairy
products, eggs and honey, fruit, vegetable and nut preparations, fish, custaceans and molluscs,
preparations of meat and fish, edible vegetables, roots and fubers, edible fruits and nuts, and other
products of animal origin. In the EU, technical measures are most frequently applied to meat and
edible meat offal, dairy products, eggs and honey, cereal preparations, beverages, spirits and vinegar,
products of the milling industries and cereals.
Table ll.l4. Technical measures applied to agricultural and food products in the US by product
Source: UNCTAD
HS Code Product
I ve animals 49
2 Meat and edible meat offal 138
3 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs etc. 232
4 and 522
5 Other products of animal origin 160
6 Live plants, flowers etc. 76
7 Edible veqetables. roots and tubers 200
8 fruits and nuts 162
9 Coffee, tea and spices 5
10 Cereals 2tll Products of the industries gluten etc.) 0
t2 Oilseeds 30
13 Gqms, resins etc. 0
t4 Other vggetable products 0
l5 and oils and fats 8
16 P{eparations of meat and fish 20t
t7 Sugar and sugar confectionery 24
l8 Cocoa and cocoa 0
t9 Cereal t46
20 Fruit, vegetable and nut preparations 340
2t t76
22 and il9
23 Residues and waste from food 0
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 0
TOTAL 2501
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Number of
MeasuresHS Code
55Live animals1 36r
and edible meat offal2
58molluscs etc.3 205and4 t2Other of animal5 25flowers etc.6 29roots and tubers7 44fruits and nuts8 0tea and9
73Cereals10
82of the industries etc.mr11
8t2
2
resins etc.13
1Othert4 29Animal and oils and fats15
33of meat and fish16
30
andt7
0Cocoa and cocoa18 200Cereal19
62and nut20
92l t26and22
50and waste from food23
0Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes24
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Table 11.15. Technical measures applied to agricultural and food products in the EU by product
Source: UNCTAD
Both the regulatory database and uNCTAD data highlight a number of products to which technical
measufes are widely applied, in particular animal-based products. However, there are a number of
inconsistencies between these two data sets. On the one hand, the UNCTAD data indicates a wider
range of products to which technical measures are heavily applied. On the other, there are differences
in the relative frequency of technical measures across taiiff lines between the two data sets'
The discussion so far has focuses on the numbers and types of technical measures applied, with no
consideration of the tariff lines that are most important in EU-US hade in agricultural and food
products. In order to highlight those products for which technical measures are potentially most trade
distortive, the Trade coverage Ratio (TCR) and Frequency Index (FI) were calculated for 1999 using
UNCTAD data on technical measures and COMEXT data on exports to the US. These calculations
were undertaken at the HS-6 level and then aggregated to the HS-2 level. Results are reported in Table
I 1.16.
Of the 24 taiff lines for agricultural and food products, both the TCR and FI were 100 percent'
indicating that all products are subject to technical measures. These include live animals, meat, fish,
472
meat and fish preparations, dairy products, fruit and vegetables, cereals and cereal preparations.
Relatively few tariff lines (4) have no technical measures applied to them. Most of the remaining tariff
lines have TCR and FI values exceeding 50 percent. These results suggest that technical measures are
potentially an issue for most agricultural and food exports to the US. However, they do not provide
any indication on their own of the tariff lines for which technical measures are most fade distortive.
Furthermore, no account is taken of differences in the number of technical measures applied to each
tariff line, only of whether measures are applied or not.
Table 11.16. Trade coverage ratio and frequency index for technical measures apptied to EU
agricultural and food exports to the US
HS Code TCR FI
1 Live animals 100.0 100.0
2 Meat and edible meat offal 100.0 100.0
3 molluscs etc. 100.0 100.0
4 Dairy products, eggs and honey 100.0 100.0
5 Otherproducts of animal origin 100.0 r00.0
6 Live flowers etc. 100.0 100.0
7 Edible roots and tubers 100.0 100.0
8 Edible fruits and nuts 100.0 100.0
9 Coffee, tea and spices 0.2r 12.9
10 Cereals 100.0 100.0
1l Products of the milling indqstries (starch, gluten etc.) 0.0 0.0
t2 Oilseeds 60.9 45.9
13 resins etc. s4.8 9.1
t4 Other vegetable products 0.0 0.0
15 Aqimal and vegetable oils and fats r.2 10.5
t6 Preparations of meat and fish 100.0 100.0
t7 Sugar and sugar co:rfectionery 30.2 20.0
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations 0.0 0.0
t9 Cereal preparations 100.0 100.0
20 Fruit, vegetable and nut preparations 97.8 96.1
2t Other preparations 100.0 100.0
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 80.s 72.2
23 Residues and waste from food industry 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 73,5 70.4
The foregoing discussion has provided some insight into the nurnber and types of technical measures
applied by the US and EU to agricultural and food products. However, in itselt it provides only
limited indications of the products for which technical measures may actually distort hade. Thus, its
key value is in guiding further analysis and aiding the interpretation of the results of the business
surveyreported in section 11.5.
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11.4. Estimation of tariff-rate equivalents
This second stage of the analysis explores the potential utility of tariff-rate equivalents to estimate the
effect of technical measures on EU exports of agricultural and food products to the us. Technical
measures alter relative prices between world and national markets in a similar manner to tariffs' Thus,
one approach to assess the impact of technical measutes is to explore the gap in relative prices where
technical measures are aPPlied.
The price wedge approach is employed below to estimate tariff-rate equivalents. Such an approach has
previously been employed to assess the price effects of technical measures (see for example Calvin
and Krissoff, l99g). The price wedge in this case is the difference between the US (Pus) price and the
price of an equivalent EU product delivered to the US, which is used as a proxy for the world price
(pw). The aim of the price wedge approach is to account for the difference between these two prices by
allocating it into the known ad-valorem tariff (T) and the technical measure tariff-rate equivalent
(Trr,a). The tariff-rate equivalent can thus be interpreted as the tariff rate that would restrict trade to the
same level as the technical measure.
calvin and Krissoff (lggg) develop a simple partial equilibrium framework that endogenously
determines the tariff-rate equivalent and level of trade:
Pus<Pw(l +T+TrM) ifT=O (1)
Pu5=Pvi(l +T+Trr'a) ifT>0
T = D(Pus) - S(Pus) Q)
Where:
T = Imports from all sources
D = US domestic demand
S = US Domestic supply
Pus= US wholesale Price
Pw = World price adjusted for freight and insurance costs
T = Ad-valorem tariff rate
Tru = Technical measure tariff-rate equivalent.
It is assumed in this framework that Pyy reflects the costs of supplying a "standard" product and is not
influenced by the technical measure of interest. Thus, it is assumed that the technical measure only
applies and affects the flow of product aimed at the US market'
474
If trade takes place, then equation (l) is a strict equality and Tnr provides a reliable measure of the
extent to which the technical measure act as a barrier to trade (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998). If trade
does not take place, equation (1) is an inequality and T1y is only a lower-bound estimate of the impact
of the technical measure.
A number of product case studies were undertaken in an attempt to estimate tariff-rate equivalents.
However, the majority of these were not successful, reflecting the inherent problems with the price
wedge approach as detailed below. However, one "successful" example is provided below as
illushation.
The case study described below estimates the tariff-rate equivalent of hygiene requirements for poul@
meat in the US. Exporters of poultry meat to the US are subject to a system of prior inspection and
approval by the US authorities to ensure compliance with US sanitary requirements. Furthermore, for
some years there has been a dispute between the US and EU over the equivalency of decontamination
methods in the processing of poultry. Apart from some trade in higher value breast meat, exports of
poultry to the US are negligible. This case study provides some assessment of the extent to which this
might be explained, at least in part, by the existence of sanitary requirements.
In order to estimate the tariff-rate equivalent of these sanitary requirements, various data is required as
follows (the sources of the data employed in the analysis are given in parentheses): i) US wholesale
price (USDA ERS); ii) EU wholesale price (Eurostat); iii) transport and insurance costs (USDA ERS).
Combining the EU wholesale price and transport and insurance costs a CIF price for potential EU
exports of poultry meat to the US can be calculated. These data refer to high value poultry meat as is
typically exported by the EU.
The estimated quarterly tariff-rate equivalent for the period 1996 to 2000 is reported in Table ll.l7 .
Over this period the tariff-rate equivalent of US sanitary requirements fort poultry meat has declined
significantly, from around 14 percent at the start of 1996 to around 8 percent at the end of 2000.
Furthermore, the estimated tarifÊrate equivalent varies on a quarterly basis reflecting changes in EU
and US market prices.
Estimation of tariff-rate equivalents through the price wedge approach has a number of weaknesses,
which limit its application in empirical studies. Many of these problems were experienced in the
current study:
- The availability of data on wholesale market prices, freight rates and insurance costs for the products
of interest is often limited. This reflects the fact that this type of analysis is often undertaken on very
specific and clearly defîned product categories.
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- It is difficult to exactly match products sold on the uS market with those exported from the EU' In
some cases no equivalent products may exist, for example cheese. In others, there may be significant
quality differences. Both of these factors limit the ability to make valid comparisons of relative prices.
- Other factors may influence differences in relative prices between the US and EU, for example other
technical measures, differences in supply structures, etc. It may be very difficult to allow for such
differences in estimating tariff-rate equivalents through the price wedge approach'
- The price wedge approach assumes that technical measures only affect the specific flows of products
of interest. In the current example, exports of poultry from the EU to the US. However, technical
measures may have a more wide-ranging impact depending on the strategy suppliers adopt to comply
with such requirements.
For all of the above reasons, it was not possible to apply the price wedge approach more widely in the
current study.
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Table ll.l7. Tariff-rate equivalent for EU poultry meat exports to the us
TariffRate
Equivalent
(%l
14.4
13.4
13.3
13.2
8.0
5.7
r0.7
7.2
lt.2
9.5
7.1
7.6
8.0
7.6
6.9
3.8
4.7
4.1
7.7
8.7
Difference
(cents/lb)
13.3
11.9
t2
I1.9
6.8
4.6
8.8
6.1
9.5
7.2
5.3
5.2
5.4
4.9
4.3
2.3
2.7
2.3
5.3
5.2
EU CIF'Price
(cents/lb)
78.9
77.2
78.2
78.5
78.3
75.5
73.3
78.2
75.1
68.4
69
63
6r.7
59.3
58
57.5
s4.5
54
55.9
54.4
Transport
Costs
(cents/lb)
5.8
6
5.9
5.4
5.5
6.2
5.9
6.7
7.4
7.1
6.7
6
6.2
6.8
7.2
7.4
7.3
7.5
7.4
7.3
Tariff
(cents/lb)
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.9
EU Price
(cents/lb)
69.2
67.3
68.4
69.2
68.9
65.4
63.s
67.6
63.8
57.4
58.4
53.1
51.6
48.6
46.9
46.2
43.3
42.6
44.6
43.2
US \ilholesale
Price
(cents/lb)
92
84
90.2
99.4
88.1
73.7
82.1
9t
56.4
61.05
70.39
&.2
58.1I
58.47
58.08
57.6
54.58
55.54
58.02
57.12
Quarter
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
I
2
3
4
I
2
3
4
I
2
3
4
Year
1996
1997
1998
r999
2000
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11.5. Estimation of costs of compliance with technical requirements
1 1.5, 1. Theoretîcal basis
The focus of this paragraph is the compliance cost approach, aiming to present a framework that 
will
facilitate estimation of the additional costs of compliance for exporters that are associated with
technical barriers to hade. Costs of compliance can be defined as:
The additional costs necessarily incurred by businesses in meeting the requirements laid
upon them in complying with a given regulation'
There are two key elements to this definition. Firstly, it covers the costs that are "additional" to those
which would have been incurred in the absence of the regulation. Secondly, it refers to those costs 
that
are ,,necessarily,, incurred when complying with the regulation. These are discussed in greater detail
below.
A distinction can be drawn between direct and indirect costs of compliance. Direct costs are associated
with the primary purpose of technical standards and/or conformity assessment procedures, whereas
indirect costs result from effects not directly related to the purpose of these requirements' For
example, the direct costs of compliance with a requirement to include particular information on a
product label might include label redesign. The indirect costs niight include product reformulation in
response to the requirement to label the product in this manner.
Compliance costs can be further sub-divided into non-recurring and recurring costs of compliance
(Figure 11.13). Non-recurring costs refer to one-off items of expenditure that are required for initial
compliance, for example investment in new capital. Recurring costs afe associated with more
permanent increases in operating expenditures, for example product testing requirements' The
distinction between recurring and non-recurring costs suggests that account must be taken of the stage
in the compliance process that costs are measured. Further, it is generally accepted that recurring and
non-recurring costs can impede hade in a somewhat different manner (Henson, 1997)'
In order to estimate the "additional,' costs that are imposed on a supplier as a direct result of a
technical measure, an appropriate benchmark must be defined. The aim of this is to identifu the
changes in supply practices that have come about as a direct result of the measure' The easiest
approach is to compare the supply practices adopted by suppliers consequent upon the imposition of
the measure to those that were previously or would otherwise be applied (A in Figure 11'14)' In this
case of an exporter, for example, the technical requirements in the home market and/or alternative
export markets may be used as a baseline. However, this assumes that the firm would not have adapted
their supply practices in the absence of the measures (B in Figure 11.14) and provide an unreliable
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assessment of changes in supply practices that are directly attributable to the inhoduction of the
measure and, in tum, compliance costs.
Figure 11.13. Compliance cost profile
Figure ll,l4. Benchmark for the measurement of costs of compliance
I Recurring
Non-recurring Costs I
Non-recurring Costs II
Cost
u
Time
Cost
Time
B
A
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compliance and to demonstrate compliance has been achieved. This will determine the extent to which
exporters that ate able to comply face barriers to trade that increase their costs over and above those of
domestic suppliers.
In the case of non-recurring costs of compliance, the framework involves the comparison of fixed
costs associated with adapting the product and/or production process to facilitate compliance. Thus, it
requires a measure of the net additional non-recurring costs of compliance that exporters face, over
and above those of domestic suppliers (NCxF):
NCIF=ç*r-"or
Where:
NC*F:1i1., additional non-recurring costs of compliance for exporters;
CxF: Non-recurring costs of compliance for exporters;
CoF= Non-recurring costs of compliance for domestic suppliers.
Whilst this does not provide a measure of the extent to which the measure acts as a barrier to trade, it
does indicate the additional investments that exporters are required to make in order to gain access to
the market concemed.
The degree to which a technical measures acts as barrier to hade depends on the net additional
recurring costs of compliance imposed on exporters (NCxu).This can be computed in a similar way to
above, by comparing the costs imposed on domestic suppliers and exporters:
NC*v:ç*v 
- 
Cou
Where:
NClv : 11.1 additional recurring costs of compliance fcii' exporters;
C*u = Recurring costs of compliance for exporters;
Cou= Recurring costs of compliance for domestic suppliers.
It is also possible to derive an index of relative recurring costs of compliance (Iy)
Iv=[Cxv/Cou]-l
which has a value of 0 when C*u = Cuv and is increasing as the net additional recurring costs of
compliance faced by exporters increase. This enables the relative recurring costs of domestic suppliers
and individual exporters to be compared with ease and provides a convenient ranking of the extent to
which the measure act as a barrier to ffade.
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Food and agricultural products are typically subject to a range of technical barriers to trade' An
assumption of this framework is that the effects of individual technical measures can be separated 
out
from one another and aggregated to provide an overall measure of the net additional costs of
compliance faced by exporters. In turn, this assumes that there is no synergy in compliance with a
range of technical requirements simultaneously, meaning the overall cost of compliance is less than
the sum of the costs associated with individual measures'
A further assumption is that domestic suppliers and/or exporters do not yield a price premium from
compliance with the technical measure, either directly because suppliers value the fact that the 
product
meets legal requirements or indirectly because the overall quality of the product is enhanced' whilst
this may be a more valid assumption for basic food commodities, in the case of more highly processed
and value-added food products it may be violated. However, in this case it is an easy task to adapt the
framework to incorporate the relative price premia received by domestic suppliers and exporters'
11,5.2. Suwey of EU agrîcultural andfood exporters
In order to assess the problems and the costs associated with compliance with technical requirements
for agricultural and food products in the united states, a survey was undertaken of EU exporters' A
sample of 1,g00 exporters of agricultural and food products were selected from across six Member
States: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and United Kingdom' An equal number of
exporters (300) was selected from each Member State. These Member states were selected because a
directory of agricultural and food exporters was available. They include most of the major exporters of
agricultural and food in the EU; the notable exclusion is Spain.
The survey was undertaken during the period April to July 2000. The sampled exporters were sent the
questionnaire and after a period of two weeks a reminder was mailed. Respondents wefe offered a
summary of the survey results as an incentive'
1 1.5.2.L Nature of resPondents
Table 11.1g details the response rate from each of the selected Member States. The overall number of
valid responses was 330, a rate of 18 percent. There were, however, significant differences in the
response rate across the Member States, from 6.1 percent in the case of Belgium to 27 '0 percent in the
case of Germany (cf. Table 1 1 .18).
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Table 11.18. Number of respondents by Member State
Member State Number '''
Belgium 20 (6.t%)
France 30 (e.t%)
Germany 8e (27.0%)
Italy 86 (26.t%)
Netherlands 3s (10.6%)
United Kingdom 70 (2t.2%)
Total 330
I L5.2.2. Main characteristics of respondents
The majority of respondents were relatively small companies. Almost 50 percent of respondents had
less than 50 employees (Table I l.l9) and almost 65 percent only operated one processing plant (Table
11.20). Around 50 percent had a turnover of ê14 million or less (Figure ll.l5). However, a
significant, although relatively small, proportion of larger exporters responded to the survey. These
companies had 500 or more employees, operated three or more plants, and had a furnover exceeding
ê180 million. This profile broadly corresponds with the structure of the agricultural and food
processing sector in the EU.
Table 11.19. Number of respondents by number of employees
Numberof :'.
Employees :
Number
Less l0 s7 (17.3%)
1049 t02 (30.e%)
50-99 37 (tr.2%)
100499 79 (23.9o/o)
500-999 t6 (4.8%)
1,000 or more 3L (e.4%)
Total 330
Table 11,20. Number of respondents by number of plants operated
Number of . '
Employéis rr - ''
Number
I t89 (64.s%)
2 2e (e.e%)
3 33 (tt3%)
4 ts (s.t%)
5 or more 2t (7.1%)
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f igure 11.15. Decile distribution of respondents by turnover
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Figure 11.16 details the agricultural and food products exported by respondents. In many cases each
company exported more than one product type. Products most frequently exported by respondents
were confectionery, biscuits and cakes, dairy products, meat products, and fruit, vegetable and nut
products. Consequently, the survey provides the most information, as well as the most reliable
information, on problems encountered exporting these products.
For the majority of respondents, exports to non-EU countries accounted for less than 50 percent of
total exports (Figure 11.17). Indeed, for almost 50 percent, non-EU exports accounted for less than 10
percent of total exports. Non-EU exports accounted for 50 percent or more of total exports for only 15
percent of respondents.
Figure i 1.18 reports the contribution of exports to the US to total non-EU exports. Whilst the US was
the sole export market for very few of the respondents, it accounted for 35 percent or more of non-EU
exports for more than 50 percent of respondents. This suggests that US exports are an important
market for the majority of respondents.
It was evident from in-depth interviews prior to the survey that the nature of the supply chain has a
significant bearing on the knowledge of exporters regarding regulatory and other requirements'
Specifically, exporters that have direct contacts with buyers typically have a grcater knowledge of
technical requirements and of the problems associated with compliance than those that supply, for
example, via an export agent. Figure 11.19 reports the methods used to export agricultural and food
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products to the US by respondents. over 60 percent of respondents exported through direct contact
with a US buyer. This suggests that the majority were likely to have a good knowledge of technical
requirements in the US.
Figure 11.16. Number of respondents exporting agricultural and food products by product
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Figure 11.18. Decile distribution of respondents exporting to the US by percentage of non-EU
exports
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Figure ll,lg,Methods used to export agricultural and food products to the United States
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11.5.3. Survey results: Problems exporting agricultural andfood products to the US
11.5.3.1. The importance of technical requirements relative to otherfactors influencing arports to the
u^t
The first stage of the questionnaire aimed to assess the importance of technical requirements relative
to other factors influencing agricultural and food exports to the US. Respondents were asked to score a
series of factors that might influence their ability to export to the US on a five-point Likert scale, from
"very important" (1) at one extreme to "very unimportant" (5) at the other. Table l l.2l shows that the
factors ranked first were market price and general labelling requirements. The factors ranked second
were consumer demand, customer requirements and nufitional labelling requirements. Food safety
and legal product quality requirements were ranked third. These results suggest that technical
requirements, and in particular.labelling requirements, were judged to be major factors influencing the
ability of EU exporters to export agricultural and food products to the us.
Table ll.2l, Mean importance score for factors influencing ability to export to the US
Note: Scores denoted by same letter are not significantly at the 5% level.
The mean importance score for the 11 factors in Table 11.21 provides an overall measure of the
problems experienced exporting agricultural and food products to the US. Table 11.22 reports the
mean importance score disaggregated according to main products exported. These results suggest that
the products for which the greatest problems are experienced exporting to the US are meat, meat
products and prepared foods. Fish, confectionery, biscuits and cakes, and fruit, vegetables and nuts are
ranked second in terms of the overall problems experienced exporting to the uS.
Factor Mean Score
Market price 1.52"
General labelling requirements 1.56 u
Consumer demand l.7g b
Customer requirements l.g1b
Nuhition labelling requirements l.g4 b
Food safety requirements t.96"
Legal product quality requirements 1.99'
Distribution system 2,ttd
US trade reshictions 2.13d
Export refunds 2.95
Other 3.32
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Table ll,22.Mean importance score disaggregated according to main products exported
Mean Score
Meat t.63^
Meat products 1.65 "
Prepared foods
- 
1.67u
Fish 1.810
Confectionery, biscuits and cakes 1.92 
0
Fruit, vegetables and nuts 1.92 
0
Fruit, vegetable and nut products 1.93'
Dairy products and eggs 1.95 '
Alcohol 2.14
Cereals products 2.38
Other 2.96
oil 3.00 
0
Beverages 3.020
All products 2.09
Table 11.23 below reports the mean importance score for technical requirements disaggregated
according to the main product exported. These results suggest that the importance of food safety,
labelling and legal product quality requirements in terms of the ability to export to the US differs
widely between products. The products for which each of these technical requirements were
considered most important were as follows:
- Food safety requirements: dairy products and eggs, fruit, vegetables and nuts, prepared foods'
- General labelling requirements: oil, alcohol, meat products, fruits, vegetables and nuts'
- Nutrition labelling requirements: prepared foods, oil, confectionery, biscuits and cakes, beverages'
- Legal product quality requirements: Fish, fruit, vegetables and nuts, beverages, fruit, vegetable
and nut products.
This suggests that it may be difficult to draw general conclusions about the impact of technical
measures on exports of agricultural and food products as a whole. Rather, specific product types need
to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
To this regard, Table 11.24 reports the mean importance score for the four types of technical
requirement disaggregated according to main products exported. Results suggest that the products for
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which technical requirements are the greatest problem are oil, fruit, vegetable and nuts, fïsh, dairy
products and eggs, and prepared foods.
However, the importance of individual measures within this overall score differs (as discussed above).
Thus, for example, whilst technical measures are most important for the ability to export oil, legal
product quality requirements are less important than for mani other food products (Table 11.23 and
Figure 11.20). Similarly, whilst technical requirements as a whole are relatively unimportant in terms
of the ability to export alcohol to the US, general product labelling requirements are more important
than for most other agricultural and food products (Table 11.23 and Figure 11.20). This reiterates the
need to consider the impact of technical requirements on a product-by-product basis.
Table 11.23, Mean importance score for technical requirements disaggregated according to the
main product exported
Note: In each column, scores with same letter are not significantly different at 5%olevel.
Mean ScoreProduct
Food Safety
Requirements
General
Labelling
Requirements
Nutrltion
Labelling':' .
Requireqents,
ProductLegal
Meat 1.89 2.02 2.31
Meat products 1.63 b 1.36 u 2.000 1.gg "
Dairy products and eggs 1.37 1.69' l.7go 1 .9 I
Fruit, vegetables and nuts 1.50' 1.60 2.02" 1.45u
Fruit, vegetable and nut products 1.79 1.71 b l.7g' r.67
Cereals products 2.03" l.8l l.6g' 2.10
Confectionery, biscuits and cakes 2.07" l.6g b 1.59 a l.g0 0
Alcohol 2.3s L.34" L.7t' 1.77 0
Fish 1.70 1.90' 7.70' 1.42^
Prepared foods 1.50 u 1.69" t.43 2.lgo
oil l.6l o 1.33 " 1.52 2.00"
Beverages 2.12 1.70 b 1.60 u 1.56
Other 2.2t l.g0 " 2.s0 2.21o
All products r.96 1.56 1.84 t.99"
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Table ll24.Mean importance score for the four types of technical requirement disaggregated
according to main products exported
oil
' :ilIÊâIl ùCOfe@
1.62u
Fruit, and nuts 1.63'
Fish 1.69 o
and 1.70 0
foods 1.70 b
Meat 1.7 6"
Fruit, vegetable and nut products 1.76"
r.77 "
biscuits and cakes 1.78'
Alcohol 1.79"
Cereals 1.91
Meat 2.05
Other 2.21
All products 1.84
Note: Scores with same letter are not significantly different at the 5% level.
Figure ll,Z1.Mean importance of technical measures to ability to export to the US' by product
in order of increasing abilitY
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I 1.5.3.2. The importance of technical requirements in the US relative to other export markets
The importance of technical requirements in the ability to export agricultural and food products also
differs between export markets. Respondents were asked to score the importance of the four technical
requirements discussed above on a five-point Likert scale from "very important" (1) at one exfreme to
"very unimportant" (5) at the other, as regardsto exports in various countries. Tables 11.25 to 11.2g
indicate that globally the countries for which these requirements were considered most important in
terms of the ability to export agricultural and food products were the United States, Canada and Japan.
Table 11.25. Mean importance of food safety requirements on ability to export to various regions
Region Food Safety Requirements
Canada 1.88
United States 1.92
Japan 2.03"
Other EU countries 2.07 u
Aushal i a./1.{ ew Zealand 2.07 u
Middle East 2.21,
Asia 2.2t
Eastern Europe 2.22
South America )7)
Africa 2.47"
Russia 2.50"
Note: Scores with same letter are not significantly different at the 5% level.
Table 11.26, Mean importance of product labelling requirements on ability to export to various
regions
Region Product Labelling Requirements 
.
United States 1.70
Canada 1.80
Japan 1.99
Middle East 2.09^
Au stral i a/lrl ew Zealand 2.09
Asia 2.tta
Other EU countries 2.12u
Eastem Europe 2.21b
South America 2.24
Russia 2.37"
Africa 2.38"
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Table 11.27, Mean importance of legal product quality requirements on ability to export to
various regions
Reglon Legal Product Quality Requlrements
United States r.97
Canada 2.02
Japan 2.tr
Australi a/I'{ ew Zealand 2.19
Other EU countries 2.22
Eastem Europe 2.29
Asia 2.31
Middle East 2.39
South America 2.49
Russia 2.52
Africa 2.52
Table 11.2g. Mean importance of general labelling requirements on ability to export to various
regions
General Labelllng Requirements
United States 1.98 "
Canada 1.gg "
Japan 2.04
Australia/I.{ew Zealand 2.12
Other EU countries 2.14
Asia 2.23"
Middle East 2.24"
Eastern Europe 2.25"
South America 2.35
Africa 2.46
Russia 2.49
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I 1.5.3.3. The awareness of exporters about us technicqr requirements
An important factor influencing the impact of technical requirements on the ability to export
agricultural and food products is the level of awareness of exporters about the requirements with
which they must comply. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they were informed
about technical requirements on a five-point Likert scale from "very well informed,, (1) at one extreme
to "very poorly informed" (5) at the other. In general, over 60 percent ofrespondents considered they
were informed about the technical requirements for agricultural and food products in the United States
(Figure 1l'21). The mean awareness score, however, was greatest for product labelling requirements
(2'22), followed by food safety requirements (2.27),and lowest for legal product quality requirements
(2.32).
Figure ll,2l. Degree to which informed about technical requirements for agricultural and food
products in the United States
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Very well
informed
Well Informed Neither Well
nor Poorly
Infrorm ed
Poorly
Informed
Very Poorly
Informed
E Food Safety Requirements
E Legal Product Quality Requirements
I Product Labelling Requirements
Respondents were then asked to indicate the importance of a vanety of potential sources of
information on technical requirements for agricultural and food products in the US on a five-point
Likert scale from "very important" (1) at one exheme to "very unimportant" (5) at the other. The most
important sources of information were export agents and customers in the US (Table ll.2g).
Relatively unimportant sources were their own govemment, trade organisations in the US and
consultants.
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Table ll.2g. Sources of information on technical requirements for agricultural and food
products ln the United States
Mean Importance
Scale
Export agents 1.50
Customers in United States t.73
Subsidiary in United States 2.24^
Trade organisations in own country 2.24^
Own government 2.430
Trade organisations in United States 2.470
Consultants 2,83
Other 3.05
Note: Scores with same letter are not significantly different at the 5% level.
11,5.4. Suney results: costs of compliance with us technical requîtements
In order to assess the costs of compliance and associated problems associated with technical
requirements for agricultural and food products in the US, respondents were asked questions
separately about the four stages of the compliance process:
- prior approval ofproduction facilities;
- product reformulation and/or change in production, packaging and labelling;
- impact on production costs;
- border procedures.
Each of these will now be considered in tum.
t 1.5.4.1. Prior approval of productionfacilities
Only 34 percent of respondents were required to obtain approval of their production facilities prior to
commencing exports to the US. These were mainly exporters of meat and meat products, dairy
products and eggs and low acid canned foods. Of these, 81 percent were required to make changes to
their processing facilities.
Figure 11.22 reports the time taken by respondents to obtain approval of their production facilities
prior to commencing exFnrts to the US. For around 60 percent of respondents, the time taken to obtain
approval was less than six months. However, for around 30 percent of respondents this process had
taken 10 months or more.
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f igure 7l'22' Time taken to obtain approval of plant for export to the United States
In addition to the costs associated with the time taken to obtain approval, in terms of the value of lost
exports, respondents were asked to estimate the cost of the changes required to obtain approval of their
processing facilities' The mean cost was 
€1.2 million, but varied from less than 
€100,000 to 
€ 5
million or more (Figure 1l'23)' The mean cost of obtain plant approval accounted for 0.56 percent of
turnover and 4.2 percent of the value of annual exports to the uS.
tr'igure 11'23. cost of adapting plant for approval to export agricultural and food products to the
US (euro'000)
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Respondents were asked to indicate the importance of a range of potential costs of obtaining approval
of their production facilities on a five-point Likert scale from "very important" (1) to "very
unimportant" (5). The most important costs were changes to documentation, upgrading of structure of
plant, and changes to procurement of raw materials (Table 1 1.30)'
Table 11.30. Importance of costs associated with obtaining approval of plant for export of
agricultural and food products to the US
Cost Vo not
Incurring Cost
Mean Importance
Score
Documentation 8.5 r.57
Structure of plant 12.8 1.72^
Raw material procurement 14.0 1.72^
Processing equiPment 1 1.8 1.g6 
b
Quality assurance/control procedures 7.4 1.97 
b
Product storage 16.8 2.21
Other 81.9 2.38
Note: Scores with same letter are not significantlY different at the 5olo level.
of those respondents that had been required to obtain prior approval of their production facilities, 79
percent had been inspected by US andlor EU/national authorities. Furthermore, these facilities were
typically subject to re-inspection on a periodic basis, although for the majority this was undertaken
less than once per annum (Figure 11.24)'
Figure ll.Z4, Frequency of inspection of plant for approval to export agricultural and food
products to the US
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I I '5'4.2. Product reformulation and/or change in production, packaging and tabelling
Almost 50 percent (161) of respondents had been required to reformulate their product to comply with
US technical requirements' The costs associated with product reformulation ranged from less than
€1,000 to 
€100,000 or more, with a mean of 
€12,100 (Figure Il.2S).
Figure ll-25. Cost of adapting product and/or manner in which it is produced, packaged or
labelled for export to the US
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Respondents were asked to indicate the importance of a range of potential costs of product
reformulation on a five-point Likert scale from "very important" (1) at one extreme to ,,very
unimportant" (5) at the other. The costs that were of greatest importance were changes to product
ingredients, changes to product labels and revision of quality assurance processes (Table 1 1.3 I ).
Table 11.31. Importance of costs associated with reformulating product and/or manner in which
it is produced, packaged or labelled for export to the united states
Cost Vo not
fncurrins Cost
Mean Importance
Score
Product ingredients 25.9 l.g0 "
Product label 5.6 1 g1'
Qualify assurance process 23.8 I .9 1
Quality of raw materials 23.8 1.gg b
Packaging 5.2 2.0rb
Product testing 22.0 2.72"
Method of processing 24.7 2.14"
Product storage 28.6 2.29
Other 38.7 3.42
Note: Scores with same letter are not significantly different at the 5% level.
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1L5.4.3. Impact on production costs
Around 56 percent of respondents indicated that the cost of producing a product for export to the US
was greater than producing an equivalent product for sale within the EU (Figure 1I.26). The mean
additional cost of producing for export to the US was 4.2 percent, although around 30 percent of
respondents indicated that additional production costs exceeded five percent'
Figure 11,26, Additional costs of producing product for export to the US compared to
comparable product for sale in the EU (%)
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Respondents were asked to indicate the importance of a range of potential additional costs of
producing for export to the US on a five-point Likert scale from "very important" (1) at one extreme to
,,very unimportant" (5) at the other. The most important additional costs of producing for export to the
US were additional input costs, and the costs of certification and quality control/assurance (Table
1r.32).
Table ll.3Z.Importance of additional costs of production compared to equivalent product for
sale in the EU
Note: Scores with same
Cost oÂ not Incurring Cost Mean Importance Score
Cost of inputs 30.6 t.62
Certification 17.9 1.73^
Quatity control/assurance 19.4 t.76
Nutritional labelling 12.4 1 9 I
Microbiological testing 18.6 1.93
Other testing 22.4 t.94
Storage 22.1 2.09"
Processing
General labelling
20.6 2.10"
6.6 2.1r"
Other 42.9 2.35
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letter are not significantlY different at the 5% level.
Respondents were also asked to estimate the degree to which their costs of production exceeded those
of an equivalent product manufactured domestically in the US. This better reflects the degree to which
additional costs are imposed on EU exporters compared to us domestic suppliers. Around 37 percent
of respondents indicated that their production costs exceeded those of a comparable uS product. The
mean additional costs were 3'l percent, although around 25 percent indicated that their production
costs were more than 5 percent higher (Figure 11.27).
Figure ll'27 
' Additional costs of producing product compared to equivalent product produced
domestically in the United States (%)
I 1.5.4.4. Border procedures
The final stage of the compliance process is the application of conformity assessment procedures at
the border. Around 93 percent of respondents were subject to border inspection, although there was
significant variation in frequency (Figure 11.28). Around 27 percent of respondents indicated that
every consignment was inspected, whilst a fi.rther 38 percent were inspected every 2 to l0
consignments.
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Figure 11.28. Frequency of inspection at US border
Respondents ,ù/ere asked to estimate the proportion of consignments that were detained following
inspection. Around 75 to 80 percent indicated that, over the last three years, no consignments had been
detained (Figure Il.2g). Furthermore, amongst those who had had consignments detained, only around
five percent had had more than 10 percent of consignments detained.
Figure ll,2g.Proportion of consignments detained following border inspection
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Respondents were also asked to indicate the destination of product consignments that had been
detained' On average, around 55 percent of consignments were re-inspected and allowed to enter,
whilst a further 17.5 percent were modified, re-inspected and allowed to enter (Table 11.33). on
average, only around 18 percent of consignments were destroyed or re-exported. These results, with
those above, suggest border inspection is generally not a problem for EU exporters of agriculfural and
food products.
Table 11.33. Treatment of detained consignments
Respondents were' however, asked to indicate the importance of various potential costs associated
with detention of consignments on a five-point Likert scale from "very important,,(l) at one extreme
to "very unimportant" (5) at the other. Costs that were considered most important were product
reformulation and freight (Table 11.34).
Table 11.34. Mean importance of costs associated with detained consignments
Cost Mean Importance
Product modification l.9l
Freight 2.06
Storage 2.15u
Product testing 2.16^
Fee to inspection agencies 2.34
Other 2.46
Treatment of Detained Consignments Mean %"
Re-exported t4.7
Deshoyed 12.9
Re-inspected and allowed to enter 54.7
Modified, re-inspected and allowed to enter 17.s
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Respondents twere also asked to estimate the average cost of a detained consignment. Around 55
percent indicated that the costs was less than €5,000, although around 20 percent indicated the cost
typically exceeded €10,000 (Figure 11.30). Presumably, the magnitude of these costs is highly
correlated with the size of the consignment and the perishability of the product concerned'
Figure 11.30. Cost assoclated with detained consignments
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As a check on'the results of the suryey, respondents were asked to indicate the overall importance of
costs of compliance with food safety, labelling and legal product quality requirements for the
competitiveness of their products compared to those produced domestically in the US. over 55 percent
of respondents indicated that these costs were important, whilst only T2percent indicated that they
were unimportant (Figure I l.3l).
Figure 11.31. Overall importance of costs of compliance with food safety, labeiling and food
quality requirements for competitlveness of products compared to domestically-produced
products ln the US
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Table 11.35 disaggregates the importance of costs of compliance according to the main product
exported. Products for which costs of compliance were most important were oi1, fruit, vegetables and
nuts, fish and dairy products and eggs. These results broadly concur with those presented in the
paragraph 1 1.5.3.
Table 11.3S. Mean importance of costs of compliance with food safety, labetling and food quality
requirements for competitiveness of products compared to competitive products in the US
Product Mean
Importance
oil 1.93 u
Fruit, vegetables and nuts i.g6 "
Fish 2.00 
o
Dairy products and eggs 2,070
Prepared foods 2.030
Meat products 2.29"
Fruit, vegetable and nut products 2.31"
Beverages 2.32"
Confectionery, biscuits and cakes 2.47
Alcohol 2.65
Cereal products 3.2t
Meat 3.40 
0
Other 3.42d
All products 2.83
Note: Scores with same letter are not significantlY different at the 5% level.
11.6. Analysis of US detentions of agricultural and food exports from the EU
The last phase of analysis aims to identify those products for which problems are actually experienced
due to technical measures. The US Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) publishes data on border
detentions of products for which it is responsible. These include food and agricultural products with
some exceptions:
- meat and poultry and meat and poultry products;
- animal products subject to controls relating to animal health and diseases;
- plant products subject to controls relating to plant pests and diseases.
s04
These data do, however, provide some indication of the problems experienced by EU exporters, both
in terms of those food and agricultural products most subject to detention and the reasons for
detention' They do not, however, indicate the eventual destination of the products, that is whether they
are eventually released and imported to the us, re-exported or destroyed.
Figure 11'32 reports the total number of us border detentions of food and agricultural product exports
from the EU in 1997,1998 and 1999. over this period, the total number of consignments detained at
the US border increased by 79 percent, whilst the value of agricultural and food exports increased by
14 percent' This suggests that the proportion of consignments that were subject to detention increased
significantly over this period. Indeed, assuming the average size of consignment remained constant
from 1997 to 1999, the proportion of consignments subject to detention increased by around 65
percent.
Figure 11.32. Total US border detentions of food and drink products from the EU lggT-gg
Source: FDA
Figure 11'33 reports the number of detentions by Member State over the period 1997 to 1999.
Differences in levels of detention reflect both the volume of exports and the types of product being
exported. In 1997 and 1998, Spain, Italy and France accounted for the vast majority of detentions.
France, for example, is one of the largest exporters of agricultural and food products to the US and
also exports certain "sensitive" products, such as unpasteurised cheeses. The pattern ofdetentions was
significantly different, holvever, in 1999. This was due to the detection of dioxin contamination in
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animal feedstuffs in Belgium, which lead to significant increases in the number of detentions of
Belgian exports.
Figure 11.33. US Border detentions of food and agricultural products from the EU by Member
State,1997-99
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Table 11.36 reports the rate ofdetention ofagricultural and food products by value ofexports over the
period 1997 to 1999. These data allow for changes in the value of exports over time and differences
between Member States. They indicate significant differences in the rate of detention between
Mernber States. In 1999, the rate of detention ranged from $489,000 per detention in the case of
Belgium to $15,635,000 per detention in the case of Germany'
These data also indicate that the increase in detentions ofEU exports ofagricultural and food products
over the period 1997 to 1999 is chiefly due to an increase in the rate of detention of exports from a
small nurnber of Member States, namely, France, Portugal, Netherlands and Belgium. In contrast the
rate of detention from some Member States actually declined over this period, namely UK, Italy,
Greece and Germany.
Table 1 1.37 reports the number of detentions of EU exports of agricultural and food products by HS-2
line. The products most subject to detention ovff the period 1997 to 1999 were dairy products, eggs
and honey, edible vegetables, roots and tubers, fruit and nut preparations and other preparations' In
1999, cereal preparations were also subject to high rates ofdetentions, in response to the detection of
dioxin contamination in Belgium. This reflects the importance of these products within overall
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agricultural and food exports from the EU and also the number and nature of technical measures to
which these products are subject.
Table 11.36. Mean value of agricultural and food exports per US detention by EU Member
State,1997-99 ($000)
Member State t997 1998 1999
United Kingdom 3649 3096 7t67
Spain 29tl 1974 2703
Portugal 2005 t206 I42 1
Netherlands 18512 9264 9615
Italy 4838 42 11 6972
Greece 2817 r034 3593
Germany t1740 778r 15635
France 4957 33s6 3196
Belgium 10792 700s 489
Table 11.37. US border detentions of food and agricultural products from the EU by product,
t997-99
HS Code Product Number of
1997 1998 t999
I Live animals 0 0
2 Meat and edible meat offal I I t0
3 molluscs etc. 192 269 76
4 and 298 349 350
5 Other of animal 0 0 0
6 Live flowers etc. 0 0 0
7 Edible roots and tubers t37 400 285
8 Edible fruits and nuts 25 40 22
9 tea and 30 119 68
l0 Cereals 2 24 3ll Products of the industries etc 0 0 1t
t2 Oilseeds 0 0
l3 resins etc 0 0 1
l4 Other 0 0
l5 Animal and oils and fats t4 10 t7
l6 of meat and fish 2 3 84
t7 and ll 28 28
l8 Cocoa and cocoa 35 0 2t
19 Cereal 59 131 594
20 and nut 219 299 2462l Other 108 122 220
22 and 5 14 2
23 Residues and waste from food 0 4 2
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 0 0 0
TOTAL I 138 1820 209s
Source: FDA
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Table 11.38 reports the reason for detention ofEU exports ofagricultural and food products over the
period 1997 to 1999. Note that a number of reasons may be given for the detention of any
consignment and, consequently, the aggregate of these figures is greater than the overall number 
of
detentions. Throughout this period, the single most important reason for detention was no-compliance
with pre-registration and/or approval procedures' in particular relating to information on methods 
of
processing and low-acid canned foods. Non-compliance with labelling requirements and
microbiological contamination were also frequent reasons for detention. In 1999, chemical
contamination accounted for around 30 percent of the reasons for detention, reflecting protective
measures against dioxins as a result of the detection of contamination in Belgium'
Table 1r3g. us border detentions of food an agricultural products by reason,1997'99
Number of Detentions
I19981997
351
1
528
880
302
2
497
801
170
0
280
450
on process not filed
Prior re gi strati on/apProval
acid canned food
or cfeam
2
544
1
0
1
98
0
0
646
0
0
0
3
I
40
0
3
47
0
0
0
0
0
28
1
0
29
Chemical contamination
Sulfites
fluorocarbons
nsafe substance
Colour
3
tzl
3
3
3
3
39
2l
1
49
t7
59
53
7
2
2
388
3
97
I
3
0
1
13
30
I
75
30
46
46
42
5
5
394
5
63
0
1
0
0
0
10
0
15
34
4l
13
29
1
1
212
Labelling
VES
vourings
labelnutritionwithoutclaim
usefordirectionsadequate
without labellingadequateproducts
colours
labelling
labelling
suaVcommon name
list
ofcontents
juice label
form or content oflabel
of supplier
not in English
388394212
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Reason Number of
t997 1998
Microbiological contamination
Listeria
Salmonella
Shigella
Bacterial contamination
Sub-total
28t
30
2
I
314
376
20
0
I
397
287
54
0
t2
353
[roaurt of diseased animal
Hygiene
Filthy
Foreign Objects
Non-compliance with HACCP requirements
Prepared, stored or held under unsanitary conditions
kradequate acidity
Off Odour
Poisonous
lnadequate processing
BSE
\ub-total
I
5l
5
0
0
3
0
9
3
0
72
0
44
4
0
6
24
1
5
7
0
9I
4
50
6
9
22
7
0
23
24
9
154
Packaging
Container with non-permitted substance
Can with non-permitted substances
Leaking or swollen packaging
Soaked/Wet
Sub-total:
Composition:
Quality standard
Substitution of ingredients
Identity standard
Wrong name
Sub-total
0
0
2
3
5
I
0
0
0
I
3
I
3
3
t0
6
l8
I
I
26
2
1
1
I
5
I
I
2
4
8
Other
nauthorised re-imported prescribed drug
ot listed
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
t4
14
fotal I 138 1820 2095
Source: FDA.
11.7. Conclusions and policy recommendations
The foregoing discussion has explored a number of analyses aimed at assessing the impact of technical
measures on EU exports of agricultural and food products to the US. Whilst the results of this analysis
are not compatible and/or presented in a form that can be readily applied to other elements of the
project, they do provide a rather in-depth assessment of the impact of technical measures. The key
conclusions of the analysis are as follows:
i) Technical measures are widely applied to EU exports of agricultural and food products to the US.
Furthermore, many products are simultaneously subject to a range of technical requirements.
However, whilst frequency-based measures provide some indication of potential "problem" products,
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they do not indicate the manner and degree to which technical measures actually impede trade'
Furthermore, whilst technical measures may impede trade, they may be justified in terms of specified
policy objectives and thus cannot be defined as 'barriers' to trade.
ii) There are significant differences in the number of types of technical measures applied to
agricultural and food products in the us and EU. However, there are close similarities in the 
products
for which technical measures are most frequently and most widely applied' These include meat and
edible meat offals, dairy products, eggs and honey, fish, crustaceans and molluscs' cereals' cereal
preparations, edible vegetables, roots and tubers, edible fruits and nuts' and fruit, vegetable and nut
preparations.
iii) A number of products are subject to relatively high rates of detention at the US border, indicating
real problems complying with US technibal requirements. These include fish, crustaceans and
molluscs, dairy products, eggs and honey, edible vegetables, roots and tubers, fruit, vegetable and nut
preparations and other preparations. Furthermore, the majority of detentions occur with exports from
particular Member States, most notably France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom' The
predominant reason for detention is non-compliance with prior approval/regisffation requirements'
iv) Tariff-rate equivalents, whilst a theoretically atffactive approach to estimate the impact of technical
measures on trade, in practice are very problematic to estimate empirically'
The survey of exporters of agricultural and food products provided a wide range of information on the
impact of technical requirements on exports from the EU to the us. Key conclusions include:
v) Technical requirements, and in particular labelling requirements' are predominant factors
influencing the ability of EU exporters to export agricultural and food products to the us.
vi) The impact of labelling requirements, food safety requirements and legal product quality
requirements on the ability to export to the US differs on a product-by-product basis' Overall,
however, these requirements have the greatest impact in the case of oil, fruit, vegetables and nuts, fish,
dairy products and eggs and prepared foods'
vii) Comparing between different export markets, technical requirements have the greatest impact on
the ability to export agricultural and food products to the US' Canada and Japan'
viii) A significant minority of exporters was required to have their production facilities approved
before commencing exports to the us. The costs associated with this process were, in many cases'
very significant, particularly for smaller companies'
ix) Around half of respondents had been required to reformulate their products before commencing
exports to the US. The unit costs of such changes were, in many cases' significant'
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x) Around a third of respondents considered their costs of production were greater than for an
equivalent product manufactured domestically in the US. The mean excess costs of production were
around 3 percent.
xi) Most respondents were subject to border inspection prior to importation to the US. However,
relatively few had had consignments detained, although where this was the case costs were often
significant.
Whilst this analysis almost raises as many questions as it answers, it does provide some insight into
the impact of technical measures on EU agricultural and food exports to the US. Clearly, further work
is required, although this study provides a good basis, indicating potential "problem" products and the
range of technical measures to which they are subjected. Furthermore, it has highlighted the
importance of the compliance process and the costs associated with different stages.
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12. THE ECONOIUICS OF NON-TARIF'F'BARRIERS
Non-tariff barriers and market failures: Risk and informational aspects
Jean-Christophe Bureau
Parbrer 2: INRA-ESR, Grignon
12.1. Introduction
The objective of this part of the project (i.e., task 3) was to contibute to develop an analytical
framework allowing to analyse the welfare effects of domestic food quality and safety regulations and
to examine their ability to address market failures.
The starting point of the work developed within this part of the project is the following paradox. On
the one hand, there is an agreement among hade practitioners that technical regulations are more and
more often used for protectionist purposes, now that tariffs tend to come down because of intemational
commitments on market access (OECD, 1999). Often, the protection of consumers or the environment
is used as an argument for imposing stricter standards which, in fact, mainly aim to keep imports out.
Numerous cases have been described where special interest groups have persuaded public authorities
to back their case and erect health and safety barriers to imports, despite proof that risk levels were
minimal (Hillman, 1978, 1997; Kramer, 1989; Roberts and Orden, lggT). Economists tlpically
atfibute the origin of such measures to rent-seeking or the capture of regulatory authorities by special
interest groups (Stigler, 1975). hr the case of environmental and safety standards, for example,
regulators may be subject to political and economic pressures when deciding thresholds and framing
regulations (Magat et al., 1986; Tullock, 1997; Powell,IggT).This legitimates the action of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), which addresses potential non-tariff hade barriers associated with food
quality through the Sariitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) Agreement. With these agreements, barriers to imports must now be based on scientific
grounds. The evidence of significant barriers to trade, caused by regulations whose motivation is
primarily to protect vested interests, suggests that the action of the WTO should be deepened in the
ongoing round of negotiations.
On the other hand, however, one cannot dismiss that consumers, especially in Europe, have genuine
concems about the safety, quality and ethical correcbress of imports (i.e., environment, child labour,
animal welfare, etc.). These concerns should be addressed unless taking the chance of a large scaled
rejection of the whole trade liberalisation process. This legitimates regulations that might restrict 6.ade
provided that they protect and, to a certain extent, satisfu consumers. These regulations should also be
designed so as to alleviate some market failures, namely those linked to imperfect information on
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quality and that openness of market to new products tends to magniff. There is therefore a difficult
challenge, that of defining rules for fair ftade without jeopardising adhesion to the trade liberalisation
process. This requires sounder rules for defining what is a trade barrier and what is a legitimate
regulation that addresses consumers concerns with minimal trade distortions.
In the sanitary and phytosanitary area, the WTO relies on a science-based approach' Basically,
measures that tend to limit trade are legitimate but must be based on scientific evidence under both the
TBT and SpS agreements. However, enforcement of international rules based purely on science has
resulted in some controversies. countries differ in their culture as well in their technical skills and
their ability to enforce regulations. Domestic regulations often result from history, correspond to
specific demands from consumers, or are designed to cope with a specific legal system which provides
particular incentives for firms as far as product quality is concerned. This raises the question of the
setting of intemational rules that enhance the process of trade liberalisation while ensuring an adequate
level of protection for consumers.
More generally, this raises the question of setting efficient domestic regulations. Efficient would mean
that the regulation manages to avoid market failures at a minimal welfare cost for the society. Clearly,
there is a need for more investigation of the costs and benefits of regulations. This is true for the
regulations that can act as trade obstacles, but also for the public intervention in a more general way
since most of the measures that are discussed in the framework of the trade negotiations (e.g. sanitary
and technical standards, denominations, labels, liability provisions, etc.), are not specific to the issue
of international nade.
Hence, the development of an analytical framework appears as necessary for analysing the welfare
effects of domestic food quality and safety regulations and be able to classifu non-tariff barriers
(NfBs) according to the degree to which they impede trade and/or actually address market
inefficiencies.
The first idea that underlies the work undertaken within this part of the project is that the standard
(neo-classical) normative framework used in public economics can be useful for addressing these
concems. Economics could be part of the "science-based, rules-based approachu that could be used for
assessing the legitimacy of trade restrictions. Economics could also contibute to clariff international
rules if disputes were solved using an economically based defînition of what is a non-tariff barrier and
what is a genuine correction of market failure. The need for an increased role of cost-benefit analysis
in designing sanitary and phytosanitary legislation has also been emphasised, in particular by the
Nobel prize winner Kenneth Arrow together with a group of economists in a manifesto published in
the review "Science" (Anow et al. 1996). The work presented may be considered as a first stage
contribution in showing that economics could help quantifu consumers concerns (through the use of
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economic valuation of their preferences) and that the whole process of economic assessment could be
a useful negotiation tool (Bureau and Marette 1999).
The second idea underlying the work undertaken within this part of the project is that the beneficial
effects of tade liberalisation may be attenuated by spontaneous market inefficiencies. In such cases,
government intervention can be modified in order to avoid negative effects and to maximize the gains
from hade. There arc at least possible causes of market failures that have been identified in the
literature: imperfect competition, imperfect knowledge and the presence of risk. Public regulations
should focus on alleviating market failures in the three cases. A logical consequence is that when it
can be shown that a domestic regulation successfully addresses one of these three issues, even though
it might result in resticting trade flows, the intemational community should acknowledge that there is
a form of legitimacy which should be reflected in trade agreements.
Hence, section 2 of this chapter proposes several analytical frameworks aimed at illustrating how hade
liberalisation may may result in spontaneous or increased market inefficiencies. There are numerous
possible cases where trade liberalisation may induce market failures. Two of them, that are particularly
relevant in the context of food quality and safety standards, were retained: the presence of sanitary and
phytosanitary risk and imperfect information on the quality of products.
The first developed model investigates the welfare impact of hade liberalisation between two
countries experiencing different levels of sanitary risk and production cost, the consumers being
unable to detect the origin of the product sold on the market. The second developed model relies on a
similar framework but put special emphasis on the impact of tade liberalisation on the behaviour of
sellers in terms of testing and signalling the quality of their product. kr this case, both counties exhibit
equal levels of sanitary risk and production cost, but differ in their ability to contol product's safety.
The third model explores the economic mechanisms affecting product safety when consumers face
different information structures. Three cases are considered: the search good situation; the experience
good situation (as defined by Nelson, 1970); the credence good situation (Darby and Karny, lg73).
The fourth developed model is specifically designed for addressing the EU-US hormone-treated beef
dispute. It corresponds to a particular case of the previous third model and is used for investigating the
welfare effects of opening the domestic market (i.e., the EU market) where hormone-free beef is
perceived as of higher quality to foreign products (i.e., US hormone-treated beef) that are perceived as
lower quality goods.
Section 3 examines some issues related to labelling policies. Indeed, there are several ways to
implement a label and this second stage of the analysis aims to further examine the effectiveness of
various labelling strategies. More specifically, three main questions are addressed: when should a
regulator promote public labelling and when should labelling be a mandatory or a voluntary
prograrnme? How should public labelling be financed? Under which conditions a label "does contain"
514
is more effective than a label "does not contain"? Lessons are drawn from developed analytical
frameworks proPosed in section 1.
Section 4 of this chapter proposes an assessment of the us sanitary and phyosanitary legislation' 
from
the point of view of the wro rules. A special emphasis is paid to the so-called Delaney clause.
Finally, section 5 concludes and draws some policy recommendations.
12.2. Tradeliberalisation and market failuresraT
12.2.1. Trade liberalîsation and împerfect competition
The linkages between competition and product quality are complex. There is evidence that there might
exist fade-offs between quality supply and competition. when this happens, by increasing
competition, trade liberalisation may sometimes have a negative influence on the quality on offer'
Greater competition may result in certain quality segments not being supplied at all, or in an overall
decline in quality on the market (Gal-or, 1989a). When fïrms have fixed costs, it has also been shown
that greater competition can cause producers to set quality levels further removed from the socially
optimum level in order to limit a fall in profits (Reitzes, 1992). Ceteris paribus, by increasing
competition in an indusfy, freer trade could encourage quality-cutting or fictitious differentiation,
especially if consumers track prices more readily than quality (Beales et a1', 1981), or when there is a
negative correlation between the quantity of output and quality (e.g', in sectors where quality depends
on resficting yields).
The mechanism by which trade liberalisation (and more generally increased competition) may affect
producer,s choice and lower their incentive to enhance safety is illustrated in Box 12.1. Further details
on the theoretical framework and obtained results are provided in Gozlan and Marette (2000). Relying
on Industrial Economics, the used framework involves extremely simplified assumptions (the negative
effect resulting from the possible decrease in effort is lower when one considers a bilateral opaning of
borders for example). kr reality, markets are more competitive. However, the mechanism illustrated
could occur in real life, since it is only an international extension of quality cutting competition' 
ra8
la7 In most of the papers under this section of the project, the emphasis was put on simplified mathematical
framework that aim at illushating economic *"rh"nirt* rather than providing a faithful representation of the
;.;ù Indeed, tlre analytical deielopments becomes rapidly mathernatically intactable when models become
,ffi,i."t.C. fhe methodology adopied was to base the ànalysis on stylized economic mechanisms'
tot Fo, exanple, in many countries, domestic competition policy acknowledges that increased competition can
result in lower quality. The regulator often permitsbaniers to entry, such as geographical barriers (e.g', areas of
exclusive dealership in order'to make sure that adequate mainlenance services will be provided), or vertical
conhacts between processors and dealers. fire purposè is to limit competition when it is acknowledged that this
;;*ltr in an increase of quality, and that this results in an improvement in collective welfare'
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Box 12.1. A Possible Case where Trade Results in Lower Quality Supptied
The purpose of the following stylised model, which draws from Gozlan and Marette (2000), is to show a
possible mechanism where fiade liberalisation lowers incentives for ensuring product quality.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that tade liberalisation results in a shift from a monopoly to an oligopoly. In a
given country, consider a producer deciding upon a level of quality effort ), e [0;l]. Although the demonstation
is more general, we focus here on a safety effort. Without loss of generality, this effort can be identified as the
probability of getting safe products. Only safe products are on demand. The cost of the effort is fÊ lZ, which is
independent of the quantity produced. By assumption, the producer decides upon .1. in a fust step, on the basis
of an expected price over the present and future periods (subgame perfect equilibrium). Consumers and suppliers
are aware of the quality of the products on offer. Demand for high quality (safe) products can be tep."reotid as
x =l- plQn (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978).
This follows the assumption of a continuum of consumers with different preferences d for quality, represented
by a uniform unit distribution of a parameter a e [o,r]. The net utility of each consumer willing to buy a unit of
thehighquality qlforapricepis U=fun-p. Theparametet 0s=plqu characterisestheconsumerwhois
indifferent between acquiring the good or not, so that demand of high quality goods is x = | - 00. The profit of
the monopolistic supplier is fI = Àp(l- plqù- f 2 12.
By backward inductiorq profit maximisation leads to an equilibrium price p' =Qn/2 and to a quality choice
2i = Mintl;qnKafl). When the unit cost of quality effort / is low, the effort is maximal, i.e., ),'= I This leads,
by assumption, to production of safe products only. Overall welfare, the sum of consumers' surplus and
producer'sprofitis llt=fr,r+cs1=3q^/8-f l2.rf f >qn/4,theeffortis î =qnl(4f)4,resultinginthe
possible production of tainted products. The effort decreases when / increases, and welfare is Ws - ql trc1 .
Now, assume that the country opens its domestic market to imports. The foreign supplier (denoted F) is similar
to the domestic one (denoted D). Assume that they compete in price, provided that they both produce safe
products. This occws with a probability loLr.Price cutting competition leads to a zero profit. Consumers'
surplus is .ic" = XrfurOt=q1l2 with do =0 in ttrat particular case where the market is covered. With a
probability lot-Ip) the domestic firm is the only one to ofier safe products and the foreign one faces no
demand. The gross profit of the domestic producer is qnl4 and consumers' surplus
isrc"'= t,r{fun-p')dT=qn/8. In the first step, the expected profit of the domestic supplier is therefore
il o = Ao(l - Ar)q n I 4 - f2D2 I 2.
Turning to the choice of the quality effort, maximisation of the expected profit leads to a quality effort
Ë=Ë=qhl4f +4n4 assoon asJ)0.Thatis,theeffortinqualityislowerunderfreetadethanunder
autarky, since .l.i < .e' . fhe reduction in profit leads the domestic supplier to cut the quality effort. The resultrg
domestic welfare is I{" = qî(qn +3.D12(q1+4f)2 .
Denote/ as the unit cost of quality effort so that I(1 : lYc. The welfare under autarky is larger than under free
trade forthe domestic country when / e]ft;enI 2J l.
The negative effect on welfare caused by the decrease in effort dominates the positive effect caused by increased
competition (i.e., the reduction in deadweight losses). As a result, freer tade results in both a decrease in product
safety and in domestic welfare. Conversely, the welfare of the domestic country under autarky is lower than
under free tade when/is close to zeto or when/becomes very large (i.e., f < f, and f > qn leJr), meaning
that the effect of the fall in safety effort is offset by the reduction of deadweight losses. When/is close to zero
the effort of both firms is close to the effort of a firm under autarky (i.e. )"' =l).
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12.2.2, Trade liberalisation and tisk
The existence of risk is also a source of economic inefficiency. By increasing trade flows, trade
liberalisation also multiplies the probability of spreading disease and unwanted species, for example'
The cost of spread of pests and pathogens can be high. The blocking of sewers in North American
cities by exotic molluscs brought in on the hulls of cargo ships is one example of this phenomenon'
various outbrea*s of food poisoning in the EU and the us caused by imported foods provide another
example. This imposes costs on society, such as lower yields in the case of an epizootic or the spread
of a plant pest, or healthcare costs. Trade liberalisation therefore modifies the "public good" aspects of
food safety. For example, a counbry's reputation as a producer of safe food may suffer when there is an
outbreak of a food-borne disease, affecting all exporters through the misdeed of only one producer'
Trade liberalisation, which exposes consumers to less familiar products, may increase the number of
cases where consumers have an inappropriate evaluation of the risk level, raising some very difficult
questions for economists.
It is not easy to assess the extent to which any increase in sanitary and phytosanitary risk is athibutable
to international trade rather than other factors such as tourism, and estimating the social costs of these
extra risks is diffrcult. However, the increased risk may limit thc welfare gains from international trade
and should, in any rigorous approach, be taken into consideration when assessing the gains resulting
from hade liberalisation.
The theoretical framework developed here relies on both Industrial Organisation and Welfare
Economics and involves simple specifications of a random contamination by pathogens. It is used to
investigate the effect of opening the domestic market to a product of uncertain quality, i.e., which
could be tainted by pathogens. The model and obtained results are reported in details in Bureau,
Marette and Gozlan (2001). As this theoretical framework assumes that foreign producers cannot
detect contamination of their products, the illushated case is relevant in Nord-South trade and
corresponds to observed consumers concerns against import from third world countries that would fall
under the special treatment (Article l0 of the SPS agreement)'
In the presence of rislq food safety inspection is a major issue. Questions arise on whether safety
inspection and/or certification program be mandatory or a voluntary progfam would be more cost
effective. Drawing on recent literature on Industrial Organization, a framework was proposed where
public, third party certification provides food-safety information to imperfectly informed buyers
(Crespi and Marette, 2000). The structure of an efficient public regulation was investigated. Using a
simple single-period model that takes into account asymmetric information and the link between the
structure ofcertification costs and the shape offees, the authors also studied the costs and the benefits
of food certification, and of the ways it should be funded in order to provide the right incentives for an
efficient regulation.
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12.2.3. The importance of informational aspects
Risk of contamination is a particular form of imperfect information. However, this is not the only one.
Imperfect information on the quality of products is also a major issue. Broadly speaking, if consumers
are not fully informed about product characteristics they may consume a dangerous product, or acquire
a quality they do not wish to consume, or pay a price that does not reflect the real quality of the good
in question. In all these cases, the level of welfare in society may be lower than it would have been if
information had been perfect. The workings of the market may cause vendors to offer an inadequate
level of quality or safety when information is imperfect. The problem is likely to become more
important while products come from further and more various origins. Because they are imported from
counfies that differ in institutional structure and regulatory framework, and therefore in their
perceived ability to protect consumers from unsafe products and deceptive practices, the process of
hade liberalisation raises consumer concernb about the safety of food products.
Since domestic consumers may value differently the quality athibutes of domestic and foreign
products, hade liberalisation, which results in the coexistence of both imported and domestic products
on the same market, may affect consumers'beliefs on the average quality of products. It is well known
since the work of Akerlof (1970) that market inefficiencies may stem from imperfect information and
that consumers' expectations about product quality play a key role in the determination of aggregate
welfare.
Consumer goods may be divided into search, experience and credence goods. A good is a search good
when the consumer is capable of assessing its quality before buying it, an experience good when the
consumer discovers the quality only after consuming it, and a credence good when the consumer never
discovers the quality of the good (or does so only in the very long term). Search goods are goods for
which perfect information can be acquired, albeit at a cost. The organoleptic components of quality
(taste) generally fall into the "experience" category. But many agrofood goods fall into the "credence"
category (Caswell and Mojduska, 1996). This is the case, for example, when the "safet5r" component
of quality or the nutritional composition of a product are at issue. It is also the case with the ethical,
cultural or environmental components of quality. The economic mechanisms at work in these three
categories are different. With experience goods, for example, the incentives for quality fraud are
limited by consumer sanctions on the occasion of repeat purchases. With credence goods, there is no
spontaneous mechanism for market regulation and it is more difficult to indicate quality in a credible
way. The market failures highlighted by Akerlof may extend into the long term (see Box 12.2).
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Biox 12.2. Imperfect information and market inefficiency
Imperfect information about product quality can cause market dysfunctions affecting the pnce and quality
taded goods. Two rnaJor tJæes ofproblems are generally identified. In the case of adverse selection, vendors do
decide the quality of their products. In the case of moral hazard, vendors do decide the quality of theirnot
risks and risks which producers have noproducts. Wittr regard to food safety for example, long-term over
conhol fall into the adverse selection category, while risks over which they do have contol fall into the moral
hazard category.
.When 
consumers are not able to distinguish the specific quality of different products, they Te not willing to pay
u, nilfr a price as they would if they ùere sure tîrat ttre produtt was of high quality' Akerlof (1970) has shown
that imperfect consumer informatioi about product quality could even result in total closedown of the market
6;;Ë 
"i tade) if, because of a 
lack of-information, buyers' willingness !o p-ay-was insufÏicient to cover
;;;e".,i"" costs.if buyers'willingness to pay is less than ihe cost of producing high quality goods, only low
quality goods (less .oiù1o pÀJ,i""l are raâea and high quality is frôzen out of the market (Akerlof quoted
.".orrl[una.ur, 
", 
a faàousi*ample of poor quality chasing away high quality).
In order to alleviate these dysfunctions, vendors may signal the quality of their products. Fol al experience good,
this signal may be 
"o*-oni.ut"d 
through the price. In lht .utt of moral hazatd, Shapiro (1983) has shown that a
nigrrrr"ptir. tlran the perfect informatioi price could encourage producers to offer high quality on a lasting basis'
This price supplement constitutes the iniormation rent, whiih inables quality to be maintained over time and
creates an incentive r"tî.ft".t on quality. rae 16, can be a way of segmenting, the 
-market 
and informing
consumers. However, there is a cost io soii"ty in comparison with a situation of perfect information, since
consumers have to p"yîft" ftigft r price neededio signal çality. This mechanism does not work with credence
goods. As consumers never dËtect'the quality of the lroduct, tepg{ purchases do not bring them any additional
information and will oàt .rtunt" their ïehaîiour, thus not providing any incentive to producers to offer high
quality.
The price mechanism described above 1S not the only way rn which quality can be signaled. Firms can spend
heavily advertising, for example, and consumers will anticipate that such expenditure can only be covered byon (if it expenence good). warranties oran information rent, indicating that the product ls of high quality ls an
substantial conpensation ln the event of problems are other tJæes of signal (Gal-Or, I 989b; Lu'tz, Ie8e). Firms
also secure reputation vra tademark or quality signal such as a label. Govemments can enhance thecan
intermediaries such brokerscredibility of quality signals by certifying them. Conversely, consumers may use as
dealers who, better informed, can give them credible information on the quality of the offered goods. In allor
these cases, information has a welfare cost to
When consumers know that they do not have complete information, markets are affected in a way that
reduce fransactions. When information is imperfect, trade liberalisation can encourage phenomena
such as the elimination of high quality products or price distortions, especially where credence goods
are concerned. There is a substantial body of research to show that information effects may limit the
welfare gains made possible by trade liberalisation as a result of lower prices and greater product
diversity (Falvey, 1989; Grossman and Shapiro, 1988)'
Economic literature suggests that regulation on product safety cannot be considered independently of
the competition structure (Daughety and Reinganum,lggT). Many normative results on safety
regulation depard on the combined effect of information and competition (Donnenfeld et al, 1985).
ue. A high quality producer has an economic interest in preserving his reputation' If he sold a poor qulltty
pioduct i4tn a f,iÉn quality price ticket, buyers detecting the quality after consuming the product would not buy
'aorn tt" same pioûucer aiain. The cost'of establishing a ieputation, which can be amortised only by the
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12.2.4. An economic assessment/deftnition of non-tariffbarriers: The case of the EA-US hormone-
treated beef dispute
The case of the hormone-treated beef between the EU and the US provided the opportunity to assess
the WTO rules regarding non-tariffbarriers in the light of the three mechanisms previously described
by which hade liberalisation may generate or increase market failures resulting from the combined
effects of risk and imperfect information.
The TBT and SPS agreements limit the freedom of WTO member countries to define technical
regulations. Together with the Dispute settlement body of the WTO, they make it possible to settle
disputes on technical trade barriers. Thanks to the reliance on the Code,v Alimentarius, such
agreements contribute to making legislation consistent throughout countries. Nevertheless, full
harmonisation of standards in all WTO counties is difficult. Moreover, it is not necessarily desirable
either. The cost of providing a given quality differs a lot among countries, making a uniform standard
economically inefficient. kr addition, consumers of different countries do not have similar
expectations about food quality and food safety regulations. Fundamental differences in the legal
system for protecting consumers from health hazards provide some justification for diverging
conceptions on the role of government in setting standards. Consumers' perceptions concerning the
quality of a product may differ due to the specific eating habits of such or such county. For example,
surveys show that in some European countries, consumers are more likely to pay a premium for
products obtained without biotechnology than US consumers. This includes genetic engineering, as
well as supplementing animals with hormones. In the case of beef, the use of hormones has given rise
to a major dispute between the EU and the US. With tuade liberalisation, information on the
(subjective) quality of the products available might become more imperfect. This might bring about
welfare losses, canceling some of the benefits of trade liberarisation.
Focusing on credence goods Bureau, Marette and Schiavina (1998) showed that the effects of tade
liberalisation under imperfect consumer information were ambiguous. The coexistence of imports and
local production can affect the perception of the quality available on the market. Trade liberalisation
may therefore increase the imperfect information of consumers about quality. This may bring about
market inefficiencies linked to adverse selection, such as a decrease in demand, the potential exclusion
of a higher quality from the market, and the risk associated with the existence of multiple equilibria.
The possible welfare losses caused by more imperfect information must be measured against the
welfare gains resulting from increased competition, from international specialisation according to
comparative advantage, and from an increase in product diversity.
information rent, acts as an incentive and prevents low quality producers from signalling their products as high
quality products.
s20
In the hormone-treated beef case, they showed that it is theoretically possible that a wro panel ruling
against a national standard of a particular country affects consumers' behaviour in a way that offsets
some of the benefits of trade liberalisation. Quantitative estimation of the different parameters
involved would be necessary for a conclusive opinion in this particular case. Presently, the only
figures available are very questionable, and a precise quantification of the welfare losses for EU
consumers and producers would require, for example, experimental economics or contingent valuation
techniques. If such cost-benefit analysis techniques showed that lifting the ban on imports of hormone-
treated beef would likely result in a EU welfare loss above the corresponding surplus of US producers,
aggregateworld welfare would decrease. In that case the economic rationale for tade liberalisation on
the basis or codex Alimentarius standards would be questionable.
When trade liberalisation calls into question national regulations whose effect is also to reduce market
inefficiencies, the welfare effects may be analytically ambiguous (Thilmany and Barrett, 1997; Bureau
Marette and Schiavina, 1998). If a 'WTO panel, for example, results in an obligation to import products
that do not satisfu consumers' ethical, environmental or cultural concerns, anti-selection mechanisms
could cause substantial welfare losses. In practice, this could involve consumer boycotts or rejections,
which would affect demand for all the goods concerned, both imported and domestic' Estimating
overall costs and benefits would involve quantiffing the different variations in welfare, raising
awkward technical problems. Nonetheless, it is possible for welfare losses to be greater than welfare
gains at a global level. It would be paradoxical if tade liberalisation, introduced by an intemational
organisation in the framework of the settlement of disputes, were to result in more trade but less
welfare.
12,2.5. An emphasis on welfare analysis
As already mentioned in the introduction, the work undertaken within this part of the project puts
emphasis on welfare analysis, and consequently on the use of cost benefit analysis in order to assess
the legitimacy of public regulations that could act as trade barriers.
The point of view of the researchers involved in this section of the project is that, when cultures differ,
economic analysis might help finding a common playing field. This issue has progressively been
accepted in the area of environmental disputes, and it is progressing, albeit slowly, in the phytosanitary
area, and, to a lesser extent, in the sanitary area. In this part ofthe project, a particular attention was
paid to the possibility of a broader use of economic assessment in food quality regulations as well as in
disputes settlement on non-tariff barriers.
Cost-benefit analysis is already used to enable public authorities to take decisions concerning national
regulations. It is already an important stage in the framing of regulations in the United States. Anow et
al. (1996), recommend that the method should be used systematically, since they observed
szl
considerable differences between the cost of public health measures and their real impact on health
(they give estimates where, within the same agency, the cost per life saved varies between
US$200 000 and US$10 000 000 depending on the program, which means that more lives could be
saved at the same cost to society; see also Magat et al, 1986). Even though society does not accept all
risks in the same way, and even though social choices cannot be reduced to the equalisation of a
statistical cost between programs, cost-benefit analysis should take a more important place.
Box 12.3 describes a few possible techniques in order to infoduce more economic assessment in the
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. There are ôlearly many technical difficulties. Measuring the
benefits procured by regulations designed to guarantee certain subjective aspects ofproduct quality is
not easy, and the problem of the valuation of imagined risks is a difficult one (Pollak, 1995 and 1998).
Estimates of cancer risk from pesticide residues contain a substantial degree of uncertainty as to the
risk, making any economic estimate particularly difficult. Sometimes, it is not possible to calculate the
probability of a risk that is too uncertain, making it difficult to carry out analysis with conventional
tools. This is the case, for example, with the risk of genetically modified organisms propagating genes,
or the risk of long-term epidemics such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or environmental risks.
However, similar problems exist in haditional risk assessment procedures. With an economic
approach, it is possible to use approaches based on the measurement of changes in the consumer utility
function when consumers have access to a product with atfributes to which they are attached (Kopp et
al.,1997).
When human health is at stake, the topic is more sensitive since giving a value to illness avoided or
even a human life saved is not always well accepted, especially in some EU countries. However, it is
lorth noticing that in the same counbies, hansportation and energy departments use such calculation
on a daily basis when they.decide priority investment in road safety or thresholds in dam buildings.
Economic assessment would simply make choices more explicit, although concepts such as "the value
of life" (actually, the value of life saved) can still be shocking for many people (Viscusi, Igg3).
Cost-benefit analysis can be ofparticular interest as far as ethical or cultural values are concerned. If
for example consumers place particular value on the fact that a good is produced without the use of
biotechnology or inadiation techniques, estimating their willingness to pay means that the variation in
consumer satisfaction resulting from a regulation prohibiting the technique in question can be
quantified in money terms (Viscusi et al., 1995; Magat and Viscusi, Lgg3). One application could be
the animal welfare issue, an awkward case where public opinion is being represented by vociferous
consumer lobbies in Europe, and where scientists have proved being of little help. More economic
assessment would make it possible to assess the real importance of this concern tlroughout the entire
population.
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Box 12.3. Methods for Estimating the Benelits of SanitarY 
and Technical Regulations
borne by the consumer.
523
12.3. Defining efficient regulations which minimise welfare costs
Genuine consumer aversion for certain imported products, for sanitary or cultural reasons, is normally
reflected in a willingness to pay in order to buy other goods which satisfu their concerns. Giving this
willingness to pay greater importance in the settlement of disputes, by comparing it with the costs to
other economic agents, would help take account of consumer preferences. This could also help to
prevent deûactors of a more open trading environment from linking trade liberalisation with an
obligation to consume products that do not correspond to consumers'aspirations. More generally, the
design of efficient regulation calls for more economic analysis of the costs and benefits. For example,
regulations that would be based on consumers'information, rather than mandatory practices, could be
more cost effective in some cases. So could regulations that would specifu a target in terms, say of
contamination, rather than an obligation of means, since they would avoid imposing a regulatory
burden on the industry for which a particular sterilization method is more effective than the other.
The principle of equivalence (i.e., the acceptance of different processes and methods if they achieve
the same result) is cenhal in the SPS and TBT agreements. With the ongoing liberalisation of hade,
cost effective domestic regulations will therefore be part of the competitiveness of the domestic
industry' This requires a thorough assessment of the way regulations are designed in the European
Union. The case of food safety is of particular importance, since there are often several ways to ensure
that a product is safe (e.g., pasteurization, irradiation, quality conkol through iFrazard Analysis at
Critical Conhol Points techniques, etc.). There are also several ways to provide producers incentives
to ensure the supply of an adequate level of food safety and quality (e.g., minimum quality standards,
reputation-based mechanisms, liability, etc.). Not all of them have the same cost effectiveness.
Marette, Bureau and Gozlan (2000) explored the economic mechanisms related to the provision of
product safety. They showed that the different types of regulation,, i.€., minimum safety standards,
labels and liability enforcement have different effects on the safety of the products supplied on the
market and on the overall welfare, depending on the information structure. For example, a minimum
safety standard can be an efficient policy instrument and lead to a higher collective welfare than the
one on an unregulated market when consumers detect unsafe products prior to consumption. When
they find out about production safety after consumption, the prospect of future sales provides
incentives for firms to supply safe products. However, market mechanisms can be usefully
complemented by a minimum safety standard or a liability policy when the spontaneous provision of
safety is less than socially optimal because of the high cost of the safety effort.
The particular case where consumers do not detect the safety of the product even after consumption
(or where they only do so after a very long period) is a challenge for regulators. Because of the
absence of verification of their claims in the medium run, sellers have no incentive to implement
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(costly) signals in order to inform consumers of the harmlessness of their products. They can therefore
be imitated by suppliers of unsafe products. Market forces may lead to a less-than optimal provision of
safety, and possibly in the absence of trade à la Akerlof (1970). In such cases' a minimum safety
standard or a label is necessary for making trade possible. This label must however be backed by
certification from a third party able to monitor the effort level. \ilhen effort safety is very costly,
though, market closure may persist.
12.3.1. Voluntary versus mandatory certîftcation
On the question of voluntary versus mandatory certification, Crespi and Marette (2000) find that if
there is more than one seller of a safe product, voluntary certification financed by a per-unit fee is
sufficient, because competition incites all such sellers to certifu their products. If there is only one
seller with safe products, mandatory certification is needed if the cost of certification is high.
Moreover, in this monopoly case a fixed user fee is more efficient than a per-unit fee in improving
welfare. They also considered the case where certification is performed by private organisations. If
there is only a single private agency (e.g., if the government grants an exclusive license) then a
monopoly allocation by this agent results in the imposition of a welfare distorting per-unit user fee.
However, when private certifiers compete to provide certification services, welfare under private
certification is the same as that under public certification'
12.3.2. Is labeting a way to solve market inefftciencies resultingfrom trade libetalîsation?
When confronted to the idea that trade liberalisation might result in more risky, or simply less familiar
product sold on the market, possibly leading to adverse selection, international organisations often
suggest labeling. Indeed, this appears as an interesting solution. Beales et al (1981) have shown that
segmenting the market, and allowing for each group of consumers to buy the products corresponding
to their willingness to p?y, is, in theory, a much better solution than mandatory uniform standards. As
a result, labeling and consumer information policies are often porhayed by international organisations
as preferable altematives to regulation because they are cheaper for producers, leave the choice to
consumers and are less likely to constitute trade barriers (OECD' 1997).
However, in practice, labeling does not solve all problems either. First, labeling is not always possible,
or, when it is, it can be very expensive. The proposals for a strict labeling of Genetically Modified
Organisms (GMOs) in Europe, require complete traceability, that is, that the whole chain be
segpented, from the producer to the final processed product. According to the industry, this would
generate very large costs (a Canadian study into segregating modified wheat products found this
would require separate facilities at 15 different points from farm to market). In addition, pollen is
known for spreading between confrolled and uncontrolled areas (some pollen was found at several
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kilometers in altitude), and the segmentation of the two markets can hardly be perfect. In some other
cases, labeling is simply not the solution that consumers are willing to accept. For example, animal
welfare activists have clearly stated that labeling was not an issue and that they wanted an interdiction
of certain rearing practices.
Another reason why labeling is not the panacea described by some economists, is that the conflicts
about the appropriate level of standards are sometimes simply displaced toward the issue of the
appropriate label, which is equally complex. There are diverging opinions, for example, on the
relevance of labels on clothing certifring low levels of pesticide use in the production of cotton, or on
the specifications for labels certifring that wood products do not harm tropical rainforests. Mutual
recognition of labeling for organically farmed products is diffrcult to achieve because countries apply
the relevant criteria more or less strictly, or because some countries are considering granting such
labels to genetically engineered or irradiated products. Basically, the need for international
harmonisation/recognition of labels and of the underlying certification procedures raises difficulties
that are comparable to the ones raised by the harmonisation/recognition of mandatory standards.
Finally, economic theory suggests that, if agents are rational, a label on credence goods should not be
sustainable. The idea is that rational consumers know that they cannot verifr that producers fill their
commitments, while rational producers have no reason to do so. Labels on credence goods require a
third party certification, and, in spite of that, are not always tusted by consumers. In particular, it is
diffrcult to monitor the production process of imported credence goods, which is the sole means for
acquiring information about their quality. Foreign firms are also less exposed to judicial sanctions
(liability), which may encourage fraud when the consumer is unable to verifu the quality of the good
in question directly.
Crespi and Marette (2001) have provided more insight to the case of labeling. They examined the
effects of GMO labeling. Using a simple, single-period, asymmetric-information model that takes into
account the link between labeling and its cost, they showed that there the impact on welfare of labeling
could vary a lot, depending for example on whether a mandated label reads "Does Contain GMOs" or
"Does Not Contain GMOs". This result shows that a potential hade dispute between the European
Union and the United Sates on the status of GMOs labeling could have complex implications. The
outcome for the two parties would be very different, depending on the sort of label that is used.
Marette and Gozlan (2000) addressed the effect of hade liberalisation and consumers' information on
the qualify and safety of products. Because it increases competition, hade liberalisation may resbict
firms'profit. Such a situation may involve arace to the bottom as far as quality supply is concemed,
when consumers' information on quality is imperfect. This problem arises in particular in the case of
credence goods. This can be a problem in the case of genetically modified products, for example. This
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means that labels or appellations of origin may increase aggregate welfare and therefore should 
not be
considered as non-tariff barriers even though they may sometimes have the effect of discriminating
against imports.
12.4. Anassessment of the us system of food safety regulation and the possible outcome of wTo
disputes
The sanitary and phytosanitary legislation of the united states and the European union differ in many
aspects (see chapter 1l). There have been some disagreements on the legitimacy of such or such
regulation, that could result in obstacles to exports of the other country. such a disagreement turned
into a formal dispute in the case of the use of hormones in the production of beef, but there are also
other disagreements on the use of hormones in dairy production, on hygiene rules in slaughterhouses
(the use of chlorine in poultry in the uS is criticised by the EU), on GMOs, etc'
Doussin and Macé (2000) described the major differences in the EU and US regulatory system that
explains the disagreements between these two trade parfirers. They showed that the divergence was
related to the recognition of the "other legitimate factors" than the sanitary issues in the Codex
Alimentarius, which is illustrated, for example, by the difference of interpretation of the scope of the
precautionary principle. This was part of the dispute on hormone-heated meat, until the Appellate
body of the WTO clarified the scope of this principle, or more exactly of the Article 5'7 of the SPS
agreement that refers to the precaution issue'
Doussin and Macé (2000 et 2001) also provided an extensive description of the US regulatory system.
They show that there are multiple agencies in charge, which could create some confusion for would-be
exporters. As a general feature, the whole US system relies on a "science-based approach", which
explains some of the reluctance of the uS administation to include some other aspects than the
biological quality of food, that Europeans are attached to. However, there is a contradiction in the US
approach, since tone of the provision of the us Food, Drug and cosmetic Act, the "Delaney clause"
acts as a precautionary clause, and is hardly science-based. Since 1958, this piece of the US legislation
forbids the sale offood that contains cancer inducing substances, in particular additives, regardless of
the level and proportion of such substances. This disposition presents some common points with the
precautionary principle, since it relies on a"zero tolerance" concept, in front of the major uncertainty
that resulted from the exposition to such substances in the fifties. This clause is largely inconsistent
with both the ,,sound science" approach of the US legislation, but also with the provisions of the SPS
agreements and Codex rules regarding the "zero risk option"'
Bureau and Doussin (2000) examined the practical effects of the ruling of the wTo panels on sanitary
and phytosanitary issues. Arbitration of recent SPS disputes clarified the right of a country to set a
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particular level of protection, as well as the role of international standards. Building on the recent
jurisprudence of the disputes settled under the WTO, they explained the practical scope of the SpS and
TBT agreements. They presented the way possible disputes between the EU and the US could be
handled by the WTO Dispute settlement body, and what would be the empirical consequences for
hade. They focused on three examples: the Bovine somatohopin (Bst) issue, the controversy on
mandatory pasteurization of cheese, and the definition and labeling of yogurts.
Their analysis of the possible outcome of a dispute under the WTO regarding Bst suggests that the
European Union could have solid arguments for justifuing the ban on Bst. tto A large body of analysis
has been carried out on potential dangers of using Bst, but the results are highly confroversial (Morris,
1999). Critics of the hormone suggest that both Bst and its mediator, Insulin-like Growth Factor 1
(IGF-I), are found at higher concentrations in milk from treated cows. Canadian researchers
concluded that long-term toxicity and oral absorption had not been fully studied and that possible
hypersensitivity reaction "deseryes further study" (Health Canada, 1999). Rejection of Bst by Canada
and by several national EU veterinary committees was also based on reports of adverse effects for
cows, including lameness, mastitis, and reduced lifespan. The US Food and Drug Adminisffation and
most other agencies interpret the data differently. For example, the Joint FAOAMHO Expert
Committee on Food Additives concluded that Bst "does not represent ahazard to human health". The
hormones Appellate body decision suggests that precautionary measures could be legitimate where
there is scientific controversy, provided that some serious risk analysis had been performed.
The outcome of a potential challenge of restrictions to imports of raw milk cheese by the EU would be
uncertain. The United States restrictions could be seen as lacking consistency, since a number of
States permit the production and marketing of such products. On the basis of the ruling of the
Appellate body in salmon, one might consider that there is a violation of the SPS provisions about
consistency of the regulation. However, according to the SPS Agreement (Art 4.1.), the EU would
have first to demonshate that the European system of risk management makes it possible to reach the
level of consumers' protection deemed appropriate by the United States. The US could challenge this
demonstration on the basis of scientific arguments by referring to the large body of scientific research
made in universities and agencies on this topic.
Since the beginning of the century, yogurts in most western European countries have contained live
ferments. In the 1980s, several other countries have started to sell post-thermized (i.e., sterilized)
yogurts, resulting in much lower logistic costs along the food chain since refrigeration is no longer
r50 Note however that the disagreement between the EU and the US within the Codex alimentarius has never
resulted in a folnal dispute, one of the reason is that the EU, while banning use of Bst, does not ban imports of
products obtained by using Bst in other countries.
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necessary. In the EU the use of the term yogurt is restricted to those product that contained "a large
amount,, of well-defined lactic bacteria. The European Court of Justice ruled that free circulation
across Member states of products denominated as yogurt could only be granted to those that
conformed to this definition. Given the economic interests at stake, such decisions about the definition
of products are of considerable importance. Codex standards are important also under the TBT
Agreement, which deals with conditioning, packaging and composition. GATT panel decisions have
established the general principle that intemational rules do not permit WTO members to restrict the
imports of products on the basis of how they are produced. The TBT Agreement limits the scope of
this principle by accounting for Processes and Production Methods (PPM), but the degree in which
measures referring to ppM can be legitimate remains under debate. National measures based on PPM
are more likely to be admitted if the production method clearly affects the quality of the product. That
is, there is a need for scientific research that highlights the nutritional aspects of the products, if a
country wants to protect a particular ûadition or know-how'
12.5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
12.5.L New critetîafor deJining trade barrters
As traditional barriers to trade come down, regulatory reform has become a more important trade issue
(OECD, l99g). The SpS and TBT Agreements have provided significant momentum towards the use
of international standards. Increased notification requirements for both TBT and SPS regulations and
the desire to avoid WTO dispute settlement procedures should make countries more aware of and
careful about the international impacts of their regulations aimed at protecting human, animal or plant
health. A number of disputes involving several OECD countries have already been brought before the
WTo since the dispute settlement procedure was established in 1995. With the strengthening of
international rules, globalisation of the food industryo increased tade in consumer food products and
the growing use of biotechnology, trade conflicts over food regulatory issues and their reform are
likely to become more cornmon. The economic stakes are high and such disputes are likely to remain a
priority in the futrne hade agenda.
There are many arguments for trade liberalisation, and most of them remain unchallenged by recent
developments in economic theory relating to differentiated products. Country specialisation according
to comparative advantage leads to lower real prices and hence, for a given level of expenditure, allows
the possibility of consuming the same amount but a higher quality of products (vertical
differentiation). In other cases, trade liberalisation reduces the cost of the consumer's preferred basket
(horizontal differentiotion). Counhies can take advantage of growing economies of scale when
markets are opened up, this in tum reduces production costs at constant quality. The increased
competition resulting from trade liberalisation encourages firms to offer a better quality/price mix. In
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addition, intemational tade increases product variety, and freedom to choose generally has a
beneficial effect on consumer welfare, since welfare suffers when regulatory barriers prevent
consumers from gaining access to higher quality foreign products. International tade also favours the
rapid spread oftechnology, stepping up the pace oftechnological progress, which in tum favours an
increase in product quality at constant prices.
However, the beneficial effects of tade liberalisation may be attenuated by spontaneous market
inefficiencies. This falls in the general category of cases particularly well described by Stiglitz (1994)
where incomplete markets (including incomplete markets for risk), non convexities and imperfect
information limit the scope of the central welfare theorem, which are implicit in the standard
legitimisation of trade liberalisation. In such cases, government intervention can be modified in order
to avoid negative effects and to maximise the gains from trade.
12.5.2. Lessonsfor the WTO dispute settlement
A conclusion of the work presented in this chapter is that the dispute settlement in the area of sanitary
and technical barriers should rely on economic analysis to a much larger extent than it is presently the
case. Presently, the SPS Agreement does not require any cost-benefit analysis when a country adopts a
sanitary measure. Should a country be able to prove that there is a risk of dissemination of a pathogen,
and even if the risk level were small, the economic consequence of dissemination negligible, and the
economic costs of the ban considerable, the ban would be legitimate. On the other hand, the SpS
framework does not allow trade restrictions when there is no evidence of rislç even if trade
liberalisation should lead to very costly market failures, because of imperfect information, for
example.
In international disputes, cost-benefit analysis could be a way to define the legitimacy of technical
barriers and national regulations that affect hade. Baldwin's criterion states that a NTB should be
defined as a measure that reduces the potential world income, rather than a measure that restricts tade
flows (Baldwin, 1970). In spite of some shortcomings, such a criterion could be a basis for dispute
settlement, as proposed by Mahé (1997. r5r The impact of regulatory measures on the aggregate
welfare should be taken into account in disputes under the SPS and TBT agreements. The research
developed in the case of hormone-treated beef shows that costs and benefits of regulations depend on
lsl The Baldwin criterion relies on a Kaldor conpensation test whose practical usefulness as well as ethical
foundations are contoversial. In international hade negotiations, the criterion that a situation B should be
preferred to a situation A because, when one shifts from A to B, the gains for some agents in A are larger than
the losses for other agents is not likely to lead to unanimous decisions, unless compeniation is actually liven to
the losers.
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costs of production, consumers' aversion to the product, and the cost of informing consumers' This
suggests that the welfare effect of trade liberalisation may differ according to each particular issue'
The overall welfare effect of consumers' aversion in the case of hormone-treated meat, may be very
different from the one, say, in the case of genetically modified grains.
A more systematic economic analysis of the rationale for regulations and deregulations would improve
the recording of consumers' expectations in the wTo dispute settlement procedure. Consumers'beliefs
on what constitutes this quality may differ from scientific concepts. However, if consumers have
genuine preferences for characteristics of the products that are not based on science, i'e', if these
characteristics affect their utility, there is no particular reason for restricting the many dimensions of
qualrty to a single atfribute, i.e., respect of Codex Alimentarius standards on food safety' In
intemational negotiations involving food qualiff, the measuring of willingness to pay may be a way to
give a proper weight to cultural or ethical characteristics which consumers are genuinely attached to'
Relying on welfare economics is not necessarily more subjective nor questionable than relying only on
',sound science,,, which is often mandated or negotiated science (Salter, 1988; Powell, 1997). Since
well designed cost-benefit analysis takes consumers'preferences into account, including it more often
in the analysis may help improve the image of the word "globalisation" in public opinion, and may
prevent consumers from associating trade liberalisation with the foisting on them of unwanted foods'
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